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This thesis analyses Spanish nation-building from a social-constructionist perspective 
assuming that nations are historically evolving social constructs and that nationhood is a 
largely modern phenomenon with pre-modern antecedents. A theoretical model for studying 
nationhood is proposed based on a critique of nationalism theories, Giddens’s social 
structuration model (Giddens 1984) refined by Sewell (2005); modernisation theories and 
discourse analytical approaches. A discourse-oriented methodology is proposed: Spanish 
nation-building, conceptualised as semiotically-mediated social action situated across 
time-space, is analysed nomothetically and ideographically, both in its broad historical 
context and in connection with recent narratives extracted from a large purpose-built corpus 
of newspaper articles. Several factors behind Spain’s problematic nation-building are 
identified in the socio-historical analysis: an unyielding geography inhibiting 
communications, a long history of political and cultural fragmentation, a late and uneven 
modernisation and the lack of hegemonic national narratives in the context of a long history 
of confrontation between different identities. The corpus-based discourse analytical approach 
employed in the latter part of the analysis illustrates the potential offered by corpus-assisted 
discourse studies in social research, revealing that a widely-accepted Spanish identity 
discourse from the centre’s perspective has not yet emerged. 
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Nationhood has long been a controversial issue in Spain. Spain’s national configuration and 
State model are divisive issues among political parties and citizen groups, especially in 
Catalonia and the Basque Country. Linz (1973 p. 99) illustrates the situation well: “Spain 
today is a State for all Spaniards, a Nation-State for a large part of the population and only a 
State but not a nation for important minorities.” The solution proposed in the 1978 
Constitution of a State composed of “nationalities and regions with their own personality” 
has not brought the debate to an end (Aja, 1999; Sosa Wagner & Sosa Mayor, 2006). Spain 
has become a highly de-centralized country divided into seventeen autonomous communities, 
each with its own parliament, government and administration, and enjoying ample financial 
autonomy. However, growing federalization has not tempered nationalist demands on the 
periphery for home-rule nor satisfied an increasingly anxious and distrustful Spanish 
nationalism. On the contrary the support for Catalan and Basque nationhood has grown 
(García Ferrando et al, 1994) while recent developments, such as the controversy 
surrounding the reform of the Catalan Statute, the solid nationalist majorities in regional 
elections in 2012 and the plans for a referendum on Catalan self-determination are being met 
with growing calls for re-centralization coming from “Madrid” (Del Pino, 2013).1 All this 
should be placed in the broader context of globalisation revealing the inadequacy of the 
current Nation-State system (Bell, 1987; Castells, 2000a; Bottery, 2003), substantial changes 
in the composition of Spain’s population in recent years due to immigration (Balfour & 
                                                 
1
 An example of this trend is the manifesto of “Foro de la Sociedad Civil” advocating a unitary Spain and the 
abolition of the autonomies.  
www.abc.es/espana/20130123/abci-foro-sociedad-civil-estado-201301212221.html (retrieved on 23-1-13). 
Another example is the growing support for a centralized State outside Catalonia and the Basque Country. 
http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2013/05/03/actualidad/1367606811_475357.html (retrieved on 4-5-13). 
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Quiroga, 2007) and a prolonged and virulent economic crisis which may destabilise Spanish 
society and trigger significant changes in how Spain is conceived (Juliana Ricart, 2012). 
 
Despite extensive research across various disciplines, the concept of nation has proven 
exceedingly difficult to pin down. The lack of an all-encompassing theory capable of 
explaining the various national manifestations and the phenomenon of nationalism and its 
causes continues to obscure the debate (Balfour & Quiroga, 2007). In the Spanish case, the 
focus has usually been on analysing nationalism on the periphery and its relationship with 
the State while Spanish nationalism and Spain’s problematic nation-building have been 
largely overlooked (De Riquer i Permanyer, 2001). Assuming that nations are not external 
realities independent of human experience and that their existence is contingent upon human 
intervention, this thesis examines Spanish nation-building employing a theoretical model 
interdisciplinary in nature and largely based on the social constructivist paradigm, which 
conceives nations as discursive constructs: the product of semiotically-mediated social 
practices situated across time and space operating simultaneously at various scalar levels. 
Such a model addresses the protean complexity of nation-building by combining the 
nomothetic analysis of social structures and processes over the longue durée with the 
ideographic study of concrete social practices at specific points in time-space.  
 
Due to space limitations, the focus is on Spanish nation-building from the perspective of the 
centre. The first two chapters are theoretical. Chapter 1 reviews the literature on nationalism 
and nation-building. Based on these insights, a theoretical model for studying the discursive 
construction of the Spanish nation is proposed in chapter 2. In chapter 3, this discursive 
construction is placed in its broad historical dimension. I explain how a complex geography 
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and a long history of political and cultural fragmentation marked the expansion of the State 
and the development of the national mode of organization prior to the emergence of a 
Spanish nationalist project. Then I analyse how the attempts to build a politically and 





were hindered by a weak State not fully capable of nationalizing the masses in the context of 
Spain’s complex transition from world empire into territorial nation, a prolonged political 
and economic crisis and a late and uneven modernisation.  
 
Chapters 4 and 5 discuss recent national narratives extracted from a large corpus of 
newspaper texts. These narratives can be considered part of the “discursive re-invention” of 
Spanish identity after Francoism, “trying to reconcile traditional narratives based on myths of 
common origin and continuity with a rapidly changing social, economic, and political 
environment where they have less and less meaning” (Balfour & Quiroga 2007, p. 6). 
Corpus-based discourse analysis employing corpus linguistics techniques is introduced as a 
valid alternative for social research. It is shown how this method can provide a much-needed 
quantitative dimension for empirically-based social research enhancing the representativity 
of the data and minimising the bias in our analysis. In view of Spain’s complex historical 
evolution and the present state of affairs, conclusions on how the discursive construction of 
the nation may evolve, shortcomings of the present study and areas for further research are 










This chapter critically reviews the various theories of the nation and nationalism which have 
dominated the academic debate. The study of nationhood has been characterized by lengthy 
disputes between competing paradigms, with entrenched positions that have often threatened 
to bring the discussion into deadlock. These disputes have prevented the formulation of an 
all-encompassing theory of the nation and nationalism, colouring the debate with complexity 
and protean elusiveness, partly rooted in the tensions between the particular and universal 
aspects of such theory (Finlayson, 1998). In view of these obstacles, the aim of this chapter is 
to identify the strengths and weaknesses in the different theories before proposing a 
methodology for researching the concepts of nation and nationalism in the context of 
contemporary Spain in chapter 2. No methodology can be put forward without some prior 
understanding of the object of study. Therefore, this chapter discusses the ontological nature 
and the origins of “the nation” and outlines possible directions for research.  
 
1.1. On the nature, origins and antiquity of nations 
We have lived in a national world for a long time and yet the concept of nation has proved 
exceedingly difficult to grasp. There is an ample body of literature dealing with theories of 
the nation and nationalism coming from a variety of disciplines: political science, geography, 
international relations, law, cultural anthropology, social psychology, political philosophy, 
sociology, history, etc. Yet, as Treanor (1997) argues, this plurality has not led to greater 
theoretical innovation as a result of a considerable overlap and duplication of concepts by 
theories developed within the narrow limits of the different fields. Let us leave aside some 
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theories which do not treat the phenomenon holistically, such as those looking at nationalism 
as a form of political extremism (Connor, 1994; Mudde, 1996), as a kind of substitute 
religion (Gentile, 1996; 2006) or in connection to gender (Enloe, 2000; Yuval-Davis, 1997). 
If we concentrate on more all-encompassing theoretical stands, we are left with three 
fundamental paradigm debates, as identified by Smith (2000): 
 
a. The nature and origin of the nation and nationalism. 
b. The antiquity or modernity of nations. 
c. The role of nations and nationalism in historical and especially recent social change. 
 
Depending on the viewpoints adopted in relation to these issues, Smith distinguishes four 
parameters of understanding of nations: primordialist, perennialist, modernist and 
ethnosymbolic. A fifth theoretical paradigm, “Post-Modernism” or “Social-Constructionism”, 
could be added to this list, given the fact that Smith identifies this position in his works and 
dedicates ample space to criticising it. Yet, Smith considers that such an account “remains 
too fragmentary and sketchy as yet to merit the designation of ‘paradigm’” (Smith 2001, p. 
57) and so he treats it as a variant of the modernist paradigm. Day and Thompson (2004) on 
the other hand distinguish between “classical” and “post-classical” theoretical approaches to 
the nation and nationalism. The former would include the four paradigms identified by Smith 
while the post-classical label refers to those approaches influenced by social constructionism. 
These post-modern approaches are also characterized by being less concerned with the 
longue durée and with grand theories, favouring socially situated forms of theorizing which 




Having once been the preferred paradigms, Primordialism and Perennialism have been 
abandoned in favour of modernist tenets now dominating the debate. Yet, despite their 
decreasing popularity in academic circles, primordialist and perennialist views are commonly 
found in the discourses of the media and the citizenry. Some authors prefer to see 
Ethnosymbolism as an emerging paradigm while others argue that it is a reformulation of the 
perennialist views (Hearn, 2006). Smith favours a sharp distinction between Primordialism 
and Perennialism on the basis that the former “stands outside historical time, being coeval 
with humanity” (Smith, 2004, p. 5). In view of this, I propose to place these parameters along 
a continuum delimited by two poles: so called “given-ness” and “invented-ness”, as 








Primordialism Perennialism  Ethnosymbolism  Modernism       Social- Constructionism 
 
 
Main theoretical paradigms on the nature of nations and nationalism 
 
“Given-ness” refers to the extent to which theories take the existence of nations either as 
natural objective phenomena predating history (Primordialism) or as ancient historical 
artefacts (Perennialism). Despite their ontological differences, Primordialism and 
Perennialism share some common traits in that they see nations as ‘cultural givens of social 
existence’ (Geertz, 1973). In both cases one is necessarily born into a nation and it has been 
that way for at least as long as there are historical records. “Invented-ness”, on the other hand, 
would pertain to those theories claiming that nations are not only human creations, but also 
recent ones: nations are seen as products of modernity, whichever way this is defined. While 
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social constructionists share the modernist idea of the nation being recently created, they 
emphasize the study of nationalism as a form of discourse. This discursive approach has led 
some authors to questioning the objective reality of the nation and nationalism, placing this 
theoretical strand at the far end of the invented-ness scale. Smith (1986; 2000) argues that 
Ethnosymbolism does not dispute the modernist claim that nations are not to be understood 
as objective external realities. However, ethnosymbolists tend to tone down the idea of 
nations being radically modern, suggesting that while Nation-States may well be modern 
creations, they have pre-modern antecedents.  
 
The next sections review the main tenets posited by these theories followed by a critique of 
their theoretical validity and methodological adequacy as far as the study of the nation and 
nationalism is concerned.  
 
 1.2. Primordialism 
Primordialism proclaims that nations are essentially organic and whole, belonging to the 
state of nature rather than being human creations. This is basically an organicist concept of 
the nation as opposed to a voluntarist one: “one is born into a nation and is indelibly stamped 
with its character and genius for life” (Smith, 2000, p. 6). The epistemological distinction 
between “brute facts” and “social” or “institutional facts” may prove useful here (Searle, 
1969; 1995; Lakoff, 1987; Stubbs, 1996). Based on the premise that reality does not depend 
on external facts but can also be socially constructed, Searle (1995) proposes a classification 
of objective facts into two main categories: On the one hand, there are so-called “brute facts” 
which exist independently of human experience. Examples of brute facts are mathematical 
theorems, or the notion that the earth revolves around the sun. On the other hand, Searle (ibid) 
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identifies other type of facts, “social or institutional facts” that rely on human thought for 
their existence. For instance, the fact that Spain is a constitutional monarchy belongs to this 
category. 
 
Primordialist definitions are at the root of nationalist ideology. Their premises are that: 
(i) Nations are brute facts which can be defined in terms of seemingly objective external 
categories such as culture, ethnicity, religion, a common language, shared history and 
heritage.  
(ii) Cultural boundaries should coincide with political ones. In other words, each cultural unit 
aspires to having its Nation-State. 
 
Despite its flaws, one should recognize some value in Primordialism, rooted in what Geertz 
(1973, 2000) calls ‘the givens of human existence’. Culture, for instance, is one of these 
givens. One cannot deny that humans are naturally social creatures and that this intrinsic 
need for socialization results in the formation of cultural groups across space and time. 
Furthermore, as Guibernau argues: 
 
A common culture favours the creation of solidarity bonds among the members of a 
given community and allows them to imagine the community they belong to as separate 
and distinct from others (Guibernau, 2001 p. 79).  
 
However, one should not conflate this universal need to belong with the actual realizations of 
this cultural imperative, which are contingent and transient. A look at the world around us in 
connection with the primordialist premises presented above reveals that it is not possible 
fully to explain nations by simply using categories such as the ones mentioned above (Kohn, 
1944; Hayes, 1960; Nairn, 1977; Carretero y Jiménez, 1977), nor does it seem clear why 
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Nation-States should be understood as culturally homogeneous entities. First of all, 
categories such as culture, language, ethnicity or shared history are problematic for a number 
of reasons: they are “fuzzy, shifting and ambiguous, and as useless for purposes of the 
traveller’s orientation as cloud-shapes are compared to landmarks” (Hobsbawm, 1990, p. 6). 
So, when linguistic, historical and cultural differences are put forward in support of a 
particular political agenda, controversy naturally arises.  
 
Let us illustrate this fuzziness by examining examples extracted from the Spanish context. 
These tend to be based on ethno-linguistic criteria given the decline in importance of markers 
like religion or race, formerly the defining feature of Basqueness in the theories of Basque 
nationalism (Arana, 1965; Laínz, 2004). If one analyses the concept of Països Catalans, this 
notion seems to be constructed on the basis of language, culture, politics and history to a 
lesser extent. Advocates of this term consider part of the Països Catalans all the territories 
where Catalan is the indigenous language, including the former Principality of Catalonia, 
that is, the current Spanish Autonomous Community of Catalonia plus Northern Catalonia - 
now in France-, the Autonomous Communities of Valencia and Balearic Islands, the territory 
of La Franja, currently belonging to Aragon and Andorra. Catalanist aspirations are regularly 
echoed in the discourse of the Catalan Government and the nationalist organisations in 
atlases, weather reports, calendars, etc.
2
This is something that many Valencians reject as 
“Catalan imperialism” and has led to antagonistic identity narratives.3 Figure 1.2 illustrates 
some of these differences:  
                                                 
2
 See for instance the culturcat website: http://www20.gencat.cat/portal/site/culturacatalana (retrieved on 
16-10-2012). 
3
 For instance, Valencian major Rita Barberá has recently argued that Catalonia systematically tries to 
Catalanise Valencian people although the latter have resisted that: 
www.abc.es/20121016/local-comunidad-valenciana/abci-catalanizacion-valencia-201210161305.html 
(retrieved on 16-10-2012).  
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Conflicting identity discourses: “Països Catalans” or “Catalan imperialism”? 
 
In view of this, one wonders who is right and who is wrong in this dispute about what 
constitutes ‘a Catalan’. Are Valencians part of the Catalan people or do they constitute a 
separate one? When examining the arguments coming from both sides, one can see how 
organicist conceptions based on culture, language and ethnicity are not as straight forward as 
nationalists claim: Where do we draw the line between Catalan or Valencian cultures? Are 
Valencian and Catalan the same language? If so, is Valencian a dialect of Catalan? One 
cannot deny the close relationship between the linguistic varieties spoken in the territories we 
call “Catalonia and Valencia” (Moreno Fernández, 2005). They all constitute varieties 
derived from Latin that share a similar linguistic substratum. So similar, in fact, that to a 
great extent they are mutually intelligible. Extent appears to be the key in this discussion: 
One can certainly speak of a close relationship between the “Catalan” varieties spoken within 
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the present-day Catalan territory, or the different fablas in Valencia. But to a certain extent, 
we can also speak of some relationship between Valencian, Catalan and other varieties 
commonly ascribed to other Romance languages such as Castilian or French. After all, are 
not these also mutually intelligible, albeit to a lesser extent? Clearly the problem comes from 
the fact that there are no universally recognized criteria in distinguishing languages from 
dialects. 
 
This issue is further complicated by the fact that cultural and linguistic categories should not 
be treated aprioristically, due to the ample evidence of direct intervention by elite groups in 
conforming them. A look at how languages evolve reveals that what we understand by 
Catalan, Euskera or Castilian is not the product of random and independent linguistic 
evolution but largely the result of the standardisation policies of government agencies and 
cultural elites. So much so that one may argue that rather than being part of the nature of 
things, languages and cultures are largely artificial creations used to help construct historical 
formations such as nations, classes, genders and races (Crowley, 1996). Batua, the chosen 
standard for Euskera, is a good case in point. Given its recent, and therefore easily traceable 
history, one cannot deny the fact that Batua did not have any speaker until it became the 
sanctioned standard variety in the mid-1970s. From then on, it began to be increasingly used 
in the media, the administration as well as at schools in spite of the protests by its detractors, 





The case of a community defined in terms of shared history is equally problematic because it 
                                                 
4
 Basque purists such as Oskillaso and Múgica argued that an invented language would end up killing the 
authentic Basque dialects (see www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Batua) (retrieved on 8-10-2012). 
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is also difficult to draw the line between history as a more or less objective narrative of 
shared past and history as a tool utilised by the State in reinforcing national identity (Álvarez 
Junco, 2001). The work “La construcción de las historias de España” (García Cárcel, 
2004b), which provides an overview of the evolution of historical narratives in Spain since 
the 16
th
 century, constitutes proof of the difficulties one encounters in trying to produce an 
objective national history. Similar evidence comes from the various historical narratives in 
the Spain of the autonomies which are being employed as ideological tools in alternative 
projects for the political organization of Spain (ibid).  
 
All this evidence indicates that the cultural elements identified by nationalist ideologues are 
not part of the nature of things, nor do they seem easy to define. Our final argument against 
Primordialism questions the second premise formulated before, namely that of nations being 
culturally homogeneous entities. In fact, a cursory look at our world reveals that culturally, 
ethnically and linguistically homogeneous Nation-States have constituted the exception 
rather than the norm (Hall, 1996): if we were to define a nation as a “stable community of 
individuals of a same ethnic group who share the same language and/or a same religion 
and/or a same culture”, then how do we explain the existence of multi-ethnic and 
multi-cultural nations such as the United States of America? Or how do we explain nations 
as small as Switzerland, which have four official languages as well as a variety of religious 
traditions. What to say about nations such as India or China, which constitute a mosaic of 
languages, ethnic groups, cultures and religions? 
 
History also shows that national realities are far from being the immutable and eternal 
entities nationalists portray. In fact, Nation-States may rise, grow, evolve, split and disappear. 
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A look at the map of Europe over the last 200 years confirms the contingent nature of nations. 
How many Nation-States universally recognised by international treaties have split or have 
joined others to form new national bodies? The fact that the idea of Spain is being questioned 
by many Basques and Catalans but also accepted by equally significant portions of these 
societies demonstrates that nations cannot be simply treated as “brute facts”, definable in 
terms of allegedly objective markers like language, culture, history, religion or ethnicity. On 
the contrary, nations are best understood as “social facts”; that is, as human constructs that 
have no independent existence outside human experience.  
 
Undoubtedly, such constructs cannot be built out of nothing. Markers such as the ones 
mentioned will constitute some of the building blocks of these national constructs. But these 
are not given facts of nature, as primordialists claim, but assumed givens that “rest on 
perception, cognition and belief” (Smith 2000, p. 21). They belong to the realm of ideology, 
belief and even desire and are perhaps best explained in terms of national identity. This 
synthesis is well captured in Kohn’s distinction between an organicist conception of the 
nation and a voluntarist one (Kohn, 1944), where rather than being born into a nation and 
being indelibly stamped by its character, one chooses to belong to one and re-affirms this 
pledge in what Renan (1954) termed as a daily plebiscite in his often-cited address.  
  
In conclusion, the analysis of the ontological nature of nations indicates that contrary to the 
primordialist premises, nations are best understood as social facts because they cannot be 
conceived independently of human experience. Primordialism may be appealing to 
nationalists and readily accepted by people because its conception of the nation rests on 
universals like descent, identity, culture or territoriality common to all humankind. But when 
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it comes to explaining the origins of specific nations, Primordialism proves “to have either a 
flawed theory or none and little or no history, being reductionist (socio-biology) or largely 
speculative or ahistorical (cultural Primordialism)” (Smith, 2001 p. 61). So, if nations are 
human constructs, it remains to be seen when and how these were created. This is the main 
bone of contention among the other theoretical paradigms of nationalism identified by Smith. 
 
 1.3. Perennialism 
Perennialist theorists attenuate the claims of Primordialism by granting that nations may not 
be part of the state of nature nor be inherent to the human condition. Yet, perennialists 
believe that nations are as old as history. They may concede that nationalism, understood as 
the deliberate movement to awaken nations, could be a recent phenomenon. But the nation 
itself is something immemorial (Smith, 2000). Accordingly, nations are not necessarily the 
product of nationalism but already existed before this ideology emerged in modern societies. 
Smith distinguishes between two versions of Perennialism. There is “recurrent Perennialism”, 
where nations are considered “a recurrent, but not necessarily a continuous phenomenon 
throughout history” (Smith, 2004, p. 9). These are the views advocated by Armstrong (1982) 
in Nations before Nationalism, which “portrays the nation as a recurrent form of community, 
with particular nations emerging and disappearing in every period of history” (Smith, 2004, p. 
9). Although Armstrong admits that modern Nation-States may differ from their pre-modern 
counterparts due to the influence nationalism exerts on the former, for him there are no 
fundamental differences between modern nations and pre-modern ones. In both cases, Smith 
argues, Armstrong sees ethnicity, “the cluster of shared sentiments, attitudes and perceptions 
of ethnic groups, and the myths, symbols and codes that guard their borders as the cement 




Another kind of perennialist approach identified by Smith is “continuous Perennialism”. This 
is a historicist view that emphasizes some kind of continuity between modern Nation-States 
and their medieval precursors. The advocates of continuous Perennialism see the nation as a 
historical construct, as the result of evolution over the longue durée rather than just as a 
product of modernity. The question of evolution versus creation has been at the crux of the 
debate between modernists and perennialists, for instance, in the discussion between Gellner 
and Smith on the issue of whether nations have navels or not (Gellner 1996, Smith 1996). 
Perennialists conceptualise the nation in evolutionary terms whereas modernists opt for 
creationism. Somewhere in between are the ethnosymbolist views advocated by Smith, as we 
shall see later. In their evolutionary account of the formation of nations, Perennialism 
emphasizes historical detail as well as the importance of cultural factors like religion, 
language, myth, custom, art and historical memory, rather than political, social or economic 
factors, preferred by Modernism. 
 
In the Spanish context, the works of philosophers Bueno (2005) and Marías (1985) as well as 
some initiatives promoted by scholars under the auspices of Spain’s Real Academia de la 
Historia represent these views. Bueno’s thesis is that Spain and the Spanish nation are not 
myths or post-modern illusions, as peripheral nationalists argue. While acknowledging the 
emergence of Spain as a political nation centred in the idea of sovereignty which dates back 
to the Constitution of Cádiz in 1812, Bueno defends that the Spanish nation predates the 
modern Nation-State and can be found in its existence as a historical reality. Similarly, 
Marías core argument is what he calls “razón histórica” where the Spanish nation is 
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conceived as historical project gradually built, layer after layer, as a result of a vast process 
of incorporation.  
 
The position of historian García Cárcel (2002) could also be considered perennialist with 
some caveats. He acknowledges the significance of concepts such as “the invention of 
tradition” as a powerful tool often used by nationalist ideologies in nation-building. Yet, he 
argues that the idea of invented traditions has often been abused by scholars holding a view 
of history that is excessively biased towards the contemporary which ultimately has brought 
along a certain degree of distortion to what he calls “historical reality”. Ultimately García 
Cárcel aligns with Américo Castro’s thesis that Spain as a nation is the product of a long and 
complex historical evolution rather than a modern invention (Castro, 1954):  
Para comprender la problemática de la articulación nacional hay que remontarse más 
allá del presente escenario en que se han instalado las supuestas <<invenciones>>de 
la nación española, el siglo XIX: No creemos que pueda hablarse de la 
nacionalización española como un fenómeno característico del siglo XIX preparado 
por el Estado en colaboración con unas élites y que presuntamente se impone a una 




Personalmente estoy tan en contra del esencialismo de la España eterna como de la 
invención de una España como artificio del Estado liberal del siglo XIX. Considero, 
como Américo Castro, que España es una realidad histórica larga en el tiempo y de 




Perennialist accounts may be rich in historical detail but often lack theoretical acumen in that 
they fail to explain how and why nation-building actually takes place. Advocates of 
Modernism have warned us of the dangers associated with having history as practically the 
                                                 
5
 In order to understand the problem of national articulation one should go beyond the current scenario in 
which the so-called inventions of the Spanish nation have taken root, namely the 19
th
 century: We do not 
believe in the idea of Spanish nationalisation as a typical 19
th
 century phenomenon orchestrated by the State in 
collaboration with some elites that is imposed on a society apparently lacking an identity. 
6
 Personally I am as much against the essentialist idea of an eternal Spain as against the invention of Spain by 
the liberal State in the 19
th
 century. Like Américo Castro, I consider that Spain is a lengthy historical reality, the 
result of a complex evolution. 
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sole argument in support of the existence of nations. There is the risk of falling into a similar 
tautological pitfall as Primordialism by taking for granted the given-ness of the nation on the 
basis of historical narratives which are repeated like mantras. Going back to the Spanish case, 
we can see how some authors employ evidence extracted from old chronicles, literary texts 
and other historical documents to support their claims of a Spanish nation predating modern 
times: Suárez Fernández (2000; 2005) points to the days of Hispania as Roman province and 
suggests the existence of a certain idea of Spain gradually evolving ever since. He uses 
abundant documentary evidence dating back to the medieval period in support of his main 
thesis: that in spite of their political fragmentation, the Christian kingdoms in Medieval 
Spain identified themselves with a primeval Hispania, lost after the Moorish invasion and 
happily recovered as a result of the on-going Reconquista, where Roman ius, a certain degree 
of linguistic uniformity and Christian heritage appeared fused.  
 
In a similar and yet more cautious line, García Cárcel speaks of Hispania Romana, at least in 
the beginning, as having no identity other than the one derived from its geographical and 
administrative nature. Yet, he argues, one does not need to wait for the 19
th
 century to realize 
that this geographical space recurrently identified as such in Spanish history is being 
gradually filled with political and cultural content. Unlike Suárez Fernández, he sounds more 
ambiguous on the issue of Visigoth Spain having a more or less defined Spanish identity. 
While he acknowledges the recurrent image of a glorious Visigoth Spain being evoked 
during the Reconquista, he gives more weight to the fragmented political nature of Spain at 
the time: 
El sueño de aquel pasado glorioso visigodo, que intermitentemente sale a la 
superficie a lo largo de la Reconquista, fue sin duda un estímulo de cara a la 
colaboración de los reinos cristianos frente al enemigo musulmán. Pero posiblemente 
fue más un producto del imaginario interesado que un ejercicio de la memoria 
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García Cárcel agrees however with Suárez Fernández on the fact that the neighbouring 
European powers did tend to perceive Spain in more unified terms than the “Spaniards” 
themselves: 
La pluralidad española fue interpretada en términos de singularidad siempre desde 




In this regard, he echoes Suárez Fernández’s references to the Spanish nation in various 
Flemish commercial documents from the 14
th
 century and even more importantly, the fact 
that the kingdoms of Portugal, Castile, Navarre and Aragon agreed to appear united under 
the term “Spanish nation” and share a single vote in the Council of Constanza in 1415 
(Suárez Fernández, 2000). Both authors also agree on how important the matrimonial 
alliances between the different kingdoms became in cementing a sense of national unity 
based on the dynastic principle: 
 
Los linajes reinantes fundían su sangre hasta un punto tal que, llegado un 
determinado momento, se entendió que una sola dinastía reinaba en toda España 




Yet, García Cárcel draws a fine distinction between the territorial unity finally achieved 
under the Catholic Monarchs and the idea of “national unity”, as the following quote shows: 
La España de los Reyes Católicos estaría marcada por la conciencia de que los reinos 
de España tenían ahora un gobierno único, de que existía la <<monarquía de 
España>>. Ese sentido unitarista político- que desde luego nunca puede adquirir el 
                                                 
7
 The dream of a glorious Visigoth past emerging from time to time throughout the Reconquista undoubtedly 
constituted a stimulus against the Muslim enemy. But this was perhaps the product of ideological interest rather 
than an exercise of rational memory. The plurality of the various kingdoms was what really counted. 
8
 The Spanish plurality was always interpreted as singularity from the outside. 
9




rango de unidad nacional- tuvo ilustres representantes en la segunda mitad del siglo 




There seem to be evident problems with trying to explain the origins and evolution of the 
Spanish nation on the sole basis of these narratives. One could question the extent to which 
the documents where the nation is mentioned are truly representative of the social milieu at 
the time or if on the contrary, the concept of a Spanish nation as mentioned there is ancillary 
to the context of enunciation associated with such documents. In other words, in their 
defence of the historical reality of the Spanish nation in pre-modern times, are those 
historians accurately interpreting Spanish nationhood or are they looking at this issue 
selectively?  
 
Other problems associated with perennialist narratives have to do with their social 
penetration and with the difficulties in distinguishing historical fact from myth. Modernist 
authors point out that only a minority of the population was literate in medieval times. So 
one may question the extent to which this rudimentary idea of Spain was present outside the 
discourse of the elites. One probably has to wait till the spread of literacy and the 
consolidation of a State education system to assume some kind of widespread national 
conscience among the masses. Also, as many perennialists admit, it is often difficult to 
separate fact from myth in this kind of historical narratives, where national origins are 
situated in a remote past permeated by legends, ancestral stories and foundational myths. 
Such idealizations abound in nationalist discourse. In the Basque case, this has been studied 
by Juaristi (1987; 1997; 2002) and Laínz (2004). According to Juaristi, some of the myths 
                                                 
10
 The Spain of the Catholic Monarchs was aware of the fact that the kingdoms of Spain had a single 
“government”, that there was a “Spanish monarchy”. This sense of political unity -that can never reach the 
status of national unity (sic)- had illustrious advocates during the second half of the 15
th




behind the construction of a Basque nation are the idea of Euskera being older than any other 
known language. Other contributing elements to the Basque mythical universe are the 
ethnicist mystifications in the writings of Romantic authors like Chaho and Navarro 
Villoslada, where we are introduced to an idealized universe based on fantastic descriptions 
of popular culture. Laínz (2004) also discusses some of the foundational myths in the Basque 
volkgeist enunciated by Arana, such as the medieval battle of Arrigoriaga, allegedly resulting 
in a confrontation between the Basque people and the Spanish aggressors, or the myth that 




The idea of Spain as a nation is not devoid of similar fantasies. National histories by 
Modesto Lafuente or Patxot y Ferrer, citing 16
th
 century authors like Juan de Mariana or 
even going as far back as St. Isidore of Seville’s “Laudes Hispaniae”, also take for granted 
the idea of a Spanish nation existing since antiquity, embedded in stories permeated by 
fantasy. We are told, for instance, about the mythical foundation of Spain by a Biblical 
patriarch named Tubal, a grandson of Noah. Spain in these stories is portrayed as an Eden 
peopled by model Spaniards, soon to be perturbed by waves of “foreign invasions” and the 
evolution of the Spanish nation is presented as a succession of paradises, losses and 
redemptions, the latter being justified by the great virtues that characterize Spanish people 
(García Cárcel, 2004b). Álvarez Junco (2001) reminds us of the dangers behind the selective 
interpretation of national narratives where myth and historical fact can hardly be separated. 
                                                 
11
 Rooted in the traditionalist reactionary ideology in defense of Absolutism, the origins of Carlism date back 
to the 1820s. Associated with the Partido Apostólico, an extreme clerical party opposed to Liberalism, Carlists 
did not recognize Isabel II, Fernando VII´s daughter, as queen of Spain and supported prince Carlos María 
Isidro de Borbón and his descendants as legitimate monarchs, participating in a series of civil wars known as 
“Carlist Wars: 1833-1840; 1846-1849 and 1872-1876. Carlism remained influential throughout much of the 19th 
century in northern Spain, mainly in Navarre, the Basque Country and in areas of Aragon and Catalonia. Carlist 
volunteers actively participated in the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) in support of Franco. The Carlist 
Movement was amalgamated with the Falange by a decree issued on the 19
th
 April, 1937. Carlism has lost 
much of its support in recent decades. See Canal (2004).   
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The main purpose of these histories may not be a wish to understand the past but rather the 
political concern of reinforcing national identity. All in all, history may be constructed in the 
service of nationalist ideology.  
 
Another risk associated with Perennialism is that it over-emphasizes the ideas of evolution 
and historical continuity underestimating the discontinuities found in many of these so-called 
historical realities across different periods; for instance the profound differences between 
modern Nation-States and pre-modern polities. One could argue that the modern concept of 
the Nation-State based on the principles of sovereignty and citizenship as well as on a high 
level of social organization is substantially different from pre-modern models based on 
highly fragmented societies and a patrimonial conception of the State. Given the politically 
and economically fragmented nature of “Spain” in medieval times and given the existing 
differences in laws, customs and even languages in the various -and let us not forget- 
independent Christian kingdoms, one has reasons to suspect that a super-ordinate idea of 
Spain linked to a primeval past was far from mature. 
 
In conclusion, compared to Primordialism and its dogmatic presupposition of the existence 
of nations, the contribution of Perennialism to explaining the national phenomenon is more 
cogent, though not free from flaws. Perennialism has thrown some light on the origins of a 
certain idea of nation, particularly in the European context, but has proved weak in 
theorizing how nation-building actually took place. Also, in assuming some kind of 
continuity between pre-modern and contemporary concepts of the nation, a certain degree of 
caution is necessary since the further we cling to the past in trying to explain the idea of 
Spain, the greater the difficulties we face. Concepts as complex as this one fade away as a 
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result of historical discontinuity and tend to be mixed with mythical elements. At the same 
time, we also run the risk of looking at the past through modern glasses and reach hasty 
conclusions on the basis of conceptual paradigms not fully developed until modern times. 
 
The next sections in this chapter are dedicated to modernist theories of the nation, which 
have constituted the dominant paradigm recently, and to social-constructionist approaches, 
seen by some as a variant of Modernism. Ethnosymbolism will be covered after that, as it 
constitutes a reaction to Modernism and Social-Constructionism. Conclusions will be drawn 
on how insights from these theories can be used in outlining a theoretical approach for this 
thesis.     
 
 1.4. Modernism 
Modernist theories rest on two main assumptions: 
(i) Nations are not objective external realities belonging to the state of nature, nor a universal 
necessity as primordialists claim. Neither, are nations as old as history as perennialists 
believe. Rather, nations are created constructs, recent in nature and novel in character.  
(ii) Nations and nationalism are the product of modernisation and as such do not require 
pre-modern antecedents. 
 
From being considered human creations it does not follow that nations should be considered 
a mere ideological illusion. This has been a common accusation by critics of social 
constructionism, to be discussed later. Rather, modernists conceive nations as human 
constructs, as collective creations engendered by nationalism under a series of conditions 
grouped under the concept of “modernisation”. This excludes the possibility of nations being 
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primordial entities but, more importantly, it also argues against the possibility of nations 
being some product of historical evolution: as Gellner (1996) argues, “nations have no 
navels.” Nations did not evolve from some pre-national antecedent. On the contrary, nations 
were created by nationalism in recent history. When exactly? No agreement exists regarding 
the time of “creation”. Some authors point at the system of Nation-States emerging in Europe 
as early as 1648, the date of the Peace of Westphalia (Tilly, 1975). Others, like Gellner (1996) 
or Hobsbawm (1990), link nation-building more closely to the rise of nationalism in Europe 
and propose later dates. Gellner dates this phenomenon towards the end of the 18
th
 century 
while Hobsbawm suggests the 19
th
 century as the time in which the system of Nation-States 
crystallised. 
 
The premise that nations are the product of modernisation is not exempt from controversy 
according to Smith (2000). As we shall see, one could explain modernisation as a highly 
complex process in which various catalysts intervene. The remaining of this section reviews 
the contributions made by prominent modernist authors followed by a discussion on the 
validity of the modernist paradigm as a whole in explaining the nature and origins of nations. 
 
Elie Kedourie 
Kedourie’s work represents one of the first attempts to explain the origin of nations from the 
modernist perspective (Kedourie, 1993). Based on the assumption that nationalism is a 
doctrine invented in Europe in the early 19
th
 century, Kedourie traces the intellectual and 
social foundations of nationalism to the Kantian concept of ‘autonomy of the will’ 
reformulated by Fichte as ‘collective will’. This is where ideas like national sovereignty and 
the right to self-determination, as enshrined by the French Revolution, stem from according 
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to this author. As far as the social causes of nationalism is concerned, Kedourie postulates 
that such doctrine represented a revolutionary and subversive answer by European bourgeois 
intellectuals who felt excluded by the Absolutist State from the power that they felt they 
deserved as a result of their enlightened education. 
 
Ernest Gellner 
Kedourie’s views were criticised by Gellner on several accounts. Gellner dismissed the 
Kantian connection in the origins of nationalism arguing that the autonomy of the will 
applied to individuals and not to groups. More significantly, he argued that Kedourie’s 
intellectualist explanation of the nationalist phenomenon was misleading because 
nationalism was not just an erroneous theory that could be disproved and discarded. Rooted 
in a socio-anthropological perspective with functionalist underpinnings, Gellner’s account 
constitutes one of the best articulated and comprehensive theories coming from the 
modernist camp (Gellner, 1964; 1983; 1996; 1997). In his view, nations and nationalism are 
the necessary product of a radical socio-cultural transformation sparkled by industrialisation. 
This process consisted of a shift from the modes of production of agrarian societies to those 
of industrial societies, which required a novel form of social organisation: the Nation-State. 
For Gellner, nationalism is a political principle which maintains that similarity of culture is 
the basic social bond and the Nation-State can be explained in terms of the association of 
culture and polity. He claims this association only emerged in modern times, as a result of 
the changes brought by industrialisation. Therefore, he argues, nations and nationalism are 
quintessentially modern. 
 
Gellner roughly divides human history into three periods: foraging, agrarian and scientific- 
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industrial. The foraging period was characterised by the absence of State. Instead, we had 
small wandering groups of hunters and food collectors organised under rudimentary forms of 
political leadership. These were societies characterised by the absence of a “high” codified 
script-linked culture. Here, one cannot speak of a relationship between polity and culture 
because neither of them existed. During the agrarian stage, an enormous population increase 
occurred as a result of the developments in food production and storage techniques. This in 
turn led to significant changes in the division of labour and more complex forms of social 
organisation. Now the State existed and so did cultural differences. In a sense, nationalism 
would have been possible. However, according to Gellner, it did not prevail because a view 
of the world which advocates that a legitimate political unit is the one formed by anonymous 
members of the same culture had no place in agrarian societies: 
These are hierarchically organised societies, with each stratum and its members 
jealously guarding its standing and its privileges and eager to differentiate itself from 
lower strata which would, given the chance, usurp some of its perks (Gellner, 1997, p. 
19). 
 
Culture, rather than uniting, separates social classes in agrarian societies and aims at 
perpetuating such separation: 
The characteristic political unit of the agrarian age is either considerably smaller than 
the limits of a culture -city States, village communities, tribal segment- or very much 
larger: Culturally eclectic empires which have no reason whatsoever to limit their 
expansion when they encounter linguistic or cultural boundaries (of which they may 
be wholly ignorant, and to which they are indifferent). The most characteristic 
political unit of the agrarian age tended to make joint use of both these principles: a 
trans-ethnic empire would be superimposed on sub-ethnic communities, which it 
used as its local agent, tax-collector and deputy (ibid, p.21). 
 
Industrialisation brought along new modes of production as well as new forms of social 
relation. Industrial societies rely on continuous economic and scientific development rather 
than on stable technologies. Because of this need for perpetual growth, industrial societies 
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cannot have the kind of stable occupational structures typical of the agrarian age. Instead, 
these are highly mobile, meritocratic societies which require universal literacy as a result of 
their inherent mobility and the increasingly semantic nature of work. As a result of this, 
homogeneity of culture becomes the new political bond:  
The mastery of a given high culture (the one used by the surrounding bureaucracies) 
is the pre-condition of political, economic and social citizenship (ibid, p.29). 
 
A key notion in Gellner’s theory is the idea of “uneven development” as a basis for 
nationalist mobilisation. The importance of this notion resides in two incontrovertible facts: 
on the one hand industrialisation did not spread simultaneously or uniformly throughout 
Europe. On the other hand, one can easily appreciate different stages of cultural and political 
development across the different European States at the time of the nationalist explosion. 
Gellner (1983) illustrates his idea of uneven development with the allegory of Ruritania vs. 
Megalomania: the Ruritanians represent one of the many peasant ethnic groups confined 
within the territory of Megalomania. They speak more or less related dialects, the 
“Ruritanian language”, used in informal communication among villagers, while the 
Ruritanian aristocracy prefers the language of the Megalomanian court. The 19
th
 century sees 
a rapid expansion of the population in Megalomania accompanied by industrialisation in 
some parts of the empire, while Ruritania remains much underdeveloped. As many 
Ruritanian peasants seek work in Megalomania, many assimilate into the dominant language 
and culture of Megalomania in spite of the discrimination they face. Yet, in the midst of 
profound social and economic changes in Megalomania, a nationalist movement sprouts in 
Ruritania spearheaded by intellectuals inspired in Ruritanian folklore and petit-bourgeois 





Gellner’s notion of uneven development shares some common ground with alternative 
modernist theories of the nation adopting a neo-Marxist perspective that emphasise the 
importance of economic transformation in explaining the origin of nations, notably Nairn’s 
notion of “uneven development” or Hechter’s concept of “internal colonialism” (Nairn, 1977; 
Hechter, 1975). Yet, in Gellner’s case, uneven development plays a secondary role to 
industrialisation and is actually used better to articulate his views on the rise of nations and 
nationalism in the context of the profound socio-cultural and economic differences existing 
in Europe throughout the 19
th
 century. In other words, industrialisation and the socio-cultural 
changes derived from this process constitute the cornerstone in Gellner’s theory while 
uneven development is used to accommodate grand theory with historical facts. 
 
Accordingly, Gellner (1997) distinguishes four main time zones in the configuration of 
Europe’s Nation-State system: zone 1 is situated along Europe’s Atlantic coast. Here, he 
argues, “State and culture were living together in kind of customary marriage for ages, long 
before the Age of Nationalism, and long before the internal logic of modern society decreed 
that the couple were meant for each other” (ibid, p. 51). Zone 2 roughly corresponds to the 
territory of the Holy Roman Empire. While a high culture had been available among both 
Italians and Germans for long, no solid State fabric was ready for the marriage between 
culture and polity to take place. Zone 3, Eastern Europe, was even more problematic. Here, 
in Gellner’s view, there was neither a consolidated State nor established national cultures. So, 
one could easily predict a violent and brutal process when nationalism spread, as eventually 
happened. Finally, Zone 4 corresponds to the area that was once under Bolshevik rule. Due 
to the special circumstances derived from Communist rule, nationalism was held in check for 
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decades and finally exploded in various forms after Communism fell. 
 
While insightful, Gellner’s grand theory of nationalism has not been exempt from criticism 
from alternative versions of the modernist paradigm and from the ethnosymbolist camp. I 
discuss modernist critiques of the model in this section and deal with Ethnosymbolism later 
on. Modernist authors have questioned Gellner on five main accounts: 
(i) Contradictory in terms; 
(ii) Excessively reductionist; 
(iii) Chronologically problematic; 
(iv) Excessively abstract and deterministic; 
(v) Too general.  
 
Hearn detects inconsistencies in Gellner’s story of uneven development. He argues that 
Gellner’s model effectively results in two different theories of nationalism with 
fundamentally different causes that at times may contradict each other: a functional 
nationalism resulting from industrialisation (Megalomania) and a reactive nationalism 
originating in societies not yet industrialised (Ruritania): 
On the one hand, Gellner conceives of nations as functional requirements of modern 
industrialized social life, and nationalism is the process that renders the necessary 
functional adjustment. On the other hand, the paradigmatic historical process of 
nationalism for Gellner was a reaction to uneven development, the encounter between 
Ruritania and Megalomania […]. Now, these two theories of what happened are not 
incompatible, and Gellner observes that in some cases people were fairly passively 
incorporated into the new industrial order, and in others were provoked to mobilize 
nationally against another dominant nation. But neither are they logically 
interdependent. One can reasonably imagine a world in which all people are either 
assimilated into the new functional order or exterminated, with no successful 
reactionary movements, or one in which all nationalism begins with such reactions, 
not against new industrial societies, but against exploitative imperial regimes. 
Obviously Gellner is obliged to tell his bold story in this dual way because it broadly 
corresponds to the historical record. As a descriptive summary of world history it is 
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very powerful. But as a theoretical whole it is somewhat puzzling, because one gets a 
sense from Gellner that both these processes – functional integration and reaction to 
exclusion- are at the heart of the matter (Hearn, 2006, p. 99). 
 
Hearn argues that at the root of this contradiction lies the stadial view of history, “imagined 
as a series of plateaux connected by steep transitional periods” (ibid, p.106), typical in 
modernist accounts of the nation. Such a view, partly driven by our cognitive need for 
simplification, does not fit well with the idea of a rapidly changing world according to Hearn. 
For Hearn, modernity is characterized not by stability but by instability “in the form of a 
series of accelerating directional trend, driven especially by capitalism” (ibid, p.115). He 
proposes to rethink the whole idea of uneven development “recognizing it as a more general 
and on-going aspect of life under capitalism, rather than as a threshold to a stable modern 
State” (ibid, p. 115).  
 
One could argue that the paradox in Gellner’s notion of uneven development is accentuated 
by the narrow functionalist model proposed, because although industrialisation in 
Megalomania may indirectly trigger a nationalist reaction in peasant Ruritania, this 
phenomenon can no longer be explained in terms of the functional needs of modern 
industrial societies, precisely what Gellner has been telling us all along. This takes us to the 
second criticism we may raise against Gellner. In view of the alternative explanations 
provided by fellow modernists, one may accuse Gellner of excessive reductionism and 
oversimplification in explaining the rise of nations as the sole result of industrialisation. To 
be fair, reductionism is an accusation we could raise against practically all modernist -and 
non-modernist- accounts. We should also point out that Gellner does acknowledge the 
possibility of other factors having an influence in the rise and spread of nationalism, such as 
the impact of the Protestant Reformation had in helping to bring about nationalism (Gellner, 
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1983). Yet, Gellner does not integrate these other factors into his theory, which remains 
narrowly focused on functional aspects associated to the process of industrialisation. Thus, 
Gellner has been criticized for underestimating the role of the State in nation-building 
(O’Leary, 1998), while various authors have sought to redress the balance by explaining the 
role the State has played in shaping modern societies. For instance, Bendix (1978) 
emphasises the transformation of political authority from the patrimonial rule of the kings to 
the bureaucratic rule of States, a process he situates at the centre of modernisation. Whereas 
in the Ancien Régime the king’s authority derived from divine sanction and the precedent of 
tradition, in the modern State legitimacy is defined in terms of popular consent. Breuilly 
(1996) has also sought to emphasize the role of the State in his conception of modernisation 
by explaining the nature of the modern State in terms of a shift from a corporate to a 
functional division of labour. He argues that in modern societies the economic, political and 
cultural needs of individuals are no longer met through single corporate organisations such as 
guilds, peasant communities or religious orders. Instead, these needs are met by separate, 
function-specific institutions like trade unions, political parties, schools or universities, 
increasingly placed under the realm of an expanded State. National identity, according to 
Breuilly, replaced corporate ties acting as a bond between individuals in a changing society. 
Similarly, Giddens has stressed the role played by an increasingly powerful State in the 
spread of nationalism as a worldview and in the transformation of pre-national State models: 
Nationalism is the cultural sensibility of sovereignty, the concomitant of the 
co-ordination of administrative power within the bounded Nation-State. With the 
coming of the Nation-State, States have an administrative and territorially ordered 
unity which they did not possess before. This unity cannot remain purely 
administrative however, because the very co-ordination of activities involved 
presumes elements of cultural homogeneity. The extension of communication cannot 
occur without the ‘conceptual’ involvement of the whole community as a 
knowledgeable citizenry. A nation State is a ‘conceptual community’ in a way in 




Tilly (1975) provides an interesting coda to these theories. He emphasises the role of an 
expanding State as one of the pillars of modernity by linking the origins of modern 
Nation-State to the increasing economic and military competition among Western European 
States that occurred between 1500 and 1700. He argues that as a result of this competition, 
States tried to extract more resources from their subjects in order to fund their military 
expansion. The peasantry and the cities resisted such policies while the competing States 
sought to weaken their position and increase their resources through the development of 
commercial agriculture, trade and the manufacturing industry. In Spain’s case, we can find 
evidence in the political evolution of Imperial Spain in line with Tilly’s theory, especially 
during the reign of Phillip IV. Elliott (1984; 1986; 1990) and Kamen (2003) have offered 
interesting insight on the fragmented nature of a State as geographically spread and 
constitutionally diversified as the Spanish Monarchy. Analysing Elliott’s account of the 
Catalan Revolt against Phillip IV, one may consider the attempts by Olivares’s 
administration to homogenise what in practice was a conglomerate of kingdoms and 
establish a more centralised model inspired in the laws and customs of Castile. This 
constitutes an important milestone in the consolidation of a Spanish national identity. 
 
Other authors have complemented Gellner’s generalizations on modernisation by 
emphasizing the role played by enlarged systems of communication in the development of 
mass national cultures. According to Deutsch (1996) community and culture are part of the 
same phenomenon. A community is formed by individuals who have learnt how to work 
together by sharing the ability to communicate effectively. Deutsch links his ideas on 
communication with the processes of social mobilization associated with the expansion of 
markets, industries and cities as well as with mass literacy. One advantage this model offers 
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is that it outlines a structural and quantitative approach to the study of nation-building.  
 
A third type of criticism raised against Gellner is derived from the fact that industrialisation 
may have come too late to have been the main and only cause of nationalism (Mann, 1992) 
and that there is ample evidence showing that early industrialization was compatible with 
high illiteracy levels among the masses (Guibernau, 1996). This does not invalidate the idea 
of industrialisation having a decisive influence on the spread of nationalism and the 
consolidation of the Nation-State system. Yet, it offers additional proof against a narrow 
functionalist theory like Gellner’s and reinforces the need to explain nationalism not only as 
the result of a complex cluster of factors but also in relation to concrete empirical evidence 
extracted from historical records. In this respect, Bell (2001) argues that the French 
countryside had not undergone widespread industrialisation in the late 18
th
 century and that 
most patois-speaking peasants were still poor and illiterate at the time. So, the changes in 
worldviews already present in the public discourse at the time need to be explained by 
factors other than those advocated by Gellner. 
 
In rejecting Kedourie’s intellectualist explanation of the origins of the nation, Gellner 
questions the role played by nationalist ideologues in nation-building placing all the 
emphasis on top-down complex macro-processes like industrialization. Nationalism thus 
becomes a form of social identity that is functional for life under the novel conditions 
derived from industrialisation, where specific forms of nationalist discourse are denied any 
lasting influence in the shaping of events:  
[Nationalist] thinkers did not really make much difference. If one of them had fallen, 
others would have stepped into his place […] No one was indispensable. The quality 
of nationalist thought would hardly have been affected much by such substitutions 
[…] Their precise doctrines are hardly worth analysing. We seem to be in the 
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presence of a phenomenon that springs directly and inevitably from basic changes in 
our shared social condition, from changes in the overall relation between society, 
culture and polity. The precise appearance and local form of this phenomenon no 
doubt depends a very great deal on local circumstances which deserve study; but I 
doubt whether the nuances of nationalist doctrine played much part in modifying 
those circumstances (Gellner 1983, p. 124). 
 
This position has been criticized by Hobsbawm (1990) among others for being excessively 
teleological and deterministic. For Gellner, nationalism appears to be the inevitable 
consequence of the socio-cultural forces unleashed by industrialisation, to the point that he 
underestimates the role played by the State and by capitalist elites in the social construction 
of a nationalist worldview through discourse. One final criticism we may raise against 
Gellner without abandoning the modernist paradigm derives from the fact that he seems 
concerned only with explaining the origins and spread of nationalism in general terms and 
that he has little to say about the specific manifestations of this phenomenon: 
[…] if nationalism is a general phenomenon, covering a whole variety of nations, 
quite obviously it cannot be explained by the reasons operating internally within each 
national movement: These reasons must be specifically related to each nation and its 
culture; they cannot apply generally, otherwise there could hardly be rival 
nationalisms. So the general explanation cannot be internal to the cultures concerned: 
It must stand outside them and explain why, in general, cultures have become a 
political principle, a principle of the delimitation of political units (Gellner 1997, p. 
95). 
 
One may turn this argument around and argue that precisely because there are indeed rival 
nationalisms one cannot simply obviate those factors specifically related to each nation and 
culture. One needs to explain why multiple and often opposing forms of national identity 







Hobsbawm coincides with Gellner in many things. Both see nations as a result of the 
complex transformation called modernisation. But while Gellner places the emphasis on 
industrialisation and downplays the role of nationalist narratives in nation-building, 
Hobsbawm’s emphasis is on capitalism. Hobsbawm also attaches greater importance to 
national identity, considered some sort of invention, an ideological illusion engineered by the 
State and by those elites benefiting from the capitalist system. Hobsbawm advocates a 
theoretical model that not only takes into account some of the abstract structural changes 
identified by Gellner but also the existence of a complex discursive process leading to the 
social construction of a nationalist worldview. This process, according to Hobsbawm, 
operates both from the bottom-up – out of raw materials like language, religion and descend- 
as well as from the top-down, by the discursive practices of States, political and economic 
elites seeking to homogenise their subject populations in order to improve governance and 
favour capitalist development. A key concept identified by Hobsbawm in relation to this 
top-down process is that of “the invention of tradition”, which he defines as follows: 
A set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a 
ritual or symbolic nature, which seeks to inculcate certain values and norms of 
behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past 
(Hobsbawm, 1983 p. 1). 
 
Hobsbawm distinguishes three overlapping kinds of invented traditions: “(i) those 
establishing or symbolizing social cohesion or the membership of groups, real or artificial 
communities, (ii) those establishing or legitimizing institutions, status or relations of 
authority and (iii) those whose main purpose was socialization, the inculcation of beliefs, 
value systems and conventions of behaviour” (ibid, p. 9). The difference between invented 
traditions, customs and routines is that the former have a ritual and symbolic function as well 
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as an ideological purpose: to manipulate the masses in order to fabricate national cultures 
and encourage national loyalties:  
And just because so much of what subjectively makes up the modern ‘nation’ 
consists of such constructs and is associated with appropriate and, in general, fairly 
recent symbols or suitably tailored discourse (such as ‘national history’), the national 
phenomenon cannot be adequately investigated without careful attention to the 
‘invention of tradition’ (ibid, p. 14). 
 
On account of his Marxist inclinations, Hobsbawm is quick to point the finger at the 
bourgeois State and the capitalist elites as key agents behind the creation and spread of 
invented traditions. Yet, while explaining such practices in terms of the ideological 
manipulation they represent, Hobsbawm intuitively acknowledges the fact that the most 
successful examples of invented traditions are precisely those which exploit practices which 
meet a felt -albeit not necessarily a clearly understood- need among particular bodies of 
people. Unfortunately, he does not discuss the extent to which the general acceptance of a 
new construct or a new discursive practice may depend on contextual factors such as a 
perceived conceptual vacuum or the existence of a previous discursive foundation on which 
new constructs and practices can take root. These are issues which other authors have 
considered in their theories (Anderson, 1991; Bell, 2001). All in all, one is left with the 
impression that while constituting a valid approach in the study of nationalism invented 
traditions pose some shortcomings. First, one cannot easily differentiate between invented 
traditions and other discursive practices aimed at fabricating national identity. Second, it may 
be useful to look at such discursive practices as links in a long chain of previous historical 
constructs rather than as isolated practices, as this may throw some light on whether some 
constructs can achieve a greater degree of recognition than others. Nevertheless, 
Hobsbawm’s model has the advantage of combining complex structural processes such as 
capitalist expansion with less abstract discursive practices susceptible to grounding our 
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analysis on a more solid and empirically verifiable level. 
 
Let us conclude by highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of the modernist theories 
analysed so far before introducing the modernist social-constructionist account. Modernism 
constitutes a solid theoretical body supported at times by compelling empirical evidence in 
spite of the deficiencies in the individual accounts and the contradictions between them. 
These contradictions prove that the origins of nations and nationalism represent an extremely 
complex phenomenon with multiple layers and complex links of causes and effects which 
prove difficult to disentangle: The ideology derived from the Enlightenment (Kedourie, Bell); 
the social changes derived from industrialisation (Gellner) and/or capitalism (Hobsbawm); 
the growing importance of social communication (Deutsch); the spread of printing and 
literacy (Anderson); the rise of the bureaucratic State (Bendix, Breuilly, Giddens); the social 
changes brought by Protestantism (Anderson) and the gradual withdrawal of God from 
human affairs (Bell); Habermas’s idea of an emerging bourgeois public sphere (Bell) and so 
on. All this reveals the lack of a unified totalising theory within the modernist paradigm, 
something which should be taken as a warning in our search for a plausible explanation of 
the origins of nations and nationalism. One only has to consider Greenfeld’s explanation of 
the origins of nationalism to see the extent of this problem (Greenfeld 1992; 2001). She turns 
much of Gellner and Hobsbawm’s argumentation upside down by proposing that instead of 
having material and economic processes driving ideological ones, it was the nation - 
understood as a novel ideological construct originated in 16
th
 century England- that drove the 
modern quest for endless material growth and gave rise to the spirit of capitalism. 
 
A second problem with modernist theories is the tension between those accounts which 
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explain the origins of the nation in a top-down fashion placing the emphasis on complex 
structural processes and those theories which concentrate on bottom-up evidence extracted 
from nationalist narratives. The former often lead to teleological and deterministic analyses 
which overlook the differences between concurrent nation-building processes whereas the 
latter place excessive emphasis on the particular and the anecdotal. A theoretical model that 
combines the analysis of higher-order structural factors with the study of the multiple and 
often competing nationalist discourses existing in Spain is not only more congruent in 
empirical terms, but also appropriate to our research objectives. 
 
A final criticism against modernist theories is that they often reject the idea of historical 
evolution having played a significant role in the constitution of modern Nation-States. This 
in principle may sound counterintuitive to many. For if nations are just modern inventions 
like the steam engine, as modernists claim, why is it so difficult to establish exactly when, 
how and why nations were actually invented? This is at the root of the ethnosymbolist 
critique to Modernism as we will see later on.  
 
1.5. Social constructionism 
Social constructionism shares the central postulates of Modernism, namely the belief that 
nations are recent human creations as well as the product of modernisation. This fact, as well 
as certain disdain towards post-modern subjectivism, has led some authors to consider 
social-constructionist theories an extension of the modernist paradigm (Smith, 2001). Others 
have argued that post-classical approaches to nationalism based on social constructionism 
merit a separate categorization on the grounds that many of these authors question some of 
the fundamental methodological and epistemological tenets postulated by classical social 
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theory, including Modernism (Day & Thompson, 2004). The concept of ‘social 
constructionism’ was first suggested by Berger and Luckmann (1967) and is based on the 
premise that “all knowledge, and therefore all meaningful reality as such, is contingent upon 
human practices, being constructed in and out of interaction between human beings and their 
world, and developed and transmitted within an essentially social context” (Crotty, 1998, p. 
42). One difference between social-constructionist approaches and most modernist theories is 
a renewed emphasis on the centrality of social agency in nation-building at the expense of 
the more abstract structural processes outside human control typical of some grand modernist 
narratives. Thus, nations and nationalism are understood as “something people create 
together rather than as phenomena over which they have no control” (Day & Thompson, 
2004, p. 16).  
 
This mode of theorizing has led to greater emphasis on the role played by discourse in 
nation-building and to a focus on different narratives of national identities which are jointly 
constructed by the various stakeholders during intricate processes of negotiation (Wodak et 
al, 1999). A positive outcome of this bottom-up discursive approach to the study of the 
nation and nationalism has been its strong empirical value, although the existence of 
contested national narratives might sometimes give the impression of fragmentation and 
certain theoretical chaos. In some extreme cases however the social constructionist approach 
has led to subjectivism, since for some authors the nation and nationalism are no longer 
perceived as objective social realities but as discursive formations belonging to the realms of 
subjective consciousness and perception (Calhoun, 1997). Far from being considered real, 
the nation is seen as something contingent upon social practices, discourses and 
representations, “an illusory or spurious community, an ideological smokescreen” (Brubaker, 
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1996, p. 15). For other authors, nations become like narrative texts or cultural artefacts 
subject to continual renegotiation and reformulation which can be deconstructed at will or 
considered obsolete in a global post-modern world (Hall, 1996).   
 
Given the different degrees of subjectivism found among social constructionist theories of 
the nation, one can propose a weak versus a strong version of this theoretical paradigm 
(Holstein & Miller, 1993). Following Miller (1995) I would reject any strong reading of 
social constructionism on the ground that even though nations can be partly understood as 
contingent discursive constructs subject to continual processes of negotiation and reflection, 
to a large extent, they can also be treated as substantive entities and sociological realities, 
resulting from the continuous reproduction of social practices according to certain patterns.  
I will now review the work of modernist authors influenced by weaker versions of social 
constructionism and illustrate how these ideas can prove useful in designing a methodology 




Several theories have explained the modern origin of nations in connection to new ways of 
understanding the world. Benedict Anderson’s “Imagined Communities: Reflections on the 
Origin and Spread of Nationalism” constitutes one of the most influential and 
thought-provoking accounts to date. Anderson’s point of departure is that in the face of their 
assumed “given-ness” and the deep emotional attachments they arouse, nations and 
nationalism cannot be adequately explained in terms of ideology. Instead, Anderson proposes 
to categorize them, along with kinship and religion, as “cultural artefacts of a particular kind” 
(1991, p. 4).  
 40 
 
Nations constitute imagined political communities- imagined as both inherently limited 
and sovereign. They are imagined because “the members of even the smallest nation 
will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in 
the minds of each lives an image of their communion (Ibid. p.6).  
 
Having established a working definition of nations, Anderson analyses how they have come 
into being and how the construct has evolved. In a Foucaultian fashion, he argues that 
nationalism has to be “understood by aligning it, not with self-consciously held political 
ideologies, but with the large cultural systems that preceded it, out of which – as well as 
against which- it came into being”, namely the religious community and the dynastic realm 
(ibid. p. 12). It is the gradual decline of these two cultural systems, which began in the 17
th
 
century, what gave way to a conceptual vacuum to be filled with the cultural artifact called 
‘nation’. New worldviews based on the idea of nations and nationalism begin to emerge in 
conjunction with the gradual erosion of a supranational Christian identity – a religiously 
imagined community, in Anderson’s terms-  and with the progressive decline of the 
absolutist dynastic regimes. For Anderson, this process does not entail the supersession of 
religion by nationalism. Rather, it can be better explained in terms of a realignment of 
concepts and categories that echo Foucault’s notions of discursive formations and shifts in 
the orders of discourse (Foucault, 1972). 
 
Anderson explains the decline of the imagined religious communities and the crisis of the 
dynastic realm in terms of “the dusk of religious modes of thought” as well as by the decline 
of a legitimate and divinely ordained hierarchical system that would lead to the 
transformation of absolute monarchies into national monarchies, a prelude to the collapse of 
the dynastic realm and the emergence of the concept of national sovereignty. Among the 
factors behind this decline he includes the growing cultural relativism caused by the effects 
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of the great explorations and voyages of discovery, which proved to the European people that 
alternative ways of life were possible. He also mentions the crisis of a supranational 
Christian identity triggered by the differences between Catholics and Protestants, the decline 
of Latin and the spread of the vernacular tongues associated with the rise of printing 
capitalism. Another key factor identified by Anderson has to do with a shift in how humans 
perceive time, which eventually made it possible to imagine the nation. He argues that the 
medieval Christian conception based on the idea of “simultaneity-along time” was replaced 
by the modern idea of a “homogeneous, empty time”. In the old notion of time, past and 
future events could not be linked either temporally or causally because they were simply 
explained in terms of God’s Will. Events were not understood in chronological terms 
because the past prefigured the future and the future fulfilled what was announced and 
promised in the past. Accordingly, Anderson argues, the notion of ‘meanwhile’ could not be 
of real significance. In contrast, in the modern notion of time, simultaneity is explained not 
in terms of prefiguring and fulfillment but by temporal coincidence, measured by clock and 
calendar. Now, according to Anderson, the idea of “a sociological organism moving 
calendrically through homogeneous empty time”, the idea of a nation “conceived as a solid 
community moving steadily down (or up) history” becomes imaginable: 
An American will never meet, or even know the names of more than a handful of his 
240,000-odd fellow-Americans. He has no idea of what they are up to at any one time. 
But he has complete confidence in their steady, anonymous, simultaneous activity 
(Anderson 1983, p. 26). 
 
Daniel Bell 
Bell (2001) fleshes out Anderson’s thesis -that of national consciousness emerging amid the 
decline of imagined religious communities and the crisis of the dynastic realm- in his 
account on the rise of nationalism in 18
th
 century France. According to Bell, the idea of the 
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nation as a political construct was made possible by a combination of religious, philosophical, 
political and material changes that together gave way to a fundamental shift in how educated 
men and women saw the world around them. On the one hand, Bell emphasises the 
decreasing influence of religion in society in terms of what Gauchet (1997) called “the 
disenchantment of the world”: 
Gauchet argues that the long-term historical ‘trajectory’ of Christianity has consisted 
of a steady intensification of the perceived separation between the human and the 
divine. By the end of the seventeenth century (‘the point… where specifically 
Christian history comes to a halt’), at least for the most advanced Christian thinkers, 
God has become an absolute, wholly alien Other, entirely apart and withdrawn from 
the human world (Bell 2001, pp. 27-28). 
 
But by the end point of Christian evolution … the world had become a place which 
could be apprehended on its own terms and also, crucially, transformed on human 
terms, allowing mankind to develop new forms of knowledge, a new relationship 
with nature and –especially- a new politics. ‘God’s difference’, Gauchet writes, 
‘leaves the human community completely to itself’, with the result that ultimately, all 
power now has to derive legitimacy from that community. The familiar modern 
distinction between the ‘religious’ and the ‘secular’ was being born (ibid, p. 28). 
 
Bell also explains how “God’s withdrawal from the world” and the gradual interiorization of 
religious belief - that is, the relegation of religion to the private consciences of individual 
believers- made it possible for the French to perceive the world around them in novel terms. 
In addition to religious and philosophical changes, he points at the transformation of the 
material world: “How the progress of transport and communication, of administrative and 
commercial practices, and the dissemination of printed matter” may have indirectly led to 
“new conceptual means of discerning and ordering the world” (ibid, p. 33). He pays 
particular attention to “the rise of the bourgeois public sphere”, theorised by Habermas 
(1989), arguing that the development of this new form of communication and association 
independent from the traditional circuits of power allowed private individuals to subject all 




Bell maps out all these conceptual changes along the public discourse of the epoch, 
providing compelling empirical evidence in support of his thesis. His point of departure is 
the emergence of relatively new concepts such as “societé”, “civilization”, “patrie”, 
“nation” and “public”, which allowed people to “imagine an arena of harmonious human 
coexistence whose principles did not ultimately derive from the dictates of an (increasingly 
absent) God” (ibid, p. 36). He shows that these new concepts were not only present among 
the philosophes and the early opponents of Absolutism, but that they also featured 
prominently in the patriotic discourse articulated by the old regime in the contexts of a 
constitutional crisis and the Seven Years War against England. In essence, Bell’s study 
reveals the links between complex structural changes operating at a macro-level and concrete 
textual evidence from 18
th
 century public discourse. In doing so, he traces the evolution of 




 century France from a strictly 
patrimonialistic conception of power where the king acts as a semi-feudal lord in a divinely 
ordained system to a proto-national monarchy with sovereignty emanating from below in a 
world ordained according to the laws of nature. Having removed God from earthly affairs, it 
became possible for the people in France to see the nation rather than the king as the only 
source of sovereignty. Once Pandora’s Box was open, the monarchy had two options left: 
reinvent itself or die. Bell provides compelling evidence of the monarchy attempting to 
reposition itself by means of some kind of proto-nationalist discourse. The execution of 
citizen Louis Capet in the guillotine on 21 January 1793 in front of a cheering crowd reveals 
the failure of the monarchy’s attempt. 
 
José Ramón Recalde 
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Despite an unequivocally modernist influence and a title with clear social-constructionist 
underpinnings, Recalde’s study, “La construcción de las naciones” (1982), is not easy to 
classify according to the theories discussed so far. The solid and well-articulated account 
presented in this book incorporates many insights from different paradigms while addressing 
some of the contradictions derived from them. Recalde first defines nations as human 
creations while emphasizing their sociological reality. He argues that these are real 
communities and that their characterization as nations is basically a nationalist decision. But 
nationalism does not create nations ex nihilo. Rather, it shapes pre-existing communities 
formed on a territorial and cultural basis into nations. Sometimes the national substratum is a 
cultural group. Other times it may be a community of citizens of a State where several 
cultures co-exist. Recalde distinguishes several stages in the nation-building process. The 
first of these stages is the development of “a national mode of organization”, understood as a 
long historical process of social transformation and modernisation initiated before the 
emergence of the Nation-State. The national mode of organization constitutes the structural 
basis upon which nationalist ideologies operate to construct the nation. However, in order to 
accommodate the fact of “uneven development” discussed by Gellner, Recalde proposes two 
paths in the construction of the nation. One is a slow process of transformation where the 
nationalist ideology operates on the basis of a national mode of organization previously 
constituted. This can be found in Europe’s old Nation-States like France, England or Spain. 
Another one is a rapid process typical of decolonized territories where the constitution of the 
national mode of organization and the influence of nationalism usually co-exist.  
 
Recalde uses Marxist and functionalist analyses to illustrate the transformation of traditional 
societies in Medieval Europe. The former are more Eurocentric and place stronger emphasis 
 45 
 
on economic aspects whereas the latter pay equal attention to political and cultural aspects. 
Both kinds of analyses explain the emergence of the national mode of organization as the 
result of the transformation of the old feudal order alongside two converging processes: a 
longitudinal one centred on socio-economic aspects and a transversal process where the 
changes in economic structures apply to other social relations. At an early stage this results 
in the emergence of a mercantile economy, growing urbanization, the growth of 
transportation and communications, the development of State armies as well as an increasing 
bureaucratization of the State apparatus whose political realisation was the Absolutist State. 
Other factors taken into account are technological developments, the spread of literacy, 
linguistic standardization and growing secularization. At the end of this modernisation 
process, with the transformation of mercantilism into industrial capitalism, we see the 
emergence of the national mode of organization, which constituted the structural basis upon 
which nationalist movements operate in designing and communicating their specific 
nation-building projects. The second stage in the nation-building process according to 
Recalde is the appearance of nationalism, defined as “una práctica de objetivos políticos y 
de contenido ideológico, que pretende establecer formas de autonomía para los miembros de 
una colectividad que titula <nación>”12(ibid, p.39). While acknowledging that nations are 
the product of nationalist mobilization, Recalde considers that nationalism does not entirely 
create nations. Rather, nationalism shapes into nations communities already present in the 
national mode of organization.  
 
Recalde distinguishes two further phases in the construction of national communities. One is 
the formulation of a nationalist ideology by elites where a community is selected according 
                                                 
12
 A practice of political objectives and ideological content whose aim is to establish forms of autonomy for the 
members of a community defined as a  <nation> 
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to specified criteria –language, race, culture, citizenship- and political goals are formulated. 
This is more visible in the case of rapid processes of nation-building where a prior political 
foundation did not fully exist. The second phase consists in the transmission and diffusion of 
the nationalist message and the subsequent nationalization of the masses in terms of 
identification and participation, accompanied by the effective organization of the society in 
national terms: politically, administratively etc. 
 
In conclusion, Recalde offers a well-articulated and coherent account of the origins and 
formation of nations which captures the complexity of the nation-building process 
adequately and proves insightful in proposing a valid methodology for the study of nations 
and nationalism. His suggestion that nationalist action operates on the basis of a mode of 
national organization previously constituted proves very useful in harmonizing the 
perennialist idea of the nation as the product of historical evolution with the modernist 
conception of the nation as a recent creation. At the same time, this theory provides some 
insight on how better to articulate the distinction between macro structural processes of 
modernisation and micro aspects related to specific nationalist discourses, something rare in 
many of the modernist accounts discussed so far. 
 
Michael Billig 
Billig (1995) has studied the daily reproduction of the nation through discourse. In analysing 
how national communities come to be imagined, he argues that identity understood in 
social-psychological terms alone cannot adequately explain how national communities are 
actually constructed: to call nationalism an identity or tie offers little explanation because it 
does not specify how identity operates and how it is reproduced. Billig proposes instead to 
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conceptualize national identities as forms of social life constructed and reproduced through 
discourse. These are essentially products of the age of the modern State which have brought 
an ideological transformation of common sense. While Billig recognizes the existence of 
highly visible discourses which consciously exalt the nation during national celebrations and 
patriotic ceremonies of remembrance, his focus is on subtler forms of flagging the nation. He 
takes Renan’s concept of the daily plebiscite into a new dimension by arguing that nations 
are reproduced daily in banally mundane ways through multiple forms of semiosis: for 
instance in the flags presiding official buildings, in bank notes and coins or in newspapers 
articles and TV programmes where the deixis of homeland is embedded in their narrative, 
such as in the maps of weather reports, in the construction of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ in sports 
news which take for granted the existence of our nations. As the result of this routine 
unquestioned reminder, Billig argues that nationhood is naturalized through habitus 
(Bourdieu, 1977; 1990), making people forget that their nations are not natural givens, topoi 
beyond argument, but historical constructs created by people. Billig’s exploration of how 
banal nationalism contributes to the subtle daily reproduction of the nation through discourse 
brings to centre stage the importance of the Gramscian notion of hegemony in the discursive 
construction of established nations (Gramsci, 1971), while providing additional justification 
for a theoretical model which situates the notion of discourse at the centre of the 
nation-building process. At the same time, it provides compelling evidence in support of 
those who argue that despite the visible influence of globalization in transforming people’s 
worldviews, one should not rush into the conclusion that nationalism may be disappearing 







Anthony D. Smith 
This theoretical paradigm is situated in between Perennialism and Modernism. Yet, if one 
looks at the trajectory of Smith, its chief advocate, it becomes clear that Ethnosymbolism 
constitutes a reaction to some of the core tenets of modernist thought by re-formulating an 
old perennialist argument, namely the importance of history in explaining the origin of 
nations. Ethnosymbolists concede that nationalism is a modern phenomenon and that to a 
large extent Nation-States are the product of modernity. Yet, they stress that nations cannot 
be entirely explained as something created ex nihilo in modern times, that many nations 
clearly have pre-modern antecedents and that is necessary to place the phenomenon of 
nations and nationalism within a wider historical perspective. In doing so, ethnosymbolists 
acknowledge that many of the features of modern nations, like a mass public culture and 
education system, a unified economy and a developed State guaranteeing common rights and 
duties to all citizens are essentially modern. However, they stress that these elements alone 
cannot adequately explain what nations are. We also need to consider those subjective 
elements related to collective cultural identity and sentiment often predating modern times. 
Among such elements they emphasize the importance of ancestral myths, symbols and 
memories as the main building blocks of ethnic identity. Only if we take into account such 
elements- they argue- can we explain the strong allegiance people demonstrate towards their 
country and the emotional attachments that nations evoke, as well as the fact that in 
legitimating their nation people often refer to its “ancestral past”. Chief among these 
symbolic elements is the “mythomoteur”, or constitutive political myth of the ethnic polity.  
 
In suggesting that many modern nations are partly shaped by pre-modern ethnic sentiments 
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and structures, ethnosymbolists propose the concept of ethnie as an earlier social category 
having several things in common with nations, such as myths of common ancestry, shared 
historical memories, some elements of shared culture, a link with a homeland and a measure 
of solidarity among its members (Smith 1986; 2000; 2004). They also stress that those 
generic features of ethnies are largely subjective, although their social reproduction may 
render some degree of objectivity:  
It is of course a moot point how far this individuality is a purely subjective 
phenomenon, how far, that is, we are dealing with the sense of common ethnicity 
rather than any ‘objective’ ethnic reality. For the purposes of the analysis that follows, 
such ‘reality’ as we shall impute to ethnie is essentially social and cultural: the 
generic features of ethnie are derived less from ‘objective’ indicators like fertility, 
literacy or urbanization rates […] than from the meanings conferred by a number of 
men and women over some generations on certain cultural, spatial and temporal 
properties of their interaction and shared experiences (Smith, 1986 p. 22). 
 
Following Frederik Barth, Armstrong argued that distinctive clusters of these 
symbolic components mark out and guard the boundaries of ethnies. Such symbolic 
clusters are both subjective, in their reference to individual perceptions and beliefs, 
and objective because their patterning produces a structure of social relations and 
cultural institutions that persist across the generations, independent of any individual 
beliefs and perceptions (Smith, 2000 p. 66). 
 
Likewise, the constitutive elements of these myth-symbol complexes are never static, as they 
are constantly being reproduced and reinterpreted. Yet, according to Smith, such 
reproduction and reinterpretation is constrained by the internal dynamics of such processes:  
[…] this ‘nation-building activity operates within a definite tradition; it is not made 
over entirely anew by each generation, but inherits the mythologies and symbolisms 
of previous generations. A new generation may come to reject the interpretation of its 
predecessor, and question its values, myths and symbols, forsaking its holy sites for 
new ones and replacing its golden ages and heroes by others; but all this questioning 
and replacement is carried on within definite emotional and intellectual confines, 
which constitute far more powerful and durable barriers to the outside than any 
physical boundaries (Smith 1986, p. 206-207). 
 
In spite of the alleged connections between ethnies and nations, ethnosymbolists do not see 
this relationship simply as an evolutionary process, given the discontinuity and change 
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between pre-modern ethnic communities and modern Nation-States (Smith, 1996; 
Hutchinson, 1994). They do not suggest there is a one-to one relationship between each 
modern nation and ‘its’ antecedent ethnie for a number of reasons: On the one hand, there is 
evidence of contemporary nations having incorporated elements from various ethnies over a 
long period of time, as in the cases of England, France or Spain. On the other hand, most 
Nation-States tend to be multi-ethnic (Smith, 1986; 2000). Rather, the relationship between 
nations and ethnies is far more nebulous and complex: after the first nations were built by 
State elites on ethnic foundations, the ethic model became increasingly popular (Smith, 
2004).  
 
One may be inclined to infer from the above discussion that Ethnosymbolism has clear 
social-constructionist underpinnings. Given its emphasis on the mythical and symbolic 
aspects of ethnicity and the assumption that ethnies or nations are not ‘objective realities’ 
-brute facts in Searle’s terms- but ‘socio-cultural realities’, one might expect an explanation 
of the origins of such ‘realities’ based on discursive practices that give shape to a particular 
worldview shared and reproduced by ethnic or national groups along the lines expressed by 
Billig among others. On the contrary, Smith attacks social-constructionism arguing that 
theories such as Hobsbawm’s, that tend to explain the nation as a social construct fabricated 
by elites and a text to be narrated (or deconstructed), are incompatible with the sociological 
reality of nations and nationalism, an idea he adopts from his master-and-antagonist Ernest 
Gellner (Smith, 1996; 2000). Such views can be certainly expected in Gellner’s case, given 
his functionalist inclinations, his neglect of nationalist discourse and his preference for a 
broad explanatory model with deterministic views. In Smith’s case it all seems rather 
contradictory. As we have seen, he insists that the ancestral myths, symbols and shared 
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memories that constitute essential features of ethnies and nations are largely subjective and 
dynamic socio-cultural ‘realities’. If that is the case, one may argue that the most plausible 
explanation for the creation and evolution of such myths, symbols and memories is through 
discourse. Yet, most Ethnosymbolists do not seem interested in pursuing that direction of 
inquiry. For them, such subjective elements associated with the nation seem something 
taken-for-granted and so the creation and reproduction of these myth-symbol complexes 
remain largely unexplained, as if myths, symbols and memories were some sort of 
pre-established ‘perennialist dogma’.  
 
Conversi’s study of Catalan and Basque ethno-nationalisms is a case in point when it comes 
to illustrating the shortcomings of Ethnosymbolism (Conversi, 1997). While being insightful 
in his analysis of the differences between Basque and Catalan identities and in showing how 
these identities have evolved over time, one often gets the impression that Conversi 
accommodates facts according to an ethnicist agenda. First, in his analysis of Catalan and 
Basque nationalist mobilisation, the question of Spanish national identity is subdued, if not 
overtly ignored when discussing the origins and spread of nationalism in Catalonia and the 
Basque Country. This is quite remarkable considering that many people in those territories 
acknowledge a dual identity -Spanish and Catalan or Basque- (Linz et al, 1986; Pérez-Díaz, 
1996; Moreno, 2001; Magone, 2004; Balfour & Quiroga, 2007). Also, Conversi has 
considerable difficulty in defining the nation, arguing that “one cannot define something 
whose purpose is to define,” while such ontological problems seem to go unnoticed in the 
case of ethnic groups:  
In their reach for some form of self-determination, nationalists use the instrument of 
the ‘nation’ as an ideological vehicle. It is exactly the latter’s situational, transitory 
and instrumental value which makes it so difficult to define. The nation cannot be 
defined because its purpose is to define. It is a conceptual tool and a boundary 
 52 
 
perception through which an ethnic group (sic) wishing to be represented in a State 
attempts to establish and define its own space of action. Central to this definition is 
the demarcation of a territory through an ideal reference to a historical past” 
(Conversi 1997, p. 7). 
 
The Basques have long been identified as a separate people by foreign travellers, 
classical writers and local scholars. Prehistoric evidences of what were probably the 
ancestors of today’s Basques are plentiful in several caves and archaeological sites 
found in the region (Collins 1986: 16-30). Roman historians and Greek geographers, 
such as Strabo, recorded their existence as early as 7CE with the name of 
‘Vasconians’. The Romans never succeeded in subduing them or absorbing their 
culture, nor did the Visigoths, the Muslims, the Franks or the Normans (sic) (ibid, p. 
44). 
 
Descriptions like the above about the Basques reveal the extent to which ethnic arguments 
are left largely unexplained in this kind of research, as one can easily produce similar 
generalizations about alternative constructs like the Spaniards supported by different 
historical narratives. Even worse, such generalizations are often made in an amateurish 
fashion resulting in an oversimplification that at times may border on gross distortion of 
historical fact. For instance, the “explicit link” between ancient Vasconians and modern 
Basques does not agree with the fact that the gens Vasconum occupied what nowadays we 
know as Navarre plus some areas in west Aragon and north-east Rioja, while the current 
Basque territory was inhabited by the Autrigones, Caristii and Vardulii (Sánchez Albornoz, 
1973; Vaca de Osma, 1995). Another example of historical distortion in the pursuit of an 
ethnic agenda can be seen when Conversi downplays the importance of the Carlist movement 
in the whole of Spain arguing that “at their height, the Carlist wars were almost exclusively 
fought on Basque territory” (Conversi, 1997, p. 46): while one needs to acknowledge clear 
ideological links between Carlism and Basque nationalism as formulated by Arana, one 
cannot interpret a dynastic conflict and a series of civil wars confronting absolutism and 




In conclusion, Ethnosymbolism represents a positive reaction to some perceived excesses of 
Modernism in that it acknowledges the fact that nations are largely modern creations and yet 
some of the raw materials employed in their conceptualization are not necessarily modern. 
This is something not only intuitively plausible but also empirically objective, given the 
historical evidence presented by many theorists. Another important contribution of 
Ethnosymbolism is the importance attached to myths, symbols and shared memories in 
shaping national identities together with the recognition that these are largely subjective as 
well as dynamic cultural realities. However, in dismissing Social Constructionism as 
post-modern sophistry, Ethnosymbolism stops short of explaining how the actual process of 
nation-building operates. It seems to me that the ‘sociological reality of nations and 
nationalism’ is not necessarily incompatible with a social-constructionist model centred on 
the idea of the nation as a discursive construct. Smith seems to be equating Social 
Constructionism, understood in fairly radical terms, with a post-modern viewpoint that 
stresses the feebleness of our modern world as a result of the idea that everything can be 
questioned -and deconstructed- provided that our objections stand the test of reason. Smith 
mounts his criticism of Social Constructionism by arguing that Hobsbawm’s prediction of 
the death of nationalism and nations has come to nought. He also attacks Hobsbawm’s idea 
of the nation being the product of elite manipulation and on the basis of these arguments he 
concludes that the idea of nations being socio-discursive constructs is untenable. Admittedly, 
Hobsbawm may have underestimated the resilience of the nation when predicting that 
nations will be consumed in the fire of modernity once nationalist discourse is deconstructed, 
as if such deconstruction merely rested on the concerted effort of post-modern intellectuals 
or globalised capitalist elites. It is true that identity discourses have become more hybrid and 
that national identities have lost ‘symbolic capital’ in the era of globalization, thanks to the 
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growth and consolidation of transnational political and economic superstructures, to the rapid 
spread of Internet virtual communities, to education systems more sensitive towards global 
concerns rather than national ones or to the spread of English as a global language, among 
other factors (Pujolar, 2007; Muehlmann & Duchệne, 2007). Yet, to proclaim the demise of 
the Nation-State may be premature at this stage, given that nationalism continues to play an 
important role nowadays (Hutchinson, 1994; Day & Thompson, 2004) and considering that 
there are other options at hand, for instance a discursive realignment of nationalism leading 
to a transformation of the concept of Nation-State into something more congenial with the 
processes of globalization (Özkirimli, 2005) or the increasing banalisation of the national 
discourse (Billig, 1995). 
 
Elite manipulation and the role States play in ‘educating’ their citizens are important factors 
in explaining any discursive shift. Such processes have been widely documented and 
analysed, but as Hobsbawm himself admits these are not all-powerful mechanisms because 
“the most successful examples of manipulation are those which exploit practices which 
clearly met a felt- not necessarily a clearly understood- need among particular bodies of 
people” (Hobsbawm 1983, p. 307). As such nations can be understood as historically 
evolving artefacts constructed discursively across generations on the basis of old myths, 
symbols, memories, invented traditions as well as a great number of socially reproduced 
practices associated with our everyday life, from sports events to weather reports or school 
curricula, to name a few. 
 
In treating discursive constructs as something ethereal, ‘not quite real’ in sociological terms, 
critics of social constructionism overlook the fact that language is inextricably woven into 
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the fabric of life: ever since the first sparks of reason began to enlighten the human mind and 
the faculty of language emerged, one can say that the world of ‘brute facts’, language and 
thought have gradually become so entangled that they cannot be treated as separate objects 
of inquiry. Such entanglement has grown spider web-like alongside increasing abstraction in 
our worldview, particularly since writing began to appear in ancient agricultural societies. As 
Halliday (1978; 1992) has indicated, such process of abstraction is reflected in the evolution 
of the lexicogrammar of languages through the emergence of new semiotic modes; for 
instance in the grammar of the nominal group in which things are construed as commodities 
that can take on value, can be itemized and drawn up in lists. Such features, according to 
Halliday, emerged as nomadic populations began to settle and agricultural practices became 
widespread, as a result of an increasing need to classify things in terms of more complex 
taxonomies. As technological advancement continued and the need for abstraction increased, 
the grammar evolved once more by incorporating mechanisms such as grammatical 
metaphors that allow us to turn actions into nominal processes, a trend that shows no signs of 
abating. In short, one can say that language, as our main semiotic system, construes our 
world, in that this world is hardly definable as an external reality independent from language 
and thought (Lemke, 1989). 
 
1.7. Conclusion 
This chapter has critically reviewed the most important theories of the nation and nationalism 
aiming to elucidate how the national phenomenon can be best studied on the basis of existing 
accounts. Let us outline a working explanation of the nation and nationalism before a 
methodology for researching the Spanish nation is discussed in chapter 2. It has been argued 
that nations are not timeless objective external realities that exist independently of human 
 56 
 
experience. Rather, nations are social facts whose existence is grounded in human 
intervention. This is something most theories acknowledge despite their differences: 
perennialists and ethnosymbolists conceptualise this human intervention placing the 
emphasis on constitutive myths, symbols and memories. Modernist theorists speak of 
imagined communities, industrialization, mass education, elite narratives or invented 
traditions. 
 
When examining the ontological nature of such human intervention, one can see a great 
degree of commonality in all these theories because myths, symbols, memories, invented 
traditions, imagined communities and narratives can all be best explained by adopting a 
social-constructionist paradigm which conceives such human intervention as a discursive 
process. Gellner’s modernist perspective constitutes a partial exception to this because he 
does not pay attention to micro aspects such as concrete national narratives and prefers to 
explain the origins of nations as the necessary -and inevitable- consequence of abstract 
processes grouped under the label of ‘modernisation’ that operate at a structural level. It has 
been argued that despite offering good insight, this theory proves to be not only reductionist 
but, more importantly, excessively abstract and deterministic because it cannot explain how 
the Spanish nation differs from other national constructs. Hobsbawm’s model offers the 
advantage of incorporating the analysis of concrete narratives combined with the complex 
structural processes identified by Gellner while Recalde’s suggestion that nationalist action 
usually operates on the basis of a mode of national organization previously constituted 
provides a useful framework for accommodating top-down structural processes and 
bottom-up instances of nationalist action as part of a more comprehensive and empirically 




In view of this, I propose to explain nations as “socially constructed socio-cultural artefacts 
of a particular kind” assuming that nations are discursively constructed and that they 
constitute historically evolving artefacts, although their evolution is never random but 
subject to certain constraints inherent to the discursive process out of which they sprout. This 
does not make nations less sociologically real or less durable, given the fundamental 
inseparability between language -our main semiotic tool- and ‘meaningful reality’ already 
discussed and given that “whatever their origins and the extent of mythologizing that go into 
their making, nations assume a life on their own in time. They are home to the manifold 
social ties their members develop and the locus of their hopes and dreams [and so] they are 
very real as aspects of lived experience and bases for action” (Özkirimli 2005, p. 166). As 
Miller (1995) argues, even if nations are not real in the same way as volcanoes and elephants 
– that is, having an existence independent of people’s thoughts about them- it is still possible 
to conceive of a ‘common public culture’ shared by members of a nation. For this reason, 
like some classical theorists, it is possible to speak of nations as substantive entities to some 
extent (Day and Thompson, 2004).  
 
The Nation-State is largely a modern construct, as recognized by modernists and by 
ethnosymbolists. Given the profound historical discontinuity and change between 
pre-modern and modern communities Smith rejects the idea of modern nations being the 
direct product of “slow, gradual, incremental growth from rude beginnings” (Smith 1996, p. 
385). The Nation-State can be understood as the ultimate result of nationalist mobilization in 
the form of discourse, which gradually gained ground towards the second half of the 18
th
 
century and became widespread during the 19
th
 century. However, this does not mean that all 
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the building blocks in the national construct should be considered modern: Braudel (1981) 
has stressed that historical change is never a unidimensional phenomenon operating at a 
single time scale. On the contrary, both rapid and slow change is present in any social 
phenomenon and nation-building is not an exception. Any plausible explanation of the 
origins of the nation and nationalism should reflect the complex nature of this change. 
Ethnosymbolists have argued that some conspicuous building blocks of the nationalist 
discourse, such as foundational myths, symbols and memories, as well as many early 
expressions of national sentiment, are not necessarily modern in many cases. There is also 
evidence coming from historical documents that a certain idea of Spain was visible, at least 
among the social elites, long before the advent of nationalism.  
 
Recalde (1982) reminds us that the structural basis upon which nationalism operates can be 
understood as the result of a long evolutionary process of social transformation broadly 
defined as modernisation. Modernisation provided the foundation for the emergence of a 
national mode of organization presided over by the State. This national mode of organization 
constituted the social foundation upon which the nationalist ideologies formulated by the 
State elites acted, creating national narratives. Once these narratives diffused among all the 
echelons of society they gave rise to national identities, understood in terms of collective 
forms of self-identification of the people with the Nation-States. That was the case with slow 
nation-building processes such as that of Spain, where nationalist action operated upon the 
basis of pre-modern ideologies and historical constructs like the Absolutist State. 
 
In conclusion, the construction of the nation is carried out discursively, meaning that each 
process of nation-building is the result of social practices being enacted and reproduced 
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across time and space. As Dieckhoff and Gutiérrez (2001) argue, national identities do not 
sprout spontaneously or locally. They are acquired by social actors through a process of 
ritualization aimed at constructing socially functional communities within a given territorial 
sovereignty, as a condition for implementing legal equality among its citizens and achieving 
common goals, such as a functioning labour market and a well-structured society. This 
process of nation-building requires substantial institutional support, for instance through 
State bureaucracies, school systems, cultural campaigns, the mass media, etc. People are 
made to believe that they share the same ancestry and destiny and feel that they are united 
through powerful emotional ties as a distinct collectivity both appreciative and protective of 
its history, heritage, territory and culture. The specific nature of these social practices may 
vary not only from place to place but also from time to time. This not only explains why 
Spain or the USA can be very different in nature, for instance in terms of how their political 
institutions operate or how their national narratives are constructed, but also why 
Nation-States are better understood as contingent, historically-evolving artefacts. That is why 
Spain nowadays is different from Spain during Franco.  
 
All this may help reconcile some of the contradictions between Perennialism and Modernism 
exposed before to the point that one may conclude that while modern creations, nations are 
not just constructed ex nihilo in modern times. In any case, one feels that the debate between 
creationism and evolutionism in the case of the nation is no longer productive once we admit 
like Özkirimli that the extent of the invention and/or reconstruction not only may vary from 
case to case but also that “what matters most is not the presence of pre-modern cultural 
materials but the ways in which these are selected, used and abused by nationalists, and this 
necessarily reflects present concerns” (Özkirimli, 2005, p. 38).  
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CHAPTER 2: SOME THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS ON 
NATION-BUILDING AND A METHODOLOGY FOR ANALYSING THE 
DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTION OF THE NATION 
 
Introduction 
It has been concluded so far that nations are best understood as socially constructed artefacts 
built chiefly in modern times as a result of the nationalist mobilization which started towards 
the end of the 18
th
 century, in the context of a complex process of social transformation 
known as modernisation. Modernisation provided the foundation for the discursive 
construction of the nation, as national narratives -myths, symbols, histories, etc.- promoted 
by the State and the elites diffused shaping national identities. However, not all the building 
blocks of the nation are necessarily modern, as ethnosymbolists have argued. In fact, it is in 
the nature of social change that new constructs like nations are seldom created ex nihilo but 
emerge from the transformation, reproduction and combination of prior constructs such as 
cultural communities, ethnic ties, pre-modern polities, language or religion (Smith 1986; 
2000; 2004).  
 
Based on these premises, this chapter has two purposes. One is to provide a theoretical 
foundation for explaining the discursive construction of the nation, particularly in the context 
of modernity. The second purpose is to derive a discourse-oriented methodology for the 
study of nation-building grounded on this theoretical apparatus. Given the protean 
complexity of this object of study, it is advisable to adopt a problem-oriented approach 
inspired in the “conceptual pragmatism” advocated by Mouzelis (1995) and Wodak (2001b) 
and strike a balance between theorization and practicality in terms of research scope. I shall 
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thus strive to ground my research methodology on as sound theoretical underpinnings as 
practicable while trying to confine the discussion to my intended object of study.  
 
In the first part of the chapter, I review the work done in various fields of the social sciences 
as well as in history, discourse and language studies, which may help us develop a theoretical 
model for studying how nations are constructed discursively. The focus of this model will be 
on nation-building as a recursive process rather than on the nation as a finished product, 
since nations are better understood as contingent as well as historically evolving constructs 
rather than static phenomena. In doing so, I explain how the various theories of the nation 
and nationalism discussed before may provide some insight on how this discursive 
construction may operate. Next, I will discuss Giddens’s theory of social structuration and 
some of the literature on modernity and its consequences and illustrate how many insights 
from these accounts can be applied in developing a theoretical model for the analysis of 
nation-building. In the second part of the chapter, I first provide a working definition of 
“discourse” as it applies to nation-building and then outline a methodology for the study of 
this phenomenon. In outlining such methodology, I first review the relevant literature on 
discourse and society under the conditions brought by modernity, with special reference to 
the work done in the area of Critical Discourse Analysis. I conclude by proposing to combine 
corpus-based discourse analysis with the historical examination of social structures and 
processes implicated in nation-building as a suitable means of studying the discursive 





2.1. Analyzing the discursive construction of the nation 
Two methodological perspectives can be derived from the theories of the nation reviewed in 
chapter one. On the one hand, one could focus on the different national narratives present in 
numerous discursive domains (political, economic, cultural, legal, historical, symbolic, 
journalistic etc.), on how these narratives have been constructed over time and how they 
have shaped Spanish identities. This would be a bottom-up text-centered perspective 
emphasising the study of the particular, a methodological approach based on hermeneutic 
practices grounded in a strong empirical foundation. Wallerstein (1991) calls this approach 
the “idiographic mode of analysis”, typically used in historical or ethnographic research. On 
the other hand, like Gellner and other theorists, one could concentrate on the top-down 
analysis of social structures present in the historical processes commonly associated with the 
emergence of the modern Nation-State under labels such as modernisation and 
industrialization. The assumption here is that generalizations that lead to broad theorization 
are more important than fine historical detail or concrete narratives, often treated as 
anecdotal by the proponents of this top-down approach. Wallerstein refers to this kind of 
methodology as “nomothetic”, commonly used in various disciplines of the “social sciences”, 
such as sociology or economics.  
 
Following Hobsbawm (1990), I shall argue that an adequate theory of the discursive 
construction of the nation should aim at incorporating both perspectives. This combination of 
idiographic and nomothetic methodologies has also been advocated by Wallerstein (1991; 
2004) in his call for the abolition of the disciplinary divide between history and the social 
sciences. Whether one opts for interdisciplinary accommodation or a more radical unthinking 
of the paradigms which have constituted the basis of social and historical research, this 
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combination of nomothetic and idiographic approaches is plagued by difficulties. For 
instance, in examining nation-building, one inevitably confronts what Stubbs has called “the 
major intellectual puzzle in the Social Sciences”, that of “the relation between the micro and 
the macro” (Stubbs, 1996, p. 21). Such relationship involves the connection between 
individual instances of discourse and underlying processes: how is it that routine everyday 
behaviour can create and maintain social institutions like the nation over long periods of time. 
The study of such connections “poses some exceedingly difficult sociological and 
philosophical problems, concerning the relation between micro-semiotic events and 
macro-social structures. These problems relate to the basic task of social science: the 
problem of order and a theory of organizations” (ibid, p. 52). Confronted with the enormous 
complexity of such task, Stubbs argues that scholars have opted for delimiting their research 
territory by withdrawing into dangerous dualisms: Langue vs. parole, competence vs. 
performance, social vs. individual. Once such dualisms have been established, the preferred 
approach has consisted in disregarding the micro in favour of the macro, the instance in 
favour of the system, in order to avoid the hazards of being labelled anecdotal or unscientific. 
Thus, the result of taking refuge in idealizations such as the “langue” or “the social” has 
often been the neglect of empiricism by not giving sufficient emphasis to empirical data.  
 
Without claiming to be able to solve these problems entirely satisfactorily, I shall argue that 
in studying the relation between the micro and the macro one ought to overcome some of the 
limitations derived from the prevailing disciplinary division in the humanities and social 
sciences and yet strive to avoid the methodological pitfalls that tend to undermine many 
multidisciplinary approaches. We need to be aware that the theoretical foundations of 
interdisciplinary approaches relating the linguistic analysis of text to social structures and 
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processes are patchy, due to the existing research gaps between disciplines that lead to 
largely unresolved issues. Stubbs (1996) highlights this problem when he talks of 
sociolinguistics not having developed a theory of social structures and institutions, 
autonomous linguistics not having a theory of agency, the social sciences lacking a theory of 
action or speech act theory not having incorporated a theory of institutions and power.  
 
The following sections in this chapter will review some of the literature in the areas of social 
sciences, discourse analysis and linguistics, which may help us develop a suitable 
methodology for the study of the discursive construction of the nation. The first of these 
methodological building blocks is the theory of social structuration as originally developed 
by Giddens (1979; 1984; 2005) and further refined by Sewell (2005). The second source of 
inspiration is an analysis of modernity and its consequences with special emphasis on those 
pertaining nation-building (Giddens, 1990; Harvey, 1989; Hall et al, 1996; Wallerstein, 1991, 
2004). A third theoretical source is based on a critique of the theories of language and society 
developed under the labels of Discourse Analysis and Critical Discourse Analysis by authors 
like Fairclough (1989; 1992; 1995; 2007), Wodak (1999; 2001b) and Blommaert (2005), 
followed by some discussion on how corpus linguistics can contribute to developing a more 
cogent methodology for the study of language in society in general and nation-building 
narratives in particular. Arguably, these methodological building blocks combined capture 
the complexity of the national phenomenon by connecting “the micro” and “the macro” and 





2.2. The structuration of society 
Giddens provides a general theory of social structuration and change contributing to 
overcome the dualism between the macro and the micro by redressing the balance between 
individual agency and social structure (Giddens, 1979; 1984; 2005). This is achieved by 
means of a well-articulated critique of structuralist and functionalist paradigms on the one 
hand and interpretative sociologies inspired in hermeneutic traditions of thought on the other. 
Giddens’s initial premise is that the differences between these theoretical perspectives in 
social science are not epistemological but ontological in nature. On the one hand, 
structuralist and functionalist approaches, which focus on the social whole at the expense of 
its constituent parts, tend to favour structure over human action and emphasize the 
constraining qualities of such structure. This results in excessively deterministic views of 
how social structuration operates with social actors being often treated like pawns at the 
mercy of “macro” structural processes that leave no room for individual action. On the other 
hand, Giddens contends that interpretative sociologies, which focus on human action and 
meaning and neglect structural concepts and constraints in the explication of human conduct, 
also fail to capture the complexities of social change by making of subjectivity the 
“preconstituted centre of the experience of culture and history” (Giddens, 2005 p. 122): if 
interpretative sociologies “are founded upon an imperialism of the subject, functionalism and 
structuralism propose an imperialism of the social object” according to Giddens (ibid, p. 
123). 
 
Giddens rejects the idea of social structure being something external to human action, 
constraining the free initiative of independently constituted subjects. Instead, human agency 
and social structure should be understood as logically implicated in each other, not as a 
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dualism but as a duality. This duality of structure which constitutes the cornerstone in 
Giddens’s theory is conceptualized in terms of a dialectical relationship between human 
action and social structure, as illustrated in Table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1.  
Structure(s)  System(s)  Structuration 
Rules and resources, or 
sets of transformation 
relations, organized as 
properties of social 
systems 
 Reproduced relations 
between actors or 
collectivities, 
organized as regular 
social practices 
 Conditions governing the 
continuity or transmutation 
of structures, and therefore 
the reproduction of social 
systems 
  
The duality of structure in Giddens’ structuration theory (Giddens, 1984, p.25) 
 
In Giddens’s view, structure (i.e. “the macro”) should be conceptualized as “recursively 
organized sets of rules and resources” generally independent of time and space and “marked 
by the absence of the human subject” (ibid, p.25), where rules are defined as “techniques or 
generalizable procedures applied in the enactment/reproduction of social practices” (Giddens, 
2005 p. 133) and resources as “media through which power is exercised as a routine element 
of the instantiation of conduct in social reproduction (ibid, p. 128). Giddens further 
distinguishes between “structures of signification”, associated with modes of signifying and 
meaning constitution, “structures of domination”, involved with the authorization and 
allocation of power resources, and “structures of legitimation”, connected with normative 
regulation and sanctioning. At the other end of the spectrum we find the social systems 
which “comprise the situated activities of human agents reproduced across time and space” 
(Giddens, 1984 p. 25). Social systems are not only empirically observable but also 
quantifiable. The relationship between structures and systems can be described as a 
dialectical one because on the one hand, social actors constantly draw on rules and resources 
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in their day-to-day activities. On the other hand, with their actions, social actors reproduce 
such rules and resources. Social agency is associated with power in Giddens’s view: “to be 
able to act otherwise means being able to intervene in the world or to refrain from such 
intervention, with the effect of influencing on a specific process or State of affairs” (ibid, p. 
14).  
 
One implication derived from the idea of duality of structure is that the structural properties 
of social systems exist only in so far as forms of social conduct are continuously reproduced 
across space and time, a process Giddens calls “regionalization of action”. Furthermore, 
structures are not to be equated solely with constraints, in the structural-functionalist fashion. 
Rather, structures can be both constraining and enabling. Therefore, for Giddens, the basic 
domain of study of social science is neither the experience of the individual actor nor the 
existence of any form of societal totality, but empirically-observable social practices ordered 
across space and time. This approach reconstitutes macro-sociology upon radical empirical 
micro-foundations. 
 
A potential problem with Giddens’s social structuration theory is his concept of “reflexivity 
of action”, a natural outcome of a social theory in which the individual is said to take 
center-stage and where human action is at the heart of social configuration. As stressed 
before, Giddens rejects the structural-functionalist idea of human behavior being the result of 
forces that social actors neither control nor comprehend, arguing instead that social subjects 
know far more about the reasons behind their actions and the consequences derived from 
such actions than structural-functional sociologists will ever acknowledge. Based on this 
premise, Giddens proposes a theory of human agency in terms of different degrees of 
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consciousness: discursive consciousness, practical consciousness and the unconscious or 
unintended. By discursive consciousness he means “the kind of knowledge social actors are 
able to explain using words”, whereas practical consciousness is defined as “tacit knowledge 
that is skillfully applied in the enactment of courses of conduct, but which the actor is not 
able to formulate discursively” (Giddens, 1979. p. 57). The unconscious is explained in 
Freudian terms while the unintended refers to consequences of social action which are not 
foreseen by the social actors.  
 
Leaving aside the issue of where to draw the line between these categories of consciousness, 
which may also result problematic, the idea of incorporating the principle of reflexivity of 
action into a general theory of social structuration constitutes “a necessary complication” 
given all the problems that this brings if one wants to postulate a model of social analysis 
constructed upon radical empirical foundations. For reflexivity of action ultimately belongs 
to the realms of cognition and individual intentionality and as such it is essentially 
unobservable (Teubert, 2010), unless some form of elicitation is provided in the form of 
what Giddens calls “discursive consciousness”. So, it is not surprising to see how the 
unconscious and the unintended are eventually brushed aside by Giddens as “methodological 
givens” together with institutionalized properties of the settings of interaction once empirical 
analysis enters the scene: 
Those who take institutional analysis to comprise the field of sociology in toto 
mistake a methodological procedure for an ontological reality […] if the study of 
unintended consequences and unacknowledged conditions of action is a major part of 
social research, we should none the less stress that such consequences and conditions 
are always to be interpreted within the flow of intentional conduct (Giddens, 1984. p. 
285) 
 
And he adds: 
 
The analysis of strategic conduct means giving primacy to discursive and practical 
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consciousness, and to strategies of control within defined contextual boundaries. 
Institutionalized properties of the settings of interaction are assumed 
methodologically to be ‘given’. We have to take care with this, of course, for to treat 
structural properties as methodologically ‘given’ is not to hold that they are not 
produced and reproduced through human agency. It is to concentrate analysis upon 
the contextually situated activities of definite groups of actors (ibid, p. 288).  
 
Drawing on the work by Giddens (1979; 1984) and Bourdieu (1997), Sewel (2005) 
elaborates on the concepts of structure introduced by those authors. He clarifies some of the 
aspects which remain excessively abstract –if not largely undefined- in the theories of the 
above mentioned authors. Sewel’s theoretical model also provides additional room for the 
play of human agency in the constitution of our world and makes it possible to explain social 
change – even sudden historical shift- while overcoming the conceptual division between 
semiotic/linguistic and material models of structure. Sewel starts by reiterating the 
importance of structure as a central concept in social science. However, like Giddens, Sewel 
argues that structure, usually conceptualized as primary, hard and immutable reality in the 
structuralist and functionalist traditions, results in models of social life which are excessively 
rigid and deterministic, where events and processes are often considered secondary and 
superficial and thus, the role played by human agency in social structuration and change is 
often underestimated. All this rigidity derived from an excessive emphasis on the macro, 
makes it difficult to explain social change according to Sewel, because structure far too often 
implies stability- if not social stasis- and therefore change in structural discourse ends up 
being “located outside of structures, either as a telos of history, in notions of breakdown, or 
in influences exogenous to the system in question” (Sewel, 2005 p. 144). Sewel proposes a 
model of structure in which “knowledgeable’ and “enabled” human agents “are capable of 
putting their structurally formed capacities to work in creative or innovative ways” to the 
extent that “if enough people or even a few people who are powerful enough act in 
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innovative ways, their action may have the consequence of transforming the very structures 
that gave them capacity to act” (ibid, p. 146).  
 
Sewel’s critique of Giddens’s structuration theory is centered various points. On the one 
hand, Sewel contends that the notion of structure in Giddens’s model remains vague and 
largely unexplained: for Giddens, structure is said to be rules and resources which govern 
social systems, the latter being defined as patterned intertwining and relatively bounded 
social practices linking persons across time and space. Unlike the patterned social practices 
that make up social systems, structure has a virtual existence for Giddens. That is as far as 
Giddens goes in explaining structure. He does not provide examples of rules and his 
definition of resources as anything that can serve as a source of power in social interactions 
remains uninformative and poorly theorized according to Sewel.  
 
Sewel modifies Giddens’s notion of structure by proposing a sharper distinction between the 
concepts of rules and resources which conform such structure. Inspired by cultural 
anthropology, Sewel conceptualizes rules as cultural schemas having only a virtual existence. 
Like Bourdieu’s habitus such schemas are considered to reside in the minds of human agents 
and manifest themselves in the form of generalizations in the enactment and reproduction of 
social practices which give shape to social systems. This cognitive explanation of structure 
proposed by Sewel presents similar problems to those already observed in Giddens’s notion 
of “reflexivity of action” or in Teubert’s understanding of “intentionality”: as such they 
belong to the realm of the mind and remain unobservable unless they manifest themselves as 
social action. All one can do is to treat them as methodological givens in a general theory of 
social structuration. Resources, however, are no longer considered virtual by Sewel but 
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“actual media and outcomes of the operation of structure” which empower or regenerate 
schemas. Sewel also rephrases Giddens’s distinction between “authoritative” and “allocative” 
resources calling them “human” and “non-human”, a terminology he considers less arcane. 
For instance, State bureaucracies or armed forces would be some key human resources 
employed in the discursive construction of the nation while road systems, communication 
networks or school curricula would constitute non-human resources in Sewel’s model. Sewel 
also proposes to treat the pairing of schemas and resources as a duality rather than a dualism 
in order to prevent what he calls the “de facto idealism that continually haunts structuralism” 
and save the theoretical premise of the duality of structure: “structure, then, should be 
defined as composed simultaneously of schemas, which are virtual, and of resources, which 
are actual” (ibid, p. 152). Therefore, schemas should be understood as the effects of 
resources in the same way that resources have to be considered the effects of schemas.  
 
Another contribution by Sewel is aimed at overcoming the theoretical rigidity typical in 
structuralist explanations of society so that the possibility of social change can be safely built 
into the concept of structure and social actors can be given due credit for their action. Sewel 
proposes five axioms: the multiplicity of structures, the transposability of schemas, the 
unpredictability of resource accumulation, the polysemy of resources and the intersection of 
structures. By multiplicity of structures Sewel means that societies are based on practices 
which derive from many distinct structures which tend to vary significantly between 
different institutional spheres and do not necessarily operate in harmony and in unilinear 
fashion. Kinship structures, for instance, have different logics and dynamics than those of 
religious structures, productive structures or educational structures. This means that 
structures associated with processes like nation-building may lead to sharply conflicting 
 72 
 
claims and empowerments. This would explain why structures which once led to the 
emergence of national markets during the early stages of modernisation may now be 
undermining the Nation-State in an increasingly globalized world. Castells (2000a) provides 
another example of misalignment of structures associated with the nation, namely how 
economic processes are increasingly articulated at a global scale whereas identities remain 
tied to national and sub-national scales.    
 
Another implication derived from this multiplicity of structures is that the practices of 
knowledgeable social actors employed in the constitution of society should be understood in 
less rigid terms than those implied in Bourdieu’s notion of habitus. Social actors in Sewel’s 
model are understood to be “capable of applying a wide range of different and even 
incompatible schemas and have access to heterogeneous arrays of resources” (ibid, p.155). 
Furthermore, the schemas to which social actors have access should be understood not only 
as generalizable to a variety of contexts but also as transposable. The implication is that 
schemas are not automatically transferred from one case to another. On the contrary, the 
range to which certain schemas can be applied is something which cannot be determined in 
advance by social scientific analysts but is rather determined case by case by social actors. 
 
Sewel also sees resource accumulation as something unpredictable, this being a natural 
consequence of the generalizability and transposability of schemas. History is full of 
examples of such unpredictability. For instance, it has been argued that one significant 
consequence of Franco’s aggressive españolismo has been a crisis of Spanish nationalism 
and a revival of peripheral nationalisms after 1975, when Spanish identity became closely 
associated with Francoism (de Riquer i Permanyer, 1996; Álvarez Junco, 2002). Resources, 
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on the other hand, are never entirely unambiguous. Sewel gives the example of how the 
physical layout of a factory embodies and therefore instills capitalist notions of property 
relations while at the same time can make us aware of the social and collective character of 
production and in doing so, undermine the capitalist notion of private property. Similarly, the 
display of a national flag may be considered banal in some contexts or understood as 
provocation in others. Finally, Sewel understands structures as intersecting with each other in 
both their schema and resource dimensions:  
[…] not only can a given array or resources be claimed by different actors embedded 
in different structural complexes (or differentially claimed by the same actor 
embedded in different structural complexes), but schemas can be borrowed or 
appropriated from one structural complex and applied to another (ibid, p. 157) 
 
In conclusion, Sewel’s elaboration of Giddens’s theory of structuration clarifies many key 
concepts which remain rather obscure in the latter’s account. It also refines the important 
notion of structure by making it less predictable and by further reinstating the role of social 
agents who appear capable of exerting some degree of control over the activities in which 
they are involved. At the same time, it makes it less awkward to explain social change over 
time by avoiding the rigid causal determinism derived from the concepts of structure 
proposed by Giddens and Bourdieu.  
 
 2.3. Modernisation and the nation 
It has been emphasized that nations are essentially modern creations although some of their 
building blocks may not be entirely modern. It is time to explain what modernisation 
precisely entails and the effects this complex process of social transformation had in the 
emergence of societies politically organized as Nation-States before discussing how 
modernisation affected nation-building in Spain in chapter three. Giddens (1990) defines 
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modernity in connection with the modes of social organization which emerged in Europe 
from the 17
th
 century onwards and which subsequently became widespread in their influence 
throughout the world as they developed and consolidated. In his view, modernity radically 
altered all traditional forms of social order in unprecedented ways. On the one hand, the 
transformations brought by modernity have resulted in forms of social interconnection which 
span the globe. On the other hand, such transformations have altered in many ways some of 
the most intimate and personal aspects of our life. For Giddens, some of the defining 
characteristics of modernity have been the accelerated pace of social change and the broad 
scope of such change, together with the emergence of radically new forms of social life such 
as “the political system of the Nation-State, the wholesale dependence of production upon 
inanimate power sources or the thoroughgoing commodification of products and wage labour” 
(Giddens, 1990. p. 6). 
 
For Wallerstein (1991; 2004) modernity is associated with the emergence of capitalism 
around the 16
th
 century in Europe and its subsequent expansion worldwide. He also argues 
that the Nation-State, which has traditionally been the main focus of inquiry in the social 
sciences, should be abandoned in favour of a larger analytical unit called “world-system” 
because in his view, the Nation-State does not constitute an autonomous society that 
develops over time. A similar conclusion is reached by Giddens (1990). He contends that the 
concept of society as a bounded system -the traditional focus in sociology in the era of 
Nation-States- should be replaced by the analysis of social life across larger spans of time 
and space. For different reasons, Laclau and Mouffe (2002) propose substituting society as a 
basic unit of analysis for a notion of the social as discursive space. They argue that social 
practices cannot be articulated within any fixed self-defined totality but that they are better 
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defined by their contingent and ambiguous nature.  
 
A world-system is defined as “a spatial/temporal zone which cuts across many political and 
cultural units, one that represents an integrated zone of activity and institutions which obey 
certain systemic rules” (Wallerstein, 2004, p. 17). Insofar as they are systemic, 
world-systems are constantly being reproduced through the cyclical processes governing 
them. But world-systems should also be understood as historical phenomena in that they are 
also constantly evolving, they have beginnings as well as ends. This is due to the fact that all 
geohistorical social systems carry contradictions which at some point will lead to their 
demise according to Wallerstein.  
 
A defining structure of modernity has to do with how time and space are organized in 
modern societies as opposed to how these parameters operated in pre-modern forms of social 
organization, such as European medieval agricultural communities (Karsten, 2013). Theories 
of spatial politics in the field of social geography speak of “the territorialization of political 
power”, understood as the production and transformation of State space where State 
spatiality is conceived in dynamic terms, not as a pre-given and fixed geographically- 
bounded realm for the enactment of social relations but as one of the constitutive dimensions 
of these social relations. As Brenner et al argue:  
States are not simply located ‘upon’ or ‘within’ a space. Rather, they are dynamically 
evolving spatial entities that continually mold and reshape the geographies of the very 
social relations they aspire to regulate, control, and/or restructure (Brenner et al, 2003 p. 
11).  
 
This dynamic reorganization of time-space is also at the center of Giddens’s theorization of 
modernity and is equally emphasized in Wallerstein’s world-systems theory, where it is 
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argued that the analysis of time-space has been conspicuously absent from social theory, as if 
time-spaces were invariable external realities within whose frames social reality resides. On 
the contrary, as Wallerstein argues, time-spaces should be understood as “constantly 
evolving constructed realities whose construction is part and parcel of the social reality we 
are analyzing (Wallerstein, 2004, p. 22).  
 
A key concept in theorizing this historical transformation of State space is that of 
geographical scale, considered to be socially constructed as both a platform and a container 
of all collective social action. It is argued that the scalar organization of State space is never 
fixed forever. Rather, it has been redesigned and restructured throughout history as societies 
undergo complex processes of transformation (Smith, 2003). Before Nation-States emerged 
as the preferred locus of social activity alongside capitalist expansion and industrialization, 
there had existed other forms of territorialization such as city-States, empires, the medieval 
State system and Absolutism. Social activity in these pre-national forms of territorialization 
was predominantly enacted at the local and regional scales: although time calculation in the 
form of calendars was already a common feature in traditional societies, time- usually 
perceived in imprecise and variable terms- was always linked with space in people’s minds. 
Furthermore, space was practically undistinguishable from place: both space and place were 
necessarily understood as the physical setting of all social activity given that humans had not 
yet made sufficient progress in controlling nature and overcoming the space barrier (Braudel, 
1981). That in turn meant that all social interaction in pre-modern times usually required the 
co-presence of social actors as opposed to what occurs in post-modern societies. That was 
still the time of the “here” and “now” in a society alien to telecommunications, advanced 
transportation networks and urban forms of life, largely composed of illiterate people. That 
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was a world in which the idea of the “absent” was hardly conceivable, where communities 
like nations were basically unimaginable (Anderson, 1991).  
 
Giddens uses the term “distanciation” to refer to this re-ordering of time-space characteristic 
of modern times while Harvey (1989) and McGrew (1996), call it “time-space compression”. 
These two terms in fact refer to the same phenomenon: a progressive conquest of space 
which has torn down all spatial barriers, where space has been annihilated through time. 
Giddens argues that one of the key events which marked the beginning of this distanciation 
-or compression- of time and space was the invention of the mechanical clock and its 
diffusion towards the late 18
th
 century: “The clock expressed a uniform dimension of ‘empty’ 
time, quantified in such a way as to permit the precise designation of ‘zones’ of the day (e.g. 
the working day)” (Giddens, 1990. p.17.). Similarly, as Harvey (1989) and Escolar (2003) 
indicate, this gradual transformation of space can be appreciated in how map-making 
evolved from the fantastic allegorical depictions of the medieval times to the increasingly 
objective descriptions during the Renaissance era of explorations and the far more accurate 
drawings found in the era of the Enlightenment, not to mention the effect instruments like 
GPS have had in the re-organization of time-space recently. In fact, maps from the 
Enlightenment onwards became essential tools in the re-ordering of space as they came to 
define land property rights, established territorial boundaries, domains of administration and 
social control and showed communication routes with growing accuracy. More importantly 
for the purposes of this research, the rationalization of space through maps allowed for a 
certain conception of “the other” to emerge in connection to space: 
[Maps] also allowed the whole population of the earth, for the first time in human 
history, to be located within a single spatial frame […]. It was within the confines of 
such a totalizing vision of the globe that environmental determinism and a certain 
conception of ‘otherness’ could be admitted, even flourish. The diversity of peoples 
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could be appreciated and analyzed in the secure knowledge that their ‘place’ in the 
spatial order was unambiguously known (Harvey, 1989. 249-250).  
 
A progressive rural exodus leading to growing urbanization together with the development of 
increasingly sophisticated communication systems and transportation networks constituted 
key factors in this radical re-ordering of time-space. All this has led in modern times to a 
gradual lifting of social relations from local contexts of interaction requiring the physical 
co-presence of social actors and their restructuring across larger spans of time-space, a 
process Giddens calls “disembedding”. Typical disembedding mechanisms are the creation 
of symbolic tokens such as money: 
Money is a mode of deferral, providing the means of connecting credit and liability in 
circumstances where immediate exchange of products is impossible. Money, we can 
say, is a means of bracketing time and so of lifting transactions out of a particular 
milieu of exchange. More accurately put, in terms introduced earlier, money is a 
means of time-space distanciation. Money provides for the enactment of transactions 
between agents widely separated in time and space (Giddens, 1990 p. 24).  
 
Another disembedding mechanism was the establishment of expert systems supporting broad 
areas of the material and social environment in modern societies, closely associated with the 
spread of literacy among the masses and State-building during modern times. These are 
defined by Giddens as “systems of technical accomplishment or professional expertise that 
organize large areas of the material and social environments in which we live today” (ibid, p. 
27). Expert systems play a decisive role in what Giddens calls “the reflexive appropriation of 
knowledge”, that is the process by which “the production of systematic knowledge about 
social life becomes integral to system reproduction, rolling social life away from the fixities 
of tradition” (ibid, p. 53). Trust plays an essential role in how all these disembedding 
mechanisms operate. Such trust is not vested in individuals but in abstract capacities 
according to Giddens: when people use money tokens in lieu of payment, it is considered 
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acceptable not because of the trustworthiness of the individual who made the payment but 
because money as a system of payment is trusted as a result of public confidence in the 
issuing government. Similarly, one could argue that the main function of expert system 
groups such as notaries public and other kinds of State bureaucrats is to institutionalize trust 
as an abstract capacity so that any social action, from the making of a will to the purchase of 
a property can be entrusted.  
 
In his theorization of modernity, Wallerstein (2004) distinguishes two types of historical 
world-systems: world-empires and world-economies. He argues that what characterises our 
modern life has been the capitalist world-economy, a system not bounded by a unitary 
political structure whose raison d’etre is the endless accumulation of capital. For the first 
time in history, an economic world-system has prevailed over alternative systemic forms 
such as world-empires, which in the past had always ended up absorbing world-economies 
manu militari. Thus, capitalism began to emerge as the sole dominating historical system on 
earth towards the end of the 19
th
 century when capitalists achieved State-societal power in 
key States across the world. Some of the key institutions in the capitalist world-system are 
the markets, the firms producing goods and services which compete with each other in those 
markets as well as the households, the social classes and the various identity groups of many 
sorts. Another important institution has been the Nation-State and the interstate system, 
comprising States situated at the core of the system as well as in its periphery. 
  
Capitalist expansion has had a dual dimension for Wallerstein. On the one hand, there has 
been a geographical spread from the core of the capitalist world-system towards those 
regions originally situated in the periphery of capitalism. The defining factor in this 
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dichotomy of core-periphery is none other than the degree of profitability of the production 
process, something directly related to the extent to which the markets are controlled by 
quasi-monopolies. This idea of monopolization at the core end of the capitalist world-system 
may sound strange to some, for it goes against the free market principle, considered by 
Wallerstein one of the most deeply-rooted myths in modern societies. In fact, capitalist 
producers always prefer monopolies because they are far more conducive to profit that free 
markets, for in a totally free market the buyers would be able to bargain down the sellers to 
lesser profit and that would render impossible the endless accumulation of capital. 
Quasi-monopolies however always dry up in the end and what today is a core product or 
service will eventually become a peripheral one in the future. There have been numerous 
examples of this transfer in recent years: from ship-building to call services or car making. 
On the other hand, capitalist expansion has also been the result of the increasing 
commodification of products and processes which once were situated outside the realm of 
the capitalist way of doing things. The development of new financial products and 
accounting practices in the context of emerging disciplines like financial engineering (Beder 
& Marshall, 2001) and the growing commodification in areas such a biotechnology and 
education constitute examples of this (Hanson, 1999; Prudham, 2007; Hendrickson & 
Heffernan, 2002; Shumar, 1997).  
 
As this process of capitalist expansion was chiefly structured at the geographical scale of the 
Nation-State during the early stages of the internationalization of commercial capital 
(Hobsbawm, 1990; Nairn, 1977; Arrighi, 2010), the Nation-State became towards the 18
th
 
century a key institution within the capitalist world-economy, where “national capitals and 
their attendant political frameworks in the Nation-State emerged as a vital geographical 
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means for coordinating and arbitrating economic competition between capitals at the global 
scale” (Smith, 2003 p. 229). The extent to which capitalist expansion led to the emergence of 
a fully-fledged national mode of organization in Spain characterized by the predominance of 




 centuries will be a 
central theme in chapter three.   
 
However, this restructuring of social relations, then being increasingly centered at the 
national scale, did not eliminate prior scalar levels of social structuration, due to the fact that 
“scales do not exist in mutual isolation, but they are always interconnected in a broader, 
often-changing inter-scalar ensemble (Brenner et al, 2003 p. 16). This is a common pattern in 
many processes of structural change where previous structures seldom disappear altogether. 
Rather, they survive embedded or latent within newly emerging structures to even re-emerge 
and play again a significant role in locating social action if required by the new 
socio-political conditions. Thus, many daily reproduction activities in the form of 
face-to-face transactions continued to operate at the local scale while the regional scale also 
remained latent, often as a residual subnational expression within the geographical scale 
system to re-emerge once more as an alternative platform for social action in the form of a 
new regionalism, as many of the processes previously regulated at the national scale become 
organized at a supra-national level (Lipietz, 2003; Keating, 2003) and new forms of 
governance which emphasize multi-scalar networks and partnerships at the expense of 
nationally rooted bureaucracies sprout (Goodwin and Painter, 1996; Jessop, 1998). The 
Spanish Autonomies and the European Union Committee of Regions constitute good 
examples of these re-emerging regionalizing trends at various scalar levels (Aja, 1999; 




Capitalism and industrialism constitute two separate and yet related organizational 
dimensions which have played a decisive role in conforming modernity according to 
Giddens. The former is defined as a “system of commodity production centered upon the 
relationship between private ownership of capital and propertyless wage labour” (Giddens, 
1990 p. 55). Capitalism, which relies on production for competitive markets, constitutes the 
main axis of the class-based societies prototypical of modern times. Industrialism, on the 
other hand, is chiefly characterized by “the use of inanimate sources of material power in the 
production of goods, coupled to the central role of machinery in the production process” 
(ibid, p. 56). These phenomena of capitalist expansion and industrial development have been 
linked to the consolidation of the Nation-State system in the theories of Gellner (1983; 1997) 
and Hobsbawm (1990), among others, as we have seen before. One of the central arguments 
in Gellner’s theory of nationalism is that the shift from the modes of production typical of 
agrarian societies to those of modern industrial societies required a novel form of social 
organization, the Nation-State, where homogeneity of culture constituted the basic social 
bond.  
 
Due to their inherently expansionist character, however, capitalism and industrialism are 
globalizing forces in essence and cannot be confined to bounded social systems like the 
Nation-State, at least not over extended periods of time. On the contrary, it can be argued 
that from their early origins, capitalism and industrialism have aimed at being international 
in scope. Certainly, these two phenomena did once align closely with the social and 
administrative system of the State at earlier stages in history in conforming what Recalde 
(1982) calls “the national mode of organization”, thus making some territories more viable as 
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Nation-States than others according to Hobsbawm (1990). But in spite of these close 
connections, capitalism, industrialism and the Nation-State should in principle be explained 
and analyzed separately in Giddens’s view.  
 
Wallerstein (2004) conceives the network of sovereign States as a key institution of the 
capitalist world-system. He argues that States have contributed to structuring the 
world-capitalist system in a number of ways. States have been largely responsible for setting 
the rules for the transfer of commodities, capital and labour across international borders as 
well as the rules regarding property rights, employment and employee compensation within 
their respective territories. States have decided on the kinds of economic processes that 
should be monopolized, the extent of this monopolization and the regulation of taxation. 
Also, States have determined the costs firms must internalize when doing business in their 
territory and may lobby in favour of companies established in their territory before other 
States.  
 
Elaborating on the idea of the State as a territorially-bounded “power container” for the 
enactment of social relations, coined by Giddens (1985), Taylor (2003) distinguishes four 
basic functions of States corresponding to four different phases of development. First, the 
establishment of the Westphalian order in 1648 consolidated the State as power container, 
increasingly unrivalled within its territory in virtue of the principle of non-interference in 
other State’s affairs. This not only contributed to weaken other rival powers within the 
State’s territory, chiefly the aristocracy and the church, but also accentuated the centralizing 
and homogenizing trend already present since the emergence of Absolutism where the State 
began to act “ like a vortex sucking social relations to mould them through its territoriality” 
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(Taylor, 2003 p. 102). Good examples of this trend in the Spanish context are the attempts by 
Olivares, as early as 1624, to establish a more centralized State largely inspired in the 
customs and laws of Castile; or the Nueva Planta decrees under Philip V (1707-1716), to be 
discussed in chapter 3.    
 
Second, the State developed into a “wealth container” as the capitalist world-economy 
emerged in the form of mercantilism. The State became intimately associated with an 
economy which the State itself managed as State exchequers played the role of tax collectors 
and military procurers and began to operate as economic facilitators. Economic policy was 
then a key component of State development and economic warfare in the form of 
protectionism was widely practiced. The third phase saw the transformation of the State into 
a Nation-State, a cultural container based on ideas like people’s sovereignty and citizenship, 
derived from the French and American revolutions where national identity replaced religious 
and local identities as a mechanism for integrating individuals into a socially-constructed 
national community incorporating them into the political arena. Nationalism promoted a 
common culture as a necessary bond between nationals, not only as a basis for national 
identities but also as a means to facilitate the operations of the national economies. 
Furthermore, the national community became inextricably linked to the land it inhabited and 
the concept of territoriality changed radically: “from being parcels of land transferable 
between States as the outcome of wars, all territory, including borderlands, became inviolate 
(ibid, p. 106). The fourth phase saw the establishment of the State as a social container as a 
result of the progressive democratization of the society and the re-distribution of wealth that 
took place in the second half of the 20
th
 century in the developed world as capitalism further 
expanded. The essence of this new construct was: 
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[…] to treat the people of a State as a society, a cohesive social grouping that 
constituted a moral and practical social system. That is to say, the State had a moral 
obligation to look after its people (provide a social safety net) and a practical task of 
making sure the society functioned properly (prevent a breakdown of social order). In 
this way, the idea of society became coterminous with the sum of persons living within 
a State’s territory (French society, British society, American society, etc.): States had 
become the social containers of our world (ibid, p. 107).  
 
Giddens (1990) and Wallerstein (2004) coincide in explaining the modern Nation-State in 
terms of the coordinated control a State administration is able to achieve over a bounded 
territory and a population. This is a phenomenon unprecedented in history, since pre-modern 
States were not able to exercise the kind of social control typical of modern societies where 
most aspects of social life are tightly regulated. Such capacity of control exercised by the 
State in turn relies upon the development of surveillance capabilities and control mechanisms 
unthinkable in pre-modern societies due to the lack of resources and capabilities. 
Surveillance and control mechanisms have enabled the State to regulate the activities of its 
citizens in practically every aspect of social life nowadays, from political participation and 
everyday legal activities to economic transactions, cultural life and so on. This kind of 
surveillance and control may often be exercised directly –even forcefully- as in the many 
instances discussed by Foucault (1967; 1977) such as prisons, schools and open workplaces. 
The existence of armies and police forces constitute an important aspect of this direct control 
by the State of the means to exercise violence on others. More often though, surveillance and 
control by the State are exercised indirectly and proactively through mechanisms like the 
control of information in the media and the education of the masses aimed at achieving 
cultural hegemony, as Gramsci (1971) reminds us.  
 
Laclau and Mouffe (2003) highlight the centrality of discourse in the operationalization of 
hegemony, understood as the transformation of a particularity into the representation of a 
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universality transcending it. They contend, however, that such hegemonic universality is 
never achieved for good because the discursive space in which hegemonic relations are 
established is inherently unstable, always subject to transformation, derived from its 
fragmented and incomplete nature, and contestation in the form of antagonistic forces 
entering the discursive space. This transient and precarious nature of hegemony can be seen 
in how modern States aim at turning individuals into nationals in what Renan (1954) called 
the nation’s “daily plebiscite”, achieved through a process of ideologization based on the 
construction and diffusion national narratives which shape national identities. Wallerstein 
(2004) identifies three main nationalization mechanisms: the State school system, service in 
the armed forces and public ceremonies. Other less explicit mechanisms employed in 
mass-nationalisation consist in situating many events reported by the media in a 
nationally-bounded discursive space, as Billig (1995) reminds us. Whether these 
nationalization mechanisms have operated successfully in Spain and the extent to which 
hegemonic national narratives have been articulated in the national arena will be examined in 
chapter three.  
 
Arguably the State has become a “leaking power container” (Taylor, 2003) or -in Ulrich 
Beck’s words- a “Zombie” (Sorensen & Christiansen, 2013), as a result of its dwindling 
sovereignty. Whereas the prevailing order of things decades ago was significantly centered in 
a Nation-State which controlled its national market, the situation has changed dramatically 
with most States increasingly under the pressure of transnational market forces. In the face of 
this challenge, one alternative would be the reconfiguration of the State by transferring 
significant parts of its power to larger political entities like the EU (Hettne, 2000; Castells, 
2000c). A bleaker outcome would be a governance vacuum leading to the break-down of the 
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current State model (Beck, 2000; Strange, 2000). This structural shift is in turn re-shaping 
the conceptions, discourses and communication practices of people all over the world as 
Kress (2010) reminds us. The disruptive effects global capitalism is having on national 
economies, to the point of making many Nation-States increasingly irrelevant -at least 
economically- no doubt confirms the globalizing nature of capitalism and industrialism as 
well as the internal contradictions of the capitalist world-system. This also justifies the need 
to treat these forces separately from the phenomenon of the Nation-State.  
 
In conclusion, the study of nation-building has to be placed in the context of modernity, a 
way of life whose main features have been a profound reorganization of time-space and the 
capitalist world-economy initiated around the late Middle Ages with the dissolution of the 
feudal world and which eventually made the socio-political institution of the Nation-State 
viable towards the second half of the 18
th
 century. As usually happens with structural 
transformations, such re-organization of time-space however did not erase the pre-existing 
scales at local and regional levels, which co-existed since then with the newly emerging 
national scale. In time, the Nation-State model spread across the world, its centrality growing 
exponentially as a result of an ever increasing time-space distanciation, made possible among 
other things by the developments in technology, transportation and communications. All this 
enabled the State to rule over people’s lives in ways that would have been unthinkable only 
decades ago. This modernisation process has in turn resulted in the development of highly 
interconnected culturally convergent urban societies where individuals have become 
necessarily more dependent on each other. This shift in the modes of social relations, 
accompanied by a growing secularization, once opened the way for alternative forms of 
identity to emerge and thus the seed of nationalism found fertile soil in which to thrive. 
 88 
 
Nevertheless, the capitalist world-economy and the process of time-space distanciation, 
which at one point in history made it possible for the mode of national organization to 
prosper, have continued with their relentless development. There are growing signs that the 
Nation-State system is becoming increasingly dysfunctional in a global capitalist era 
dominated by the Internet where time has finally been abolished (Castells, 2000a) and where 
alternative discourses now coexist with those developed by nationalism (Machin & Van 
Leeuwen, 2007). It is certainly too soon to say what may eventually become of identity 
discourses, cultures and State institutions like the Spanish nation, nor is the role of social 
research of this kind to predict the future. Nevertheless, everything seems to indicate we 
have entered a period of transition and that new forms of political organization are radically 
transforming the world of sovereign States as we know it nowadays. All these issues will be 
examined briefly in the conclusion of this thesis in connection with the Spanish nation.  
 
2.4. A discourse-oriented model for the study of nation-building 
It has been emphasized that nations are historical products as well as social constructs and 
that nation-building is carried out discursively, in terms of social practices situated across 
time-space. According to the moderate version of social constructionism adopted, nations 
can be partly considered substantive social facts shaped by the continuous reproduction of 
certain discursive practices. At the same time, nations can be partly seen as contingent 
products, given that the discursive practices which shaped them may change or even 
disappear over time. It has also been stressed that the discursive construction of the nation 
operated on two fronts: it shaped the national mode of organization, that is, the social basis 
upon which nationalism operated. It also led to the creation and diffusion of narratives 
constituting national identities. Given this centrality granted to discourse in nation-building, 
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it is important to define what discourse means in the context of the present research. In this 
section I propose a working definition of discourse and outline a theoretical model for 
explaining the discursive construction of the nation based primarily on the insights of 
Giddens’s theory of social structuration. The model proposed incorporates Sewel’s 
contribution to such theory as well as some key ideas on modernity and its consequences, 
one of which has been the emergence and consolidation of Nation-States across the world as 
key institutions of a broader world-capitalist system.  
 
Defining “discourse” is not easy. Indeed, the concept of discourse has proved difficult to 
conceptualize because it often means different things for different scholars. Fairclough 
(1992), Blommaert & Bulcaen (2000) and Schiffrin et al (2001) distinguish various 
categories of definitions. In the narrowest sense discourse is defined as text, more 
specifically as text beyond the sentence level. This way of conceptualizing discourse is more 
amenable to the kind of focused idiographic linguistic analysis placing the emphasis on the 
description of text, mostly in its written variety. It does not pay much attention to alternative 
–and complementary- forms of semiosis commonly found in communicative exchanges; it 
does not venture much into the analysis of context and it may even tend to avoid the 
formulation of generalizations about the language system or about the social aspects of 
language use. In a second category of definitions, discourse is understood in much broader 
and imprecise terms, as “language in use” or as “practice”, generally meaning that the 
analysis of discourse should not be reduced to the –chiefly descriptive- linguistic analysis of 
text. It should also include the nomothetic –partly descriptive but also partly interpretive- 
study of “context” and discuss for instance the conditions for the production, circulation, 
distribution and consumption of texts and the phenomena of intertextuality and 
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interdiscursivity. This broader category of discourse is more accommodating with the work 
done in the emerging area of multimodal discourse analysis which in part exposes the 
limitations of a monomodally conceived world where language is perceived as the only 
means of encoding meaning in human communication (Kress & Van Leeuven, 2001; 2006; 
Kress, 2003; 2010; Levine & Scollon, 2004; O’Halloran, 2004; Jewitt, 2009).   
 
The issue, therefore, is which of these two approaches to discourse best captures the 
complexity of the phenomenon of nation-building as theorized before. The principle of 
conceptual pragmatism invoked earlier on dictates that the working definition of discourse 
adopted should be applicable to all key aspects of nation-building. It should be able to 
account for the emergence and development of the national mode of organization, the social 
milieu where nationalist movements operated with great or little success. Also, this working 
definition of discourse should explicate the elaboration and diffusion of nationalist doctrines 
in the form of narratives which formed the basis of Spanish identities. Arguably a narrow 
language-based definition of discourse which disregards other forms of semiosis and ignores 
extra-linguistic factors described as context cannot satisfactorily explain the discursive 
construction of the nation in all its complexity. This is so because social action in 
nation-building may not always be accomplished linguistically. What is needed, therefore, is 
a broader social-semiotic approach to communication understood as multimodal semiotic 
work carried out in the domain of the social, often involving speech or written text but also 
gesture, action or even image, colour or music (Kress, 2010). Accordingly, discourse should 
be defined in broader terms for the purpose of this research: as social practice, in the form of 
material action operating across time and space, which is semiotically mediated. Naturally, 
language –spoken or written- continues to be the primary tool in human communication 
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despite the growing importance of multimodal forms of semiosis in an age dominated by 
computer technology. This means that any material practice implicated in nation-building 
which may have been originally enacted through non-linguistic means – a military parade, an 
exhibition in a museum, a financial transaction- may likely end up being reported as text in 
the form of a news report or in face to face conversation.  
 
As Blommaert (2005) argues, this richer notion of discourse is by no means an 
unproblematic one. It requires complex forms of analysis and exposes the limitations of 
linguistic evidence in explaining the discursive construction of the nation in its totality. At 
the same time, it reveals the need for discourse analysis to become an interdisciplinary field 
of scholarship where semiotic work and social practice can be linked. Furthermore, given the 
conceptualization of social structuration as a duality- and not a dualism-, the study of the 
discursive construction of the nation should be based neither on the experience of individual 
actors, nor should it presuppose the existence of any form of societal totality. It should be 
centred instead on the analysis of social practices ordered across time-space. That in turn 
implies that the focus of such analysis should never be the nation as an end product, be this 
the result of the narrated experiences of individual actors or of agent-less structural processes 
involving material changes, but rather the focus should be on nation-building understood not 
only as a historical phenomenon but also as an on-going process recreated by reflexive social 
actors which constantly reproduce the structural conditions which make nation-building 
possible. Figure 2.1 illustrates how this discursive construction of the nation may operate 









The discursive construction of the nation 
 
At the basis of this complex process we find innumerable micro-events and event-chains (i.e. 
a series of associated actions taking place at one single point in time such as a military 
parade, a New Year celebration, a football match, etc.). Such micro-events are situated along 






























other or crisscross in ways which are not always predictable. Some of the key discursive 
domains and typical events associated with the discursive construction of the nation are listed 
on table 2.2: 
 Table 2.2.  
Discursive domain Event type 
Symbolic i.e. flags, anthems, military parades, national day celebrations, the bull road 
sign, sports events, souvenirs for tourists, landmarks, archetypal places, etc. 
Cultural i.e. literary works, musical pieces, movies, pictorial artworks, museums, 
tourist brochures, national character stereotypes, sense of humor,  etc. 
Educational i.e. School curricula, teacher training courses, textbooks, lessons, etc. 
Economic i.e. The issuing of State debt, financial transactions, company mergers, 
working schedules, product sales, etc. 
Media & Communication i.e. Newspaper articles, TV programs, news bulletins, weather maps, etc. 
Legal i.e. Laws, court procedures, etc. 
Political i.e. Speeches, demonstrations, meetings, policy documents etc.  
Historical i.e. Historical narratives in books, textbooks, novels, movies, etc. 
 
 Some discursive domains at the micro-level of nation-building 
 
This list is not meant to be an exhaustive one. It simply illustrates some aspects of discourse 
traditionally implicated in nation-building in different areas of social research, those of 
politics (associated with the State), economics (associated with the market) and sociology 
(associated with civil society). Wallerstein argues that such disciplinary division does not 
correspond to social reality, as the phenomena dealt within these separate boxes are “so 
closely interrelated, that each presumes the other, each affects the other, each is 
incomprehensible without taking into account the other boxes” (Wallerstein, 2004, p. X). 
Micro-events such as those listed above have contributed in one way or another to the 
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construction and daily reproduction of the nation as an imagined community. As such, they 
represent “segments of the respective societal ‘reality’ which contribute to constituting and 
shaping the ‘frame’ of discourse” (Wodak 2006, p. 177). Some of these micro-events are 
customarily interpreted and reproduced in the media according to specific conditions for text 
production and reception that determine not only what is likely to be published but also how 
the news would be constructed. However, there are also many micro-events that are seldom 
newsworthy. These are key elements in what Billig (1995) has fittingly called “the banal 
reproduction of the nation” which often escapes the attention of the very participants in the 
event: from a history lesson in a school to a casual conversation in a cafe; or a flag being 
waved at a public building.  
 
Regardless of their media impact, micro-events constitute some form of 
semiotically-mediated material action. They can be realized linguistically, through written or 
oral text, and/or by other semiotic means (bodily action, images, motion pictures, etc.). They 
constitute rich material for empirical observation and analysis thanks to the fact that they 
operate at the lowest scale in what Wallerstein (1997) has called “episodic geopolitical 
TimeSpace” or what scholars of the Annales School call “l’histoire événementielle” 
(Braudel, 1969). As such, micro-events are clearly situated across time-space and so they can 
be precisely located and dated. They usually have recognizable agents behind them 
(individuals, institutions or both) and are also easily quantifiable. The domains of social 
action where these micro-events occur are never self-contained. Rather, these are interrelated 
in dynamic ways. Connections between them are in constant flux and as such they are not 
predictable. We have seen how the axioms of multiplicity of structures and transposability of 
schemas account for this unpredictability. As Sewel (2005) explains, the structures behind 
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specific social practices do not necessarily operate harmoniously and in a unilinear fashion, 
while the schemas associated with such practices are not automatically transferred from one 
instance to another. Take, for instance, the boycott of Catalan cava in 2004-2005 after 
Carod-Rovira, a supporter of Catalan independence from Spain, called for Catalonia to 
boycott Madrid's bid for the 2012 Olympic Games in response those who opposed the reform 
of the Catalan Estatut, echoed also in the international press.
13
 It was reported that this 
boycott had a negative impact on the sales of cava and other Catalan products throughout the 
Spanish territory which lasted for months. Here we can see how a form of social action 
initially operating at the symbolic level derives in material processes with clear economic 
implications as well as symbolic ones.  
 
Micro-events may take place once although they may be reproduced by social actors giving 
rise to complex networks. I will call these event networks “processes.” Processes usually 
operate at the meso-structural level, an intermediate stage between micro-events and 
macro-structures. As such, meso-processes are often readily identifiable. They can be 
roughly allocated in time-space although we may not be able to date them as precisely as 
micro-events, unless these are triggered by something remarkable such as an act of terrorism 
with significant repercussions (i.e. the September 11
th
 attacks) or a regime change (i.e. the 
political transition in Spain after Franco’s death). Being complex networks of events, they 
are less amenable to idiographic analysis. Agency here is diluted, quantification is often 
problematic and so is explanation, since processes usually operate along complex chains of 
causes and effects situated across different fields of action. A case in point is the formation 
of modern Nation-States where different theories have placed the emphasis on different 
                                                 
13
 www.nytimes.com/2006/03/13/international/europe/13spain.html (retrieved on 27-8-11) 
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causes, a process so complex that one cannot easily determine what constitutes a cause or an 
effect. Thus, whereas Gellner (1983; 1997) or Hobsbawm (1990) see material and economic 
processes driving ideological ones, Greenfeld (1992; 2001) sees things the other way around. 
A more recent case of such kind of process related to this research is the de-centralization 
Spain has undergone in recent decades including the re-alignment of power structures 
alongside the devolution of powers from the State to the regions, the emergence of new 
social actors at the regional level and the growing differentiation in regulatory frameworks. 
While in the case of micro-actions the focus is usually at the lowest time-space scale, 
meso-processes are best explained in terms of historical cycles, so called “conjunctures” 
(Braudel, 1969) situated in cyclo-ideological time-space (Wallerstein, 1997). 
 
The structural resource of power plays a key role in determining which events are more 
likely to be reproduced and which are not. Sometimes the pervasive influence of power leads 
to processes being carefully regulated, meaning that the reproduction of an event can be the 
result of established regulatory frameworks which may define to the minutest detail how 
certain things should be done. Other times processes result from the reproduction of certain 
events under less strict regulatory conditions, for instance, the ways national symbols are 
displayed during football matches, where power may still be enacted albeit in a less ordered 
fashion.  
 
The concept of hegemony as developed by Gramsci (1971) constitutes an important 
dimension of power where a cultural, intellectual or moral leadership replaces domination as 
the form of social and political struggle. In any case, independently of whether it is plain 
domination or subtle hegemony that is constraining or enabling social action, each 
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micro-event carries different weight according to the power invested in it. Blommaert 
explains the unequal capacities of the different social actors using the notion of “voice”, 
defined as “the way in which people manage to make themselves understood or fail to do so” 
(Blommaert, 2005. p. 4). Voice in turn largely depends on the discursive resources at the 
actors’ disposal and the conditions of use specific to the contexts in which the 
communication event occurs. For instance, the government’s decision to place a flag in the 
centre of Madrid is very different from an individual’s decision to do the same in a balcony 
at home. In principle, the more an action is reproduced, the higher the chance its constitutive 
principles become perpetuated and naturalized.  
 
The macro-levels of the discursive construction of the nation are represented by structures, 
highly abstract agent-less phenomena situated at the longue durée (Braudel, 1969) or at the 
higher level of “structural”/“eternal” time-space (Wallerstein, 1997), a scale where change 
proceeds so slowly that it may appear almost timeless. As we have seen before, structures in 
this discursive construction consist of a duality of virtual cultural schemas and actual 
resources, including human and non-human, which both enable and constrain social action at 
the micro and meso levels. Structures also vary in terms of depth and breadth in the impact 
they exert on social action. Deep structures are derived from quasi-static principles and they 
hardly change over time. Often they can be considered almost like “States of being” or “facts 
of life”. Macro-structures and micro-actions are also understood as being dialectically 
related (Fairclough, 1992; Giddens, 1984) since micro-actions are not only shaped by 




A key structure involved in the constitution and reproduction of nation-building is “identity”, 
understood here in general terms: that ineluctable “need to belong” inherent in the social 
nature of human beings, something Fishman (1980) has associated with ethnicity and 
kinship and Guibernau (2001) relates to culture. It has been stressed that identity, once 
closely associated with another structure, “religion”, particularly during pre-modern times 
(Pérez Vejo, 1999; Bell, 2001), acquired the form of “national identity” after the 
transformation of the religious being defined by Gauchet (1997) in terms of the 
“disenchantment of the world”, a process which in Spain’s case was particularly problematic 
in view of the resistance it generated, as we will see in chapter 3. This disenchantment 
arguably led to the transfer of some religious features into the newly-emerging identities 
contributing to the sacralisation of the nation (Gentile, 1996; 2006; Mosse, 1990). Culture 
and power are two other basic structures in the configuration of social life and constitute 
essential pillars of any nation-building process together with economic structures related to 
phenomena such as capitalism and industrialization which have been traditionally linked 
with the emergence of the Nation-State system. Another structure has to do with the ways 
we relate to our physical surroundings and how this shapes the way we construct our world, 
a notion analysed in Braudel’s study of the formation of the French nation (Braudel, 1988) 
or implicit in Giddens’s notion of time-space distanciation (Giddens, 1990). We have seen 
before how the local was practically the only realm available for social action to be enacted 
in pre-modern times and how time-space distanciation gradually grew accompanied by 
processes such as urbanization, linguistic standardization, the spread of literacy, the 
development of an industrial economy and of transportation networks, all of which are 




Implicit in the historical dimension of nation-building is the notion of change and how 
change operates in the context of the social structuration framework detailed above. Change 
is hardly observable at the highly-contingent micro level of analysis, unless sufficient time 
has passed between the event and its interpretation. This is because the episodic time-space 
frame in which micro-actions operate does not provide a sufficiently broad perspective to 
help us differentiate between the anecdotal and the consequential. Most change at the upper 
levels of analysis in the discursive construction of the nation takes place gradually, if at all. 
The higher we go in the structuration scale, the slower change occurs due to the inherently 
pervasive nature of structures. Sometimes old practices and concepts once being constantly 
reproduced by social actors may alternate with new ways enacting things. A good case in 
point is how the current state of distanciation enables the enactment of social action at both 
the local and global levels of time-space when a few decades ago social action usually took 
place at the local level. Other times the old may slowly fade away into the realm of history 
after being substituted by the new. Often though, these old ways do not vanish without a 
trace. Rather, they may be assimilated within new processes and structures according to their 
own inner logic until all connections between the old and the new may be forgotten. On 
occasion change may occur abruptly as a result of transformation at the higher levels of the 
structuration scale due, for instance, to the emergence of new resources in what I would call 
“structural shift”. Structural shift can be defined as highly-salient processes involving the 
upper levels of structuration which may lead to dramatic change in the discursive 
construction and reproduction of social life. These are situated in what Wallerstein (1997) 
calls “transformational TimeSpace”. Some cases of structural shift may be connected with 
key historical processes which can be dated quite precisely, such as the development of the 
Internet. Alternatively structural shift may be associated with processes which can only be 
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dated approximately, such as capitalism or the emergence of the Nation-State system. Their 
significance resides in that they induce change at higher-order time-space scales to the point 
that they make such change irreversible. A recent example of macro-structural shift is the 
ever-growing heterochrony, and heterotopy, we experience in our daily lives as a result of 
technological developments in the area of communication (Lemke, 2000) making imagined 
spaces greater than the nation increasingly salient in our daily lives, be this the result of large 
economic transactions spanning the globe within milliseconds in computerized high 
frequency trading where nations are being auctioned at the markets on a daily basis; or our 
daily global communication through social networks. Regardless of whether the old 
Nation-States will be consumed in the fires of modernity (Hobsbawn, 1990) sandwiched 
between the local and the global, the impact of this shift is already obvious in many spheres 
of daily life, as manifested in the growing multi-scalarity in many world affairs (Fairclough 
et al, 2007). This has led some authors to highlight the growing inadequacy of the 
Nation-State arguing that “it is becoming too small for the big problems of life and too big 
for the small problems of life” (Bell, 1987 p. 14).  
 
Examining the impact of historical change in national narratives, the notions of monologism 
and dialogism originally theorized by Bakhtin (1981; 1986) and further refined by Crowley 
(1996) may prove useful, as these concepts provide an adequate framework for analyzing 
change in the various national narratives situated across time-space. Monologic forces are 
said to be centripetal and homogeneising in nature while dialogic forces are characterized by 
being centripetal and heterogeneising. Depending on which of these forces prevails at a 
certain point in time, Bakhtin (1981; 1986) distinguishes three different States: monoglossia, 
polyglossia and heteroglossia. Monoglossia would be naturally associated with monologic 
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forces, polyglossia with dialogic ones and heteroglossia would result from the synthesis of 
these two opposing forces. Crowley (1996) argues that there are significant differences in 
how Bakhtin conceptualizes monologism and dialogism at different stages of his work. One 
the one hand there is the idealized viewpoint commonly found in Bakhtin’s early writings 
where the relationship between monologism and dialogism is conceived in purely 
chronological and static terms, where there is an implicit notion of teleological progression 
from what Bakhtin then considered an inferior worldview of monologism to a superior one 
of dialogism. This idealist account is replaced in Bakhtin’s later works by what Crawley 
calls a more politicized version of the relationship between monologism and dialogism, 
conceived now as a dynamic ideological struggle presided by power, in which the status and 
position of particular monological and dialogical forms of discourse are always at stake. In 
the context of this power struggle, monologism and dialogism are said to be in constant 
conflict in discourse with the States of monoglossia, polyglossia or heteroglossia no longer 
being conceived teleologically nor being idealized in terms of absolute bad and good, as had 
occurred in the earlier versions of Bakhtin’s theory: 
Under the influence of the politicized conception of these terms, the relations 
between monoglossia, polyglossia and heteroglossia appear very differently. Rather 
than conceiving of these terms as referring to chronological stages of linguistic being 
which occur in  an irreversible teleological process, the politicized standpoint takes 
them as forms of representations of language engendered by social and historical 
conflict. This means that rather than their evolution being guaranteed, with progress 
from the least good (monoglossia) to the best (heteroglossia), their appearance 
depends upon the contingencies of history and the balance of forces at a particular 
point (Crowley, 1996 pp. 36-37). 
 
In other words, monoglossia, polyglossia and heteroglossia are no longer perceived as fixed 
stages in linguistic evolution and they are stripped of any moral connotation as a result of 
Bakhtin’s theoretical shift. In Crawley’s view, this also opens the way for less abstract 




On the basis of this semiotically complex notion of discourse and the multi-scalar model of 
structuration proposed above, the study of the discursive construction of the nation requires 
an interdisciplinary methodology combining idiographic and nomothetic modes of analysis 
which help us address the micro-macro gap, considered by many the major intellectual 
puzzle in the Social Sciences. Much of the work currently done under the labels of Discourse 
Analysis (DA), and especially Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), is clearly positioned along 
these methodological lines. I examine next some of the prospects and problems associated 
with these fields of inquiry and explain how a corpus-based discourse analytical approach 
can minimize some of their methodological shortcomings. 
 
2.5. Discourse analysis and the study of society 
Discourse Analysis has emerged as an important area of inquiry in the social sciences adding 
a strong interdisciplinary flavour to some of the research carried out in disciplines 
traditionally perceived as independent fields of research: linguistics, semiotics, literary 
studies, psychology, sociology, social policy, cultural studies, anthropology, philosophy, and 
more recently, law, history, historiography, mass communication or artificial intelligence, to 
name some of the areas that have adopted some form of Discourse Analysis as a 
methodology (Jaworski & Coupland, 1999); (Wetherell et al, 2001); (Schiffrin et al, 2001), 
(Billig, 2003). According to Van Dijk (1985), the roots of modern Discourse Analysis can be 
traced to various developments which took place across several fields of the humanities and 
social sciences in the 20
th
 century, starting from the work of Russian Formalists (Propp’s 
work on the morphology of the folktale) and Czech Structuralists in the 1920s, followed by 
the work of French Structuralists and semioticians (Lévi-Strauss’s structural analysis of 
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culture and his analysis of myths, or the work of Barthes and Todorov in semiotics), 
anthropologists and linguists (Hymes, Malinowski, Firth, Sapir) in the 1960s. What many of 
these works had in common was an interest in linking the analysis of language in use with 
the study of the social, cultural and historical contexts in which texts are produced. This also 
coincided with the emergence of functional linguistics as an alternative paradigm to the 
idealised and abstract models of linguistic research represented by the Saussurean tradition 
and Chomskyan linguistics. While emphasizing the study of parole and the social dimension 
of language, these functional approaches often stressed the need to go beyond the sentence in 
doing linguistic analysis.  
 
Coinciding with the “linguistic turn” in the humanities and social sciences which recognized 
the centrality of language as a structuring agent (Clark, 2004), the 1970s saw the publication 
of the first studies in which discourse analysis was explicitly identified as an “independent 
orientation of research within and across several disciplines” (Van Dijk, 1985 p.4), while 
new discourse-oriented theoretical paradigms emerged in areas like sociolinguistics (Labov, 
Sacks, Schegloff), pragmatics, speech act theory (Austin, Grice, Searle), linguistic 
anthropology (Gumperz, Hymes) and psycholinguistics (Kintsch, Rumelhart). A subsequent 
development took place in the late 1970s and early 1980s with the emergence of critical 
linguistics (CL) and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as distinct area(s) of inquiry within 
the more general discourse analysis paradigm. These new critical approaches shared with 
traditional methods of discourse analysis a focus on text as the basic unit of study and the 
Hallidayan idea of language as social semiotics. Yet, they differed from previous work in 
that they attempted to marry linguistic analysis from a functional perspective with social 
theories centred on the notions of power and ideology, inspired in the Neo-Marxist critical 
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theory of society as formulated by the Frankfurt School of Marxism, French Structuralist and 
Post-Structuralist theories (Althusser, Derrida, Barthes and Foucault) as well as Habermas’s 
notion of ‘universal pragmatics’ emphasising the fundamental role that language-based 
social interaction plays as a mechanism for domination and social force (Hammersley, 1997); 
(Wodak & Meyer, 2001c). 
 
Language use is never neutral according to CDA. It is shaped by complex relations of power 
and ideology said to govern all social practices. Such power relations are not always apparent 
to discourse participants since they remain hidden in the course of everyday social 
interaction. In consequence, one fundamental function of critical approaches to discourse 
analysis is to uncover “the structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and 
control as manifested in language use” (Wodak & Meyer, 2001c). Pennycook argues that the 
main difference between non-critical and critical approaches to discourse analysis rests in the 
shift from description to explanation: the focus is no longer placed on exploring how 
language is used beyond the sentence level but rather on Foucault’s idea of “why at a given 
time, out of all possible things that could be said, only certain things were said” (Pennycook, 
1994. p. 116). Despite interpreting discourse in terms of a dialectical relationship with social 
practice in which “discursive practices shape reality and at the same time are shaped by 
reality” (Fairclough, 1992 p. 60), it is society that is placed in the driver’s seat by CDA 
(Teubert, 2010), as CDA works from top to bottom: from the social to the textual (Martin & 
Wodak, 2003). Ultimately, CDA aims at going beyond the notion of just “doing discourse 
analysis with an attitude” (Van Dijk, 2001b). Its goal is to bring about social change that 





This is why the tension between the macro and the micro levels of analysis is more patent in 
these critical versions of discourse analysis and the ways CDA has addressed this tension has 
led to much criticism. CDA has been accused of numerous methodological flaws in how the 
linguistic analysis of individual texts is linked with the study of social practices and 
structures. By focusing mainly on the analysis of the social context in which discursive 
practices are embedded, CDA often fails to provide sufficient empirical evidence on the 
linguistic side on how these discursive practices are enacted on a daily basis. CDA 
researchers are said to underemphasize the study of significant amounts of text and choose 
texts for analysis on the basis of exceptionality, if not convenience, rather than 
representativeness (Stubbs 1996), arriving at “premature conclusions about the significance 
of poorly described linguistic behaviour” (Bell, 1991 p. 215) and building an “elaborate 
theoretical and interpretive superstructure upon the frailest text-linguistic foundations” 
(Toolan, 1997 p. 93).  
 
In a related type of criticism, CDA practitioners have been accused of ideological bias and 
teleological fallacy in interpreting individual texts on the basis of pre-conceived ideologies 
where the analyst often conflates text analysis with social explanation. Leading advocates of 
traditional approaches to discourse analysis have emphasized that no contextual categories 
such as power or ideology should be aprioristically imposed on the linguistic analysis of text 
or talk. Rather, sociocultural interpretation should strictly derive from the actual linguistic 
analysis in the texts. Otherwise social commitment may be compromising scholarship. This 
issue has been at the root of some heated academic debate: “Widdowson versus Fairclough” 
(Widdowson, 1995; 1996; 1998); (Fairclough, 1996), “Schegloff versus Wetherell and Billig” 
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(Schegloff, 1997; 1998; 1999); (Wetherell, 1998); (Billig, 1999a; 1999b); or 
“Tyrwhitt-Drake versus Flowerdew” (Tyrwhitt-Drake, 1999); (Flowerdew, 1999). As 
Widdowson argues, CDA takes for granted specific ideological constructs that are not 
empirically accounted for as if they could be read off straight from the texts. By producing 
alternative, and equally plausible, analysis to one of Fairclough’s texts, Widdowson 
successfully manages to equate the interpretation typically practised in CDA research to the 
approach employed in literary criticism, thus throwing into question the whole 
methodological apparatus of CDA.  
 
In response to this accusation, CDA advocates readily admit that: 
The application of contextualisation criteria is less strict in CDA than in other 
approaches such as CA [Conversation Analysis] and that [in CDA] there is no hesitation 
in examining text and context separately […]. Once a feature of context has been 
observed, postulated or otherwise identified, CDA may be used to explore whether or 
how such a feature affects, or is affected by, structures of text and talk (Van Dijk, 1999 
p. 460).  
 
Furthermore, CDA scholars confess their pride in being biased (Van Dijk, 2001a) arguing 
that no research approach can ever be entirely neutral in terms of ideology (Billig, 1999a; 
Fairclough, 1996). In their view, CDA does not (and should not) preclude the possibility of 
alternative interpretations of texts, provided that these can be judged plausible (Flowerdew, 
1999). Another common reaction from the CDA side is that in pragmatics and 
sociolinguistics research, context variables are somewhat naively correlated with an 
autonomous system of language (Wodak, 2001a); (Kress & Hodge, 1979); (Van Dijk, 1999) 
because these approaches tend to ignore the fact that texts are always ideologically loaded 




Yet more revealing and incisive criticism on the nature of CDA’s ideological bias has come 
from Hammersley where he discusses the philosophical foundations of CDA and argues that 
a critical approach geared to serve a specific political agenda is nothing but controversial: 
“CDA does not only adopt a critical stance towards research products but also towards the 
social phenomena it studies. As a result, the criteria that guide this criticism are not just 
cognitive but also valuational” (Hammersley, 1996 p. 240). One should be ready to concede 
that no entirely objective analysis may be possible in social science research because such 
analysis will inevitably be constructed from a particular rhetorical standpoint. Yet, 
objectivity is a matter of extent. The fact that it cannot be achieved in absolute terms should 
not prevent us from seeking more scientific ways of analysing and interpreting texts. 
Individual texts may offer multiple interpretations. One way of justifying our interpretation is 
to have more comparison across texts, something CDA often fails to do (Stubbs, 1997). 
 
A third type of criticism is connected with how the interdisciplinarity advocated by CDA 
practitioners is actually implemented in their research. Interdisciplinary work is often 
presented in deliberately vague terms in CDA and given the heterogeneity of theories and 
methodologies employed in this field it seems difficult to classify CDA as an independent 
area of study: 
Indeed, heterogeneity of methodological and theoretical approaches represented in 
this field of linguistics would tend to confirm Van Dijk’s point that CDA and CL ‘are 
at most a shared perspective on doing linguistic, semiotic or discourse analysis 
(Wodak, 2001a p. 2). 
 
Undoubtedly CDA has set itself an enormous task in trying to analyse the connection 
between language use and social theory. Such a task requires broad research aims and 
categories of analysis as well as a strong interdisciplinary vocation. But this should not mean 
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one should uncritically embrace interdisciplinarity without carefully considering the 
methodological challenges of interdisciplinary work. This is because different disciplines 
may not share similar goals or epistemological foundations and may tend to utilize different 
methods of data collection and analysis. In view of the unbridled eclecticism demonstrated in 
its research and disparity of methodological approaches employed, sometimes without any 
rigour, CDA has been accused of “not having any metamethod [and] no way of separating 
the correct and the useful from the banal” (Frawley, 1987 p. 363). Admittedly, no single 
discipline or methodology can handle this micro-macro relationship between language use 
and social practice satisfactorily. This requires some mediation across disciplinary domains 
not exempt from problems, as CDA practitioners have occasionally acknowledged (Wodak, 
2001a). In addressing such problems, they advocate an integrated model of interdisciplinarity 
where different disciplinary approaches are treated as interdependent in the context of 
problem-oriented research (Weiss & Wodak, 2003). And yet one cannot fail to notice how 
methodological caution in cross-disciplinary work is easily overlooked in some CDA 
research where loud calls for taking discourse analysis beyond linguistics into the realm of 
social theory serve to mask mediocre research build upon the frailest of empirical 
foundations. 
 
One final type of criticism against CDA has to do with the lack of a diachronic dimension in 
most of the work (Toolan, 1997; Blommaert, 2005). This is so despite the fact that it is not 
possible to demonstrate large-scale social practices and processes on the basis of empirical 
data not only restricted in size and scope, as we have seen before, but also in time range 
(Blommaert & Bulcaen, 2000). The discourse-historical approach developed by Wodak and 
her associates (Wodak, 1995; Van Leeuwen & Wodak, 1999) constitutes an important 
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exception. For instance, in their study of Austrian national identity Wodak et al (1999) aimed 
at tracing the intertextual history of phrases and arguments. The method combined the 
linguistic analysis of original documents, ethnographic research about the past, in the form of 
interviews with war veterans, and the analysis of contemporary news reporting and political 
discourse. Nevertheless, one can say the incorporation of historical research and/or the 
diachronic analysis of intertextuality is fairly rare not only in CDA but also in other forms of 
discourse analysis. 
 
Many of these methodological shortcomings found in CDA could be addressed by 
introducing a corpus-oriented discourse analytical approach combining the more qualitative 
top-down analysis prevalent in discourse studies with the quantitative empirically-driven 
analysis of corpus linguistics (CL). First, CL tools help us reduce our cognitive bias when 
doing discourse analysis (Baker, 2006). The methodology employed in CL favours 
objectivity in that at the starting point of our analysis, data are not selected in an “ad hoc” 
fashion by the analyst in order to confirm existing biases. Second, the use of a corpus 
enhances the representativity of our data by bringing a quantitative dimension to our analysis. 
CL tools allow us to gain a much firmer grasp on the analysis of intertextuality patterns and 
trends than the intuitive and impressionistic methods so often employed in CDA. Hundreds 
of concordance lines no doubt provide a much more compelling evidence of underlying 
hegemonic discourses than isolated examples, allowing us to make reliable generalizations 
about language use (Stubbs, 1997). Third, while revealing what is typical in a particular 
discourse, corpus data can unveil the existence of counter-examples that may constitute proof 
of resistance discourses and can help us discriminate between what may be hegemonic from 
what may be anecdotal or counter-hegemonic. Fourth, the use of CL offers the benefit of 
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providing a more standardized method of analysis instead of the more “ad hoc” approaches 
often found in CDA. This way CL contributes to enhance the replicability of methods of 
analysis and the reliability of results (Stubbs, 1996; 1997). Finally, corpus-based studies 
have the potential of providing a much needed diachronic dimension to the analysis of 
discourse. Incorporating this historical dimension to discourse analysis is important because 
discourse and society are not static constructs. They evolve over time. 
 
CL approaches are not free from methodological weaknesses and risks, though. The first 
problem every corpus linguist confronts has to do with corpus design, as the results of our 
research are only as good as the corpus one has utilized (Sinclair, 1991). Basic issues such as 
the size of the corpus, its contents (the extent to which those contents are relevant and 
balanced or whether the corpus has been compiled for the purposes of the research or a 
publicly available corpus has been employed); whether the corpus has been annotated or not 
etc., can be critical. Practical considerations such as the material and human resources, 
copyright issues or the timeframe available for research always condition the content and the 
size of the corpus, especially if one is compiling one’s own corpus. Another important 
consideration has to do with the purpose of our research. Arguably, producing a dictionary 
requires a type of corpus very different from the one we would need to study the construction 
of Spanish identities. Tidier purpose-built corpora may offer some advantages over larger 
reference corpora in studying how specific social practices are enacted through text. Being 
more homogeneous, they minimize the effects of contextual differences enhancing the 
quantitative analysis of relevant discursive features. They also facilitate the diachronic 
analysis of intertextual patterns and trends in relation to key historical events adding 
considerable explanatory power to our analysis. Tidiness and tightness, however, should not 
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constitute an excuse for ad hoc approaches in corpus compilation. As far as possible, when 
compiling a corpus, one should avoid the problems associated with corpus-based research 
approaches, “a methodology that uses corpus evidence mainly as a repository of examples to 
expound, test or exemplify given theoretical statements” (Tognini-Bonelli, 2001 p. 10) and 
comply instead with the criteria of corpus-driven research “where the corpus is used beyond 
the selection of examples to support or quantify a pre-existing theoretical category” (ibid, p. 
11). In other words, texts should not be selected by the researcher on the basis of personal 
preference or convenience, as often happens in CDA, but rather should be chosen according 
to standard objective contextual and linguistic criteria. In view of this, a compromise solution 
has been adopted in selecting the texts for the corpus, making use of categorisations such as 
source, genre, year of publication and main discursive space and employing a lexical search 
query to minimise bias (see pages 241-242).  
 
Another problem is the excessive dependence CL has on lexical evidence in doing DA, 
where the node word and its collocates often constitute the starting as well as the end point of 
the analysis (Koller & Mautner, 2004). Arguably, some forms of discourse may be more 
amenable to the kind of phraseological quantitative analysis CL provides than others. Also, if 
we limit our analysis to words and phrases, we run the risk of misjudging the impact of 
certain themes because these can be realized through different vocabulary or we may 
overlook linguistic phenomena operating beyond the delicate level of lexis, such as 
transitivity, modality, stance, recurrent topoi, etc. (Stubbs & Gerbig, 1993). While 
concordance analysis may reveal the existence of such phenomena, one may need to broaden 
the scope of the analysis to the level of whole-text for more accurate assessment to take place. 
A third type of risk associated with quantitative discourse analytical approaches is conflating 
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sheer frequency with hegemonic discourses (Baker, 2006). We should take into account that 
different texts carry different weight depending on “who says what” and that sometimes what 
remains unsaid is more important than what is said because a hegemonic discourse can be 
more powerful when it is taken for granted and is not contested. A case in point would be 
Billig’s work on Banal Nationalism (Billig, 1995). Also, corpus-oriented studies often 
neglect broader aspects typical of qualitative approaches such as the conditions of production 
and reception of texts or the analysis of genres. 
 
In conclusion, all this points towards a need for combining the quantitative 
empirically-driven analysis of CL with the more qualitative top-down analysis prevalent in 
discourse studies. However, since the qualitative methods of CDA may often be at odds with 
the predominantly quantitative methodology employed by CL (Orpin, 2005), we need clearer 
guidelines to help us integrate both approaches effectively and make best use of the 
synergies such integration may generate. While corpus-oriented discourse analysis can 
enhance objectivity and help reduce the gap between the textual and the social, it needs to be 
supplemented with the study of the historically evolving contextual milieu in which text 
production and reception is situated. Also, social practice at the macro level cannot be 
adequately explained through bottom-up empirical analysis due to its sheer complexity. Its 
constitutive processes and structures are the result of complex chains of causes and effects 
operating at higher levels of time-space. As such, they may be analysed nomothetically but 
cannot be explained ideographically because they defy quantification. This does not 
undermine the potential corpus-based discourse studies offer for a more solid empirical 
foundation in social science research. The last section summarizes the main conclusions 
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reached in this chapter and outlines a methodology for studying the discursive construction 
of the Spanish nation. 
 
 2.6. A methodology for analysing of the discursive construction of the nation  
It was concluded in chapter one that nations are social constructs and that nation-building is 
carried out discursively. It was also argued that the discursive construction of the nation as a 
historical process occurred in modern times, although not all its building blocks are 
necessarily modern. This chapter has presented a theoretical model to explain how this 
discursive construction of the nation operates. Let me summarize what has been said before 
outlining a methodology for the study of nation-building in Spain.  
 
Nation-building is said to be enacted discursively, in terms of observable social practices 
situated across time-space. Such practices consist of multimodal semiotic work structured at 
different levels which in turn operate at different scales according to Giddens’s theory of 
social structuration. At the lowest level we have myriad micro-events and event chains, such 
as the regular presence of flags in official buildings. Events such as these are enacted by 
reflexive social agents across dynamically inter-related social domains. The continuous 
reproduction of micro-events gives rise to processes operating at the meso-structural level in 
the timescale of conjuncture: see, for instance, the decentralization process Spain has 
experienced after 1975. At the macro level of structuration, we have highly abstract 
agent-less phenomena situated at the longue durée, such as time-space distanciation, identity 
or territorialization. As Sewel (2005) explains, structures such as these consist of a duality of 
virtual cultural schema and actual resources which both enable and constrain social action at 
the meso and micro levels. Ideographic analysis, based on first-hand experiences grounded 
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on a strong empirical basis, is the preferred method in studying micro-events. 
Meso-processes are less susceptible to idiographic analysis than micro-events because they 
may operate along complex chains of causes and effects situated across different realms of 
the social, while the analysis of macro-structures can only be nomothetic, based on deductive 
generalization and rational argumentation.  
 
Nation-building resulted from two inter-related phenomena. The first of these was the 
profound socio-economic changes of structural nature defined as “modernisation” leading to 
the emergence of a national mode of organization. A defining structure of modernisation was 
the progressive distanciation between time and space where social action increasingly 
transcended the realm of the local. This turned nations into imaginable communities where 
the State was able to exercise its homogeneising action over a territory in different phases, 
described by Taylor (2003) as “power container”, “wealth container”, “cultural container” 
and “social container”. Another key process of modernisation was the rise and consolidation 
of capitalism and industrialization in which Nation-States have operated as key political units. 
The second phenomenon implicated in nation-building was the nationalist mobilization led 
by the State and its elites which resulted in the emergence and diffusion of national 
narratives giving rise to more or less hegemonic identity discourses. 
 
On the basis of these insights, I propose a discourse-oriented methodology to study 
nation-building in Spain combining the historical analysis of social structures, processes and 
events implicated in this construction with the study of national narratives during specific 
periods. Such a methodology would integrate the nomothetic and idiographic modes of 
analysis enabling me to test hypothesis and draw generalizations based on concrete empirical 
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evidence. On the one hand, I will examine the specific conditions present in the historical 
development of the national mode of organization in Spain, with particular emphasis on the 
effects derived from State-building and modernisation. This will consist of a critical review 
of historical accounts of Spanish nation-building and modernisation. The approach adopted 
here will be predominantly nomothetic given the structural complexity and higher level of 
abstraction of the phenomena being examined, although the discussion will be illustrated 
with concrete evidence from different periods. On the other hand, I will research the nature 
and level of nationalist mobilization by examining the construction of national narratives and 
analyse the extent to which more or less hegemonic nationalist discourses have led to the 
emergence and consolidation of specific forms of Spanish identity. In researching this aspect 
of nation-building, I will combine the nomothetic analysis of the historical conditions present 
in the formulation of such narratives with the idiographic commentary of such narratives 
based on concrete examples. This broader historical analysis will be complemented with a 
more focused quantitative empirical study of recent national narratives from the Spanish 
press. The idea is to triangulate the qualitative analysis of national narratives against a 
“quantitative snapshot” of how these narratives have been constructed in Spain in recent 
years based on data extracted from a large corpus of newspaper articles.  
 
As argued before, this corpus-oriented discourse analytical approach can be a valid 
methodology for text-based analyses of social issues as it addresses some of the 
methodological shortcomings derived from alternative methods of discourse analysis and 
discourse-based historical research: it provides an objective method of text selection 
enhancing the representativity of our data; it offers a standardized replicable method of 
linguistic analysis and it allows us to make reliable generalizations about language used 
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based on large amounts of data, revealing what is typical in a discourse without neglecting 
the existence of counter-examples which may constitute proof of anecdotal or 
counter-hegemonic discourses. Ideally this corpus-based approach to text analysis should be 
applied to different historical periods. This is not possible due to the limitations in the scope 
of this research. The hope is to lay the foundation for future studies where the present 
findings could be contrasted against additional evidence.  
 
I provide in chapter three a historical introduction to the development of the national mode of 
organization in Spain and I discuss the extent to which more or less consolidated Spanish 
identity discourses could emerge during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries by reviewing 
the work of historians, economists, sociologists and political scientists, with particular 
emphasis on macro structures and processes supplemented with concrete examples from 
specific periods. In Chapters four and five the emphasis will be on the micro. I will 
concentrate on the corpus-based discourse analysis of recent national narratives in the 
Spanish press. The approach adopted here will combine the more quantitative, lexically 
oriented methodology of corpus linguistics with the qualitative analysis of entire texts. Such 
approach is said to help us minimize the micro-macro gap by favouring objectivity and 
representativity and providing a more balanced and comprehensive method of linguistic 








This chapter discusses the historical process of Spanish nation-building from a broad 
social-semiotic perspective, examining two key phenomena implicated in the discursive 
construction of the nation, as theorized by Recalde (1982). The first one is the development 
of the national mode of organization, a concept influenced by Gellner’s modernisation theory 
(Gellner, 1996; 1997). It can be defined as the social structures, institutions, processes and 
practices which emerged across different territories in Europe as a result of the dissolution of 
the old medieval world. On the one hand, the national mode of organization brought a 
re-configuration of the geographical scales in which key social practices were enacted, from 
the local to the national. On the other hand, it constituted the milieu upon which the second 
phenomenon implicated in nation-building operated: that of nationalist mobilization in the 
form of narratives which constituted the basis of national identities. Recalde (1982) stresses 
that while the national mode of organization prepared the ground for the formation and 
diffusion of national identities, it did not pre-determine any concrete forms of nationhood, 
which ultimately depended on the consolidation of institutions associated with hegemonic 
discourses of the nation over a bounded territory. That explains why in the Spanish case we 
have seen competing national identities.  
 
In Spain, as in the case of the old political constructs described by Hobsbawm (1990), 
State-building went hand in hand with the development of the national mode of organization. 
Spain can be considered a political and territorial nation sprouting from a State which 
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 centuries (de Blas Guerrero, 1989; García Cárcel 2002). That State began its 
transformation into a Nation-State mainly towards the second half of the 18
th
 century as a 
result of the discursive processes and practices which continue nowadays as nation-building 
in Spain is being reproduced, and also contested, on a daily basis through social action 
structured at different scales, as theorized by Giddens (1984).  
 
Based on this assumption, I will discuss the development of the national mode of 
organization and nationalist mobilization along the phases identified by Taylor (2003) 
inspired in the metaphor of the State as a “container”, gradually capable of articulating an 
increasing number and variety of social relations within a bounded territory (Sack, 1983; 
Johnston, 1991). I will examine the extent to which this complex process of territorialisation 
was accomplished successfully in Spain while acknowledging that State-building should be 
studied as part of a broader phenomenon of time-space re-organisation associated with the 
expansion of the capitalist world-system along the three globalization phases identified by 
Karsten (2013): terrestrial, industrial and electronic globalization. My discussion will be 
centred in the nomothetic analysis of the more general aspects of Spanish nation-building 
illustrated with concrete examples from different periods. Figure 3.1 illustrates the main 
phases of this territorialization characterized by the growing presence of the State in 




Figure 3.1.  
 
 
Phases in the discursive construction of the nation  
 
Late Modernity 
- Trans-national scale 
- Trans-national sovereignties 
- Global Post-Fordist capitalism 
- Advanced urbanization, 
communications & transportation 
- Identity  under challenge 
Modern Times 
- National scale 
- Nation-State as cultural container 
& social container 
- National identities 
- Industrial capitalism 
- Growing urbanization, 
communications & transportation 
Early Modern Times 
- Trans-local scale 
- State as power container 
- State as wealth container 
- Commercial capitalism 
Medieval Times 
- Local scale 
- Fragmentation of social 
relations 
- Patrimonial State 
- Property entailment 
- Religious & local identities 
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This transformation cannot be conceptualized in linear terms but in progressively 
incremental ones. Hearn captures the essence of this cumulative view of social evolution 
advocated here: 
The story of our social evolution is not so much one of progressing through stages, 
marching from one social form to the next, but rather one of overlaying of older forms 
with newer ones, such that principles that were once dominant in governing human 
behavior are not so much replaced as encysted within new and more complex forms, in 
which what were once minor principles (centralized redistribution, market exchanges) 
become dominant ones (Hearn, 2006 p. 65).  
 
Accordingly, structures like geographical scales do not vanish over time. Rather, once a 
different scale emerges as the preferred locus for the enactment of social practices, such as 
those implicated in nation-building, the alternative scales where those practices were 
previously anchored may become less active, although they may be re-activated in future if 
circumstances demand so. First we see States emerging as power containers out of the 
fragmented medieval polities during early modern times. Anchored in the local scale, the 
medieval order was characterized among other things by a fixed hierarchical God-ordained 
society; by a patrimonial idea of the polity rather than a socio-cultural one; by the 
co-existence of royal and seigneurial powers where the king was primus inter pares; by the 
prevalence of local laws, taxes and customs; by great cultural and linguistic diversity and by 
the prevalence of religion in conforming identities. Initially we see how the power of the 
king grows at the expense of the nobility and the State appears increasingly able to maintain 
peace within its territory and wage war outside its borders in competition with rival States, 
thanks to its ability to collect taxes and mobilize its subjects for service in the army.  
 
A second phase during the early modern period saw the State expanding as a wealth 
container as the capitalist world-economy emerged, first as mercantilism and later 
 121 
 
transformed into industrial capitalism. This marked the beginning of a process which 
culminated in the establishment of national economies in the context of an increasingly 
centralized State based on a more cohesive legal and governance framework in the regions; 
greater territorial control supported by a growing bureaucracy, an army as well as a growing 
urbanization resulting from the rural exodus supported by better communications and 
transport infrastructure.  
 
In the third phase the State expanded into a “cultural container”. People were assimilated into 
a national culture as a result of the nationalist mobilization articulated by the State and by the 
elites captured in national narratives. The formation of national identities followed the 
sequence of penetration, integration, participation and identity (Linz, 1973), also made 
possible by the spread of literacy among the masses and the growing secularization of the 
society, where the Christian God co-existed with a secular god in many people’s hearts: that 
of the fatherland, its symbols and myths. Various institutions and institutionalized practices 
would play a key role in the nationalization of the masses. One was the education system, 
responsible for establishing a national curriculum chiefly aimed at turning individuals into 
nationals. Another one was a conscript army where patriotic values were promoted among 
people irrespective of their social class and geographical provenance. The mass media also 
contributed to the construction of national identities in a visible way, by narrating the nation 
according to their ideology, and in a covert way, by situating their discourse at the national 
scale. 
 
The Nation-State would assume the role of “social container” towards the second half of the 
20
th
 century. This was the result of the progressive democratization of the State and the 
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re-distribution of wealth made possible by capitalist expansion in the era of the welfare 
States, thanks to a more efficacious taxation and a greater emphasis on social cohesion in 
State policies. The culmination of this process however has seen the supremacy of the 
Nation-State being questioned after the re-scaling of economic practices at the trans-national 
level, something that will be briefly discussed in this thesis.  
 
The central argument presented in this chapter partly deviates from those who regard 
construction of the nation in Spain as an outright failure (Colomer, 2006; 2008). A moderate 
position is adopted where Spanish nation-building is conceptualized as weak and 
problematic: 
Spain therefore is a case of early State-building where the political, social and cultural 
integration of its territorial components –nation-building- was not fully accomplished 
(Linz, 1973 p. 33).  
 
Spain’s deficient nation-building is made evident by the emergence of alternative 
nationalisms in Catalonia, the Basque Country and, to a lesser extent, Galicia during the 
second half of the 19
th
 century and their consolidation after that. These centrifugal 
movements, which have co-existed with different discourses of Spanish nationalism since the 
19
th
 century, regained strength after Francoism and have pursued alternative national projects 
in the regions under their influence which are antagonistic to those advocated by mainstream 
españolismo. 
 
In the following sections, I discuss some inter-related structures and processes influencing 
the discursive construction of the nation in Spain. I start by analysing the role played by 
geography in nation-building. I explore, in connection with this, the geographical and 
cultural concept of Hispania in Spanish historiography as an important component of 
 123 
 
identity discourse. I will also discuss the following factors implicated in the problematic 
process of national construction in Spain: 
 
1. The failure in constructing a viable unitary State during the 18th and 20th centuries despite 
repeated attempts, rooted in the different political and social configurations of the 
Spanish kingdoms in medieval times; the continuing political separation of the Crowns 
during the Habsburg period, and the complex transition from a world empire into a 
Nation-State experienced in Spain. 
2. The problematic process of economic and social modernisation as the Ancien Régime 
was substituted by a modern society with a liberal system of property rights and a truly 
national community slowly emerged as a result of industrialization, developments in 
transportation and communications, urbanization, mass education and the increasing 
bureaucratization of the State. It will be argued that Spain’s modernisation was late in 
comparison to that of most European countries and also uneven, due to the decline of the 
Castilian centre in favour of the periphery.  
3. The lack of consensus on a hegemonic national discourse beginning with the failed 
liberal revolution during the nineteenth century, accompanied by a highly contested 
secularization process. This resulted in antagonistic national identity discourses at the 
centre and at the periphery which continue to exist nowadays. 
 
3.1. Geography and nation-building in Spain 
Geography constitutes a key structure in any territorialization process of nation-building 
characterized by the increasing ability of the State to exercise its control over a bounded 
territory, regulating and integrating social practices. As Braudel (1988) and Weber (1976) 
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emphasise with reference to France, geography conditioned how human action transformed 
what originally was a conglomerate of loosely connected peoples, once subjects of one king, 
into a modern community of citizens with equal rights and duties, conscious of constituting a 
nation. The role played by geography in Spain can be examined along the same lines. Juliana 
Ricart (2012) argues that Spanish nationalization has been weakest on the periphery, in what 
he calls “España foral” and “España asimilada” (Figure 3.2). 
 
 Figure 3.2.  




Spain shares with Portugal the Iberian Peninsula, surrounded by the Mediterranean Sea, the 
Atlantic Ocean and the Bay of Biscay and separated from France by the Pyrenees. Spain is 
the second largest country in Western Europe after France, with a total area of 505,370 sq. 
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. Figure 3.3 shows the map of the Iberian Peninsula. Whereas the Pyrenees practically 
sever Spain from France with their imposing height, there is no apparent natural border 
between Spain and Portugal. Far from that, the Iberian Peninsula appears as a distinct and yet 
highly complex unit, as Spain and Portugal share rivers, mountain ranges, climates and a 
similar rural structure. This geographical substratum can be analysed in connection with the 
opposing tendencies towards political unity and atomization present throughout history in the 
context of a problematic historical process of Spanish nation-building. 
 
Figure 3.3.  
 




In fact, the Iberian peninsula had already been identified as a geographical entity throughout 
Antiquity under a variety of names (Benito Ruano, 1998): Anaku, Meschesch, Tarschisch, 
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 The world Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency 2012 (retrieved on 18-5-12) 
16
 Source: NASA visible earth (retrieved on 18-5-12) 
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Hesperia, Ophioussa, Iberia, I-schephan-im and eventually, in Roman times, Hispania, 
divided into three provinces around 27 B.C (figure 3.4) and later on into five provinces 
(figure 3.5).  
Figure 3.4.  





                                                 
17
 Source: http://bib.cervantesvirtual.com/portal/antigua/img_hispaniaromana.shtml (retrieved on 18-5-12) 
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Figure 3.5.  








The concept of Hispania also appears in early narratives like Isidore’s Laus Hispanie where 
the virtues of a land blessed by nature inhabited by noble people are exalted in the context of 
an identification of Hispania with the Regnum Gothorum, a connection also found in the 
works of bishop Julián de Toledo (circa 642-690) (García Moreno, 2005). The idea of la 
pérdida de España
19
 after the Muslim invasion in 711 and the Re-conquest initiated with the 
legendary battle of Covadonga reinforced the identification between Hispania and Visigoth 
Spain proclaimed in the Chronicon Albeldensis and the Chronicle of Alfonso III, where the 
Kingdom of Asturias is considered the continuation of the Visigoth monarchy (Suárez 
Fernández, 2005; Benito Ruano, 2005). In view of this, it has been suggested that this 
geographical concept of Hispania dating back to ancient times could constitute the basis for 
defining complex historical realities like that of Spain as it is understood nowadays (Ladero 
                                                 
18
 Source: www.regmurcia.com/servlet/s.Sl?sit=c,373,m,2916&r=ReP-26546-DETALLE_REPORTAJES 
(retrieved on 19-5-12) 
19
 The loss of Spain.  
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Quesada, 1994; 1998). This is the argument of those scholars associated with a perennialist 
conception of nationhood, claiming that a certain idea of Spain as a historical and cultural 
community was already present in people’s minds, at least amongst an elite, long before the 
modern Spanish Nation-State emerged (Castro, 1954); (Marías, 1985); (Comellas & Suárez 
Fernández, 2003); (Bueno, 2005).  
 
As discussed before (pp. 17-18), much of the evidence presented in support of this 
evolutionary view of nationhood comes from the analysis of how the concept of Spain was 
formulated in the medieval chronicles of the different kingdoms in the Iberian Peninsula 
(Maravall Casesnoves, 1954); (Suárez Fernández, 2000; 2005); (Valdeón Baruque, 2005). 
González Antón (2007) argues that the formulation of such a concept was by no means 
univocal. Rather, its nature was often overarching and polysemic, usually referring to a 
particular kingdom which was considered part of a broader historical and cultural reality 
pre-dating the Muslim invasion. In other words, the medieval Spanish kingdoms tended to be 
perceived as parts of a diverse Spain where political, juridical and cultural differences 
reigned. Interestingly, the fact that Portugal was an integral part of Hispania is conveniently 
overlooked in many perennialist accounts of Spanish nationhood where history is seen as an 
uninterrupted continuum and crucial differences between periods are usually minimized, if 
not blatantly ignored. In fact, in the last 1,300 years, we only see a relatively brief period of 
political union of all the territories once constituting Hispania: when the kingdoms of 
Castile-Leon, Aragon, Navarre and Portugal were ruled by the same kings between 1580 and 
1640. Although the discourse of a hypothetical Iberian Union has resurfaced from time to 
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time among Portuguese and Spanish groups over the last two hundred years or so,
20
 the fact 
that such union never materialized, and also the fact that Spanish nationhood remains a 
controversial issue within Spain, can partly be explained by this tension between unity and 
diversity rooted in Iberian geography.  
 
Despite enjoying a certain sense of unity derived from its relative geographical isolation 
from the rest of Europe, there are also features in the geography of the Iberian Peninsula 
which inhibit communication, favouring diversity and fragmentation: the average altitude of 
the peninsula, 660 meters compared to France’s average of 340 meters, makes Spain the 
second highest territory in Europe after Switzerland (López Gómez 1998). This no doubt 
conditioned the development of an efficient transportation system in Spain, as the markedly 
different profiles of the railway connection between Paris and Madrid illustrate (figure 3.6). 
 
Figure 3.6.  
  
 Topographic profile of the railway Paris-Madrid via Irun (López Gómez, 1998) 
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 The last time it was a survey conducted at the University of Salamanca where one out of three Spaniards and 
almost 40% of the Portuguese asked would support an Iberian Union. Source: 




Similarly, inland communications have traditionally been inhibited by a lack of navigable 




 centuries, due to poor 
planning or financial problems. If we add to this the fact that Spain’s modernisation process 





centuries, to be discussed later on, one may assume how this combination of geographical 
and economic factors played a significant role in the comparatively weak nationalization of 
Spain. As Ruiz explains: 
Look at a map of Spain and you will see a series of subregions in which political, 
linguistic, social and cultural boundaries run parallel to the geographical contours of the 
land. Follow the slopes of the mountain ranges, the edges of the great plains and the 
courses of the rivers, and you will find the topographical features sorting themselves 
into subdivisions which often (but not always) coalesce into particular political entities, 
or which, in an age of fragmented political autonomy, become individual Spains within 
the larger context of the peninsular State (Ruiz, 2001, p. 11).  
 
3.2. Early State-building and the emergence of the national mode of organisation 
(1469-1716) 
This section discusses the transformation of the atomized polities which emerged in the 
Iberian Peninsula during the Reconquista into pre-national forms of Statehood. This process 
became apparent during the second half of the 15
th
 century, continued with mixed results 
during the Habsburgs and intensified with the Bourbons during the 18
th
 century. The last 
decades of the 15
th
 century and the opening years of the 16th constitute an important 
milestone. Many of the changes, and also continuities, occurring then shaped for better or 
worse the nature of what would become the modern Spanish nation. On a positive note, as 
Elliott insightfully argues, Spain’s old-age shortcomings, its geographical obstacles, its 
fragmented and complex nature, suddenly seemed to have been overcome and what for so 
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long had largely been a mere geographical expression, was transformed into an historical 
fact: 
For a few fabulous decades Spain was to be the greatest power on earth. During those 
decades it would be all but the master of Europe; it would colonize vast new overseas 
territories; it would devise a governmental system to administer the largest, and most 
widely dispersed, empire the world had yet seen; and it would produce a highly 
distinctive civilization, which was to make a unique contribution to the cultural tradition 
of Europe (Elliott, 1990 p. 13). 
 
And yet, despite the positive effects brought by Spain’s ascension to the world stage in terms 
of political, economic and military power, I will argue that further to the obstacles posed by 
an intricate geography, the development of the national mode of organization was affected 
by a number of factors: One of these was the deeply-rooted differences between Castile and 
Aragon concerning their distinct political and social configuration and their often 
contradictory historical evolution. Such differences and contradictions did not abate with the 
union of the Crowns under the Catholic Monarchs. On the contrary, they continued as a 
result of their preservationist policies and those of the Habsburgs, despite some timid 
attempts to bring the administration of the realms closer (Sánchez Albornoz, 1973). Another 
factor was the dynamics generated by Spain’s imperial status, still rooted in many respects in 
a pre-modern patrimonial conception of the State (Bernal, 2005). These dynamics were not 
always conducive towards greater political integration within Spain as we will see.  
 
García Cárcel (2002, p. 9) uses the expression “España horizontal” to describe this period of 
“federalism and pluralism” under the composite monarchy of the Habsburgs, as opposed to 





 This idealized interpretation of horizontal Spain, shared by Lluch 
(1999), has been questioned by González Antón (2007) who considers that García Cárcel 
sees federal pacts, regional liberties and constitutional government versus centralism and 
Absolutism where he should have seen the resistance of the local oligarchy rooted in a 
feudalizing horizontal model against modern Absolutism, which González Antón considers 
part and parcel of the State-building process leading towards the construction of the modern 
Nation-States. Regardless of which of the two interpretations one may prefer, García 
Cárcel’s distinction between a horizontal and a vertical Spain remains valid in that it points 
to a multi-directional and contradictory process of nation-building.     
 
At the start of this long transformational process we have a series of independent kingdoms 
which had originated in the Iberian Peninsula during the Christian expansion against Islam 
known as the Reconquista (figure 3.7). The Reconquista brought a sense of common purpose 
to the peoples of “Spain” who had joined forces against Islam. Testimonies in this respect 
abound: from the idea of “loss” and “recuperation” of Hispania found in medieval chronicles, 
to the various enthusiastic declarations of unity (González Antón, 2007). Take for instance 
the remark of the town councillors of Barcelona made in a letter to those of Seville on the 
occasion of the marriage between Ferdinand and Isabella: “now […] we are all brothers” 
(Elliott, 1990 p. 24); or Joan Margarit i Pau’s congratulatory words in the prologue of his 
Paralipomenon Hispaniae, dedicated to the Catholic Monarchs: 
[…] con vuestro enlace matrimonial habéis devuelto aquella unidad que desde tiempos 
de los romanos y de los visigodos había perdido” (quoted in González Antón, 2007 p. 
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 This was the year when the Nueva Planta Decree for Catalonia which sought to centralize Spain under the 
Castilian model was issued. Similar decrees had been issued in 1707 for Aragon and Valencia in 1707 and 
Majorca in 1715.  
22
 With your marriage you have restored that unity lost since the times of the Romans and the Visigoths.   
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Or, as Peter Martyr d’Anghiera remarked in a letter in 1489 after observing the Christian 
armies: 
Who would have thought that the Galician, the proud Asturian and the rude inhabitant 
of the Pyrenees would be mixing freely with Toledans, people of La Mancha, and 
Andalusians, living in harmony and obedience, like members of one family, speaking 
the same language and subject to one common discipline? (López de Toro, 1953) 
(quoted in Kamen, 2003 p.17). 
 
Figure 3.7.  
The Iberian Peninsula: 1270-1492 
 
Notwithstanding this sense of shared identity based on the idea of being part of an 
over-arching territorial, historical and cultural reality, these were, like elsewhere in Europe, 
socially stratified polities ultimately conceived as patrimonial States, where the kings saw 
their powers constrained by a powerful nobility and where the struggle for hegemony often 
resulted in matrimonial alliances between dynastic houses. Some effects of this lack of 
strong and centralized power were political atomization; the absence of a unified legal 
system; a fragmented economy and cultural heterogeneity, as illustrated by the fact that 
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linguistic borders were imprecise and that different codes were employed in the same 
territory depending on the context, the audience and the genre employed (Moreno Fernández, 
2005).  
 
The union between Castile and Aragon resulting from the marriage between Isabella and 
Ferdinand in 1469 represented an important step towards political unity although this was 
not yet the union of two peoples, something unimaginable in an epoch characterized by 
social fragmentation, but of two royal houses linked by close family ties.
23
 Although they 
shared the same monarchs, Castile and Aragon retained their own institutions, political 
organizations and distinct ways of life. Historians generally agree that these long-standing 
differences between the kingdoms, together with their often contradictory historical 
evolution would hamper the process of building a unitary Nation-State attempted from the 
18
th
 century onwards.  
 
When the dynastic union between Aragon and Castile materialized, it represented an unequal 
partnership on many accounts. The differences in size, demographics, social structure, 
political organization, economics, and historical trajectory between the two sides would 
condition the process of State-building in Spain for centuries to come. The kingdom of 
Castile was considerably larger and more populated than the Kingdom of Aragon. Its 
378,000 Sq.-km. represented two thirds of the Iberian Peninsula, about three times the size of 
Aragon (Ruiz Almansa, 1943). Population estimates at the time vary considerably. In any 
case, even the most conservative figures leave no doubt as to the demographic imbalance 
between the two kingdoms. Comellas and Suárez Fernández (2003) estimate that Castile had 
                                                 
23
 Ferdinand and Isabella were in fact second cousins. Aragon had been ruled by a junior branch of the 
Castilian House of Trastámara since the compromise of Caspe in 1412, after the death of Martin I, the Humane, 
who had died sonless.   
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a population between 3 and 4 million by 1348 compared to 1 million in Aragon and 80,000 
in Navarre. Alvar (1996) suggests a population for Castile of 4,300,000 (82%), 855,000 for 
Aragon (16%) and 100,000 for Navarre (2%) towards the beginning of the 16
th 
century while 
Elliot (1990) estimates a population for Castile between 5 and 6 million inhabitants 
compared to 1 million in Aragon during the same period. By the end of the 16
th
 century, Ruiz 
Almansa (1943) calculates a population of 8,304,000 (84.33%) for the kingdom of Castile, 
1,358,000 (13.79) for the kingdom of Aragon and 185,000 (1.87%) for Navarre. The latter 
also suggests a higher population density for Castile (22 inhabitants per Sq.-km.), compared 
to 13.6 in Aragon, something difficult to imagine after the demographic shift of the 18
th
 
century which saw the displacement of the population from the centre to the periphery, as we 
will see later on.  
 
Despite its social and political turmoil in previous decades, Castile’s future would prove to 
be brighter than that of Aragon during the next two hundred years. According to Elliott 
(1990), Castile was then a flourishing society with a clearer sense of purpose, whose 
economy was being transformed by the growth of the wool trade. The reinforcement of royal 
power achieved by the Catholic Monarchs over the nobility and the Church finally brought 
peace and stability to the land, allowing Castile to unleash its potential at a time when the 
discovery of new lands opened the way for imperial expansion. Comparatively speaking, 
Aragon constituted “a society in retreat” after its conquests and economic empire had peaked. 
Despite being weak and exhausted after a long crisis, Aragon managed to preserve a 
constitutional system which prevented the kings from exercising the kind of powers they 
enjoyed in Castile. These differences in the social and political configurations between the 
two Crowns would condition the process of territorialization in Spain, as the State evolved 
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from the comparatively weak and atomized medieval structures to the more unified and 
centralized absolute monarchies of the early modern era. 
 
The advancement towards Absolutism would continue with the Habsburgs coinciding with 
Spain’s imperial hegemony in the 16th and 17th centuries. This transformation did not 
implicate a stronger articulation of society, which would remain politically fragmented and 
culturally heterogeneous for several centuries. Therefore, one cannot yet speak of modern 
national relationships but of the progressive expansion of an embryonic State built on royal 
authority and the establishment of a more vigorous political nexus between the monarchs and 
the territory. As an emerging urban bourgeoisie revealed the dysfunctionality of the old 
feudal links, royal authority rose above the power of the noblemen: the king became not only 
lord of vassals but also the holder of sovereignty (González Antón, 2007). This 
newly-acquired political power would alter the relationship between the monarchy and the 
territorial community governed by the king. The kingdom was progressively transformed 
into a sovereign territory conceived as indivisible.  
 
According to the structuration model proposed before, this transformation occurred gradually. 
The old private feudal relationships co-existed with new practices until the former appeared 
obsolete and were overruled by State laws. More importantly, the transformation operated 
very differently in terms of fashion and pace in Castile and Aragon (Linz, 1973; Elliott, 1990; 
González Antón, 2007): in Castile, the expansion of the State brought higher levels of 
depersonalization and technification of political relations which secured the primacy of royal 
power through the formation of a modest bureaucracy responsible for administering the 
government and collecting taxes. This bureaucracy proved able to ensure the loyalty of the 
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towns and strengthen royal authority at the expense of the aristocracy. Rather than 
representing an entirely new creation, the institutions of the new State emerged from the 
transformation of existing ones. The new councils, a key element in the governance of the 
territory, evolved from the private royal councils of previous centuries. Controlled by the 
grandees earlier on, the councils became increasingly professionalized with the incorporation 
of jurists and officials faithful to the monarchy after 1480. The royal secretaries played a key 
role in the new administration. They liaised between the sovereign and the council, assisted 
in the preparation of meetings and advised the king on policy matters. At the municipal level, 
the expansion of the Castilian State was accomplished through the newly-created institution 
of the Corregidor towards the end of the 14
th
 century (Bermúdez Aznar, 1974). Responsible 
for governing the towns, the figure of the Corregidor gained in importance under the 
Catholic Monarchs after being established in all major Castilian towns. Each Corregidor was 
assisted by a team of Alcaldes, Alguaciles and Escribanos
24
 who helped establish royal 
authority throughout Castilian towns counteracting the influence of the nobility.  
 
Another important development was the organization of the Treasury with its accountants 
and appointed officials supported by a tax system partly inherited from previous epochs: 
sales taxes, customs, local tributes and monopolies, as well as by contributions from the 
Cortes. A new system was established: private agents were no longer responsible for tax 
collection which became now the responsibility of the towns. Each town would pay the 
treasury an agreed amount and divide it among its dwellers. Despite the regional imbalances 
within the Crown of Castile,
25
 the new fiscal policies strengthened the royal treasury which 
was increasingly able to collect more taxes at the expense of the aristocracy. Comparatively 
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 Mayors, mayor’s assistants and notaries public.  
25
 Galicia’s taxes, for instance, remained under the control of a powerful local aristocracy.   
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speaking, the Crown’s income in Aragon remained stagnant with a tax system anchored in 
old practices (Ladero Quesada 1973; 1982).  
 
A third pillar in the expansion of the Castilian State was the constitution of an incipient 
security force and professional army. Founded in 1476, the Santa Hermandad was a rural 
militia responsible for combating banditry funded by general taxes. Each town was 
responsible for policing its territory and criminals were summarily judged locally. By 1493 
the Crown also had a permanent cavalry corps, the “Guardias de Castilla”, considered to be 
the first professional troops at the service of any monarchy in Europe. New royal ordinances 
in 1495-1496 opened the possibility of mobilizing one out of twelve men aged between 
twenty and forty-five and regulated the financing and organization of each military unit 
called Tercios, which soon acquired great prestige after a series of military victories in 
Europe. These changes signalled the end of the feudal army system paving the way for the 
State’s monopoly on institutional violence at the expense of the aristocracy.  
 
Also, the new Inquisition organized by the Catholic Monarchs would promote religious 
orthodoxy in order to achieve the religious unity necessary for the success of their 
State-building project. Based on the medieval Aragonese model established by the popes, the 
institution was introduced in all the other kingdoms. This was by no means done in a 
uniform fashion, as each kingdom had its own tribunal. Yet, the Inquisition would prove an 
important political tool for the expanding State to exercise its control over the different 





This bureaucratization and professionalization of the State was accompanied by a process of 
legal standardization as royal powers rose above local customs and regulations. The 
establishment of the Audiencias Reales as the highest courts in each realm strengthened the 
justice system in the kingdoms. Based on the model provided by the Royal Audiencia and 
Chancelleria of Valladolid in 1371, similar institutions were set up in Galicia (1479) and 
Granada (1505). They represented an important step towards the professionalization of 
justice and the elimination of private feudal justice. The first ordinance of the Audiencia of 
Catalonia dates back to 1483 and those of Aragon and Valencia begin to be organized 
towards 1507 and 1510. The system of Audiencias would spread throughout the kingdoms of 
Aragon and Castile, including the Indies, later on. Another step in this direction was the 
adoption of local fueros by neighbouring areas forming “families of fueros” and the revision 
and amalgamation of local usages by the Crown in order to promote legal standardization, a 
process which begun in the 13
th
 century. A growing legal technification was achieved by the 
implantation of the old Roman law promoted by the monarchs and their jurists and opposed 
by the local aristocracy and the clergy. These constituted the initial steps towards the 
universalization of the law. Eager to preserve their ancient privileges, the local elites 
proclaimed the right to revolt against the king’s authority if the fueros and privileges granted 
in the feudal pact were not respected. The Crown’s policies prevailed at times; on occasion 
compromise was sought. But the process of political homogenization initiated at the time 
proved to be irreversible in the end (González Antón, 2007). 
 
The State-building process outlined above differed greatly in the Crown of Aragon where a 
weaker monarchy proved unable to exercise a similar level of control over the privileged 
classes as in Castile. Aragon’s political fragmentation, where each kingdom preserved its 
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own political institutions and laws, further undermined the action of the monarchs, forced to 
deal with three separate parliaments. The monarchs often delegated their authority to their 
viceroys, appointed noblemen acting on their behalf who dealt with the institutions in each of 
the kingdoms (ibid). Acting separately in the kingdoms which formed the Crown of Aragon, 
the elites retained much of the control of the institutions while the Crown struggled to gain 
the support of royal-charter cities and towns. A bastion of the oligarchies and the urban 
patriciate, the Aragonese Cortes became the reverse of their Castilian counterpart where even 
the presence of nobles and clergymen became increasingly rare as early as the 15
th
 century 
(Claramunt, 2004). By the time Ferdinand was proclaimed king, the power of the nobility, 
the clergy and the towns had been consolidated in practice as well as consecrated in their 
fueros. This status quo would continue during his reign and would be inherited by the 
Habsburgs. 
 
In conclusion, the union of Castile and Aragon represented an important first step towards 
Statehood although it is too soon to speak of national unity. Spain constituted a political 
entity as far as it was ruled by the same kings, although each kingdom retained its political 
institutions, laws, customs and currency. There might have been a certain sentiment of 
belonging to a geographical and cultural community based on narratives of a Roman 
Hispania being recovered from Islam, at least among the intellectual elites.
26
 But identity at 
the time was not yet centred in the nation. Furthermore the geographical barriers, primitive 
communications, low literacy rates and above all the functional needs of what still were 
highly-fragmented pre-industrial societies would constitute formidable barriers for the 
emergence of a more homogeneous national culture for centuries to come. Also, the 
                                                 
26
 In any case, the union of all the kingdoms which constituted Hispania only occurred between 1580-1640 
when the Habsburgs ruled in Spain and Portugal.  
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differences in size, population, political institutions and historical trajectories resulted in an 
unequal union between the kingdoms. Better prepared to face the challenge at the time, 
Castile, like England, would be destined to play the leading role in Spanish nation-building 
while the peoples of Aragon would have to content themselves with a subordinate role. 
 
State-building continued under the Habsburgs (1506-1700) coinciding with Spain’s imperial 
adventure, a parallel process which would affect subsequent nation-building in significant 
ways. In general terms, the State model of Habsburg Spain continued to be that of the 
composite monarchy, based on the strict political differentiation of the Crowns of Castile and 
Aragon configuring Spain as a loose federation of kingdoms ruled by a single monarch. 
Testimony to this policy of e pluribus unum can be found in the advice of Charles V to his 
son Phillip II: 
No conviene hacer apartamiento de los miembros que Dios quiso juntar en un cuerpo, 
entendemos de servirnos juntamente de todas las naciones de nuestros reinos y señoríos, 





Os aviso que en el gobierno de Cataluña seáis más sobre aviso porque más presto 
podríais errar en esta gobernación que en la de Castilla así por los fueros y 
constituciones todas, como porque sus pasiones no son menores que las de otros y 




The bureaucratization of the State continued with the creation of new institutions: in addition 
to the Councils of Navarre, Flanders, Portugal and Italy, the latter formerly integrated with 
Aragon, we see the creation of the important Council of State (1521) presided over by the 
king to deal with the most critical issues; a committee to deal with war affairs (1522), which 
                                                 
27
 It is not suitable to keep apart the limbs which God meant to join in a single body, we intend to be jointly 
served by all the nations in our kingdoms and dominions, preserving in each of them their laws and customs.  
 
28
 I advise you to be especially careful governing Catalonia. You may err more easily in governing Catalonia 
when compared to Castile because of their fueros and constitutions and also because their passions are not less 
than other people’s and they tend to exteriorize them more often.   
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would become the Council of War in 1586, also presided over by the king, and the Council 
of Finance (1523). The entire State apparatus would eventually be composed of fifteen 
councils, including the Royal Chambers of Castile and Aragon. There were also numerous 
technical committees, called juntas, which dealt with minor issues beyond the scope of the 
councils. The figure of the viceroy was also strengthened after they assumed the roles of 
Captain General and president of Audiencia in the territories under their control. More 
Audiencias Reales were established in Seville (1525), the Canaries (1526), Sardinia (1564), 
Sicily (1569) and Majorca (1571). 
 
The expansion of the State took place at the expense of the local oligarchies who would 
continue resisting this process with mixed results, more successfully in Aragon than in 
Castile. González Antón (2007) considers the rhetoric in defence of the freedoms often 
employed by the Cortes in Aragon and Catalonia as intrinsically antimodern, being an 
attempt by the regional elites to preserve their feudal privileges against the growing 
Absolutism of the monarchy, considered by him a sign of modernity at the time. Other 
historians tend to see this process in more ambiguous terms when they emphasize the 
centralization and homogenization of the State to the detriment of regional differences and 
liberties. García Cárcel’s (2002) dichotomy of “España horizontal-vertical” arguably 
reflects this alternative interpretation of a Spanish history from the periphery where Castilian 
Absolutism is contrasted with Aragonese contractualism. Regardless of the interpretation to 
one may subscribe, the important thing is that the wind was blowing in the direction of the 




As the State continued with its expansion, a growing españolización can be perceived in the 
political discourse at the time. Some of its building blocks were a common identity based on 
a lingua franca increasingly used across the different territories, a common religion and a 
shared historical narrative centred in Spain’s providential mission as imperial power and 
bastion of the Catholic faith (García Cárcel, 2004a). However the survival of a patrimonial 
conception of the State and the lack of political reforms towards the unification of the 
different kingdoms in a single State hampered this homogenization (Elliott, 1984; González 
Antón, 2007). Castile’s hegemony in this process of State-building continued with renewed 
strength not only thanks to its demographic and economic dominance, which grew further 
during the 16
th
 century, but also as a result of Castile’s newly found geostrategic advantage 
with the shift of international politics from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic. Castile’s 
hegemony was enhanced with the monopoly in the American trade, becoming the sole 
recipient of the precious metals from the Indies, and its proximity to north-western Europe, a 
key source of fiscal revenue in the Habsburg Empire. This occurred as the Aragonese were 
often denied the right to colonize the Indies, formally annexed to Castile alone, and a good 
opportunity to foster national unity resulting from the close collaboration of all the peoples in 
the common task of colonization was thus forfeited (Elliott, 1990). The establishment of the 
court in Madrid and El Escorial during the reign of Phillip II would also place the 
government and symbolic centre of the Empire in Castile while the institutions of the 
composite monarchy were increasingly influenced by the Castilian model.  
 
The consolidation of Castilian as the dominant language occurred during this time, paving 
the ground for its transformation into a national and international language, Spanish, as the 
decline of other romance languages accentuated. This was not only the result of Castile’s 
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demographic superiority, political hegemony and economic prosperity. The early 
standardization of the language achieved after the publication of the first grammar in 1492 
and the first orthographic rules in 1517 by Antonio de Nebrija and the growing prestige of 
Castilian as an international language of politics and culture with a rich literature constituted 
also important factors (Moreno Fernández, 2005). Other aspects in the growth of a common 
Spanish identity were the first steps towards the nationalization of the historical memory and 
the diffusion of a shared value system based on the Catholic ideal and Spain’s imperial 
mission in the context of the Counter-Reformation. The publication of Juan de Mariana’s 
Historiae de rebus Hispaniae in 1592, translated into Spanish in 1601, represented a 
milestone as the first history of Spain from its origins till the 16
th
 century ever written. The 
histories of the Indies exalting the deeds of the conquerors also contributed to this historical 
memory. A new epic vision of Spain, “martillo de herejes, luz de Trento, espada de Roma 
[…]”29, also emerged during the reign of Phillip II exalting Spain’s providential role in the 
evangelization of America and the defence of Catholicism, contributing significantly towards 
the configuration of a budding Spanish identity. In any case, one cannot yet speak of a 
national identity in the modern sense because the concept of nation at the time had not yet 
acquired its political meaning. Two key ingredients of nationalism were still missing: the 
connection between an official culture and the State power and the idea of popular 
sovereignty. It is more appropriate to speak of a budding ethno-patriotism, a form of pride 
towards a particular ethnic or cultural community expressed in the context of an exaltation of 
a warring monarchy which constituted the cornerstone of this growing Spanish identity 
(Álvarez Junco, 2001). This link between monarchy and Spain, not yet apparent in the idea 
                                                 
29
 “Hammer of heretics, light of Trent, sword of Rome […]”. This is a quote from Menéndez Pelayo’s Historia 
de los heterodoxos españoles referring to this epoch. Published in 1880-1882, this is a key reference in the 
National-Catholic narrative of the Spanish nation.    
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of universal monarchy of Charles V,
30
 will grow in importance during the Habsburg period 
as part of the legitimizing discourse of an expanding State. This can be perceived in the 
display of new symbols exalting Spanish history together with the traditional dynastic 
symbols of the Habsburgs in the new palace of Phillip IV (Brown and Elliott, 1980). Also, 
the notion of limpieza de sangre,
31
 which became widespread towards the second half of the 
16
th
 century, permeated the entire Spanish society, as the discrimination against Jewish and 
Muslim converts and their descendants became institutionalized. 
  
Spain’s imperial adventure coincided with these early stages of nation building. The 
relationship between the two phenomena has been analysed by Bernal (2005) in its political, 
social and economic dimensions. He concludes that Spain’s imperial expansion represented 
to a large extent a missed opportunity for nation building because the empire arrived too 
early to be a catalyst in the nationalization process, resulting in an unfinished national project 
when the imperial distraction disappeared. The imperial project was born entangled in the 
archaic patrimonialism of the Habsburg monarchy inherited from the medieval period. 
Charles’s empire was very much rooted in a dynastic, Christian and universalist conception 
of the world, in what Vilar (1962) called the “supreme stage of feudalism”. Part of the 
empire may have ended up being Spanish but it started as Castilian, Aragonese, Austrian, 





                                                 
30
 For instance, Charles V used the title “Augustus Imperator Caesar” far more often than “Hispaniarum rex” 
and avoided using the symbols of the Spanish kingdoms in his coat of arms.  
31
 “Cleanliness of blood.” 
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Figure 3.8.  
 




Bernal (2005) argues that the empire functioned like another element of this composite 
monarchy characterized by a power system of indirect government. It was not a dependent 
empire but a negotiated one, which did not require a strong Nation-State, as was the case 
with Holland whose empire was built between 1576 and 1648 as it achieved its national 
independence. The Spanish empire was the prototype of a subordinated empire whose 
conquest was initially “outsourced” to the conquerors and then governed by the Crown 
through viceroys, officials and Audiencias.
33
 The dynamics of power established in the 
context of the empire did not always act as unifying forces within Spain, partly because of 
Aragon’s exclusion from the colonization process and the dominating position of Castile 
                                                 
32
 Source: www.rootsweb.ancestry.com/~wggerman/map/hapsburg.htm (retrieved on 8-7-2012).  
33
 The Capitulations of Santa Fe signed in 1492 between Christopher Columbus and the Catholic Monarchs 
constitute a very good example of this subordination.   
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which often led to “the resentment of the Portuguese, the disappointment of the Catalan, the 





From an economic perspective, the empire also failed to create the conditions for national 
unification, as Spain’s expansion was rooted in archaic medieval structures which led to 
economic inefficiency. Contrary to the English or Dutch mercantile colonial model 




 centuries, the 
Spanish colonization over-depended on mining and was closely linked to the international 
monetary economy. Relying almost exclusively on public credit to fund its wars, Spain was 
the only bullionist country in Europe, responsible for almost 50% of the monetary circulation 
between 1492 and 1740. As a result Spain became a victim of its own monetary wealth. 
Added to this was the dependence on European manufactures as a result of Castile’s 
incapacity to meet the economic demands of the colonies, largely due to its demographic 
weakness. In the end, the monarchy squandered the enormous resources of the Indies and 
enriched its European rivals without promoting any industrialization at home: “Spain was 
poor because Spain was rich” (Fuentes, 1999 p. 157). Bernal’s conclusion is that the 
construction of an integrated national State was never completed. Due to the financial, fiscal 
and credit characteristics of its relationship with the Indies, Spain ended up subordinating the 
economic interests of the metropolis to those of the colonies and the Spanish society 
eventually became a hostage of its own empire. Kamen’s vision of the empire seems to lead 
to a similar conclusion:   
 
                                                 
34
 My translation.  
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We are accustomed to the idea that Spain created its empire, but it is more useful to 
work with the idea that the empire created Spain. At the outset of our historical period, 
‘Spain’ did not exist, it had not formed politically or economically, nor did its 
component cultures have the resources for expansion. The collaboration of the peoples 
of the peninsula in the task of empire, however, gave them a common cause that 
brought them together and enhanced, however imperfectly, peninsular unity (Kamen, 
2003 p. XXV).   
 
Spain’s imperial adventure proved to be a fragile foundation for nation-building in the long 
run because it did not lead towards greater integration of the territories which constituted the 
composite monarchy. Rather, it led to the subordination of most territories to Castile. When 
the empire faltered because the costs of defending it became unbearable, not only would 
Castile pay a huge price for its leading role, but also the composite monarchy model would 
prove untenable. The crisis was already manifested in Olivares’s attempts towards greater 
centralization in his famous memorandum of 1624 to Phillip IV:  
Tenga VM por el negocio más importante de su Monarquía el hacerse Rey de España; 
quiero decir, Señor, que no se contente VM en ser Rey de Portugal, de Aragón, de 
Valencia, Conde de Barcelona, sino que trabaje y piense con consejo mudado y secreto, 
por reducir estos reinos de que se compone España, al estilo y leyes de Castilla sin 
ninguna diferencia, que si VM lo alcanza, será el Príncipe más poderoso del mundo. 
 
(The most important thing in your Majesty’s Monarchy is for you to become king of 
Spain: by this I mean, Sir, that Your Majesty should not be content with being king of 
Portugal, of Aragon, of Valencia and count of Barcelona, but should secretly plan and 
work to reduce these kingdoms of which Spain is composed to the style and laws of 
Castile, with no difference whatsoever. And if Your Majesty achieves this, you will be 
the most powerful Prince in the world) (quoted in Elliott, 1984 p. 200). 
 
Another important step was Olivares’s attempt to create a Union of Arms where the peoples 
of the composite monarchy would contribute to the defence of the empire, a burden which 
had been disproportionately shouldered by Castile. The plan met with the opposition of the 
Catalan Cortes and no agreement with the monarchy was reached. Only Aragon and 
Valencia supported the enterprise. The Catalan and Portuguese revolts of 1640 represented 
another milestone in this confrontation between the centralizing aspirations of the monarchy 
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and the socio-political structures inherited from the middle ages. Portugal would eventually 
achieve its independence while Catalonia would return to the Spanish monarchy after a short 
chaotic period of separation under the vassalage of France. The terms of the agreement 
secured by the Catalans included the Crown’s renunciation of any centralizing reform. This 
situation continued during the reign of Charles II which according to Elliott (ibid) 
represented a golden age for provincial autonomy, characterized by a quasi-superstitious 
respect toward regional rights and privileges on the side of a Crown too weak to protest. This 
represented a pyrrhic victory by the Catalans, as the centralization of the State was simply 
postponed for some time.  
 
While the political forces continued leading Spain towards greater centralization in line with 
the Castilian model, the economic and demographic tide was beginning to work against this. 
The failure to recover from the European economic crisis of the 17
th
 century marked the 
beginning of Spain’s centuries-old divergence from the western European capitalist core 
which would emerge after the crisis of the 17
th
 century (Hobsbawm, 1965). This failure, 
comparatively more acute in Castile than in other territories, also marks the beginning of an 
economic and demographic shift from the centre towards the periphery, effectively reversing 




 centuries. This shift has continued unabated until the present 
times:  
This contrast between the economic and demographic behaviour of the interior and the 
coastal areas during the second half of the seventeenth century can be regarded as the 
starting point of the growing gap in economic development and wealth between the 
different regions of Spain. This gap continued to widen throughout the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries to the present day, with the end result that is exactly the opposite of 
the situation in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, when the interior was the richest, 




The crisis not only triggered a significant fall in agricultural production, a livestock crisis and 
the decadence of the Castilian centres of industry and commerce (ibid.), it also led to a sharp 
depopulation and deurbanization from which Castile would not recover. What had been the 
most populated region in Spain and one of Europe’s most urbanized areas in the second half 
of the 16
th
 century became towards the second half of the 17
th
 a clear example of urban 
network collapse Gelabert (1994).
35
 While admitting the existence of separate causes behind 
the crisis in individual cities, Gelabert (ibid) points to an overriding general explanation, 
namely the increasing fiscal pressure on Castilian cities resulting from the need to fund 
Spain’s imperial adventure. This pressure led to mass migration from the cities to the 
countryside triggering a re-organization of the population into small and medium-size 
communities in order to escape the burdens suffered by the people in the cities. While some 
authors even speak of “refeudalization” (Atienza Hernández, 1994), others (Yun Casalilla, 
1994) deny that possibility arguing that the crisis did neither lead to a fragmentation of the 
political system nor to a decrease of royal power. Yet, both authors concur that the crisis of 
the 17
th
 century reinforced the links between the monarchy and the nobility and strengthened 
the control of the upper classes on the economy as a whole in Castile. This reverse in 
fortunes between Castile and the coastal regions would significantly hinder the centralizing 
nation-building project orchestrated from Madrid during the next centuries as we will see. 
 
  
                                                 
35
 Castile’s population in 1700 was 5% less than that in 1591 and by 1789 there were fewer centres with a 
population of 2,500 and 10,000 inhabitants than there had been in 1591.  
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3.3. The construction of the Spanish nation in modern times: social transformations 
and State-building  
This constitutes a period of dramatic change brought by modernisation as the national mode 
of organization, chiefly characterised by an expanding State and by the identification 
between polity and culture, became fully established. Significant structural transformations 
occurred: capitalist expansion triggered the decline of traditional atomized agricultural 
societies cemented on birth rights and entailed land, substituted by industrialized literate 
urban societies based on private property and profit accumulation, better connected through 
transportation and communications. The Ancien Régime, a rigidly stratified God-ordained 
social order presided over by the king and based on inherited legitimacies, was substituted by 
the “nation”, a cultural community where sovereignty resided in the people according to the 
Rousseauian principle of “collective will” (Recalde, 1982; Pérez Vejo, 1999). Also, capitalist 
expansion would chiefly operate at the national scale during this stage of modernisation.  
 
Despite a strong centralizing drive after dynastic change, nation-building in Spain would be 
hindered by a problematic modernisation in the context of a complex transition from a world 
empire into a Nation-State. This would result in a weak State, despite the advances in 
State-building, still influenced by the inertias of Spain’s imperial model; a late and uneven 
industrialization; a shift in the country’s social configuration associated with demographic 
and economic trends and a highly unstable political climate characterized by a legitimacy 
crisis which ultimately prevented the formulation of hegemonic narratives of the nation. 
 
The centralizing process initiated with the Habsburgs and interrupted after the 1640 crisis 
resumed with renewed strength with Phillip V of Bourbon after defeating the Austrian 
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candidate to the Spanish throne in the War of Succession (1701-1714). Castile had aligned 
with the French prince while Aragon opted for the Archduke Charles of Austria. The 
Bourbons promoted a series of reforms destined to modernize the State and raise Spain’s 
international standing. The most important of these reforms were the Nueva Planta decrees 
(1707-1716) which suppressed the Fueros and the institutions specific to the Crown of 
Aragon and imposed a more uniform State structure in the territories of the Spanish 
Monarchy. Only the Fueros and institutions of the Basque Provinces and Navarre, allied with 
Phillip V in the war, were preserved. The decrees rationalized the State administration 
establishing three basic institutions in all the kingdoms of the Spanish Monarchy: the 
Captain General, the Audiencia and the Intendencia (Cánovas Sánchez, 1985). In substitution 
of the Viceroys, the Captain Generals became the most important political and military 
figure after the king in each territory. They headed the Audiencias, the army and directed the 
State apparatus. Royal orders were channelled through the Audiencias, also responsible for 
administering justice according to the Castilian model. The role of the Intendencia was the 
implementation of a tax system aimed at increasing the State revenue by promoting a more 
uniform contribution from the different territories, putting an end to the old privileges.  
 
The Nueva Planta decrees also brought to an end a situation in which the subjects of a 
particular kingdom were considered foreigners in other territories of the Crown and were 
prohibited from occupying administrative positions. The laws of 1757 and 1765 promoting 
the free commerce of grain and other goods contributed to the creation of a more unified 
market and brought a new dynamism to the Mediterranean regions. Other measures in the 
same unifying direction were the production of maps detailing the situation of roads and a 
list of road works to be carried out ordered in 1718; the regulation of national post stages in 
 153 
 
1720, the building of the first canals, the creation of royal factories and the first detailed 
national road plan in 1761 González Antón (2007). At the same time, Spain lost influence in 
Europe and increasingly directed its attention towards its American colonies. All the regions 
would now share the benefits of the colonial adventure after the removal of all restrictions 
and privileges enjoyed by Castile. This no doubt had important unifying effects. Although 
financial constraints often hampered these reforms, the unifying drive during this period of 
intensive reform and modernisation of the State is evident.  
 
García Cárcel (2002) considers the idea of Nueva Planta as a symbol of the end of Catalan 
liberties after the Castilian annexation of Aragon a simplistic view because the old Castilian 
administration was also affected by the new fiscal measures and the deployment of 
intendentes. Although one may see a component of revenge against the Crown of Aragon for 
having supported the Austrian candidate in the war,
36
 the declared objective of the decrees 
was to impose a homogeneous government across Spain where all the people would be 
subject to a common regime, the same laws and a single administration. As such, Nueva 
Planta represented a major step in the progressive conquest of the State by the monarch to 
the detriment of the old feudal privileges and customs. By effectively bringing the old 
composite monarchy to an end, the Nueva Planta decrees represented an important victory, 
albeit a temporary one as time would prove, of a vertical Spain over a horizontal Spain.  
Another sign of the affirmation of the monarchy were the regalist policies adopted in the 
dispute with the Church, which saw its political power diminishing in favour of the king. The 
expulsion of the Jesuits from Spain in 1767 represented a milestone in this process of 
                                                 
36
 The decree of the 29
th
 June 1707 justified the new State organization arguing that the subjects of Aragon and 
Valencia had broken their allegiance to their legitimate king.  
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consolidation of the monarchy as the sole dominant power in the territory (González Antón, 
2007).  
 
This consolidation is accompanied by the early manifestations of a new conscience among 
the elites influenced by the ethno-patriotic discourse of the Habsburg period, where a 
uniform State is increasingly identified with a Spanish nation presided by the Monarchy 
(Fernández Sebastián, 1994). Álvarez Junco (2001) considers this to be beginning of the 
nationalization of culture in Spain enacted through the creation of collective narratives 
orchestrated by the State and the elites, a process which would peak during the 19
th
 century 
as we will see. For instance, the phrase “Reino de España” became more widespread during 
the 18
th
 century and was officially adopted under Jose Bonaparte.  
 
Many signs of the transformation of the State into a cultural container can be found. One was 
the creation of institutions including academies and societies, some officially sponsored by 
the Monarchy. First, the Royal Library, founded in 1712, followed by the Real Academia 
Española (1714), aiming to promote the purity and elegance of the language. It contributed 
to the standardization of Spanish through the publication of dictionaries, grammars and 
orthographies.
37
A similar intention was behind the creation of the Real Academia de la 
Historia (1738) and the Real Academia de las Artes de San Fernando (1752) as instruments 
of a State embarked on a process of cultural reform and homogenization. Sociedades de 
Amigos del País, regional and local academies, clubs and tertulias were also established 
promoting culture, arts and science in an attempt to modernize the country (Enciso Recio, 
1987a). They also promoted a discourse where Spain as an imagined community was 
                                                 
37
 The Academy’s motto, “limpia, fija y da esplendor” clearly reflects this aim. Its first dictionary of 
authorities was published between 1726-1729.  
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reinforced. This is particularly noticeable in the newly-emerging historical and 
historiographical conscience in the context of an intellectual climate which emphasized a 
critical history against the fabulous narratives of the past, as exemplified by the work of 
Feijoo, Mayans and others (Mestre Sanchís, 1987). As Maravall Casenoves (1972) pointed 
out, this change of focus in the study of history reflected a shift in interpreting the world. The 
new authors speak of “Society” instead of using terms such as “Kingdom”, “State” or 
“Monarchy”. This broader new concept included phenomena such as “culture”, which 
featured increasingly prominently in the work of many intellectuals interested in exalting the 
glories of the Spanish nation, often confronted with the stereotypes of European writers 
ridiculing Spain as a backward decadent nation of religious fanatics and cruel barbarians 




As occurred with the collective past, literature also was re-interpreted in national terms with 
the publication of the first histories of Spanish literature following a similar trend in other 
European countries. The Rodríguez Mohedano brothers published theirs in 1766, soon 
followed by similar works by Lampillas (1778-1781), Juan Andrés (1782-1799) Masdeu 
(1783) and Capmany (1779-1792) (Álvarez Junco, 2001). Álvarez Junco (ibid) considers 
these Spanish intellectuals concerned with the country’s modernisation the first patriots. 
They not only showed pride in being called Spaniards but also considered their duty to serve 
their nation thorough their work. In doing so, they looked at Europe in search of solutions for 
Spain’s problems. In his “Teatro Crítico Universal” Feijoo proposes a new form of national 
conscience, more dynamic and critical with traditionalist views without blindly emulating 
European trends. Writing from the periphery, Mayans placed the emphasis in the 
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achievements of Spain’s golden age, from Cervantes to Vives, stripped of any superstitious 
inclination. One can often detect a certain tension in the discourse of many 18
th
 century 
Spanish intellectuals and their modernizing intentions when confronted with Spain’s 
backwardness. This is often reflected in their often ambivalent and anguished words, as in 
the following Statement by Phillip V’s minister José del Campillo:  
Voy a escribir de España, contra España y para España […] Escribo de España lo que 
no quisiera escribir, escribo contra España porque la retrato tan cadavérica como hoy 




Other sign of this transformation of the State into a cultural container were the State policies 
promoting Castilian as a national language at the expense of regional languages. Before 
issuing the Nueva Planta decree in Catalonia, the council advised the king in a report dated 
the 13
th
 June 1715 to impose the use of Castilian in the Catalan high courts in substitution for 
Latin,
40
 tolerating the use of Catalan in the lower tribunals until the scriveners mastered the 
use of Castilian and to prohibit the use of Catalan in all primary schools and during religious 
instruction (Prats in Nadal et al, 1985). Similarly, a secret instruction to the Corregidores 
advised in 1716 “[poner] el mayor cuidado en introducir la lengua castellana para que se 
note el efecto sin que se note el cuidado” (Mercader Riba, 1961 pp.324-325).41 Although 
many of these recommendations were not detailed in the Nueva Planta Decree, there is no 
doubt that the promotion of Castilian as a language of prestige, and the patoisation of other 
languages, constituted a key aspect in the nationalization of Spain then.  
 
                                                 
39
 “I am going to write about Spain, against Spain and for Spain […] I write about Spain what I do not wish to 
write, I write against Spain because I portray it as ghastly as it now is, and I write for Spain wishing that it 
becomes what it should.” Extracted from “España, despierta”. 
www.cervantesvirtual.com/obra-visor/espana-despierta--0/html/fef10658-82b1-11df-acc7-002185ce6064_1.ht
m (retrieved on 13-9-12) 
 
40
 Verdicts used to be written in Latin until 1716 according to González Antón (2007). 
41
 Pay special attention to the introduction of the Castilian language and ensure the measure succeeds without 
attracting much attention. 
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Other important measures were the educational reforms of Charles III establishing a 
compulsory primary education for the first time in Spanish history in 1781. Intellectuals like 
Campoamor or Jovellanos promoted the education of the masses as an instrument of social 
cohesion and nationalization, leading to the foundation of new schools, the first initiatives 
regarding the standardization of the curricula and the recruitment of teachers and the 
introduction of textbooks, where Latin began to lose ground in favour of Castilian. As 
Iglesias Brinquis (1988) has stressed, this marks the beginning of “a national education” in 
Spain.  
 
The growing popularity of the printed press was another factor contributing to the 
consolidation of Castilian as a national language (Enciso Recio, 1987b). Father Antoni 
Bastero, known for his support of the Catalan language, stated in 1726 that the true language 
of creation in Catalonia is none other than Castilian “por ser aquel idioma en estos tiempos y 
casi desde que se hizo la unión de las dos coronas castellana y aragonesa, más común y 
general que el nuestro
42
 (Quoted in González Antón, 2007 p. 311). Similarly, Ballot i Torres, 
who authored a Catalan grammar, expressed in 1814: “pera què voler cultivar la llengua 
catalana, si la de tota la naciò és la castellana, la qual debem parlar tots los que nos 
preciam de verdaders espanyols?”43 (ibid, p. 311). The words of another illustrious Catalan, 
Antonio de Capmany, who would participate in the elaboration of the first Spanish 
constitution in 1812, leave no doubt about the advances toward a national language which 
were taking place at the time, at least among the elite, when he expressed that Catalan “es un 
idioma antiguo, provincial, muerto hoy para la república de las letras, idioma rancio y 
                                                 
42
 As this language is nowadays and ever since the union of the crowns of Castile and Aragon took place, more 
common and generalized than ours. 
43
 Why should one wish to cultivate the Catalan language if Castilian is the language of the entire nation and 
should be spoken by all of us who proudly call ourselves true Spaniards? 
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semimuerto” and he speaks of “mi celo nacional y mi amor a la lengua patria [Spanish]” in 
the prologue of his French-Spanish dictionary (ibid. p. 311).
44
 It is also true that some 
intellectuals defended the preservation of the regional languages, as in the case of Mayans, 
author of a Castilian-Valencian dictionary, lamenting at the same time what appeared to be 
their inevitable demise, given that they were scarcely used in formal situations.  
 
The growing nationalization of Spain on the basis of identity can also be perceived in the 
apparition of new symbols. One was the adoption of an anthem after a grenadier march 
composed by Manuel Espinosa de los Monteros in 1761. A flag was first proposed for the 
navy in 1785 after a decree by Charles III and was adopted by the army in 1843. The 
instability of Spanish national symbols has been attributed to a problematic identity (Álvarez 
Junco, 2001), something to be explored later on. All in all the Bourbons carried out reforms 
which further consolidated the State and homogenized the territory, while new elements in 
the legitimizing discourse of the Monarchy where introduced: after being described as a great 
warrior, a legitimate prince and defender of the faith, the king was now portrayed as “the 
benevolent father of the nation” dedicated to the well-being and prosperity of his subjects. 
None anticipated that this new legitimizing discourse associated with progress and modernity 
would eventually conflict with the old ideas and that the foundations of the Ancien Régime 
would crumble as a result of the newly-emerging national identities (Álvarez Junco, 2001). 
In any case, despite these advances in the construction of the Spanish State, a thorough 
nationalization of the masses would have to wait until the 20
th
 century when the obstacles 
present in the traditional social organization gradually disappeared and the national mode of 
organization was fully consolidated. 
                                                 
44
 Catalan is an ancient provincial language of no use nowadays in the republic of the letters, an antiquated and 




The cornerstone of the most widely accepted theories of the nation discussed in chapter 1 is 
the relationship between modernisation, understood as an all-encompassing process of social 
transformation, and the national mode of organization, the social basis upon which 
nationalist mobilization operated fostered by an expanding State. This process, documented 
by Weber (1976) in his study of the modernisation of France, involved the painfully slow 
transformation from what a Parisian visitor to the countryside in the 1840s considered “a 
country of savages”, a highly diverse and fragmented land and society (politically, legally, 
economically, demographically as well as culturally) into the more unified, modernized, 
culturally integrated and spiritually united nation of the early 20
th
 century. The impact of 
modernisation in the nationalization of the Spanish people has been studied by Vincent (2007) 
or Fusi Aizpurúa (2000) among others. Others have concentrated on specific periods such as 
the Second Republic (Holguín, 2002) or have focused on particular aspects of the 
nationalization process such as national narratives (Álvarez Junco, 2001) and national 
education (Boyd, 1997). As Spain experienced a comparatively slower and more problematic 
modernisation than France, one may assume that the nationalisation of the masses would 
have been even more difficult in Spain’s case.     
 
Given the complexity of modernisation, I can only outline its major inter-related dimensions. 
One of these is economic, involving a re-distribution in the use of productive factors 
(Sánchez Albornoz, 1985b). In traditional societies, largely based on subsistence agriculture, 
the reproduction of the economic system was sustained by entailed land and by labour with a 
limited use of capital. Modern societies are built instead on a market economy and the 
accumulation of capital, a system which only gained impetus with industrialization and the 
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development of communications and transport infrastructure. Another dimension is a 
demographic one, including a shift in the demographic patterns and a growing degree of 
urbanization (Nadal, 1984). The pattern of change involved first a drastic reduction of 
catastrophic mortality, caused by episodes such as epidemics, and then a reduction of 
ordinary mortality. A subsequent phase brought lower fertility rates which eventually led to 
the aging of the population, as life expectancy grew, and to a slowing down in population 
growth. The mass transfer of a population no longer threatened by impending death from the 
countryside into the cities brought along a new mentality blowing away the cultural barriers 
raised by isolation and illiteracy (Weber, 1976).  
 
A related dimension is a political one, namely the transformation of the hierarchically 
ordained societies of the Ancien Régime into nations of citizens, a process inaugurated with 
the French Revolution. This political transformation re-defined how societies were conceived: 
the fragmented traditional societies structured in “Estates of the Realm” were transformed 
into more inter-connected systems ordained under the principle of effective identification of 
the individual with the nation, as defined by the identity markers promoted in the discourses 
of nationalist mobilization, usually under the tutelage of a State increasingly capable of 
ordaining the life of its citizens in economic, political and cultural terms. As we saw in 
chapter one (pp. 25-35), Gellner (1997) explains that this identification between polity and 
culture brought by nationalism constituted a functional requirement for the newly 
industrialized societies. A fourth cultural dimension completes the picture brought by 
modernisation. It led to greater homogenization of the population through the establishment 
of mass education, compulsory military service and conscript armies, the development of the 
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mass media, linguistic standardization and the adoption of shared cultural traits increasingly 
perceived as national characteristics. 
 
Researchers generally agree that Spanish nation-building was hindered, among other things, 
by a deficient modernisation along the four dimensions outlined above. Opinions however 
vary regarding the extent to which modernisation failed altogether or merely stagnated in 
Spain during the era of nation-building and the causes behind this backwardness. Regarding 
economic modernisation, some of the most negative views are those held by Vicens Vives & 
Nadal (1969), Trebilcock (1981) and Berend and Ranki (1982), who consider that Spain 
suffered from an underdeveloped economy during the 19
th
 century similar to that in 
third-world countries. A second group of researchers like Nadal (1975), Tortella (1972; 
1973a; 1994) and Martin (1990) subscribe to the idea of failed industrialization in 19
th
 
century Spain. They argue that despite the early developments led by the Catalan cotton 
industry towards the 1840s followed by the Basque iron and steel industry in the second half 
of the century, industrialization never prospered in Spain as a whole, as the country was not 
able to provide the capital nor the markets for industrialization to develop. Thus, despite 
being considered among the first-comers to industrialization, Spain, with the exception of 
Catalonia, continued to be an overwhelmingly agrarian society towards the end of the 
century and what once had been a great empire, was relegated to playing a peripheral role 
during the capitalist modern era. In fact, one must wait, according to these authors, until the 
1960s-1970s to see the beginning of full-scale industrialization. 
 
A less negative view regarding Spanish 19
th
 century economic modernisation is held by a 
third group of authors, including Prados de la Escosura (1988), Sánchez Albornoz (1985b) 
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and Ringrose (1996). They subscribe to the idea of “backwardness”, arguing that Spain 
experienced a late modernisation when compared with most European countries. And yet, 
despite this relative backwardness, which Prados conceptualizes in terms of a backward 
economy with low investment rates, not open to the rest of the world; a weak industry; an 
agriculture dominated by subsistence levels and a late demographic modernisation 
characterized by low education rates, it is argued that Spain experienced real economic 
growth in absolute terms during the 19
th
 century, as reflected for instance in the evolution of 
the nation’s GDP. In other words, despite experiencing a moderate economic 
modernisation,
45
 Spain clearly lagged behind most of Europe as it followed its own late 
modernizing path. Ringrose argues that this model of slow and yet sustained economic 
modernisation explains Spain’s “economic miracle” in the 1960s and 1970s much better, a 
phenomenon which, in his view, could not have happened without some prior development:  
[…] by the early 20th century Spain, while clearly behind the advanced countries on 
many accounts, had long been following a recognizable variant of the European 
developmental path. Articulated without the use of national categories, the proposition 
being suggested says that Iberia was a long-term participant in the continent-wide 
process of accelerating economic expansion which began in the later seventeenth 
century (Ringrose, 1996 p. 31).  
 
The development of a modern transport infrastructure constitutes a critical factor for 
economic modernisation as well as for nation-building. On the one hand it helps increase the 
size of the market promoting a greater division and specialization of labour. On the other 
hand, transportation development may have backward linkages (i.e. the growth in the 
demand of products such as coal, iron manufactures or construction materials) and forward 
linkages (i.e. the effects transportation has in other economic sectors; for instance in the 
technological innovations of the steel industry or the improved skills of the workforce) 
                                                 
45
 For Prados (1988) this economic modernisation was sustained and continuous, for Sánchez Albornoz (1985b) 
it constituted long-term growth but it was neither lineal nor sustained.  
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(Gómez Mendoza, 1985). Last but not least, transportation provides the necessary platform 
for the diffusion of new ideas and cultural practices which constitute key elements in the 
nationalization of the masses.  
 
Gómez Mendoza (ibid) argues that Spain initiated the 19
th
 century with a road system which 
was clearly inadequate for its economic modernisation: for instance, the French road network 
was eight times larger than its Spanish equivalent at the time. In addition to that, France had 
more than 11,000 kilometres of navigable rivers and canals compared with a few hundred 
kilometres in Spain. Also, most Spanish roads were poorly built, only apt for travellers on 
foot or for horses, becoming impassable after a few days’ rain. Given the appalling condition 
of the road network, most goods were transported on mules. Early attempts to modernize the 
transport infrastructure failed due to the considerable financial constraints and the social 
instability Spain experienced with several wars during the 19
th
 century. The most important 
developments took place in maritime transport with the improvements in ports, the growth in 
sailing and the introduction of steam boats towards the end of the 19
th
 century.  
 
The construction of the railway system took off with the Progresista government after a bill 
passed in 1855. Intended to promote economic development, the law led to large-scale 
investment thanks to the subsidies for the importation of transport materials and the State 
grants which reduced the risks (Tortella, 1994). Foreign capital constituted the lion’s share of 
the railway investment, comparatively much larger than the capital invested in industry. 
Nadal (1975) estimates the investment in the railway to have been seven times that of the 
industry whereas Gómez Mendoza (1985) thinks it was fifteen or sixteen times higher. The 
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contrast with England, where according to Nadal (1975), the capital resources destined to the 
railway represented less than 70% of those in industry, is clear.  
 
Despite these efforts, researchers tend to agree that the development of the railways, an 
essential feature in Spain’s economic modernisation, did not contribute to the modernisation 
of the Spanish economy as much as it did in other parts of Europe. Tortella (1994) contends 
that the investment in the railway was accomplished at the expense of an industry which 
remained largely underdeveloped and thus the opportunity to invest in directly productive 
activities was lost. Nadal (1975) argues that Tortella’s premise is dubious as it presupposes 
that industry would have received more investment if this had not been directed to the 
railway, something which may not have occurred given the low industrialization levels in 
many Spanish regions and given that most of the capital invested in the railway was foreign. 
In any case, researchers agree that the railway in Spain was built hastily and without 
adequate planning, without really taking into account the country’s needs. In 1864, when the 
financial collapse of the railway was already in sight, the engineer Martínez Alcíbar had 
alerted that:  
Los transportes de poco sirven si no hay productos que transportar […]. Es preciso crear 
estímulos muy poderosos y eficaces para el desarrollo de la producción industrial tan 
atrasada, tan abatida y postergada en España, aún en situaciones normales. Las vías 
férreas contribuyen a facilitar el aumento de la producción industrial; pero donde no 
existe, no la improvisan, como lo va demostrando la experiencia
46
(quoted in Nadal, 
1975 p. 47).  
 
Similarly, George Stephenson, an English railway pioneer, claimed in 1845 after visiting 
Spain:  
                                                 
46
 Transportation is not really useful if there are no products to transport […]. It is necessary to create powerful 
and efficacious stimuli for the development of industrial production, so backward, depressed and delayed in 
Spain, even under normal circumstances. The railroad contributes to facilitating an increase in the industrial 
production; but it does not improvise this where it does not exist, as experience demonstrates.  
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I have been a month in the country, but I have not seen during the whole of that time 
enough people of the right sort to fill a single train (quoted in Nadal, 1975 p. 48).   
 
The establishment of a modern communication platform is equally important in 
nation-building because it contributes to unifying the territory and homogenizing the people 
living there as result of a more efficient transfer of information. The improvement in 
communications in 19
th
 century Spain is obvious. Take for instance the modernisation of the 
post system, which had been established in the 18
th
 century, with the introduction of stamps 
in 1850. Another example of this modernisation was the construction of the telegraph 
network which began in 1853 followed by the telephone in the 20
th
 century. In any case, 
despite the developments in transportation and communications and an on-going process of 
legal standardization,
47
 Tortella (1994) argues that Spain did not have a national market 
during the entire 19
th
 century as shown in the regional differences in the prices of basic 
products such as wheat and oil. Balfour concurs with Tortella arguing that: 
Spain was a largely immobile country; until at least the 1920s, communications were 
very poor and villages and provincial towns were trapped in an inner-looking world 
oblivious to national issues (Balfour, 1997 p. 104).     
 
In conclusion, independently of whether one adopts the view of underdevelopment, the idea 
of a failed industrialization or the notion of backwardness to explain Spain’s 19th century 
economic modernisation, one thing seems clear: Spain at large continued to be a 
pre-industrial nation by the early 20
th
 century lagging at least half a century behind the more 
developed European countries. Catalonia and some areas of the Basque Country constituted a 
partial exception. Catalonia was the only region in Spain whose economy was primarily 
based on manufacturing, having reached levels of employment in the industrial sector similar 
                                                 
47
 For instance, the Commerce Bills of 1829 and 1885, the regulation of the monetary system, the 
standardization of weights and measures, the gradual implementation of the metric system during the 
mid-nineteenth century, etc.  
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to those of Great Britain and much higher than those in France, Italy or Spain as a whole, as 
table 3.1 illustrates: 
 
 Table 3.1.  
 
 Primary Sector Secondary Sector Tertiary Sector 
Great Britain 6 54 39.5 
Catalonia 27.5 53.5 19 
France 35.5 38.5 26 
Italy 47 35.5 17.5 
Spain 48 34 18 
 
Distribution in percentages of the working population according to sector, 1930-1931 
(source: Gil Ibáñez, 1979)  
 
Maluquer de Motes (1985) attributes Catalonia´s successful 19
th
 century industrialization to 
the developments which took place in the preceding centuries, notwithstanding the lack of 
natural resources such as iron ore and coal which made industrialization possible in other 
parts of Europe. Chief among these developments was the sustained agricultural growth in 
areas destined for export like viticulture, in the context of a society comparatively more 
egalitarian than the one existing in other Spanish regions at the time. This agrarian prosperity 
and the increase in exports provided the initial capital for investment in other areas of the 
economy and gradually contributed to the transformation of the Catalan region as an 
industrial base for textile production. As Martin indicates:  
At the turn of the century, 59 % of the taxes paid to the government for all types of 
production emanated from the principality that possessed only a tenth of the national 
population and, like Lancashire in England, accounted for 90 % of the country’s textile 
output. Industrial concentration provided Barcelona and other factory towns with high 
ratios of workers in their populations. Half of all inhabitants in Catalonia came to reside 
in Barcelona province as a result of the urbanization brought on by industrialization. By 
Spanish standards, the number of workers was exceedingly high, 117,000, or more than 
one-fifth of the city’s half million residents, more than half of whom were employed in 




Some areas of the Basque Country also became industrialized towards the end of the 19
th
 
century thanks to a surge in mineral exports in high demand by the British steel industry 
(Fraile, 1985). The profits obtained were employed in creating a local steel industry which 
prospered partly thanks to Spain’s protectionist policies. De Churruca (1951) estimates that 
the region produced 66.5% of the pig iron and 68.4% of the steel in Spain between 
1900-1930, turning the Basque region into a key area in Spanish economic development: In 
1939, the region housed only 3% of the Spanish population but was responsible for 6% of 
the entire Spanish GDP (Fraile, 1985).  
 
The rest of Spain continued to be a pre-industrial society based on subsistence agriculture. 
This was particularly the case of the regions which had once belonged to the kingdom of 
Castile. Andalusia, which had previously benefitted from the colonial trade, remained 
underdeveloped when compared with the rest of Spain as a result of the deep-rooted 
inequality in the distribution of the land (Tedde de Lorca, 1985). Old and New Castile, 
excluding the city of Madrid, which continued to benefit from its status as Spain’s political 
capital, not only faltered in their attempt to industrialize but also experienced economic 
regression, as some of its traditional sectors, like wool and handicrafts, lost ground in favour 
of Catalan wool and manufactures. As Sánchez Albornoz (1985a) explains, Castile’s 
evolution during the 19
th
 century and beginning of the 20
th
 century resembles the more recent 
processes typical of the third world, as it became a captive market for the Catalan and 
Basque industries.  
 
Spain’s demographic trends, clearly connected with the country’s economic backwardness 
analysed above, constitute another important factor in support of the idea of a late and 
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uneven modernisation influencing Spain’s deficient and belated nation-building in modern 
times. There is widespread consensus that Spain underwent a late demographic 
modernisation compared to more developed European nations (Nadal, 1984); (Tortella, 
1994); Pérez Moreda (1985). As Table 3.2 illustrates, the Spanish population grew at a 
slower pace than most European countries during the 19
th
 century:  
 


















Great Britain 10.9 37.0 239.4 1.230 18 29 
Holland 2.2 5.1 131.8 0.844 18 32 
Belgium 3.0 6.7 123.3 0.807 19 29 
Sweden 2.3 5.1 121.7 0.800 17 27 
Germany 24.5 50.6 106.5 0.728 22 36 
Austria/Hungary 23.3 47.0 101.7 0.704 25* 35* 
Italy 17.2 32.5 88.4 0.635 24 33 
Portugal 3.1 5.4 74.2 0.557 20 30 
Spain 11.5 18.6 61.7 0.482 29 34 
France 26.9 38.5 40.6 0.341 22 21 
Ireland 5.0 4.5 -10.0 -0.105 20 23 
*Austria only. 
Population growth and other demographic variables in Europe (Source: Tortella, 1994 p. 
28) 
 
The figures provided by Nadal (1984) in his longitudinal study do not differ significantly 
from those of Tortella. According to Nadal, the Spanish population grew considerably, albeit 
comparatively slowly, during the 19
th
 century: between 1797-860, the yearly growth rate was 
0.63% compared with 1.25% in England and Wales between 1795-96 and 1861; between 
1860-1910 the Spanish rate was 0.49% while that of England and Wales between 1861-1911 
was 1.18%. Also, whereas demographic modernisation in Western Europe occurred during 
the 18
th
 century, the reduction of catastrophic mortality associated with epidemics, although 
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initiated in the 18
th
 century, did not reveal itself in its full extent until the 1900s, after the 
diffusion of the smallpox vaccine. Similarly, ordinary mortality rates, especially infant death 
rates, did not drop significantly until the First World War. As late as 1900, Spain had a gross 
birth rate of 33.8‰, a death rate of 28.8‰ –compared with an average death rate in Europe 
of 18‰ and an average life expectancy of 35 years. The Spanish levels had already been 
surpassed in Scandinavia 150 years before, according to Nadal. This large difference in 
mortality rates could not be compensated by a relatively higher Spanish birth rate. On the 
contrary, the smaller growth in population experienced by Spain was made worse by the 
migration of Spaniards abroad. 
 
Tortella (1994) and Nadal (1984) associate Spanish demographic evolution with economic 
and social backwardness, characterized by low agricultural productivity which often led to 
subsistence crises and epidemics, poor health and living conditions, a transportation network 
both expensive and underdeveloped and widespread ignorance. Sánchez Albornoz (1975) has 
identified another sign of Spain’s belated demographic modernisation in the trend typical of 
Spanish peasants of getting married during spring, giving birth in winter, dying of 
gastrointestinal diseases in summer and of lung diseases in winter. Such a trend continued in 
Spain until the second half of the 19
th
 century. Spain’s socio-economic backwardness was 
also manifested in the high numbers of people employed in the agricultural sector: between 
65% and 70%, a percentage which remained unchanged until the 1920s-1930s (Pérez 
Moreda, 1985).  
 
Another sign was the slower degree of urbanization experienced during the 19
th
 century, 
despite Spain’s early urbanization in previous centuries. The migratory movements from the 
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countryside to the cities initiated during the 19
th
 century did not increase sharply until the 
20
th 
century. Around 1800, only around 6% of the Spanish population lived in eight cities 
with more than 50,000 inhabitants, Madrid being the largest with over 150,000 people 
(Fontana, 2007). Towards the end of the 19
th
 century, Spain had only two cities of around 
500,000 inhabitants, Madrid and Barcelona, compared with twenty-five in Europe, out of 
which seven cities had more than a million inhabitants (Tortella, 1994). Table 3.3 shows the 
distribution of Spanish population according to town size and its evolution between 
1900-1981. We can see that Spain underwent a strong urbanization during the 20
th
 century: 
in 1900, 50.4% of the population lived in towns with less than 5,000 inhabitants and 78.4% 
in towns up to 20,000. By 1981, these percentages had dropped to 17.4 and 37.2 respectively 
while the proportion of people living in towns with more than 100,000 inhabitants had 
increased from 8.9% in 1900 to 42% in 1981.  
 
Table 3.3.  
 






















1900 14.8 12.7 9.3 14.0 16.9 10.7 4.7 3.0 4.6 3.2 5.7 
1910 13.4 12.0 8.8 13.5 17.2 12.0 4.7 2.9 4.6 4.3 5.9 
1920 12.0 11.2 8.5 12.6 17.0 12.4 4.5 3.6 5.6 5.1 6.8 
1930 10.5 10.0 7.7 12.0 17.0 12.0 4.7 5.9 4.9 6.6 8.3 
1940 9.5 8.8 6.9 10.8 15.1 12.6 5.6 5.7 5.3 10.8 8.3 
1950 8.5 8.2 6.4 10.4 14.4 12.0 5.1 4.3 6.2 11.9 12.1 
1960 7.5 7.0 5.5 8.9 14.3 11.2 5.9 4.0 7.5 13.6 14.2 
1970 5.8 5.1 4.5 6.9 10.9 11.1 5.6 5.6 7.2 18.8 17.9 




Distribution of the population in Spain (%) according to town size, 1900-1981 (Sources: 
Censo de la población y viviendas de España, 1960, T. 1 pp. XXIII-XXXVIII and 
Anuario Estadístico, 1971, p. 54 and 1982, p. 64; quoted in Nadal, 1984, p. 230)  
 
Similarly, literacy rates remained significantly low during the 19
th
 century despite some 
improvements (figure 3.9). Less than 30% of the adult population was literate by 1860 and 
only 50% was literate around 1910.  
Figure 3.9.  
   
Illiteracy rates in various countries between 1850-1910 (Source: Tortella, 1994. 
P.12) 
 
As we saw in the case of the economy, the demographic trends also presented considerable 
regional differences. There is consensus among researchers that only Catalonia achieved 
demographic modernisation during the 19
th
 century at a pace which resembled more closely 
that in Europe’s industrialized areas. The Catalan demographic growth between 1700-1850 
resembled that of England and Wales despite a higher mortality rate. Tortella (1994) 
attributes this to higher birth rates in the context of economic expansion, as shown by the 





















proportion of people in the agricultural sector remained around 65% of the total male 
working population during the entire 19
th
 century, the percentage in Catalonia, especially in 
the province of Barcelona, not only stayed below 40% but also decreased throughout the 
century. As late as 1930, Spain still had 45.5% of its working population employed in the 
agricultural sector compared to 11.2% in the province of Barcelona (Pérez Moreda, 1985). 
Similarly, the Catalans represented 23.6% and 22.5% of the Spaniards working the 
commercial and industrial sectors by 1910 according to Tortella (1994). Nadal (1984) and 
Tortella (1994) also conclude that, as a result of the different levels of regional development 
and large-scale migrations within Spain and abroad, the demographic weight of Spanish 




 centuries (table 3.4):  
Table 3.4.  
 Total figures (thousands)  Percentages 
Region 1787 1860 1910 1970 1981  1787 1860 1910 1970 1981 
Andalusia 1,804 2,967 3,839 5,971 6,442  17.6 18.9 19.2 17.6 17.1 
Aragon 614 891 953 1,153 1,213  6.0 5.7 4.8 3.4 3.2 
Asturias 346 540 685 1,046 1,127  3.4 3.4 3.4 3.0 3.0 
Balearics 176 270 326 558 685  1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.8 
Canaries 167 237 444 1,170 1,445  1.6 1.5 2.2 3.4 3.8 
New Castile 1,122 1,495 2,150 5,164 6,021  10.9 9.6 10.8 15.2 16.0 
Old Castile 1,213 1,630 1,851 2,154 2,231  11.8 10.4 9.3 6.3 5.9 
Catalonia  802 1,674 2,085 5,122 5,958  7.8 10.7 10.5 15.1 15.8 
Estremadura 412 697 991 1,145 1,050  4.0 4.6 5.0 3.3 2.8 
Galicia 1,340 1,799 2,057 2,584 2,754  13.1 11.5 10.3 7.8 7.3 
Leon 620 851 1,003 1,172 1,110  6.0 5.4 5.0 3.4 2.9 
Murcia 332 589 880 1,167 1,292  3.2 3.8 4.4 3.4 3.4 




529 729 986 2,343 2,642  5.2 4.7 4.9 7.1 7.0 
SPAIN 10,269 15,645 19,944 33,824 37,617  100 100 100 100 100 
 
Regional distribution of Spanish population, 1787-1981 according to the census (Nadal, 
1984) 
 





 centuries in favour of the Mediterranean regions: Galicia, Asturias, the Old Castile and 
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Leon housed 34.3% of all Spaniards in 1787 compared with 28.0% in 1910 and 22.3% in 
1981. In contrast with this, the Balearics, Catalonia, Valencia and Murcia represented 20.4% 
of Spain’s inhabitants in 1787 compared with 25.1% in 1910 and 30.7% in 1981. Only 
Madrid and part of New Castile experienced significant growth. In fact, as Ringrose (1973, 
1983) has argued, such growth mainly occurred at the expense of Castile’s continuing 
decadence. The final outcome was the disintegration of Castile’s former thriving urban 
network, a process initiated during the late 16
th
 century which continued unabated in 
subsequent centuries. Nadal (1984) estimates that the city of Madrid had a population of 
281,170 in 1857 compared with 3,188,297 in 1981, an increase of 1034%. In comparison, the 
surrounding provinces (Avila, Segovia, Guadalajara, Cuenca and Toledo) had 1,068,680 
inhabitants in 1857 compared with 1,153,493 in 1981, an increase of a mere 8%. This 
resulted in a population density below 20 inhabitants per square kilometre in an area 
equivalent to 12% of the Spanish territory.    
 
The picture emerging from the analysis of Spain’s economic and demographic modernisation 
indicates that despite the advances in the expansion of the State since the 18
th
 century, 
Spain’s backwardness hindered the consolidation of the national mode of organization during 
the 19
th
 and much of the 20
th 
century. Comparatively speaking, Spain remained a pre-modern 
society during the entire 19
th
 century and the first decades of the 20
th,
 characterized by low 
industrial and agricultural productivity, poor communications, higher mortality and low 
literacy rates as well as low urbanization levels. These factors constituted formidable 
obstacles for the effective nationalization of the masses according to modernist theories of 
the nation: As Fusi Aizpurúa (1992; 2000) has emphasized, in many respects Spain may 
have been officially centralist in the 19
th
 century but the life of the country still gravitated 
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around the local and regional scales, a phenomenon which may explain why the level of 
regional versus national consciousness continues to be an important factor in contemporary 
Spain (García Ferrando et al, 1994). The form of political clientelism known as caciquismo, 
which characterized Spanish politics at the time, represented a clear symptom of this 
localism derived from the State’s inability to govern social processes at a national scale (Fusi 
Aizpurúa, 1990; Storm, 2004). Caciquismo in turn thrived under the lack of a concerted 
policy for nation-building on the part of the State and its elites which in turn encouraged 
social passivity, turning potential citizens into mere clients (Vincent, 2007). The situation 
described by Holguín in her study of the misiones pedagógicas as a tool for the 
nationalization of the masses in republican Spain reveals that as late as the 1930s people in 
rural areas in many parts of the country remained cut off from the rest of the world as a result 
underdevelopment:  
Like the Soviet Union and Mexico, Spain had to deal with the problems of land reform, 
economic disparities between urban and rural areas, rampant illiteracy, limited numbers 
of qualified teachers and technicians, a poor infrastructure, ethnic differences, and a 
popular religiosity that, according to revolutionaries impeded progress […]. Although 
Shulgin was discussing the conditions in Soviet Russia, he could just as easily have 
been talking about contemporary Spain, where cosmopolitan city-dwellers visited the 
cinema, listened to the radio, and participated in political life, while many people in 
rural areas had no experience with electricity whatsoever, struggled to earn their daily 
bread, and had minimal contact with the political ideas emanating from the metropolis 
(Holguín, 2002 pp. 52-53). 
 
The marked regional differences in Spain’s social modernisation observed above further 
complicated Spanish nation-building as Castile, the driving force of the process, lost part of 
its economic and demographic weight in favour of the periphery, especially the more 
industrialized and culturally thriving Catalonia. This economic subservience and relative 
social backwardness of Castile was not accompanied by political subordination as Madrid 
retained much of its political power, albeit at a cost: this misalignment between economics 
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and politics would be at the root of many conflicts in Spanish contemporary history, 
including Spain’s unresolved national construction plagued by competing nationalisms at the 
centre and the periphery. 
 
3.4. The construction of the nation in modern times: national identities 
I have discussed the difficulties for the national mode of organization to consolidate in Spain 
during the transition from the Ancien Régime to the modern State. These difficulties not only 
resulted from a late and uneven economic and social modernisation. They were partly 
motivated by the country’s intricate geography, its long history of cultural diversity and 
political fragmentation and by Spain’s imperial “distraction.” This section mainly analyses 
the role of politics in forging a Spanish identity and the extent to which identity could diffuse 
as a result of the nationalization of the masses orchestrated by the State and the elites, a 
process which took centre stage during the 19
th
 century, as the State became a cultural 
container. Despite the claims portraying nations as brute facts or quasi-eternal entities, these 
culturally homogeneous societies evoked by the nationalists did not exist. They had to be 
constructed through social mobilization (Deutsch, 1966; Recalde, 1982), including the 
objective process of State expansion known as territorialization as well as the subjective 
process of participation and identification aimed at the political and cultural integration of 
the people expressed through shared national symbols and narratives (Jusdanis, 1990). 
Recalde (1982) argues that once the structural basis for the effective identification with a 
particular nation is in place, the decision to construct the nation, Spanish or Catalan, is 
largely subjective. This implies, as Vincent (2007) and de Riquer i Permanyer (2001) have 
suggested, that the nationalist challenges coming from the periphery towards the end of the 
19
th
 century cannot be interpreted as primordial ethnic identities surfacing through the cracks 
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of a largely artificial Spanish State. On the contrary, Basque and Catalan nationalism 
constituted a reaction in response to the incapacity of the State to construct an integrative 
nationalism capable of uniting people around a shared national project. The rest of this 
chapter is dedicated to analysing the difficulties in trying to build a truly national State in 











centuries notwithstanding the expansion of the State and its growing influence in people’s 
lives (Linz, 1973); (de Riquer i Permanyer, 1996a, 2001);  (Fusi Aizpurúa, 2000); (Álvarez 
Junco, 2001); (Fontana, 2007); (González Antón, 2007); (Vincent, 2007).  This can be 
attributed to various factors: first, in line with Spain’s late modernisation thesis, the State 
generally lacked the means to exert its influence in society during a period characterized by 
economic underdevelopment and prolonged debt crisis. Second, despite attempts aimed at 
constructing a national culture and a symbolic universe, there was not clear and consistent 
mass-nationalization in the long run, partly due to the shortcomings of Spanish Liberalism. 
Third, in marked contrast with the colonial expansion in other European nations, Spain saw 
its influence at the world stage greatly diminished during a period marked by the loss of its 
Empire and the absence of external threats following the Napoleonic War. Fourth, and 
perhaps more crucially, Spain’s weak nationalization can also be attributed to its long-lasting 
and partly unsolved “legitimacy problem”: as Weber (1993) has emphasized, every form of 
power needs to achieve widespread recognition and acceptance in order to perpetuate itself. 
That was not possible in Spain, riddled during much of its recent history with attempts by 
one faction to construct a Spanish nation at the expense of others. Consequently, a series of 
competing and often irreconcilable national identities were constituted across two main axes, 
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one being a traditionalist-conservative versus a liberal-progressive españolismo (i.e. right 
versus left) and the other Spanish nationalism versus Catalan and Basque nationalism (i.e. 
vertical versus horizontal Spain).    
 
De Riquer i Permanyer (2001) distinguishes three periods in the construction of a Spanish 
identity during the 19
th
 century: an early phase between the early 1800s and the end of 
Espartero’s regency (1843), a second stage occupying much of Isabella II’s reign and the six 
years of democratic governments following La Revolución Gloriosa (1844-1874) and a third 
phase from the restoration of the monarchy in 1875 to the 1898 crisis. The early stages in the 
construction of a modern Spanish identity coincide with the collapse of the Ancien Régime in 
the wake of the Napoleonic invasion. Only then the term “Nación” would become 
politicized (García Cárcel, 2004b) and the budding ethno-patriotism of the 18
th
 century 
headed by the monarchy and orchestrated by the elites began to be expressed in 
unequivocally national terms, at least by some of those who led the resistance against the 
French. The political crisis after the abdications of Charles IV and his son in favour of 
Bonaparte followed by the French invasion and the popular uprising of the 2
nd
 May across 
Spain had resulted in a power vacuum. As Artola Gallego (1999) stressed, the people reacted 
by effectively upholding the sovereignty relinquished by the king with his abdication. Then, 
when the insurrection needed to be institutionalized, the provisional Juntas which were 
formed constituted a remarkable political innovation without any clear link with the 
institutions of the Ancien Régime. One cannot detect a widespread national conscience 
among the masses who took part in the uprising. In fact, due to the confusion reigning at the 
time, the calls to rise against the French invader were mixed. Contemporary accounts 
indicate that calls were often made in defence of the Catholic faith and the Absolute 
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Monarchy rather than the still unfamiliar nation.
48
 This may explain the enthusiastic popular 
support towards Absolutism when Ferdinand VII returned to Spain in 1814.
49
 Rather, the 
liberal revolution that followed the uprising was the work of the modernizing elites which 
made use of the crisis to construct a novel political edifice by re-interpreting the notion of 
sovereignty in national terms:  
[…] Hundido el Estado, se hizo preciso organizarlo de forma improvisada, a partir de 
una serie de juntas locales, que más tarde se coordinaron en un organismo central, el 
cual a su vez convocó unas Cortes, institución que no se había reunido –salvo con 
funciones protocolarias- desde hacía siglos. Las élites modernizadoras aprovecharon 
aquella ocasión para imponer un programa de cambios sociales y políticos. Y la manera 
de defender la competencia de aquel organismo para tal función reformadora consistió 
en lanzar la idea revolucionaria de nación, titular de la soberanía en el momento en que 




The national idea embraced by these liberal elites in legitimizing the war against the French 
would become the founding myth of an emerging social order consecrated in the 1812 
Constitution. Sovereignty would no longer be the patrimony of the monarch but of the nation, 
vaguely understood in terms of citizenship rather than in ethnic terms, as the inclusion of the 
American creoles suggests:  
Art. 1. La Nación española es la reunión de todos los españoles de ambos hemisferios. 
Art. 2.  La Nación española es libre e independiente, y no es ni puede ser patrimonio 
de ninguna familia ni persona. 
Art. 3. La soberanía reside esencialmente en la Nación, y por lo mismo pertenece a ésta 




                                                 
48
 The testimonies of friars Rafael de Vélez, Simón López and Manuel Amado adhere to this view (see Álvarez 
Junco, 2001). 
49
 The cry “vivan las caenas” (long live the chains) became popular at the time in support of Ferdinand’s 
decision to ignore the 1812 liberal Constitution.  
50
 Once the State had collapsed, it became necessary to organize it in an improvised manner on the basis of a 
series of local juntas which later were coordinated around a central organization which convened a Cortes, an 
institution which had not been called up –except for protocol purposes- for centuries. The modernizing elites 
made use of the occasion to impose a programme for social and political change. And their way of justifying 
the powers of that institution for their reforming purposes was to launch the revolutionary idea of the nation as 
the holder of sovereignty at the moment when the monarch was missing.      
51
 Art. 1: The Spanish nation is the joining of all Spaniards from both hemispheres. Art. 2: The Spanish nation 
is free and independent and is not and can never be the property of any family or person. Art. 3: Sovereignty 
resides essentially in the nation and thus only the nation has the right to establish its fundamental laws. (Source:  
http://www.congreso.es/constitucion/ficheros/historicas/cons_1812.pdf) (retrieved on 8-11-12).  
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This marked the beginning of the liberal narrative of the nation, rooted in the principle of 
people’s sovereignty. Adhering to the modernizing agenda of the Enlightenment, the liberal 
intelligentsia understood the nation in secular terms. They however disregarded the 
Enlightenment’s elitism and cosmopolitism in favour of the new romantic vision which 
granted the people a central role. This mythologisation of the populus was necessary for the 
liberal bourgeoisie to affirm their political rights. National sovereignty became identified 
with the medieval liberties of Castile and Aragon suppressed by the first Habsburgs, accused 
of having brought Absolutism. The war against the French was portrayed as “a War of 
Independence” where Spaniards had risen against tyranny: not only Napoleon’s tyranny, but 
also the tyranny of those opposed to the will of the nation. The phrase “españoles, ya tenéis 
patria”52, proclaimed by Argüelles during the inauguration of the Constitution in Cádiz, 
captured the essence of this liberal conception of society founded upon the revolutionary 
concept of nation (Lario, 2012).  
 
Following France’s example, another aspect of the liberal narrative consecrated in the 
Constitution was the aspiration towards a uniform culturally homogeneous centralized nation 
which would abolish regional differences and privileges. This desire led to the rejection of 
federalism, perceived as a step towards future disintegration (Álvarez Junco, 2001; de Riquer 
i Permanyer, 2004). At this stage, unitarism received considerable support from the Catalan 
bourgeoisie, implicated as they were in defending a Spanish national market for their 
industry (García Cárcel, 2004b). Despite the legal and administrative homogenization 
accomplished since the Nueva Planta decrees, the authors of the 1812 Constitution found the 
Spanish nation terribly fragmented and lamented the excessive cautiousness with which 
                                                 
52
 Spaniards, you now have a fatherland.  
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homogenization had been carried out in the past. Even before the Cortes met, Jovellanos 
proposed to achieve “la más perfecta uniformidad” across the territories.53 The most radical 
proposal came from Agustín de Foronda, suggesting to divide Spain in eighteen square 
sections, called number one, number two, etc. instead of Biscay, Andalusia, etc., as a way of 
achieving a more perfect unity (Maravall Casesnoves, 1977). Quintana, another key figure at 
the Cortes, called for a Constitution which: 
Hiciera de todas las provincias que componen esta vasta Monarquía una Nación 
verdaderamente una […] En ella deben cesar a los ojos de la ley las distinciones de 
Valencianos, Aragoneses, Castellanos, Vizcaínos: todos deben ser Españoles (see 




Similarly, Egaña compared the situation before and after the Constitution:  
La Nación estaba enteramente separada, desunida y dividida. Cada Provincia tenía sus 
leyes y fueros particulares, su gobierno y administración peculiar. Unos ciudadanos 
gozaban de derechos y privilegios que otros no conocían […] No había entre nosotros 
una verdadera asociación política. Por fortuna, con la Constitución todo ha mudado. Ya 
no subsisten los fueros y leyes particulares de las provincias: para toda es uno mismo el 
gobierno y uniforme la administración. Todos están sujetos a la misma ley y todos 
llevan igualmente las cargas del Estado. Todos pertenecemos a una familia y 
componemos una sola sociedad. La máquina del Estado rueda ya sobre ejes propios 
para la buena y legítima dirección del movimiento político. Los Españoles, constituidos 
imperfectísimamente en el antiguo régimen y reducidos de algunos siglos a esta parte a 
cultivar, manufacturar, traficar y combatir en provecho y gloria de uno solo, formamos 
ya un verdadero cuerpo político y somos realmente una Nación libre, independiente y 
soberana. (Correo de Vitoria No. 7, 11-I-1814 pp. 49-50  (quoted in Fernández 
Sebastián, 1994 pp. 59-60). 
 
(The Nation was completely separated, disunited and divided. Each Province had its 
own laws and specific fueros, its own government and its own administration. Some 
citizens enjoyed rights and privileges which others did not have […] There was not 
among us a true political association. Fortunately everything has changed with the 
Constitution. There are no longer fueros and specific laws in the provinces: the 
government is the same one for all and there is a uniform administration. We are all 
subject to the same law and the same State obligations. We all belong to one family and 
form a single society. The State machine already moves on its own axles for the good 
                                                 
53
 “The most perfect uniformity”. He did so in a report of the Central Junta (see Artola Gallego, 1959 p. 267). 
 
54
 Would make of all the provinces which are part of this vast Monarchy a truly single Nation […] There shall 
cease from a legal point of view the differences between Valencian, Aragonese, Castilian, Biscayan: everyone 
should be Spaniard.  
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and legitimate governing of the political movement. Spaniards, which used to be 
imperfectly constituted during the Ancien Régime, reduced for centuries to farming, 
manufacturing, trading and fighting for their own benefit and glory, now form a true 
political body and we are a truly free, independent and sovereign Nation). 
 
This liberal idea of the nation would be rejected as a dangerous innovation threatening to 
dissolve the traditional God-ordained society by the supporters of the Ancien Régime, headed 
by the clergy. The conflict between secularizing liberal nationalism and the ideologies of 
reaction, first Absolutism and later on National-Catholicism, partly explains the lack of a 
hegemonic national narrative during the 19
th
 and the 20
th
 century, one of the causes behind 
Spain’s weak mass-nationalisation. This also explains phenomena like clericalism and 
anti-clericalism in all their manifestations: in the press, the literature, the symbols and 





 centuries (Díaz Mozaz, 1976; Caro Baroja, 1980; Raguer Suñer, 2001; 
Figuero, 2001).  
 
While the liberals portrayed the nation as the legitimizing myth of the “War of 
Independence”, the absolutists viewed the conflict as a struggle in defence of religion, the 
monarchy and the tradition, as reflected in cries such as “¡Viva María Santísima, viva 
Jesucristo, viva su fe, su religión, viva Fernando VII, mueran los franceses!,”55 heard in 
Andalusia in 1808. This idea of a crusade against Jacobin atheism is also reflected in the 
words of Father Simón López labeling the French troops as the forces of revolution: 
“coaligación de los impíos, incredulous, deístas, ateístas, herejes, apóstatas de la Francia y 
                                                 
55
 “Long live the most holy Virgin Mary, long live Jesus Christ, long live His faith, His religion, long live 
Ferdinand VII, death to the French!” (Source: R. Vélez “Preservativo contra la irreligión”, Cádiz 1808. 
Quoted in Álvarez Junco, 2001 p. 305).  
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de la Europa toda” intent on “arruinar el Trono y el Altar”56 (Álvarez Junco, 2001 p. 123). 
It would take the conservative forces several decades to assume the dissolution of the old 
order, accept the idea of “nation” and begin to elaborate a national narrative according to 
their worldview because:  
La idea de nación llevaba en germen una legitimación laica, autónoma, del Estado, cosa, 
en principio, poco grata a oídos eclesiásticos, como eran los de casi todos los ideólogos 
del conservadurismo hispano del momento (ibid p. 306).
57
    
 
Accordingly, at the time of the first Carlist War (1833-1840) the liberal troops were labelled 
“nacionales” and their Carlist counterparts “absolutistas” or “apostólicos”: the nation 
remained the monopoly of the liberal elites who would embark on the elaboration of a 
narrative and symbols in pursuit of their nation-building project. That involved radical 
changes in the society, namely the substitution of the inherited legitimacies in a 
God-sanctioned natural order by a new world organized according to nations which 
presumably had existed since the dawn of history. This was the task historians, writers and 
artists embarked on: creating a new mental universe in substitution of the old one where 
reality was re-interpreted through the national perspective. Paradoxically, nations were being 
presented as natural realities when in fact they were being constructed, as Alcalá Galiano 
made clear stressing the need to “hacer a la nación española una nación, que no lo es ni lo 




Although the elaboration of national histories started late in Spain, the work of Modesto 
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 “alliance of impious, unbelievers, deists, atheists, heretics, apostates of France and the entire Europe intent 
on ruing the Throne and the Altar”.  
57
 The idea of nation carried with it a secular and autonomous legitimation of the State, something in principle 
not really acceptable to the clergy, who were the chief ideologues of Spanish conservatism at the time.  
58
 “Making of the Spanish nation a single nation, something which is not at this moment nor has it been until 
now”. See Alcalá Galiano, A. (1955) “Índole de la revolución de España en 1808, 1839” (in Obras Escogidas, 
Vol. II pp. 309-325. B.A.E.) 
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Lafuente, Patxot i Ferrer, Cabanilles, Gebhardt or Cánovas, among others, contributed to the 
construction of a collective memory which could accommodate the emerging Nation-State 
(López-Vela, 2004). Lafuente’s Historia General was particularly influential in this respect, 
epitomising the liberal narrative of the nation. Lafuente starts by portraying Spain as an 
almost timeless historical reality in a world governed by Divine Providence. Following the 
well-known sequence of paradise, fall and redemption of the narratives at the time inspired in 
Isidore’s Laudes, he begins by describing Spain as an Eden peopled by tribes of Celts and 
Iberians, considered “the first Spaniards”. The narration unfolds with the Roman conquest, 
which in his view gave unity and culture to Spain and brought Christianity to the land. The 
arrival of the Visigoths after the Roman decadence gave rise to the foundation of the nation 
according to Lafuente, as these gave Spain laws and celebrated religious assemblies still 
admired by all. Spain would then suffer from the foreign Muslim invasion whose response 
was the “Re-conquest”, defined as a struggle for Spain. The reign of the Catholic Monarchs 
constituted a key moment of unprecedented success in the history of Spain leading to its 
political unity. Unfortunately, such success would be followed by a period of decadence 
inaugurated with the arrival of the foreign Habsburg dynasty. This negative opinion towards 
the Habsburg, blamed for abolishing popular liberties, bringing Absolutism, the rule of the 
Inquisition and social involution to Spain is typical of liberal narratives of the nation which 
in turn tended to praise the Bourbons, particularly Charles III, as modernizing reformers. The 
portrayal of Phillip II as a the paradigm of Absolutism and religious fanaticism, the 
mythologisation of the Castilian Comunero movement and the Aragonese resistance against 
Habsburg Absolutism are central features in these narratives. The opposite view is held by 
conservative historians who praise the Habsburgs for their identification with religion and 
consider the Bourbons a foreign dynasty which introduced harmful reforms in government 
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and culture, alien to Spanish tradition, as we will see. The War of Independence naturally 
constitutes another high point in the liberal narrative, as the liberties suppressed at Villalar 
and Zaragoza were reborn.
59
 As López-Vela (ibid) argues, Lafuente portrays the events 
associated with the War of Independence as a national revolution rather than a social one: 
Rara vez se ha visto tanta unidad en la variedad. Desaparecieron al pronto y pareció 
haber borrado como por encanto las jerarquías sociales; y es que la patria que se iba a 
defender no es de nobles ni de plebeyos, no sólo es de los ensalzados ni sólo de los 
humildes; la patria es de todos, es la madre de todos (Lafuente, M. Historia General de 




The work of historians was complemented by that of academics, writers, painters, sculptors, 
musicians, etc., which had embarked on the nationalization of the culture since the 18
th
 
century, although the bulk of their work would take place in the following century: “they 
imagined reality in national terms. They invented and re-constructed history and made it 
national” (Álvarez Junco, 2001 p. 239). This nationalizing zeal dominated emerging 
disciplines like archaeology or ethnography. It also led to the first histories and compilations 
of Spanish literary classics, where a Spanish literature with specific characteristics, different 
from other literatures, was presented. Early examples were the works of the Rodríguez 
Mohedano brothers (1766) or Antonio de Capmany’s “Teatro histórico-crítico de la 
elocuencia española” (1786) among others. Also, Spanish historical themes began to be 
introduced, particularly in theatre. During the second half of the 19
th
 century around one 
hundred plays inspired by Spanish history were staged: “Numancia destruida” by López de 
Ayala, “Doña María Pacheco”, by García Malo, “Guzmán el Bueno” by Nicolás Moratín, 
etc. Clearly the elites understood the didactic purpose of their work, in line with 
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 Reference is made here to the battle of Villalar (1521), were the Comunero revolt came to nought, and the 
attacks against the Aragonese fueros (1591) in connection with the Antonio Pérez affair.  
60
 One has rarely seen so much unity in the midst of variety. Social hierarchies suddenly disappeared as if by 
magic; since the fatherland they all were defending does not belong to the noblemen nor to the commoners, it 
not only belongs to those exalted but also to the humble; the fatherland belongs to all, it is everyone’s mother.   
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Hobsbawm’s notion of the invention of tradition, as the words of Antonio de Capmany 
exhorting writers to nationalize the masses indicate:  
[…] ejercitar su talento en letrillas y romances populares que despertasen ideas de honor 
y patriotismo, refiriendo proezas de esforzados capitanes y soldados en ambos mundos, 
ya contra indios, ya contra infieles, ya contra enemigos de España en África, Italia y 
Flandes, pues hartas ofrece la historia. Y con estos cantares, repetidos en bailes, en 
plazas, fiestas y teatros, se daría sabroso pasto al pueblo, y se despertaría de su actual 
indolencia (Antonio de Capmany, “Centinela contra los franceses” (quoted in Álvarez 
Junco, 2001 p. 232).
61
    
 
The dramas of Zorrilla would represent the culmination of this romantic reconstruction of the 
past in “Spanish terms”, where a profoundly conservative image of Spain which transcends 
time is established (ibid.). A number of moral features would be consecrated as part of this 
Spanish canon: the fighting spirit of the Spanish race, as exemplified in the absolute 
contempt towards death;
62
 an aristocratic vision of the world rooted in the concepts of 
honour and lineage, together with a profound monarchism and religiosity associated with 
Catholicism. The work of painters and sculptors also contributed to the construction of a 
Spanish worldview. Traditional religious themes or those inspired by Greco-Roman 
mythology were often substituted by scenes from Spanish history, as academies and other 
official institutions organized contests and exhibitions to promote patriotism. “Historical” 
paintings, starting with Goya’s series dedicated to the 2nd May events, would dominate the 
scene during the 19
th
 century, creating a narrative which enabled people to imagine the world 
through Spanish eyes. In 1856, the Real Academia de San Fernando inaugurated a series of 
“national exhibitions” dominated by Spanish historical paintings like “Don Pelayo en 
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 Exercise their talent in lyrics and popular poems which would provoke sentiments of honour and patriotism, 
narrating the deeds of valiant captains and soldiers in different worlds, against Indians or infidels, against the 
enemies of Spain in Africa, Italy and Flanders, as history offers us plenty of choice. And with these songs, 
performed again and again in dances, public squares, celebrations and theatres, the people could be instructed 
and awaken from their current indifference.    
62
 This contempt towards death is clearly visible in the narratives of the Spanish Foreign Legion, one of the 
most extreme manifestations of Spanish nationalism. 
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Covadonga” (figure 3.10). Other works illustrated the liberal narrative of the nation with 
politically-charged themes like the Comuneros or even more contemporary topics connected 
with the struggle against Absolutism, like the Execution of Torrijos, remembering the liberal 
uprising against Absolutism in 1831 (figure 3.10). This interest in national themes would 
begin to fade away towards the end of the 19
th
 century when the avant-garde movements 
entered the scene, although the nationalization of the arts continued with the publication of 
the first histories of Spanish art (Álvarez Junco, 2001). 
  
  Figure 3.10.  
“Don Pelayo en Covadonga”, by Luis de Madrazo (1855)63 
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Nationalism had mixed success in the musical scene. Theatre regulations prohibited in 1807 
“cantar y bailar piezas que no sean en idioma castellano y actuadas por actores y actrices 
nacionales, o naturalizados en estos reinos”65(Álvarez Junco, 2001 p. 260). Towards the 
1830s there were repeated calls advocating a Spanish national opera and the production of 
musical works in Castilian, followed by the contribution of composers like Hilarión Eslava, 
Soriano, Gaztambide or Barbieri in search of Spain’s musical essence. The efforts to promote 
a national opera continued with the inauguration of Madrid’s Teatro Real in 1850 and the 
launching of a magazine, La Opera Española, in 1875. The initiative never really bore fruit 
as the public continued to prefer Italian works. The success of zarzuelas compensated 
somehow for the failure in establishing an operatic tradition. Numerous zarzuelas 
showcasing Spanish customs and manners were produced and staged from the second half of 
the 19
th
 century onwards. The identity values portrayed, however, could hardly convey the 
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 Source: cgfaonlineartmueseum.com (retrieved on 22-11-12).  
65
 Singing and dancing pieces which were not in Castilian or were not performed by national actors and 
actresses or by those naturalized in these kingdoms. 
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exalted ideals of patriotism found in many operas at the time, given the low-class themes and 
characters of many zarzuelas. One has to wait for the work of composers like Falla, 
Granados and Albéniz for a repertoire of Spanish national music to be recognized 
internationally (ibid).  
 
All in all, the creation of a mythical and symbolic apparatus on which to assert the nation 
was attempted and partly accomplished, as the State and the elites collaborated in 
constructing a Spanish cultural edifice through the nationalization of the past, the arts and 
even the sciences. The nationalization of the masses however was weak as a result of Spain’s 
deficient economic and social modernisation, analysed before; Spain’s decline as a world 
power and relative lack of external threats; a weak debt-ridden State incapable of funding its 
nation-building initiatives and a legitimacy problem rooted in a prolonged political 
instability where no hegemonic national construct could take root. 
 
The liberal revolution faltered from the start bringing nation-building to standstill when 
nationalism was spreading throughout Europe. The Constitution was promptly abolished and 
the Ancien Régime temporarily restored. Firmly opposed to the liberal national project, the 
Church would constitute the main support of the reactionary forces (de Blas Guerrero, 1996). 
The next decades would be marked by political instability. The ship of the State would drift 
between Absolutism and Liberalism in the midst of frequent uprisings and government crises, 
while the Empire crumbled with the independence of the Americas.
66
 What this situation 
revealed was a “nation in the making”, presided by a weak debt-ridden State incapable of 
penetrating its society. It also revealed a former world power “in retreat”, no longer able to 
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 The Battle of Ayacucho (1824) marked the end of the Spanish American Wars of Independence. Spain’s 
American Empire was reduced to the islands of Cuba, Puerto Rico, finally lost after the “1898 disaster”.  
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engage in major wars or external ventures at a time when other European nations were 
undergoing a colonial expansion which brought them prestige strengthening their 
nation-building efforts.
67
 Worse still, Spain was not only economically and socially 
backward but also politically divided as the right and the left struggled to control the State. 
After Ferdinand VII’s death, the first Carlist War (1833-1839) inaugurated a long period of 
social strife punctuated by political crises and civil wars which would characterise Spanish 




 centuries, constituting a fertile ground for a culture of violence as 
legitimacy could not be achieved through victory in the political arena. The “nación cainita” 




In exchange for not having external wars, Spain had civil wars (three in the nineteenth 
century, and a terrible one in the twentieth), which have exactly the opposite effect to 
external conflicts: they destroy the unity of the social body, instead of being a 
reinforcing factor. Not only did Spaniards not fight united against anyone; they also 
fought a great deal against each other. The Spanish State was in a chronic political crisis, 
its legitimacy being constantly questioned during a period of at least seventy years 
(1808-1875): from liberal to autocratic periods, from one dynasty to another, from a 
monarchical constitution to a republican one, from a unitary Republic to a federal one. 
Revolutions and civil wars made it difficult for any government to have stability, 
legitimacy and the means to imprint any deep cultural mark on Spanish society (Álvarez 
Junco, 2002 p. 23).  
 
The second phase in nation-building identified by de Riquer i Permanyer (2001) was equally 
problematic. The fate of the Ancien Régime had been sealed after the first Carlist War. Yet 
the climate of national rupture created by the conflict made the liberal State headed by a 
young queen largely unprepared for the task particularly fragile. The threat of Carlism 
continued during most of the century with numerous uprisings and two more wars 
(1846-1849 and 1872-1876) until the movement’s decline accelerated by the integrista split 
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 Lord Salisbury’s famous speech on May 4, 1898 epitomizing Spain as a “dying nation” clearly reflected 
Spain’s decline as a world power.  
68
 Cainismo, understood as fratricidal violence and the violent betrayal of one’s compatriots, has been 
frequently used in many accounts of Spanish contemporary history.  
 190 
 
in 1888. A recognizably modern society based on private property instead of birth-rights 
began to emerge in the 1830s with land confiscations affecting mainly the Church and the 
municipalities. Although the nobility lost their jurisdictional rights, they generally managed 
to retain their properties. The political control of the State would remain in the hands of a 
wealthy land-owning oligarchy in detriment of the emerging industrial bourgeoisies of 
Catalonia and the Basque Country, the only territories where some economic modernisation 
had occurred (ibid).  
 
As the liberal regime moderated its stance, the nationalist discourse evolved diluting its 
democratic and civic connotations and becoming more authoritarian and ethnocentric. The 
Liberal camp split between Moderates, Progressives and Democrats while sectors of the 
conservative right gradually came to accept the idea of the nation.
69
 Formerly rejected as a 
dangerous innovation of atheist philosophes and regicides bent on destroying a 
God-sanctioned traditional order, the nation would be incorporated into the 
counter-revolutionary discourse of conservative intellectuals, previously based on religion 
and dynastic rights.
70
 This shift can be appreciated in the contrasting narratives of Donoso 
Cortés and Jaime Balmes (Álvarez Junco, 2001): the former, epitomizing the old 
counter-revolutionary stance of obdurate resistance against the forces of modernity, was 
naturally suspect of anything national. The latter, perhaps recognising the demise of the 
Ancien Régime, aimed at re-constituting the social order by preserving religion and 
monarchy, presenting them as consubstantial with the nation.  
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 This phenomenon was commonplace across Europe as Hobsbawm (1990) has pointed out.   
70
 See, for instance the writings of Father Alvarado and Fray José de Cádiz against Liberalism echoing French 
counter-revolutionary authors such as Barruel and De Maistre (Gregorio Alonso, unpublished paper: 
http://sas-space.sas.ac.uk/4135/1/LIA,_Atlantic_Catholic_Citizenship,_Alonso,,_18.04.12.pdf, retrieved on 
21-12-12).   
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This shift in the conservative discourse led to a re-interpretation of Spanish history initiated 
by Cavanilles, Belmar, Ferrer de Couto, Monreal y Ascaso and Merry, among others. The 
National-Catholic narrative of the conservative reaction would be systematised in Menéndez 
Pelayo’s “Historia de los heterodoxos españoles” (ibid): following the scheme of paradise, 
fall and redemption, this account placed the emphasis on religion as the nation’s kernel. If 
what had defined the liberal narrative was the idea of a perennial nation, the true historical 
subject in the conservative narrative was God’s people, represented by the Church. For the 
liberals, the episodes of crisis had coincided with the loss of national liberties under the 
Habsburg yoke, while the War of Independence, portrayed in quasi-epic terms, symbolised 
the recovery of those liberties and the nation’s rebirth. For the Catholic conservatives, the 
reigns of Charles V and Phillip II had epitomized the triumph of the faith, when Spain 
“evangelizadora de la mitad del orbe […] martillo de herejes, luz de Trento, espada de 
Roma […]”71 had fulfilled her historical destiny. This paradise had been lost with the arrival 
of weaker rulers and, later on, with the alien Anti-Christian ideology of the Enlightenment 
which had separated religion from politics. In their view, the War of Independence had been 
above all a crusade in defense of Catholicism against impious ideologies contrary to Spain’s 
true spirit. 
 
The rapprochement between the State and the conservative forces led by the Church took 
centre-stage during two decades of Moderate rule led by Narváez and O’Donnell’s Liberal 
Union, a centre-party formed by lukewarm Moderates and rightist Progressives.
72
 The 
attempts by all to articulate a stronger national identity would be marred by the failure to 
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 “Evangeliser of half of the globe […] hammer of heretics, light of Trent, Rome’s sword” (quote extracted 
from the Epilogue of “Historia de los heterodoxos españoles) 
(http://bib.cervantesvirtual.com/servlet/SirveObras/07927287699833781846746/p0000032.htm#I_345_, 
retrieved on 21-12-12).    
72
 This period started in 1843 and ended in 1868. The Progressives only governed between 1854-1856.  
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cement governance on political stability channelled through citizen participation and solid 
political parties. Politics would continue being characterised by the military’s interference in 
civil affairs and by frequent government crises triggered by coups or palace conspiracies. 
Between 1834-1875 Spain had seventy governments lasting on average less than seven 
months each. Twenty-nine of these governments were presided by military figures (García 
Madaria, 1982). As Balmes famously put it in 1846: 
It is not that the civil power is weak because the military power is strong but rather that 
the military power is strong because the civil power is weak […] The political parties 
have alternated periods in power; but none has succeeded in building a civil power 
(quoted in Payne, 1967 p. 25).    
 
The Constitution of 1845 effectively renounced national sovereignty establishing that the 
legislative power resided in the Cortes and the monarch. The new electoral law further 
limited voting rights to roughly 100,000 wealthy proprietors, excluding the middle and lower 
classes from participation.
73
 The Concordat of 1851 proclaimed Catholicism as Spain’s 
official religion. This was aimed at mending the relationship with the Church, badly 
damaged as a result of the liberal policy of disentailment (Fontana, 2007). In exchange, the 
Church accepted the State’s secular jurisdiction and some idea of national sovereignty 
diluted as it was in the new Constitution (Vincent, 2007). The expansion of the State 
continued with the establishment of new institutions and the attempts to further regulate 
people’s lives in the spheres of law and order, taxing and education. Unlike the short-lived 
changes of 1822, aimed at suppressing the old kingdoms, the territorial re-organisation 
proposed by Javier de Burgos in 1833 would survive with minor modifications until 1978 
(Figure 3.12). The State’s presence also grew with the articulation of the territory in 
Ayuntamientos and Diputaciones and the establishment of civil and military governors 
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 “At national level, after 1846, parliamentary suffrage encompassed a mere 1 per cent of the population after 
1846” (Vincent, 2007 p. 24).  
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appointed by the central government in each province. The creation in 1848 of the new 
departments of commerce, education and public works also contributed to the expansion of 
State bureaucracy. A custom and excise police, the Carabineros, and a coastward organized 
by the State were established to combat smuggling and privateering. More crucially, the 
Civil Guard, a militarised police force, was founded in 1844 in substitution of the local 
militias to combat brigandage and defend private property across Spain, beginning to reach 
rural areas which had remained largely unattended before (Ballvé Mallol, 1987). Finally, the 
various codifications of criminal and civil law and the law of public order granted the State 
ample powers of territorial and societal control. For instance, the law of public order made it 
possible for civil governors to declare a “state of alarm” if there was suspicion that public 
order was being compromised. If matters got worse, the “state of war” could be declared and 
command be handed onto the military.  
 Figure 3.12.  
  
Territorial division of Spain (1833-1978)  
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An ambitious fiscal reform was launched in 1845 aimed at leveling the disparate regional 
burdens and establishing Spain’s first comprehensive system of direct and indirect taxes: a 
graded land tax, taxes on urban rents and commercial profits and a stamp duty. The reform, 
however, did not increase the number of tax-payers given the State’s proverbial inability to 
permeate society and private life at the time. Measures like the creation of a national 
statistical office (1846) or a commission responsible for cartographic, census and fiscal 
functions (1856) represented steps in this direction. However, the plans to create a fiscal 
register were soon abandoned and substituted by a much less efficient system based on 
personal declarations of wealth which led to widespread cheating. Other important measures 
towards financial unification were the adoption of the decimal monetary system (1848) and 
the introduction of a national currency, the peseta (1868), (González Antón, 2007). 
 
Spain had ceased to be a maritime power after Trafalgar (1805), having lost the capacity to 
defend its Empire. The country turned inwards after the American wars of Independence and 
would not embark in any major international conflict. This absence of external threats, a 
consequence of Spain’s increasing irrelevance internationally, hindered Spanish 
nation-building as it limited opportunities for communal identification (Álvarez Junco, 2001; 
de Riquer i Permanyer & Ucelay-Da Cal, 1994). Even worse, Spain suffered a series of 
devastating civil wars proving that Spaniards not only failed to unite against others but chose 
to fight each other instead. O’Donnell’s government policy between 1858-1863 aimed at 
re-establishing Spanish prestige seeking a more prominent role in international affairs. This 
resulted in a series of small-scale conflicts in Cochinchina, Morocco, Mexico, Dominican 
Republic and Cuba where Spain could exercise its muscle against suitably weak rivals. These 
interventions generated ephemeral waves of patriotic enthusiasm in the press and among the 
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public which distracted the attention of the military, busy as always plotting to bring down 
governments. Eventually, Spain did not gain much from these ventures, which only made the 
country’s inability to compete in the international scene more evident. The threat to the 
authoritarian Moderate regime grew in the 1860s due to a profound financial crisis and the 
expansion of left-wing organizations caused by an increasing politicization of the working 
classes. The 1868 revolution would dethrone Isabella without bringing the much needed 
stability. The murder of Prim, who had lead the revolution, anticipated even greater 
instability: Amadeo of Savoy’s short reign would be followed by the First Republic 
(1873-1874) which introduced federalism for the first time in Spain. Three concurrent 
conflicts (the third Carlist War, the Cantonal Revolution and the Cuban War) would bring 
the collapse of the State in the midst of revolutionary strikes, coups and declarations of 
independence of various territories across Spain (Figure 3.13). 
 Figure 3.13.  
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 See http://murzainqui.blogspot.hk/2012/10/espana-como-siempre.html (retrieved on 1-1-2013).  
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The Bourbons would return in 1875 after yet another coup. Stability had become an 
over-riding goal after decades of political turmoil and the growing social agitation which 
accompanied the rise of the working classes (Martin, 1990). The Restoration had been 
conceived by Cánovas, its political architect, to guarantee stability at the expense of real 
democracy. The regime would provide a “functional and modernizing form of government”, 
at least until 1898. It would survive multiple crises until 1923, while ensuring legality at the 
expense of compromising the legitimacy required for an efficacious nationalization of the 
masses (Vincent, 2007). The 1876 Constitution re-affirmed the Moderate-inspired principle 
of shared sovereignty between Crown and Parliament now divided into two chambers, where 
the newly-created Senate became a bastion for the oligarchies and the remains of the Ancien 
Régime (Álvarez Junco, 1997a). An executive-led State with a centralist vocation was 
established on the basis of the peaceful turn in office of two parties: Cánovas’s conservatives 
and Sagasta’s liberals. The State would continue with its expansion beginning to assume its 
modern form and penetrating, despite chronic debt problems, new spheres of social relations. 
This was mainly achieved through legislation and the creation of new institutions populated 
by a growing bureaucracy. The Civil Code (1889) and the establishment of the modern 
judicial system provided the basis for the administration of justice to become a State 
monopoly. The monopoly of banknotes granted to the Bank of Spain (1874) encouraged the 
widespread use of the peseta. The establishment of new ministries like Public Instruction 
(1900), services such as post and telegraphs (1889) and State corps of lawyers, custom 
inspectors, tax collectors, auditors, public notaries (1881-1886) also illustrate this growing 




Notwithstanding the State’s expansion and relative modernisation,75 its presence in society 
appeared as heavy and yet weak (Vincent, 2007). While political decision-making took place 
in the cities, Spain continued to be a predominantly agrarian poorly-communicated country 
with low literacy levels and sharp social differences, “un país de centralismo official, pero 
de localismo real” (Fusi Aizpurúa, 2000 p. 165).76 The State’s lack of social penetration, 
despite the growing concentration of power at the centre, was compensated by a complex 
network of patronage, caciquismo, through which centrally-made decisions were passed onto 
the regional and local levels of power for further implementation. In many respects, 
considerable power remained in the hands of a local oligarchy more interested in maintaining 
their privileges than in modernizing politics while the State never really succeeded in 
“touching all its citizens directly” (Schubert, 1990 p. 184). The end result was a system 
constructed upon a disenfranchisement of the citizenship, what de Riquer i Permanyer (2001) 
calls “desmovilización ciudadana”, which hindered the on-going nationalisation of the 
masses. Or, in Vincent’s words, this weak and yet heavy State presence “meant that Spain 
developed into a heavily ruled society in which few people obeyed the rules, at least not at 
petty, quotidian level” (Vincent, 2007 p. 57):  
Caciquismo was, in some respects, simply a means of conducting business. If the 
central State had neither the economic resources nor the democratic legitimacy to 
ensure the impersonal operation of government and the rule of law, it nevertheless had 
to find a way of ruling. Co-opting established local elites by a process of reward and 
then making them integral to the way government functioned, confirmed its oligarchic 
nature. The caciques constrained the actions of ‘elected’ deputies, ensuring that 
parliament would not pass unwanted legislation and that any reform measures that did 
get through the system would not hurt the dominant elites. (Vincent, 2007 pp. 74-75).  
  
Ostensibly meritocratic but actually oligarchic, the regime came to depend on keeping 
established elites in power. Elections were held, but nothing depended on their outcome. 
Electors were enfranchised, but the governing parties continued to function as clientelist 
retinues. Newspapers were published, but political decision-making remained an 
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 Álvarez Junco (1997) describes the Canovite system as neither traditional nor modern: a competitive 
oligarchical monarchy undergoing modernisation.  
76
 “A country of official centralism and yet real localism”  
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internal, elite affair. The growth of publishing, journalism, and urban cafés led to the 
concomitant growth of a public sphere, but politically informed comment and debate 
simply existed alongside (and outside) the government’s accepted channels of 
communication (Vincent, 2007 p. 57).     
 
Plagued by chronic funding problems, the State also showed little interest in pursuing a 
concerted mass-nationalisation policy. Key instruments identified by Weber (1976) in France 
were not efficaciously employed in Spain. Despite an early interest in establishing a public 
education system, little was achieved (Boyd, 1997); (Álvarez Junco, 2001). The preface of 
the 1812 Constitution had already specified the need for public education as a priority for 
mass-nationalisation. Subsequent plans were produced in 1813, 1820-1823, 1834 and 1845 
without results. The Ley Moyano (1857) finally unified public instruction under the shared 
control of the State and the Church. Three levels were established: elementary education for 
all Spanish children aged between six and nine would be provided at schools in towns of 
more than five hundred inhabitants. Secondary education would be taught at schools in 
provincial capitals. A handful of universities at regional capitals would offer degrees while 
doctorates were only granted at Madrid’s Universidad Complutense. As the State did not 
have sufficient resources, no provision for funding was made. Responsibility was passed 
onto the Ayuntamientos. Consequently, the law ended up being freely interpreted, if not 
largely ignored. It would take over 100 years for the State to be able to fund schooling as 
regulated in 1857. Education remained the privilege of a few, illiteracy being widespread in 
many parts of the country (see figure 3.9. p. 75), failing to eradicate regional languages and 
to disseminate a homogenizing national narrative.
77
 This vacuum left by the State continued 
being filled by the Church, keener on producing Catholics rather than nationals. In fact, the 
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 Although the number of monolingual speakers was falling in Catalonia, Galicia and the Basque Country, 
around 54% of Basques still spoke their language in 1868 (Vincent, 2007). According to Marfani (2001) the 




 centuries promoted diglossia rather 
than the Castilianisation those areas where other languages were used.  
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percentage of Catholic schools rose from 10% in 1860 to 30% in 1920 (Álvarez Junco, 2001). 
One needs to wait till the creation of the lay Institución Libre de Enseñanza in 1876 for the 
Church to find a true competitor in educating Spaniards.  
 
Military service constituted another missed opportunity for nation-building. In contrast with 
France, where universal conscription contributed greatly to the nationalisation of the citizens, 
the Spanish system facilitated the exemption from the military service for a fee, effectively 
discriminating between rich and poor. This system turned the army into “an enemy of the 
lower classes” (Costa Pinto & Nuñez Seixas, 1997), failing to fulfill the unifying role the 




The elaboration and diffusion of national symbols in the form of flags, anthems, monuments, 
street names, festivities, ceremonies, etc. was often carried out in an erratic, discontinuous 
and even contradictory fashion (Álvarez Junco, 2001). Limited funding and insufficient 
motivation played a role on this. On occasion, a more inclusive national discourse was 
sacrificed as governing factions took the opportunity to promote their own political agendas. 
A red and yellow flag for the navy, described in a decree by Charles III as “national”, was 
adopted comparatively early (1785) (Figure 3.14). Its use, in combination with other symbols, 
spread during the Napoleonic War. It was adopted by the Liberal militias while Ferdinand 
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 The Barcelona riots in 1909 known as “the tragic week”, which started when a group of conscripts to be sent 
to Africa revolted against the government, constitute a good example of the disaffection of the lower classes 
towards the system (See Connelly Ullman, 1968).   
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The Liberals adopted the red and yellow flag during the first Carlist War while the Carlists 
chose the Burgundy Cross. The use of the red and yellow flag was extended to the army in 
1843. The symbol had become quite popular by the 1860s and was used as a national flag by 
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National flag since 1981 
 




the revolutionaries in 1868 while Carlist supporters continued using the Burgundy Cross. 
With time the Left supported the inclusion of a third colour (purple, in remembrance of the 
Comuneros) in the national flag. That symbol would be officially adopted during the Second 
Republic and substituted again, after Franco’s victory in the Civil War, by the red and yellow 
flag, this time with Imperial Eagle, the columns, the yoke and arrows and the legends “plus 
ultra”, in remembrance of the Spanish expansion across the world, and “Una, Grande y 
Libre”, Falange’s motto. Most of these elements have disappeared from the current Spanish 
flag, now displaying the Crown’s coat of arms, the columns and the legend “plus ultra”.  
 
Like the flag, the anthem has been controversial and seen multiple changes during its 
relatively short history. First called “marcha de honor española” in a decree on 3 September 
1770, it was subsequently renamed “marcha real”, after being played in before the 
monarchs in official events, and finally “himno nacional” in a decree by Franco in 1937 
(Fernández de Latorre, 2000). It was officially declared Spain’s anthem in 1908. However, it 
was substituted by Riego’s Anthem during the liberal triennium (1820-1823) and the two 
republics (1873-1874 and 1931-1939). The anthem has no lyrics, although Otazú suggests 
there have been up to thirty-two different versions during its relatively short history.
80
 This 
has often been attributed to the difficulties in agreeing on its content:  
Este pertinaz mutismo, pues, no me parece fortuito: el himno nacional es la expresión 
de que los ciudadanos toman la palabra y asumen su apropiación del Estado, 
autocelebrándose en la comunión de unas palabras patrióticas. Pues bien, nada parecido 
se había producido en la España del tránsito del siglo XVIII al siglo XIX, ni se produjo 
posteriormente en un país cuya historia proporcionó pocas oportunidades al ciudadano 
para que se apropiase de la palabra pública (Serrano, 1999 p. 112).
81
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 See www.arbil.org/(79)himn.htm (retrieved on 2-8-12). The most recent versions were produced in 2007, 
under the initiative of the Spanish Olympic Committee, and in 2012, by popular singer Joaquín Sabina.    
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 This persistent silence does not seem fortuitous: the national anthem is the expression of the citizens’ raising 
their voices and assuming their appropriation of the State, congratulating themselves by sharing some patriotic 
words. Well, nothing of the sort had taken place in Spain during the transition from the 18
th






In fact, the overt display of Spanish identity has been considered politically incorrect in 
recent decades, a consequence of the appropriation of national symbols during Francoism 
(Balfour & Quiroga, 2007; Laínz, 2004). Consequently, Spaniards have tended to avoid 
displaying the flag, and even the use of the word Spain, until recently, while regional 
symbols have flourished (Figure 3.15):  
 
Figure 3.15.  
 
A cartoon ridiculing the attitude towards the flag after Spain’s victory in the FIFA 
World Cup in 2010
82





The commemoration of events and festivities remembering the nation has also been 
inconsistent throughout Spanish history (Serrano, 1999). Despite its potential to unite 
                                                                                                                                                       
It did not occur either later on in a country whose history provided few opportunities for the citizens to own the 
public discourse.  
For more discussion on the instability of Spanish national symbols, see Solé Tura, J. (1997) ¿Qué historia? El 
País. 6-11-97 http://elpais.com/diario/1997/11/06/opinion/878770804_850215.html (retrieved on 7-1-13).     
82
 See http://www.miclonmalvado.com/ (retrieved on 7-1-13). 
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Spaniards of different ideologies, the 2
nd
 May never really took off: the Cortes declared it “a 
day of perpetual national mourning” in 1814 but the idea was shunned after the absolutist 
restoration. By mid-19
th
 century, the feast was celebrated mainly in Madrid, being even 
shunned by the moderate governments for being “too liberal”. The centennial of the 
“discovery of America” by Columbus was first commemorated in 1892. The celebrations 
were then criticized by republican, socialist and anarchist organizations who accused Spain 
of destroying and enslaving indigenous peoples. A government decree declared the 12
th
 
October a national feast in 1918. The fact that it coincided with the religious celebrations of 
El Pilar, provided certain ambiguity to the commemoration from the beginning. To this day, 
12
th
 of October celebrations are more prominent in embassies and consulates abroad than 
within Spain.    
 
The construction of a capital city worthy of that name constituted another important symbol 
of statehood offering great opportunities for the nationalisation of space in the form of 
commemorative monuments, street names etc. Despite Madrid’s unrivalled status as Spain’s 
political capital, it took a long time for the city to become an important economic centre like 
Barcelona or Bilbao. Madrid remained small compared with major European capitals during 




 centuries not approaching 1 million inhabitants until the 1930s 
(Vincent, 2007). From being a small, cramped insalubrious place during much of the 19
th
 
century, the city began to expand significantly during the reign of Alfonso XII (1874-1885) 
with the construction of new barrios, larger avenues and the erection of luxurious buildings, 
all inspired by Hausmann’s Paris. Opportunity finally rose for the symbolic nationalisation 
of space which had been advocated by Mesonero Romanos during the 1930s (Serrano, 1999): 
old street names were changed; some places were named after national heroes; monuments 
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celebrating the nation were erected. Yet, in Madrid, as in the rest of Spanish cities, a 
thorough nationalisation of the space never really prospered due to a general lack of 
enthusiasm and the often contradictory policies adopted. Street names and monuments often 
changed together with governments while in cities like Barcelona the nationalisation of space 
soon began to contradict the discourse of the State.       
 
All in all, Spain’s problematic nation-building during the 19th century had resulted in a 
fragile identity as no hegemonic national narrative could be consolidated. Towards the end of 
the century, increasingly antagonistic discourses had been established (Figure 3.16). On the 
vertical axis, the two main Spanish national narratives were the Progressive liberal account, 
rooted in the secular ideas of the Enlightenment and the Jacobin-inspired concept of the 
nation of the 1812 Constitution, and the conservative National-Catholic account where the 
nation was primarily identified with religion. This second narrative, influenced by the 
pre-national discourse of the Ancien Régime, had been adopted by the Moderate Right and 





















 Competing national discourses towards the end of the 19
th









On the horizontal side there was the Spanish Progressive Federalist discourse of the 
Republicans and Iberistas, the pre-national Carlist discourse of the Foralistas and the 
newly-emerging regional/national identity discourses in Catalonia, the Basque Country and, 
to a lesser extent in Galicia, where language differences and a strong regional culture had 
survived Spain’s incomplete nationalization process. Outside this national framework there 












Linz (1973) and de Riquer i Permanyer (2001) detect the first signs of Catalan 
disenchantment towards the second half of the 19
th
 century in the midst of the revival of 
Catalan language and culture known as Renaixença, when an increasingly frustrated 
industrial bourgeoisie which had originally supported the nationalist project of the Liberal 
Revolution became estranged from what they perceived as an archaic, culturally-aggressive, 
Castilian-centred mass-nationalisation where the more entrepreneurial modernising social 
model of Catalonia had been subordinated to the agrarian and commercial interests of the 
Spanish oligarchies: 
However, between the middle and the turn of the [19
th
] century, one variable changed: 
different segments of Catalan society, first the upper bourgeoisie and later the middle 
classes, thought that a more effective solution could be found within the regional 
framework by administrative and political self-government and even within a Catalan 
state built on the basis of nationalism. Frustrated in an effort to gain power in Madrid, 
the Catalan bourgeoisie dreamed of power in Catalonia […] (Linz, 1973 p. 57).    
 
Paradoxically, the elites in Spain’s most modernised territory seemed conspicuously 
uninfluential in Spanish politics then:  
Entre 1814 y 1900 sólo hubo 3 catalanes que fueran jefes del gobierno español (Prim, 
Figueras y Pi i Maragall, los tres en el Sexenio) cuando el número de gabinetes que se 
constituyeron en ese largo periodo de tiempo fue de 115. El número de ministros 
catalanes fue tan sólo de 22, sobre un total de casi 850, es decir, poco más del 2,75 por 
100, cuando Cataluña representaba casi el 10 por 100 de la población española. Y de 
estos 22 ministros casi la mitad -10- lo fueron también durante el Sexenio y sólo 3 
durante la primera etapa de la Restauración. Me parece que estas cifras se comentan por 
sí solas (de Riquer i Permanyer, 2001 p. 82).
83
          
 
Catalan frustration began to be expressed in the form of anti-centralist calls against the 
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 Between 1814 and 1900, there were only 3 Catalans at the head of the Spanish government (Prim, Figueras 
and Pi i Maragall, the three of them during the Democratic Six-year period) when there were 115 governments 
formed during this long period of time. There were only 22 Catalan ministers out of nearly 850. That 
represented little more than 2.75%, when the population in Catalonia represented 10% of Spain’s population. 
And out of these 22 ministers, nearly half of them -10- were in office during the Democratic six-year Period 
while only 3 served during the early stage of the Restoration.    
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Castilian acculturation of Catalonia
84
 and it gradually evolved into a dual patriotism which 
favoured the construction of “una España plural” compatible with the old allegiance 
towards a Catalan fatherland (Fradera, 2000). With time, the Catalanist modernising agenda 
would re-surface in the form of a new discourse, “regeneracionismo”, portraying the 
Catalan nation as a modernizing agent within a pluralist Spanish State, defined by Ucelay-Da 
Cal (2003) as “Catalan imperialism”. This hesitancy in Catalan politics between leading 
Spanish regeneration in their own terms and seceding from Spain would remain a constant in 
the discourses of Cambó and, more recently, Durán i Lleida and Unió Democràtica de 
Catalunya.     
 
The origins of Basque nationalism are different. The national creed first took root, during the 
second half of the 19
th
 century in the context of Biscay’s rapid modernisation, among a 
reactionary urban petit-bourgeoisie which had supported Carlism and the Fueros abolished 
in 1876. Its prophet, Sabino Arana, elaborated an identity centred on race, language and 
religion which idealised a traditional rural culture threatened by industrialisation and 
immigration. With time, this radical Aranist discourse would co-exist in the Basque 
Nationalist Party (PNV) with the more pragmatic approach of the Euskalerriacos, supportive 
of Basque autonomy within the Spanish State (De Pablo & Mees, 2005). 
 
The “1898 Disaster”, where Spain lost its remaining colonies in a war against the USA, 
would constitute the climax of this identity crisis. Spain had become a residual power during 
the 19
th
 century following the loss of its empire, its prolonged political instability and a series 
of devastating civil wars, while other countries had grown stronger with industrialisation. 
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 See for instance the comments by Joan Mañé i Flaquer, director of El Diario de Barcelona, complaining in 
1856 that Catalonia was being treated as a colony by Spain (de Riquer i Permanyer, 2001 p. 84).   
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Cánovas had famously captured the inferiority complex of the nationalising elites affirming 
that “son españoles los que no pueden ser otra cosa”85 (Álvarez Junco, 2001 p. 573). A 
sense of decadence was already present in works like Garrido’s “La regeneración de España” 
(1860), Mallada’s “Los males de la patria” (1890) or Isern’s “El problema nacional y sus 
causas” (1897). However, the final realisation of Spain’s downfall would come once news of 
the destruction of its navy arrived. The media’s patriotic enthusiasm and jingoism at the start 
of the conflict had been a gross underestimation of America’s might. A wave of pessimism 
and self-deprecation ensued, where Spain appeared to be “sin pulso”, as Silvela, soon to be 
appointed Prime Minister, lamented in the press.
86
 All seemed to confirm Spain was one of 
the dying nations alluded in Lord Salisbury’s earlier speech.87 While Álvarez Junco (1997b) 
argues that this prostration mainly affected the centralist elites, it meant that the nationalising 
efforts had not gone altogether in vain: compared with the reaction of the same elites after 
Ayacucho (1824), when the loss of the empire had gone practically unnoticed, the outcry in 
1898 could only mean that defeats were now being interpreted in national terms, as collective 
failures of the nation, not as a loss of territory by the monarch.     
 
The hopes for political stability and national consolidation raised by the Restoration had 
vanished in the midst of a profound crisis. Spain had lost a captive market for its 
manufactures, something which above all damaged the interests of the Catalan industrialists. 
Yet, the country’s economy would recover from the blow thanks to the repatriation of capital 
from the former colonies, the growing trade with Europe and the devaluation of the peseta 
(Vincent, 2007). More crucially, the crisis affected national identity. Spain’s defeat had 
occurred precisely at the height of colonial expansion in the world, “when the possession of 
                                                 
85
 Spaniards are those who cannot be anything else. 
86
 See www.xtec.cat/~jrovira6/restau11/silvela.htm (retrieved on 15-1-13). 
87
 Lord Salisbury’s speech at the House of Lords on May 4, 1898. 
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colonies was regarded as the bench-mark of a nation’s fitness to survive” (Balfour, 1997 p. 
49). There was also a crisis of legitimacy as the oligarchic regime built on the peaceful turn 
in office of conservatives and liberals became widely questioned:  
The events of 1898 dealt the Restoration system a fatal blow. Pork barrel politics cannot 
operate without a barrel of pork and the loss of the colonies had, in effect, killed the 
fatted pig. Virtually every part of these once stable relationships came under challenge: 
the relationship between the centre and periphery, the role of the people as opposed to 
their elite representatives. The absence of national representative structures –above all 
national political parties- made it hard to address these questions. Faith in the 
Restoration system ebbed away and, as it did so, the legitimacy of the entire governing 
system came into question, for the Spanish State was peopled by the very same caciques 
who were increasingly blamed for Spain’s ills (Vincent, 2007 p. 82).        
 
Social mobilisation grew amidst criticism of the regime, cultural introspection and calls for 
Spain’s modernisation and Europeanization. A growing social unrest linked to an 
increasingly organized worker’s movement would threaten the established order, a 
phenomenon echoed in the press at the time as “la cuestión social” (Balfour, 1997). On the 
vertical axis of the nationalist discourse, this mobilisation was manifested in the movement 
of Regeneracionismo, the work of the Institución Libre de Enseñanza (ILE) and the literature 
of the Generación del 98. Regeneracionismo started as a progressive cause seeking to reform 
and modernize society. Considering Spain as a problem, a disease-ridden organism in need 
of treatment, much in line with the Herderian nationalism and the social Darwinism en vogue 
at the time, authors like Costa, Picavea, etc.
88
 would diagnose the disease: backwardness, 
caciquismo and oligarchy among others, and propose measures to modernise the country’s 
economy and society in order to Europeanize Spain: as Ortega y Gasset put it “España es el 
problema, Europa la solución”89 (quoted in Ochoa de Michelena, 2007 p. 197). The ILE 
focused on reforming education as a means of national regeneration emphasising scientific 
                                                 
88
 See, for instance, Picavea (1899) and Costa (1900) and (1902).  
89
 Spain is the problem, Europe the solution.  
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thinking, modern pedagogy and secularism while the authors of the Generación del 98 would 
add to the Regenerationist preoccupation for Spain a renewed interest in Spain’s volkgeist 




Regeneracionismo also influenced the discourse of Catalan nationalism on the horizontal 
axis. Catalanism shared with mainstream Regeneracionismo the idea of Spain’s national 
crisis and failed modernisation. However, the solutions proposed were markedly different (de 
Riquer i Permanyer, 2001): in Spain, Regeneracionismo had become inward-looking, 
Castilian-centred, thus forfeiting once again the possibility of a pluralistic nation capable of 
bringing together different regional sensitivities. This can be perceived in the compulsive 
preoccupation with Castile found in the authors of the Generación del 98 or in the views of 
prominent Regenerationist like Ortega and Azaña, and their insistence on Castile’s role in 
achieving Spanish unity.
91
 The Catalan elites conceived Spain’s regeneration in terms which 
were markedly different. Their emphasis was on constructing a Catalan nation 
“de-Castilianising” Catalonia to make it European, so that Catalonia could play a leading 
role in modernizing and constructing a new Spain, conceived as “un conjunto de pueblos 
diversos, de variadas identidades, unificados por un Estado común” (ibid p. 207). In 
comparison, Basque nationalism appeared more reactionary and detached from Spanish 
affairs given the emphasis placed on race and religion in its discourse and the radical 
anti-Spanish diatribes of its founder. 
 
This tension between Castilian-centred unitarism and Catalan-led pluralism symbolized in 
                                                 
90
 See, for instance, Maeztu’s “hacia otra España” (1899); Unamuno’s “En torno al casticismo” (1902); or 
Azorín’s “Castilla” (1912).     
91
 See, for instance, Ortega y Gasset’s “España invertebrada” (1921). Azaña’s national discourse evolved from 
his initial support of Catalanist demands to what Contreras (2008) calls “desencuentro” –disagreement-.       
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the idea of Spain as a “nation of nations” remains unsolved, as we will see in chapters 4 and 
5. After the reform of the Estatut derailed in 2010 when the Spanish Constitutional Court 
declared 14 articles unconstitutional and re-interpreted another 27 articles of the Catalan text, 
the number of Catalans questioning the viability of a Catalan nation inside the Spanish State 
has grown significantly.
92
   
 
This painful soul-searching no doubt stirred some consciences. Everyone seemed to demand 
regeneration but none agreed on how to proceed. Traditionalists would re-interpret 
regeneration as a need to return to Spain’s Catholic roots, a view defended from church 
pulpits, Jesuit schools and the ACNP (Asociación Católica nacional de Propagandistas) 
against the secularising agenda of the progressive Regenerationists and the ILE (Vincent, 
2007). The regime of the Restoration would survive another 25 years tainted by crisis (34 
governments between 1902 and 1923; the Tragic Week riots in 1909; the military defeat at 
Annual in 1921) and failed attempts of political reform, most notably conservative PM 
Antonio Maura’s “revolution from above”, aimed at diminishing the influence of the 
caciques and revitalising parliamentary politics without relinquishing control of the society 
by the State (Vicens Vives, 2012). This resilience can only be explained by the dynamics in a 
society not yet modernised (Balfour, 1997) and the flexibility of a system capable of 
accommodating opposition politics, and above all politicians, at the expense of the 
precarious nationalisation of the masses (Vincent, 2007). The Canovite system would 
eventually succumb to yet another military coup (1923). By then, the oligarchic system of 
dynastic parties had become untenable due to the growing demands for reform and the 
advancement of mass politics. The monarchy would take refuge in a military dictatorship 
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with Regenerationist aspirations, another missed opportunity which would eventually lead to 
the Second Republic in 1931.  
 
The mass-nationalisation effort after 1898 had come too late, as alternative peripheral 
nationalisms continued to spread among regional elites. A new idea of Spain as an aggregate 
of nations integrated in one single State had gained ground in the country’s most developed 
and dynamic regions. Catalan and Basque nationalists would launch alternative 
nation-building projects as their presence grew in Ayuntamientos, Diputaciones and new 
institutions like Catalonia´s Mancomunitat, threatening the balance of power in the restored 
monarchy:  
[…] a partir de 1901, los partidos dinásticos serán totalmente barridos de la vida política 
barcelonesa. Primero, y de forma muy rápida, perderán la representación en las Cortes. 
Así, si entre 1876 y 1899 en la ciudad de Barcelona habían sido elegidos un total de 41 
diputados dinásticos (21 liberales, 19 conservadores y 1 independiente) frente a tan sólo 
11 no dinásticos (8 republicanos y 3 posibilistas), en cambio en el periodo 1901-1923 se 
elegirán un total de 79 no dinásticos (38 de la Lliga Regionalista, 37 republicanos, 3 
carlistas y 1 independiente) y un solo diputado dinástico, un liberal elegido en 1901. Y 
en el ayuntamiento de Barcelona a partir de 1905 ya no será elegido ningún concejal 




The lack of a hegemonic narrative on the vertical axis of the discursive construction of the 
nation further undermined Spanish nationalism. De Riquer i Permanyer (1996a; 2001) 
distinguishes four main trends in españolismo towards the 1920s and 1930s: 
 
- A conservative nationalism, staunchly monarchist, ultra-Catholic and anti-democratic, 
                                                 
93
 From 1901 onwards, the dynastic parties would be swept away from Barcelona’s political scene. First, and 
very rapidly, they would lose their Parliamentary seats. Thus, a total of 41 dynastic MPs (21 Liberals, 19 
Conservatives and 1 independent) had been elected in the city of Barcelona between 1876 and 1899 compared 
with 11 non-dynastic MPs (8 Republicans and 3 compromising ones). Subsequently, between 1901-1923, a 
total of 79 non-dynastic MPs were elected (38 members of the Lliga Regionalista, 37 Republicans, 3 Carlists 
and 1 independent) and only 1 dynastic MP, a Liberal elected in 1901. And in Barcelona´s City Council, not a 
single dynastic councillor would be elected after 1905.        
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opposed to the liberal parliamentary system. Its origins can be traced back to Carlism. 
Re-formulated as Catholic traditionalism by Donoso Cortés, Menéndez Pelayo and 
Vázquez de Mella towards the second half of the 19
th
 century, it was further developed 
by Maeztu and Acción Española. The State was seldom conceived in staunchly unitarist 
terms, leaving some room for a diluted regionalism in the administration and respect for 
the fueros.  
- The aggressively unitarist, anti-separatist nationalism of the military and the Falange, 
advocating a strong centralist State. Like traditionalism, it opposed political parties and 
parliamentary democracy. However, it did not make of Catholicism and monarchism a 
central point of its discourse, despite neither being genuinely secular nor republican. 
- The democratic secularising progressive liberal nationalism associated with the 
republican Regenerationists led by Ortega and Azaña. Their attitude towards Basque and 
Catalan nationalism was usually more pragmatic and tolerant than in other trends, 
something which can be attributed to political opportunism in De Riquer i Permanyer’s 
view. 
- The Jacobin nationalism of the working-class leftist parties which supported a strong 
interventionist State as the main instrument of social reform. Profoundly egalitarian, this 
current was naturally suspect of any policy which could undermine State power and 
vehemently opposed the Catholic ideology of the right, including the PNV.  
 
These trends in Spanish nationalism would co-exist during much of the 20
th
 century. They 
influenced each other occasionally and usually competed for a hegemony which was never 
achieved despite certain discourses being dominant during prolonged periods such as 
Francoism. Religion and its role in society would constitute the main bone of contention as a 
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result of the confrontation between Liberalism and Traditionalism took centre-stage in the 
early 19
th
 century. In fact, no other European country saw a resistance towards secularisation 
as powerful and determined as Spain’s at the time (Vincent, 2007). The Catholic revival 
towards the end of the 19
th
 century would lead to a bitter confrontation between anti-clericals 
and clericals during the early 20
th
 century whose climax would be the anti-clerical violence 
during the Republic and the Civil War. At the same time the nationalisms on the periphery 
would challenge the discourses from the centre without being able to defeat them altogether. 
Ultimately, this failure in constructing a widely-accepted national identity on the vertical and 
horizontal axes can be attributed to a crisis of legitimacy. Indeed, Spanish contemporary 
history is riddled with attempts to construct a society where one particular way of conceiving 
the nation has been imposed on others, often violently. 
 
The Dictatorship of Primo de Rivera (1923-1930), a counter-revolutionary initiative of the 
military and the conservatives with the monarch’s compliance, aimed at reforming the State 
following the collapse of the Canovite system. Initially portrayed as a transitory military-led 
fix with Regenerationist aims,
94
 the initiative evolved into an attempt to articulate a national 
project rooted in National-Catholicism. The government, supported by the Unión Patriótica 
–the Dictatorship’s only party- and the militia of the Somatén, embarked on the 
nationalisation of the masses with a discourse which combined the critique of the 
Restoration’s parliamentary regime with the traditionalist anti-Liberal ultra-Catholic 
discourse of Menéndez Pelayo and Vázquez de Mella and the statist centralist authoritarian 
ideology of the military and Fascism. Its ideologues (Maeztu, Pemán and Pemartín) 
advocated a historicist and organic conception of the patria, said to have become a nation as 
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 Primo de Rivera was portrayed by its supporters as the much-needed “iron surgeon” advocated by Joaquín 
Costa towards the end of his life (see Mateos de Cabo, 1998). 
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a result of Spain’s Christianization and political constitution as a Monarchy. The notion of 
popular sovereignty remained conspicuously absent from a discourse which, borrowing 
Ortega’s idea of Spain as a collective enterprise, proposed a recipe for national regeneration 
combining a return to Spanish traditions and Catholic roots with the promotion of 
technological advancement which would cement the expansion of the Nation-State (Quiroga 
Fernández de Soto, 2006).  
 
Spain’s pressing need for regeneration was justified with a dualist discourse where the 
mythical narrative of Imperial Spain, cemented after the Re-conquest with the unity achieved 
under the Catholic Monarchs and the Conquest of America, the epitome of Spain’s civilising 
mission, was confronted with the Anti-España, characterising those periods where the true 
nationalising forces had been neglected, plunging the nation into decadence. Thus, the 
triumph of the anti-Spanish secularising forces of afrancesados and liberals had ultimately 
led to the disaster in 1898 and the threat of fragmentation caused by separatism. This 
renewed emphasis on unitarism and uniformity would lead the ideologues of Primoriverismo 
to question the regionalism previously endorsed by Carlists and Catholic reactionaries alike.  
La teoría de “las dos Españas” había nacido fruto de la interpretación maniquea que del 
pensamiento ilustrado y liberal habían hecho los absolutistas españoles durante la última 
década del siglo XVIII y primeras del XIX. En esta interpretación la patria se 
identificaba con la religión, y la España “tradicional” encarnaba el Bien absoluto, 
mientras que los liberales e ilustrados españoles se igualaban al Mal absoluto. Éstos 
eran descritos el “enemigo interior”, “antiespañoles” que actuaban dentro de la 
conspiración universal de las fuerzas del Mal contra el Bien, dentro de un esquema 




                                                 
95
 The theory of “the two Spains” had been born out of the Manichean interpretation of the ideologies of the 
Enlightenment and Liberalism made by Spanish Absolutists during the last decade of the 18
th
 century and the 
first decades of the 19
th
. According to this interpretation, the fatherland was identified with religion and 
“traditional” Spain embodied absolute Good, while Spanish liberals and the enlightened represented absolute 
Evil. These two were described as the “internal enemy”, “Anti-Spanish” who participated in the universal 
conspiracy of the forces of Evil against Goodness, according to a reactionary schema which preferred myth in 
favour of rational argumentation.       
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La toma de postura es clara: el regionalismo “natural”, definido en términos meramente 
culturales, al mezclarse con elementos políticos liberales ha dado lugar a una “herejía 
nacionalista”, por lo que el regionalismo se considera peligroso para la unidad nacional. 




Influenced by Fascism, Primo’s authoritarian regime embarked on a regeneration programme 
aimed at modernising the country and nationalising its people. This programme included the 
reform of the education system, the administration, the army as well as the development of 
infrastructure, agriculture and industry alongside protectionism, with measures such as the 
building of thousands of schools, roads, railways, airports, bridges and socializing policies 
aimed at addressing class conflicts providing an alternative to capitalism and socialism. The 
dictatorship would secure the collaboration of the Socialist Party and the UGT for some time.  
 
These modernising initiatives were accompanied by a mass-nationalisation policy and the 
persecution of peripheral nationalisms: a decree against separatism, the suppression of the 
Mancomunitat, the State monopoly of textbooks, the imposition of Castilian in all schools, 
the promotion of feasts and symbols like the Día de la Hispanidad or Barcelona’s Pueblo 
Español etc. (Vincent, 2007).
97
 By 1928, support for the regime was clearly dwindling. The 
1929 crisis would deliver a fatal blow to the dictatorship’s modernization and nationalisation 
project, leading to the growth of Republicanism and left-wing parties. Also, the 
dictatorship’s anti-regionalism produced the opposite effect, leading to a greater 
identification of the people with regional and nationalist alternatives to unitarist españolismo. 
Worse still:  
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 The position adopted is clear: “natural” regionalism, defined in cultural terms, had combined with liberal 
political elements giving birth to a “nationalist heresy” and thus, regionalist should be considered a threat to 
national unity. The nation, as an organic being, cannot be questioned by its parts.   
97
 The celebration of the “Día de la Hispanidad” on the 12th of October had been declared a national feast in 
1918. The miniature village of “El Pueblo Español” was built with the occasion of the Universal Exhibition 
celebrated in Barcelona in 1929.     
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[…] el sentimiento de unidad española, aún desde posiciones progresistas y 
proautonomistas, empezó a tener que cargar con otro lamentable malentendido y otra 
interpretación interesada: “España” era algo, un abstracto, cuya unidad política se 





A year after Primo’s resignation, the triumph in local elections of Liberal Republicans and 
Socialists marked the end of the Monarchy, signaling the turn of the centre-left to launch 
their national project.
99
 The Republic’s Regenerationist agenda was aimed at modernizing 
Spain according to the European model. That included democratizing politics by ending the 
oligarchic regime of the Restoration, socializing wealth by promoting an agrarian reform 
re-distributing land among the peasants and nationalising the masses alongside Republican 
values through an ambitious programme of schooling and pedagogical missions in hundreds 
of remote villages. The secularization of society was another key aspect of the republican 
agenda advocating the complete separation of Church and State, effectively confining 
religion to the private sphere with laws guaranteeing freedom of worship, civil marriage, 




The initial enthusiasm of the Republican elites would soon fade as the deeply-rooted 
contradictions derived from the country’s problematic modernisation process resurfaced 
(Tuñón de Lara et al, 1985). Spanish society appeared sharply divided: only for the 
bourgeois centre-left parties the Republic constituted an end in itself. Their socialist allies 
supported the new regime as a necessary step towards Socialism. For the Anarchists, the 
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 A unitarian Spanish sentiment, even when understood from progressive and pro-autonomy viewpoints, 
began to be misinterpreted and associated with ideologically charged views: Spain was something, an abstract 
entity, whose political unity was being forcibly imposed by dictatorship, as usual.   
99
 The Republican victory in urban centres was overwhelming. The monarchist had won in the countryside 
where popular vote was often controlled by caciques.  
100
 “Catholic schools continued, but outside the State system, and in 1933 further legislation banned all monks 
and nuns from teaching (Vincent, 2007 p. 121).  
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Republic was a bourgeois institution incompatible with their revolutionary ideals. The 
oligarchy holding the economic power saw the loss of political power as a temporary setback 
while Catholic monarchists accepted the rules of the democratic game waiting for a chance 
to destroy the regime. The radical laicism adopted from the start, epitomised in the 
destruction of churches and convents in Madrid after the proclamation of the Republic, 
would place religion at the centre of the confrontation between the two Spains, diminishing 
the legitimacy of the Republic for failing to include all Spaniards (Vincent, 2007).        
 
The national question resurfaced with the proclamation of the Catalan Republic by Macià 
and the drafting of a Statute of Autonomy initially declaring Catalonia’s sovereignty and 
self-determination.
101
 The compromise of the central government presided by Azaña and 
peripheral nationalists to reform the administrative structure of the State would trigger a 
process of devolution to the regions interrupted by the Civil War. The Constitution of 1931 
defined Spain as a State “integrado por Municipios, mancomunados en Provincias y por las 
Regiones que se constituyan en régimen de autonomía”.102 The autonomy granted to 
Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia promoted local institutions, regional languages 
and cultures. Other regions also sought the recognition of their specificity with calls in 
favour of autonomy (González Antón, 2007). 
 
Political instability and a culture of violence haunted the Republic from the start. Democracy 
was threatened by right and left-wing extremists unwilling to accept defeat in the polls. The 
                                                 
101
 These claims would not appear in the final version of the Statute negotiated with the central government. 
The definition of Catalonia as “an autonomous State within a Federal Republic” would be changed into “an 
autonomous region within the Spanish State” (see González Antón, 2007 p. 464).   
102
 “integrated by Municipalities associated together in Provinces and those Regions constituted in regime of 
autonomy” (Article 8 of the Constitution).  
See  www1.icsi.berkeley.edu/~chema/republica/constitucion.html (retrieved on 11-2-13)    
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regime would survive the military coup of 1932 and the Socialist Revolution of 1934 aimed 
at overthrowing the elected governments. In the end, the uprising in 1936 following the 
Left’s victory in the elections, would lead once more to the violent confrontation between the 
two Spains in the most destructive civil war in Spanish history.
103
Nothing hinders 
mass-nationalisation more than civil wars because of the trauma and division caused. The 
1936-1939 conflict, which brought massive bloodshed and destruction, constituted the 
climax in the age-long confrontation between antithetic ways of conceiving Spain on the 
vertical and horizontal axes expounded above. Once again, the victors in the conflict would 
impose their notion of Spain on those defeated, which they labelled as the Anti-Spain. Yet 
again, the national project that would emerge after the Civil War would exclude the other 
half, buried in cemeteries, imprisoned or in exile.  
 
Francoism represented a period of aggressive españolización during which the national mode 
of organisation would become fully established as modernisation peaked. This was the result, 
among other things, of rapid industrialisation, advances in education, the development of 
communications and urbanisation. Modernisation, aided by the regime’s authoritarian nature, 
would bring an unprecedented penetration of the State, finally undergoing its transformation 
into a cultural and social container, with signs of a welfare society appearing during the 
1960s. Yet, paradoxically, the regime’s efforts in promoting a staunchly Catholic and 
unitarist nationalism would backfire once Franco’s rule ended. Francoism was dismantled 
from the inside by its successors who would negotiate the democratisation of the country 
with the opposition. 
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 The number of victims during the Civil War and the repression during Francoism has been a matter of 
controversy among historians. Beevor (2006) estimates 38,000 victims of the “Red terror” on the Republican 
side and 200,000 of the “white terror” on the nationalist side. Casanova rises the number of victims in the 
Republican side to 50,000 (see Juliá et al, 1999). Preston (2006) estimates there were 180,000 victims on the 




The ultimate failure of the Francoist mass-nationalisation can be attributed to the regime’s 
violent origins as well as to its nature, something which would prevent its continuity after 
Franco’s death. On the one hand, the regime’s legitimacy had been founded upon the victory 
at the Civil War and the subsequent repression. While the fullness of such victory created the 
conditions for the long-term survival of Francoism, the imposition of a national identity 
increasingly obsolete in the face of Spain’s rapid modernisation would end up undermining 
the success of the enterprise. On the other hand, the highly-personalised authoritarian nature 
of Francoism would condition the regime’s political evolution reducing its chances of 
survival after Franco’s death.  
 
Indeed, it seems difficult to explain Francoism given its chameleon-like evolution, largely 
conditioned by the heterogeneity of its social base, the outcome of the Second World War 
and the changing international scene. Among the victors of the Civil War one finds the 
regime’s different “families”: the supporters of Alfonso XIII, the Carlist, the Falange, the 
Church, the Army and, later on, the technocrats. Also, one can distinguish a totalitarian 
project inspired by Fascism during the early years of Franco’s rule, albeit with features 
markedly different from the Fascist model, such as a weak single party and the considerable 
strength of the Church and the Army, and a second stage Linz (1974), Payne (1987) and Soto 
Carmona (2001) have described as an “authoritarian regime and political system of limited 
pluralism.” It was during the totalitarian phase when the doctrine and the symbolic apparatus 
of Francoism was constructed through ceremonies, festivals, monuments, flags and emblems, 
street names, political speeches, patriotic songs, epic narratives, stories of martyrdom and 
redemption, etc. The resulting discourse, rooted in the principles of National-Catholicism, 
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Anti-Liberal Traditionalism and the Fascist-inspired statist rhetoric of the Falange, included 
various themes: the Civil War as a Crusade coupled with the cult of the “Fallen”; Franco’s 
providential role in history as the Caudillo who saved Spain from the hordes of Marxism and 
Liberalism and regenerated a unified Spanish nation destined to fulfil its historical mission of 




These narratives shared an organicist, historicist and unitarist idea of Spain, advocating 
centralization, cultural homogenisation, firmly opposed to the peripheral nationalisms, 
considered a threat to Spanish unity. Yet they also differed in their conceptualisation of the 
nation in significant ways: the National-Catholic discourse promoted the “politization of 
religion” placing traditions and Catholicism as the cornerstone of Spanish identity. The 
discourse of the Falange tended to sacralise the nation effectively turning españolismo into a 
form of “political religion” (Box, 2010). National Catholicism and Falangism would 
compete for hegemony and on occasion influence each other until the latter’s decline, 
initiated after the Allied victory in the war and confirmed with the ascent of the technocrats 
associated with Opus Dei in the 1950s. Focusing on economic reform at the expense of 
ideology, these technocrats would end the autarkic policies of early Francoism and pave the 
way for Spain’s economic and social modernisation in the 1960s coinciding with a relaxation 
of political repression and greater international openness. Spain’s dramatic turnaround in the 
1960s would be based on unprecedented economic growth manifested in the rise in industrial 
production, consumer demand and the development of tourism. All this, coupled with the 
expansion of education, record literacy levels, and the impact of mass-migration and 
urbanisation would bring Spain closer than ever to the more advanced European societies 
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 All these themes feature prominently in key documents during early Francoism, such as Franco’s speech on 
18 April 1937 announcing the unification of all the forces participating in the “Crusade” (see Di Febo & Juliá, 
2005 pp. 145-149).    
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(Gunther et al, 1988). The following quotes illustrate these changes in Spanish society:  
[…] in the 1960s, the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) doubled in real terms 
rising to 40 per cent that of Italy, through this was still only 23 per cent that of France. 
Yet, the rate of growth was exponential: between 1959 and 1971, Spain’s average 
annual growth (measured in terms of GDP) was second only to Japan’s (Vincent, 2007 
p. 182). 
 
[…] between 1950 and 1967 the number of children enrolled in secondary education 
increased fourfold. Twenty-three thousand new schools were established after 1957 and 
by 1968, official statistics put the illiteracy rate under 3 per cent of those under sixty 
years old (ibid p. 180).  
 
In 1950, the proportion of Spaniards living in towns of over 100,000 inhabitants stood 
at 35.7 per cent, rising to 44.1 per cent ten years later, and 51.4 per cent in 1970. 
Pressure on accommodation was such that shanty towns had sprung up around all major 
cities in the 1950s (ibid p. 184) 
 
During the 1960s, the proportion of Spain’s population involved in farming fell below 
50 per cent for the first time. Villages stopped being agrarian communities, bound 
together by productive relations stemming from the land; the pueblo became rather an 
idealized refuge, offering an escape from urban congestion and the stress of daily life 
(ibid p. 185). 
 
These momentous changes in Spanish society contrasted with a limited democratisation and 
cultural modernisation, as Francoism struggled to cope with the demands of a society 
undergoing rapid transformation (Di Febo & Juliá, 2005). The regime’s official discourse 
turned to emphasising the country’s prosperity and stability, invariably attributed to a 
competent administration, encouraging the depoliticisation of the people by promoting 
consumerism, sports and spectacles, while an ageing Franco appeared like an old-fashioned 
grandfather figure to many. The ideological principles initially employed in legitimising the 
regime and its nation-building discourse would become diluted, if not altogether questioned. 
The relegation of the Falange in favour of the less-politicised technocrats, the 
aggiornamento in the Church after the Vatican Council and the rapid secularisation in 
society would contribute decisively to such dilution (Malefakis, 1996). The effects of the 
Council began to be felt towards the end of the 1960s as the Church became sharply divided 
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between Francoist traditionalists and progressives highly critical of the regime through 
associations like the HOAC and the JOC and publications like Ecclesia and Vida Nueva.
105
 
This division within the ranks of the Church was accompanied by a profound crisis as the 
number of seminarians decreased dramatically, priests married and church attendance 
dropped (Payne, 2006).  
 
During Franco’s final years, all seemed to indicate that the unitary ultranationalist State 
model imposed in 1939 had failed (Fusi Aizpurúa, 2000). The elites appeared divided 
between a loyalist minority advocating continuity and a moderate majority supporting 
democratic reform from inside (Palomares León, 2006). Protests and strikes increased as 
organised clandestine opposition across the country grew and a revitalised Catalan and 
Basque nationalism spread. Supported by a vigorous culture, Catalanism flourished, 
demanding political autonomy as a first step towards nationhood (de Riquer i Permanyer, 
1996b). Basque nationalism became more radical and violent as ETA gained support. Such 
radicalism has been attributed to a weaker Basque culture threatened with extinction in its 
own territory (Conversi, 1997; Aranzadi et al, 1994) as well as to the social reaction against 
Francoist repression (Powell, 2001). The Catalan and Basque demands for autonomy and 
self-determination would receive enthusiastic support from the left, further undermining 
Spanish nationalism, associated by many with Francoism and hipercentralism for years to 
come (De Blas Guerrero, 1978); (Sepúlveda, 1996); (Díaz Gijón et al, 2001); (González 
Antón, 2007). 
 
The main cause behind Franco’s failed mass-nationalisation was its fragility, derived from 
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opposing the régime as political parties were banned.  
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the regime’s anomalous nature and limited legitimacy. The ideological hegemony of 
parliamentary democracies across Europe after WWII had brought international isolation and 
disrepute to the regime (Malefakis, 1996). Francoism appeared tainted by violence against 
Spain’s other half, the “Anti-Spain”. Such violence was perpetuated through repression, 
particularly brutal at first, while later on the regime resorted to blocking political 
participation and employing force when necessary. Also, the regime’s efforts to develop a 
legal framework to ensure its continuity were undermined by the centrality of Franco as a 
figurehead and the personality cult built around him at the expense of a solid political 
foundation and a well-defined ideology (Powell, 2001); (Tussell, 2005). As Franco grew 
older, this fragility became even more evident as Spanish civil society strengthened 
alongside an increasingly de-ideologised State bureaucracy in the context of frantic 
economic and social modernisation (Pérez- Díaz, 1987); (Linz & Stepan, 1996). Inspired by 
staunchly Catholic authoritarianism with a Fascist outlook, Francoism appeared 
anachronistic to many. When Spaniards were given the opportunity to vote in free elections, 
they would support those forces in favour of democratisation, including those defeated at the 
Civil War. 
 
Largely peaceful and orderly, the transition to democracy constituted a gradual process of 
regime deconstruction orchestrated from inside, led by the monarchy and negotiated with an 
opposition unable to impose its model of rupture from outside (Seco Serrano, 1996); 
(Colomer, 1998). Haunted by the memories of a bloody civil war while still under the 
tutelage of a highly conservative army acting as guarantor of national unity,
106
 Spanish 
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society chose political stability, moderation and consensus over drastic change potentially 
leading to renewed social confrontation. The acceptance of civil supremacy by the armed 
forces after the 1981 aborted coup d’état significantly contributed to democratic 
consolidation.  
 
The configuration of a State model capable of accommodating Spain’s conflicting national 
identities has proved far more difficult to solve. Spain abandoned its secular policies of 
unitarism, political centralisation and cultural uniformity in favour of a highly decentralised, 
culturally diverse territorial model functioning de facto like a federal State (Moreno, 2001); 
(Magone, 2004); (Aja, 1999).
107
 Several factors favoured this federalisation: unitarism and 
centralism had become widely questioned, if not delegitimised altogether, after Franco’s 
death while the demands for self-government from peripheral nationalists were associated 
with the democratic discourse (Sepúlveda, 1996); (Balfour & Quiroga, 2007). However, 
Spain’s long-established centripetal tradition, the army’s staunch unitarism, ETA’s threat and 
the pluralism of the Catalan and Basque societies advised against any bold move towards 
federalisation.
108
 The result was compromise, reflected in the ambiguity of the 1978 
Constitution: Article 2 proclaimed “the indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation” while 
recognising and guaranteeing “the right of autonomy of the nationalities and regions which 
integrate the Spanish nation […],”109 without specifying which territories were considered 
“nationalities” and which were “regions”. The inclusion of the term “nationalities” provoked 
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 One cannot speak of a de iure federal State in Spain because such concept does not appear in the 1978 
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 Despite the fact that nationalist parties have often governed in recent decades and that support for Catalan 
and Basque independence has grown, especially among the youth, nationalism has seldom been a hegemonic 
force in these regions. On the contrary, a majority of Catalan and Basque citizens have traditionally 
acknowledged a dual identity (García Ferrando et al, 1994); Del Pino (2004).     
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much controversy at the time: 
[…] convivían entonces en las Cortes, como en el seno de la propia sociedad, visiones 
muy dispares de la realidad española. Así se comprobó de inmediato con motivo del 
debate surgido en torno al término “nacionalidades”, propuesto al alimón por Roca y 
Herrero de Miñón en agosto de 1977, con el apoyo de socialistas y comunistas (que lo 
venían utilizando habitualmente desde los primeros años setenta) y la oposición cerrada 
de Fraga. Para el político catalanista, la inclusión de dicho término en el título 
preliminar de la Constitución suponía el reconocimiento del carácter plurinacional del 
Estado español, lo cual representaba una ruptura no sólo con el pasado autoritario 
inmediato, sino con siglos de centralismo y uniformidad impuestos. Para AP y algunos 
sectores de UCD, en cambio, “nacionalidad” era sinónimo de nación, e incompatible, 
por tanto, con la existencia misma de una única nación española. La izquierda, por su 
parte, admitía la primera parte de la argumentación, pero extraía de ella la conclusión de 
que España era una “nación de naciones”. A pesar de que, en un esfuerzo hercúleo por 
contentar a los más aprensivos, la versión final del artículo 2 matizaría el alcance 
simbólico de esta innovación mediante el reconocimiento de “la indisoluble unidad de 
la Nación española, patria común e indivisible de todos los españoles,” la presencia del 
término “nacionalidades” hizo imposible la aprobación de la Constitución para buena 
parte de los parlamentarios de AP (Powell, 2001 pp. 228-229). 
 
([…] highly disparate viewpoints toward Spanish reality co-existed in the Spanish 
Parliament and society. This was soon confirmed during the debate regarding the term 
“nationalities”, jointly suggested by Roca and Herrero de Miñón in August 1977 with 
the support of Socialists and Communists (who had been using it since the early 1970s) 
and the adamant opposition from Fraga. For the Catalanist politician, the inclusion of 
this term in the preface of the Constitution represented the recognition of the 
plurinational character of the Spanish State, something which not only constituted a 
breach with the recent authoritarian past but also with several centuries of imposed 
centralism and uniformity. However, for the AP and some sectors of the UCD, 
“nationality” was synonym of nation and hence, it was incompatible with the very 
existence of a single Spanish nation. The left, on the other hand, admitted the first part 
of the argumentation but extracted the conclusion that Spain was “a nation of nations”. 
Although the symbolic implications of such innovation would be toned down in the 
final draft of Article 2, in an herculean effort to satisfy those who were most 
apprehensive, by recognising “the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation, common 
and indivisible fatherland of all Spaniards”, the inclusion of the term “nationalities” 
made it impossible for a good number of conservative MPs to support the Constitution). 
 
All this controversy resulted in an open model of State re-configuration negotiated in an 
often improvised manner, resulting in the Estado de las Autonomías (Aja, 1999); (Fusi 
Aizpurúa, 2000); (Powell, 2001). With the possibility of a centralised State ruled out from 
the start, two alternatives remained: one was granting autonomy to Catalonia, the Basque 
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Country and Galicia, as in the 1930s, recognising their cultural specificity versus the rest of 
Spain. The other alternative was to generalise the autonomic system
110
 across the country, 
opting for greater homogenisation in pursuit of a federal agenda, without openly calling it 
“federal”. Eventually, this second alternative prevailed amid the initial indifference from 
people in many regions and a fair amount of discrepancy arising from the fact that some of 
the autonomous regions proposed had no substantial historical or cultural basis. The end 
result would be an open hybrid transactional formula guaranteeing the right of autonomy to 
nationalities and regions, without being named, establishing two alternative paths towards 
autonomy: a fast-track process, applied in Catalonia, the Basque Country, Galicia and 
Andalusia, and a slow-track one used in other regions (Tomás y Valiente, 1992). 
 
This process of devolution significantly altered the structure of the State, effectively turning 
Spain into one of Europe’s most decentralised countries: for instance, in 1985, the central 
government was responsible for 87% of public expenditure, the towns spent 9% and a mere 
3% of public expenditure was connected with the autonomous communities. In comparison, 
by 1997, the percentage of public expenditure of the central government had been reduced to 
61% and that of the autonomous communities had increased to 26% of the overall budget 
(Powell, 2001). Similarly, between 1982 and 1992, the number of public workers in regional 
administrations reached 600,000, thirteen times more than in 1982. Another milestone in this 
devolutionary process was the transfer in 1996 of 30% of the income tax yields to the regions 
together with the capacity to regulate other taxes previously allocated to them (ibid).           
 
However, the road towards federalisation has been riddled with difficulties arising from the 
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contradictions inherited from the past and the tensions derived from the open and negotiated 
nature of the process, conceptualised by Moreno as “multiple ethnoterritorial concurrence”:  
In Spain multiple ethnoterritorial concurrence relates to the interplay among Spanish 
regions and nationalities pursuing political and economic power, as well as the 
achievement of the legitimization of their institutional development. It incorporates in a 
dynamic manner the economic and political elements that are central to Spain’s process 
of federalization […] Given the Spanish context of open interactions, concurrence is 
used to mean a simultaneous occurrence of events at both state and sub-state levels 
within plural Spain. However, the term concurrence should not be understood as being 
equivalent to that of competition. In decentralized Spain there are competitive actions 
between state and sub-state nationalisms and regionalisms, and between the latter 
amongst themselves. But the underlying feature in the process of Spanish concurrence –
mainly between the central and meso levels- is the lack of compulsion to eliminate other 
participants. In some other instances the logic of competition implies instead the aim of 
achieving the monopoly by means of the elimination of the competitors […] (Moreno 
2001, pp. 90-91). 
 
This discursive process of ethnoterritorial concurrence has resulted in a quasi-federal State 
with an additional important feature, the so-called “hechos diferenciales” distinguishing 
some territories from others (Aja, 1999): official languages other than Castilian in Catalonia, 
the Basque Country, Galicia, Valencia, the Balearic Islands and parts of Navarre;
111
 the 
Basque, Navarrese and Canary special tax system, institutions and legal codes specific to 
some territories (Diputaciones, Cabildos, autonomic police forces, specific civil and foral 
laws, etc.). More importantly, the growing presence of nationalist movements in Catalonia, 
the Basque Country and Galicia dedicated to negotiating additional concessions from the 
central government throughout the process of regional devolution, while promoting their 
own alternative nation-building projects in competition with that of the Spanish State, has 
conditioned the construction of the Autonomic State, adding uncertainty and instability to 
Spanish politics (Flynn, 2001); (Sosa Wagner & Sosa Mayor, 2006). The transfer of powers 
in the areas of education and culture to the regions has contributed to this situation, given the 
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 The fact that over 40% of Spaniards reside in an Autonomous Region with an official language in addition 
to Castilian needs to be emphasised (García Ferrando et al, 1994).  
 229 
 
all-important role these play in identity-formation (Dávila Balsera, 2005); (Fernández, 1995), 
together with an españolismo evidencing a certain inferiority complex against peripheral 
nationalisms.
112
 As the devolution process was reaching its end, peripheral nationalisms 
have often chosen to radicalize their views and pursue pro-independence agendas (Powell, 
2001).
113
   
 
In the face of these concessions granted to peripheral nationalisms, other regions have often 
reacted by demanding equal treatment from the State in what constitutes another key feature 
of the current Spanish political discourse, the principles of “comparative grievance” and 
“inter-territorial solidarity” (Moreno, 2001). In response to these centrifugal pressures, the 
State and the elites have embarked on reformulating the Spanish national discourse in pursuit 
of a renewed identity capable of responding to the challenges posed by alternative identities 
formulated from the periphery, in what Balfour and Quiroga (2007) call “the reinvention of 
Spain.”  
 
Finally, the discursive construction of the nation(s) in Spain needs to be situated in the 
broader context of the emerging “network society”, a complex structural transformation 
analysed by Castells (2000a; 2000b; 2000c) characterized, among other things, by the 
re-scaling of core social practices to the trans-national level. Such a transformation has been 
primarily driven by the expansion of the world capitalist system in the form of global 
economic processes and the technological and communications revolution which has 
undermined the constraints of space and time on social organization and interaction, 
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accelerating interdependence in a rapidly shrinking world. As a result of increasing 
globalization, the fundamental patterns of socio-economic organization, the territorial 
principle and power are undergoing rapid change, bringing into question the Nation-State 
system, while national cultures are under the pressure from mass-migration in a borderless 
world.
114
The Nation-State system may be far from over but undoubtedly the State’s 
monopoly on power faces unprecedented challenges from globalization: 
These arguments suggest that the modern state is increasingly embedded in webs of 
regional and global interconnectedness permeated by quasi-supranational, 
intergovernmental and transnational forces, and unable to determine its own fate. Such 
developments challenge both the sovereignty and legitimacy of states. Sovereignty is 
challenged because the political authority of states is displaced and compromised by 
regional and global power systems, political, economic and cultural. State legitimacy is 
at issue because with greater regional and global interdependence, states cannot deliver 
fundamental goods and services to their citizens without international cooperation (Held 
& McGrew, 2000 p. 13). 
 
Confronted with these challenges, European States have embarked in a process of 
regionalisation resulting in the development of the EU network State (Hettne, 2000). 
Immersed in this process, the Spanish State not only faces pressure from peripheral 
nationalisms demanding powers but feels also compelled to transfer more powers to Europe 
seeking to preserve stability in an increasingly chaotic “world order” where the financial 
markets have abducted State politics. 
 
3.5. Conclusion  
 
In this chapter I have analysed the historical process of nation-building in Spain in its dual 
dimension, including the development of the national mode of organisation and the 
consolidation of a Spanish identity based on shared national narratives and symbols. From 
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 231 
 
such an analysis one can conclude that despite an early auspicious beginning, Spanish 
nation-building has been problematic and incomplete, resulting in a long-established 
well-defined State unable to accomplish a thorough mass-nationalisation across its territory.  
 
The causes behind Spain’s partial nationalisation can be found at different scalar levels in 
Giddens’s social structuration model: an unyielding geography hindering communications; a 
long history of political and cultural fragmentation rooted in Spain’s medieval past which 




 centuries with the composite monarchy of the Habsburgs; 
the “distraction” of a world Empire which perhaps arrived too early in history to become a 
key nationalisation factor; a late and uneven modernisation which not only delayed the 
consolidation of the national mode of organisation but also coincided with the Castilian 
decline in favour of the periphery, effectively reversing the trend initiated around the 15
th
 
century when Castile had gained a supremacy which placed it at the centre of Spanish 
nationalisation.  
 
During the era of nationalism beginning towards the second half of the 18
th
 century, this 
unitarist Castilian-centred nationalisation model was not sufficiently robust. Spain not only 
lagged behind other European nations in terms of economic and social modernisation, it also 
lacked the stability needed for the State and the elites to accomplish the nationalisation of the 
masses. The resistance of the Ancien Régime against liberalism inaugurated a prolonged 
confrontation between antithetical conceptions of Spain. Soon after the Napoleonic Wars, 
Spain entered an era of acute political instability and social division punctuated by a series of 
civil wars and abrupt regime changes during which neither a State model nor a hegemonic 
identity discourse could consolidate. The 1898 crisis would reveal the extent of Spain’s 
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identity crisis, reflected in the regeneracionismo of the intellectual elites, while emerging 
peripheral nationalisms began to gain considerable popular support in Catalonia and the 
Basque Country. The climax of all this instability would be the civil war initiated in 1936 
where the “two Spains” fought to death. Franco’s victory inaugurated a dictatorial regime 
during which a staunchly unitarist conception of Spain rooted in the ideology of National 
Catholicism was imposed. Franco’s aggressive españolización would backfire after the 
transition to democracy bringing the current de-centralisation and federalisation during 
which peripheral nationalisms have re-emerged with renewed strength while a de-legitimised 
Spanish nationalism has tried to re-construct its discourse. This has coincided with a 
dramatic acceleration in the expansion of the capitalist world system during which core 
social processes are being increasingly articulated at the transnational scale. This 
re-configuration of political power not only threatens the survival of the State, at least in its 
current form, but also conditions the Spanish identity construction insofar as identities are 
reproduced on a daily basis in what Renan (1884) famously called “le plebiscite quotidien”. 
The next chapters are dedicated to the ideographic analysis of contemporary national 
narratives from the centre’s perspective, as formulated in the Madrid press, which partly 
illustrate the current state of affairs in the discursive construction of Spanish identity. 
 233 
 
CHAPTER 4: THE DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTION OF THE NATION IN THE 
SPANISH PRESS: “NACIÓN” IN THE NEWS 
 
Introduction 
Chapters 4 and 5 are dedicated to exploring the role played by the media in shaping and 
reproducing national identities. More specifically, I analyse the discursive construction of the 
nation in the Spanish press by examining how the term “Nación” is conceptualized in recent 
narratives of El Mundo and El País. This kind of analysis builds on previous research on identity 
discourse in the press where competing narratives in newspapers from Madrid and Barcelona 
where identified in connection with two different events: The 1994 USA Football World Cup 
and the political negotiation between CIU, a centre-right Catalan nationalist party and the PP, 
the centre-right winner of the Spanish elections in 1996 (León Solís, 2003). The present research 
however differs from that study in several ways: (i) instead of comparing national identity 
narratives “from the centre” with those “from the periphery”, it narrows the focus and examines 
how the nation is discursively constructed from the centre’s perspective by examining the 
narratives of Spain’s leading newspapers in terms of readership and social projection across 
Spain.  (ii) This research does not concentrate on two single events but looks at a broader 
period. (iii) While also employing discourse analysis (DA) a research tool, it combines 
qualitative and quantitative approaches to DA by incorporating Corpus Linguistics into its 
analytical apparatus. 
 
The chapter starts with a description of the corpus employed in this research. First I explain how 
the corpus was compiled and annotated. Second, I introduce the different sections of the corpus. 
The rest of the chapter focuses on analysing the use of the term “Nación” in the News 
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sub-corpora of El Mundo and El País and discusses key issues in the discourses of the two 
newspapers in relation to this term.  
 
 4.1. General information about the corpus employed in this research 
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 below show the details of the corpus used, comprising 49,859 articles 
from El País and El Mundo for a total of nearly 30 million tokens. The corpus is divided into 
two main sections. The larger one is the News Sub-corpus (Table 4.1) comprising a total of 
36,145 news articles and over 20 million tokens. The smaller section is the Opinion 
Sub-corpus (Table 4.2), composed of 13,714 opinion articles and editorials from the two 
newspapers totalling over 9 million tokens. All the articles were written over a twelve-year 
period, from January 1996 to December 2007. The earliest articles in the corpus coincide 
with the last months of President González and the ascension of President Aznar into power 
in March 1996 while the latest articles in the corpus correspond to the first term of President 
Rodríguez Zapatero in office. 
 
Table 4.1.  
News El Mundo EL País 
No. articles 19,200 16,945 
No. tokens 10,743,390 9,696,984 
No. types 85,757 84,446 
Type-Token Ratio (TTR) 40.85 41.48 
Total No. Tokens 20,440,374 
 





Table 4.2.  
 
Opinion El Mundo Opinion El País Opinion 
No. articles 8,157 
 
5,557 
No. tokens 4,901,574 4,468,687 
No. types 93,022 85,270 
Type-Token Ratio (TTR) 45.31 44.95 
Total No. Tokens 9,370,261 
  
The Opinion Sub-corpus 
 
El País and El Mundo were chosen for being the country’s most popular dailies during the 
period covered in this research. Traditionally perceived as close competitors in the Spanish 
media industry, these newspapers are also seen as more or less aligned with the two 
dominant discourses in contemporary Spanish politics: that of the center-left, whose leading 
advocate is the PSOE, and the center-right represented by the PP (Woodworth, 2002). 
Nowadays, El País and El Mundo continue to be the most widely read dailies in Spain 
covering general news and current affairs, only surpassed by Marca, a sports tabloid which 
has traditionally been the most widely read publication in the country. Figure 4.1 shows the 
evolution of the readership of Spain’s most popular broadsheets between the years 2000 and 
2008. The source of these data is the "Estudio General de Medios” (EGM).115 Similar 
organizations in the UK are the “Audit Bureau of Circulations” (ABC) and the “Joint 
Industry Committee for National Readership Surveys” (JICNARS). Unfortunately, the 
evolution of the readership between 1996 and 1999 is not available in this website. 
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 The data of the EGM are available at www.aimc.es/aimc.php (retrieved on 15-10-08).  
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Figure 4.1.  
 
 
 Readership of Spain’s main broadsheets: 2001-2008 (in thousands of readers) 
 
All the articles in the corpus were manually collected from the newspapers’ national 
edition
116
 in their online archives using the following search query: 
  
Figure 4.2.  
ESPAÑA OR ESTADO OR CATALUÑA OR Catalunya OR VASCO OR Euskadi OR Herria OR Gibraltar! 
OR comunidad! OR AUTONOMÍA OR GALICIA OR ASTURIAS OR CANTABRIA OR RIOJA OR 
ARAGÓN OR CASTILLA OR ANDALUCÍA OR EXTREMADURA OR VALENCIA OR BALEAR OR 




OR ESTATUTO OR TERRORISMO OR VIOLENCIA OR ETA OR bandera! OR lengua! OR cultura! OR 
HISTORIA OR IDENTIDAD OR INDEPENDENCIA OR autodeterminación! OR selección OR selecciones 
OR SOBERANÍA OR Estella OR Lizarra OR plan Ibarretxe OR financiación! 
  
Search query 
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The search terms were not case sensitive. Capitalized words represent lemmas (i.e. REGIÓN: 
región, regiones, regional, regionalismo(s), regionalista(s) used here for simplification 
purposes, while (!) represents a wildcard: i.e. comunidad! would return articles containing 
“comunidad” and “comunidades”. In both newspapers, the news articles were extracted 
from a section called “España” whereas opinion articles and editorials came from a section 
identified as “Opinión”. Each article was stored in a separate file and coded as follows in 
order to facilitate the retrieval of contextual information related to the article in question: 
 
 Figure 4.3.  
Source: El País or El Mundo. 
Main discursive Space: Catalonia, Euskadi, Other Regions, Spain as a whole. 
Genre: Opinion/ Editorial, News, Interview 
Year of publication 
File number 




Detailed notes on key events and processes echoed in the articles were also compiled.  
These constitute “a parallel record” of the discursive construction of the nation which can be 
compared with textual patterns in the corpus. This arguably enhances the analysis because 
major shifts in textual patterns can be put into a historical perspective thus facilitating a 




4.2. The news and opinion genres in the corpus 
The organization of articles into the two sub-corpora employed in this research reflects the 
traditional division between news and opinion genres commonly found in the modern press 
where news are perceived as dealing with facts while opinion concentrates on analysis. Such 
distinction is generally recognized by professional journalists and media researchers alike 
despite the fact the boundaries between news and opinion may not always be clear-cut. In fact, 
as Bell (1991) points out, news is not just about the facts but also the product of organizational 
structures and professional practices. Hard news as we find them in newspapers is not produced 
by individual journalist-authors. On the contrary, at the core of news what one can find is 
multiply embedded texts. This is due to a number of reasons. One the one hand news is the 
result of the collective effort of reporters, sub-editors and editors who regularly intervene in the 
process of news-making and edit the source texts originally submitted by individual reporters 
following standard professional practices. On the other hand, much of the content included in a 
typical hard news item does not usually come from the reporter’s individual observation. It is 
either obtained during an interview with one or several news sources or simply taken from 
previously written documents in the form of press releases, public addresses or news agency 
copy.  
 
Following this long established journalistic convention, news and opinion articles in El País and 
El Mundo appear in separate sections of the papers both in the hardcopy and in their digital 
editions. Also, Opinion is usually flagged by means of a standard heading and the name of the 
article’s author. The vast majority of the articles in the News sub-corpus belong to the category 
of ‘hard news’, although there are some cases of what Bell (ibid) calls ‘soft news’ or ‘feature 
articles’. El País usually employs the term ‘Reportaje’ to flag this soft news while El Mundo 
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does not usually have a term to differentiate between hard and soft news explicitly. Immediacy 
and factuality are two of the most distinctive features commonly associated with hard news. 
Hard news typically deals with very recent ‘happenings’ because newsworthiness is closely 
associated with timeliness. Some news contains tales of accidents, natural catastrophes, crimes 
etc. Another major category of hard news is dedicated to politics. This latter kind of news 
constitutes the bulk of the articles in the News sub-corpus in this research. Much of this news, as 
we will see, has to do with what people say rather than with what they do. In other words, this 
news is basically “talk about talk” where journalists report on what politicians have said on a 
particular occasion in the form of statements, announcements, opinions, reactions, appeals, etc. 
Consequently, much of the text in the News sub-corpus comes in the form of reported speech. 
This is often overtly reflected by the use of direct quotations or reporting verbs where other 
people’s talk is paraphrased, although there are occasions where reported speech, or 
pseudo-reported speech, does not feature at the surface level of text. Given this basic fact of 
news making one can conclude following Fishman (1980) that facts in the news are so and so 
because someone says it.  
 
Typical examples of hard news items in the News sub-corpus can be found in Appendix 1. Texts 
1 and 2 from El Mundo and El País respectively illustrate some of the common characteristics of 
the political news genre as found in the corpus. Text 1 is anonymous whereas text 2 includes the 
initials of its author (C.V) and the place where the news originated (Madrid). The only 
geographical reference we find in text 1 is “España”, the section of the newspaper where the 
article comes from. Both articles start with a headline, a one sentence summary of the story, 
followed by the lead. The lead is clearly the most distinctive feature in the news genre where the 
headline is expanded into a single paragraph summary capturing the essence of the news item 
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(who, what and where). This allows the copy editor or the audience to get the main point of the 
story. Bell convincingly argues that the lead paragraph, in addition to summarizing the news 
story, constitutes a nucleus of evaluation because it “focuses the story in a particular direction: it 
forms the lens through which the remainder of the story is viewed” (Bell, 1991 p. 152). This 
evaluative function is even more obvious in the news headline according to this author.  
 
The rest of the text in the articles contains additional details where one or more participants are 
either directly quoted or paraphrased by the news writers. Unlike in personal narratives, the 
sequence of events presented in the news is hardly ever arranged in chronological order. We can 
see, for instance, that when additional details are provided after the lead, there are usual 
references to prior events such as a protest which took place in 1960 in text 1. Also, hard news 
stories typically end without any clear resolution or any coda, contrary to what usually occurs in 
personal narratives. If any outcome is mentioned at all, this usually appears in the lead. Thus, we 
can see how both text 1 and text 2 conclude somewhat unceremoniously as if the volume in a 
radio transistor gradually faded away.   
 
Text 3 in Appendix 1 is an example of the kind of soft news also found in the News sub-corpus 
albeit much less frequently. The article is explicitly labeled as “Reportaje” (feature), to 
differentiate it from hard news items. The headline is comparatively more complex than the ones 
typically found in hard news because it is preceded by a head title: “Los obispos repiensan 
España” (the bishops re-think Spain), followed the proper headline. The author’s full-name 
comes next, followed by the place where the news comes from (Madrid), the name of the 
newspaper, the section where this item is included (España) and the date when the news was 
published. Text 3 presents some of the characteristics of the feature news genre mentioned by 
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Bell (1991): First, the article is comparatively longer than those usually found in hard news. 
Second, this kind of feature news includes a fair amount of editorializing, a typical attribute of 
Opinion articles as we will see. This editorializing can already be seen in the rhetorical question 
at the beginning of the article, typeset in italics in the original text: “¿Está en juego la unidad de 
España?” (Is the unity of Spain at stake?).  More examples can be found in the remaining text 
which combines the kind of reported speech typical of hard news with the opinions of the 
journalist-author distinguishable by the way modality is encoded: (“pero parecen contar con el 
apoyo de los obispos andaluces […]” they seem to have the support of the Andalusian bishops), 
([El resto del episcopado] podría compartir alguna de las ideas de Rouco y Cañizares […]” 
[the rest of the bishops] may share some of Rouco’s and Cañizares’s ideas [..]) etc. Third, the 
article does not appear to be time-bound to immediacy as we saw with hard news. We can see a 
reference to time in the lead but it does not point to the immediate past, as it always occurs with 
hard news, but to the immediate future. Therefore, the lead does not perform its usual function: 
that of being the abstract of the article. Here it looks more like an introduction because it does 
not summarize what has happened but rather deals with what may happen according to the 
intentions expressed somewhere else by the participants in the event (“[la Comisión permanente 
de obispos] intentará llegar unida y con algún documento a la Asamblea Plenaria de mañana y 
el jueves” “[the Bishops’ Committee] will try to arrive at both tomorrow’s and Thursday’s 
Plenary Meetings united and with some kind of negotiated document”).    
 
The bulk of the Opinion sub-corpus, on the other hand, consists of articles contributed regularly 
by columnists. We can also find some unsigned editorials which supposedly reflect the stance of 
the newspaper on a particular issue, usually featuring prominently in the news of the day. 
Finally, there are also letters to the editor sent by readers expressing their opinion on multiple 
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issues. The analysis of numerous articles in the Opinion sub-corpus reveals the existence of 
significant differences within the Opinion genre which are reflected not only in the rhetorical 
structure of the texts but also at the grammatical and lexical levels. These differences will be 
analyzed in detail in the next chapter. Let me just anticipate that one type of opinion article tends 
to be time bound, usually addressing issues featuring prominently in the news of the day. This 
kind of article is usually written in a style which stresses editorializing by means of 
unconstrained authorial judgment. A second type of opinion article is not usually time bound as 
it does not relate to any specific news event. The style used here is more typical of the one found 
in expository essays where a proposition is presented at the beginning and this is subsequently 
evaluated by presenting different arguments in a concise, clear and impersonal manner. 
 
Not surprisingly, the differences between the News and Opinion genres discussed above are 
clearly manifested at the lexical level. Tables 4.3 and 4.4 compare the most common lexical 
keywords in El Mundo Opinion versus El Mundo News and El País Opinion versus El País 
News respectively. These keywords, listed here according to their degree of keyness, were 
obtained by comparing the wordlists of the Opinion versus the News sub-corpora using 
WordSmith Tools 5.0 (Scott, 2008). Keyness was double-checked using an online 
Log-Likelihood calculator
117
 which yields the following values as strength indicators, where a 
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Figure 4.4.  
95th percentile; 5% level; p < 0.05; critical value = 3.84 
99th percentile; 1% level; p < 0.01; critical value = 6.63 
99.9th percentile; 0.1% level; p < 0.001; critical value = 10.83 




Each keyword appears in the leftmost column followed by the absolute frequency scores in the 
Opinion and News sub-corpora and the log-likelihood score in the rightmost column. A plus 
sign indicates that the keyword in question is unusually more frequent in the Opinion sub-corpus 
if the score is higher than 3.84. A minus sign indicates an unusually higher frequency in the 
News sub-corpora of the two newspapers.   
 
Table 4.3.  
Keyword Frequency  
El Mundo Opinion 
Frequency  
El Mundo News 
Log-likelihood 
Opinión 7749 40 +17523.79 
Es 46440 58298 +7767.13 
Editorial 2505 492 +3508.03 
Impresiones 1548 65 +3097.22 
Historia 2861 1828 +1744.17 
Nacionalismo 2962 2493 +1227.53 
Líder 1633 7225 +754.63 
Estatuto 3790 10191 +119.30 
Política 8985 17525 +79.80 
Ibarretxe 3818 9875 +77.26 
Ayer 5731 32562 -5451.48 
Aseguró 288 9505 -5214.88 
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Portavoz 839 10644 -3943.26 
Añadió 78 5689 -3631.33 
Según 2403 16381 -3524.59 
José 2709 16992 -3284.32 
Afirmó 309 6593 -3149.71 
Fuentes 223 6038 -3131.15 
PP 9014 36313 -2999.65 
Ejecutivo 962 9330 -2855.27 
Secretario 744 8075 -2694.42 
Presidente 5866 25675 -2615.51 
Dijo 1431 10707 -2585.14 
Gobierno 13866 48393 -2528.69 
Madrid 2777 14583 -2144.87 
CIU 1971 10837 -1722.04 
Vasco 9073 31237 -1549.79 
Congreso 1852 9031 -1158.78 
Acuerdo 2893 12235 1147.26 
Socialistas 2271 9789 -961.66 
Partido 6194 20173 -794.02 
España 12953 37312 -748.81 
Batasuna 3913 13756 -738.40 
PNV 6797 21238 -685.78 
Proceso 2918 10687 -662.18 
PSOE 6381 19419 -545.17 
Partidos 3987 12564 -423.33 
Zapatero 7841 13791 -236.89 
Fue 4897 13772 -233.13 
Aznar 4228 11936 -207.84 
Cataluña 5496 14953 -193.88 
ETA 15719 3983 -188.98 
País 6507 16695 -118.76 
 





Table 4.4.  
Keyword Frequency  
El País Opinion 
Frequency  
El País News 
Log-likelihood 
Es 41467 49814 +7659.63 
Historia 3353 1488 +2890.43 
Nacionalismo 4280 2898 +2388.72 
Editorial 266 137 +200.93 
Ayer 1809 29223 -12531.93 
Presidente 3113 24971 -6549.23 
PP 6680 36823 -6016.00 
José 1858 18277 -5747.36 
Gobierno 11055 47459 -4763.90 
Portavoz 550 10293 -4720.22 
Dijo 765 11309 -4635.93 
Ejecutivo 456 8489 -3884.19 
Secretario 401 7712 -3577.42 
Aseguró 64 5371 -3523.18 
PSOE 3083 17550 -3015.01 
Líder 628 7913 -2960.31 
Afirmó 66 4164 -2628.53 
CIU 1589 11050 -2483.14 
Fuentes 165 4611 2441.11 
Madrid 2239 13002 -2301.78 
PNV 5514 23011 -2155.61 
Añadió 64 3449 -2122.55 
Socialistas 2012 11426 -1955.77 
Zapatero 2278 12070 -1847.63 
Según 2100 11414 -1822.78 
Aznar 2570 12838 -1770.60 
Batasuna 2433 12329 -1745.56 
Ibarretxe 2580 11442 -1238.21 
ETA 11448 35336 -1136.27 
Estatuto 3668 13794 -967.75 
Partido 5220 1778 -871.01 
Vasco 8066 24976 -816.20 
Acuerdo 2934 10831 -716.83 
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Partidos 4299 13771 -529.89 
País 11406 31233 -467.96 
Cataluña 4872 14063 307.80 
España 11374 28876 -205.51 
 
 Comparing the most frequent keywords in El País Opinion vs. El País News 
 
The analysis of these keywords reveals a great deal of overlap in the terms with the largest 
differences in keyness in the News and Opinion sub-corpora in El Mundo and El País. 
Keywords like “opinión”, “editorial” or “impresiones”, all common headings found flagging 
opinion articles, are unusually more common in the Opinion sub-corpus. Abstract concepts such 
as “historia”, “nacionalismo”, “política” and the verb form “es”, which encodes processes of 
being, are also significantly more common in opinion articles. All these terms are naturally 
associated with the opinion genres because the emphasis there is on conceptual analysis at the 
expense of narrative, typical of news. As one may expect, the news genre is characterized by a 
much higher frequency of time expressions like “ayer”, used in reporting the immediate past or 
lexis associated with participants in the events narrated (i.e.“presidente”, “portavoz”, “José”, 
“gobierno”, etc.). Other terms unusually more frequent in the News sub-corpus are commonly 
found in reported speech such as reporting verbs  (i.e. “dijo”, “aseguró”, “añadió”, “afirmó”, 
etc.) or reporting expressions such as “fuentes”, “según” etc.  
 
In the remaining sections of this chapter, I examine the narratives of the nation in El País and El 
Mundo focusing on how the term “Nación” is employed in the News sub-corpus. I start by 
outlining the method of analysis employed, followed by the findings and some discussion. 
Special emphasis will be placed on the differences and similarities in the ways the two 
newspapers employ “Nación” in their discourses.  
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 4.3. Method of analysis  
This section outlines the approach used in the analysis, which will also be applied in the next 
chapter with other keywords employed in the discursive construction of the nation in the 
Spanish press. In order to achieve greater coherence, I will foreground the results and 
background the procedures in my discussion. Admittedly this may obscure to some extent the 
finer details of how the findings have been determined, something that can be partly 
compensated by outlining the protocol of analysis below.  
 
The analysis comprised the following: 
 
1. Word frequency data: The frequencies of “Nación” in both sections of the News sub-corpus 
were studied to gain an initial understanding on the centrality of this concept and to identify 
possible differences in the use of this term in different newspapers and across different 
sections of the corpus. 
 
2. Diachronic analysis: This provided evidence on the use of “Nación” in the two newspapers 
across different periods. Significant frequency shifts in certain periods or sharp frequency 
differences between the two newspapers may contribute to explaining important changes in the 
discursive construction of the nation or differences in stance between El Mundo and El País. 
They may also help us identify key events in this discursive construction, something which 
could be subsequently corroborated with evidence at phraseological and whole-text levels. 
 
3. Collocate and phraseological analysis: Nación’s most frequent collocates were analysed to 
gain an initial understanding on how this concept is employed discursively in the two 
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newspapers. Raw frequencies were complemented with Mutual Information scores to measure 
the relative strength of the relationships. While the analysis of frequent collocates provided the 
main input in identifying common phrases in the concordances, additional phraseological 
patterns were extracted to include common phrases containing less frequent collocates whenever 
necessary. The reason for doing so is that a more common collocate does not necessarily result 
in a common fixed phrase or phrasal pattern due to the numerous possibilities derived from 
language variation. Keyness plays an important role in identifying any statistically significant 
deviation in the use of a phrase between the two newspapers. Log-Likelihood (L-L) was used to 
confirm whether the differences in frequency between particular words or clusters in El Mundo 
and El País were deemed significant.  
 
4. Text and discourse analysis: phraseological analysis provided the basis for broader textual 
analysis to help us determine how “Nación” is discursively constructed in the articles 
containing the keyword. At this stage, especial attention was paid to discourse patterns and 
common topoi in unveiling the ideological stances of both newspapers. Diachronic analysis was 
also employed to determine if there were significant differences in stance between the two 
newspapers and/or across different periods and/or in connection to any key events discussed in 
the press. Naturally, a broader window of analysis introduces too many variables and makes the 
kind of sentence-level quantitative analysis used in 3 and 4 above impracticable. However, the 
qualitative analysis done at this stage was built upon a solid quantitative basis because I was 





4.4. Frequency data of “Nación” in El Mundo and El País News 
“Nación” appears as the 407th and 365th most common word in El Mundo and El País News 
wordlists. Its distribution in both sub-corpora does not deviate significantly as tables 4.5 and 4.6 
show. 
Table 4.5.  
 No. of tokens % Tokens No. of texts % of texts 
El Mundo News 2,862 0.026 1,492 7.77 
El País News 2,658 0.027 1,372 8.09 
 
“Nación” in El Mundo & El País News 
 
Table 4.6.  
El Mundo News Log-Likelihood El País News 
2,862 -1.12 2,658 
 
 “Nación” in El Mundo News vs. El País News 
 
The -1.12 Log-likelihood score indicates that the term “Nación” is comparatively more frequent 
in El País News despite having a higher raw frequency in El Mundo News. This is due to the 
fact that El Mundo News sub-corpus is comparatively larger than El País News, as shown in 
table 4.1. Nevertheless, if the criterion for determining the statistical significance of a 
log-likelihood score is set at the rigorous critical value of 3.84 (p<0.05), then it can be 
concluded that a -1.12 L-L score would not be deemed significant enough statistically speaking 





4.5. Diachronic analysis of “Nación”  
Figure 4.5 reveals sharp differences in the use of “Nación” over time. After a relatively small 
increase in 2004 in relation to the previous year, 2005 sees a remarkable rise in occurrences in 
both newspapers: around 498% in El Mundo and 604% in El País News. This tendency 
continues in 2006 in El Mundo while the occurrences in El País News decrease by almost 19%. 
We see a sharp decline in both newspapers in 2007 with figures close to those of 2004. 
 
Figure 4.5.  
 
 
Diachronic use of “Nación” in El Mundo vs. El País News  
 
The sharp rise and drop occurs within two years during Rodríguez Zapatero’s first term in office. 
In total, 2005-2006 account for 58.66% and 61.81% of the number of occurrences of “Nación” 
in El Mundo and El País News respectively. A summary look at the chronology of events 
compiled during the collection of the corpus points towards the new Catalan Statute as the main 




















of the term “Nación” referred to Catalonia in the Estatut gave place to much discussion in the 
media.  
 
As stressed in chapter 3, such political initiative needs to be understood within a wider historical 
context following the creation of the State of Autonomies with the 1978 Constitution, which 
initiated a period of de-centralization and devolution that has not yet concluded partly due to the 
open-ended nature of the constitutional pact in relation to the structure of the Spanish State (Aja, 
1999; Moreno, 2001). A nationalist party (CiU) led by Pujol governed Catalonia from 1980 to 
2003. Pujol‘s long term in office was characterized by a policy of nation-building inside 
Catalonia and conditional collaboration with the central governments of González and Aznar in 
exchange for important concessions, especially when those governments were minority ones 
(Magone, 2004). A three-party coalition government of Catalan Socialists (PSC), 
Independentists (ERC) and Ecosocialists (ICV) governed Catalonia between 2003 and 2010 and 
the nation-building process that distinguished Pujol’s long reign continued unabated with the 
elaboration of the new Estatut (MCN030027).
118
 The Catalan regional elections in 2010 saw the 
return of CiU to power with an absolute majority in the Catalan Parliament after having spent 
seven years in the opposition.  
 
Even before their ascent to power, the Catalan Socialists led by Maragall, traditionally 
sympathetic with the idea of a federal Spain, seemed keen to outdo their nationalist rivals of CiU 
in asserting their Catalanist credentials. This could be interpreted as a political manoeuvre to 
attract some of the electorate traditionally supportive of CiU. A proposal for a new Estatut was 
presented by Maragall in March 2003 in Madrid where he advocated “accommodating Catalonia 
                                                 
118
 The references of all the articles quoted from the corpus can be found in Appendix 2.  
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within a federal Spain” as well as “an international role for the Catalan government, the 
Generalitat” (MCN030112).119 This federalist sentiment traditionally present in some sectors of 
the PSOE received renewed impulse during the party’s meeting in Santillana del Mar in 2003 
which confirmed a pluralist turn in its territorial policy after several years of complicity with the 
PP in the Basque Country following the assassination of Miguel Ángel Blanco by ETA. Such 
complicity, which had become patent in organizations such as Foro de Ermua and ¡Basta Ya! 
and had been instrumental in the emergence of a “Bloque constitucional” during Redondo 
Terrerros’s leadership of the Basque Socialists (PSE), was interrupted after Ibarretxe’s victory in 
the Basque elections in May 2001 (MEN020568). Zapatero further encouraged Maragall by 
promising him “to support the reform of the Catalan Estatut approved by the Catalan Parliament” 




Eventually the first article of the Estatut initially proposed by the Catalan Parliament formally 
recognized Catalonia as a nation. This national recognition of Catalonia was strongly opposed 
by the People’s Party (PP), who called it “una reforma encubierta de la Constitución” (a covert 
reform of the Constitution) (MCN050174, PCN050562);
121
 also by many military and sectors of 
the judiciary (PCN060780, PCN060465, MCN050429). The People’s Party appealed to the 
Spanish Constitutional Court (Tribunal Constitucional) to have the Catalan Estatut declared 
unconstitutional. It also organized a campaign in defense of Spanish unity, symbolically 
launched in Cádiz (MCN060336, PCN060741): the city where the first Spanish constitution was 
                                                 
119
 “El encaje de Cataluña en una España federal” y “la presencia internacional de la Generalitat” were the 
actual words used by Maragall . 
120
 Zapatero’s exact words were: “Apoyaré la reforma del Estatuto de Cataluña que apruebe el Parlamento de 
Cataluña” as shown in YouTube: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e5VONY0UCnI&feature=PlayList&p=E5EB4A863C35AABD&playnext=
1&playnext_from=PL&index=10 (retrieved on 14 December 2009). 
121
 The idea of the Catalan Estatut being a covert reform is often repeated in the discourse of both newspapers, 
with 28 occurrences of “reforma encubierta” interpreted as such in El País News between 2004-2006 and 20 
occurrences in El Mundo directly linked to the Estatut. Other occurrences in El Mundo are linked to “Plan 
Ibarretxe” or the policies of Zapatero or Pujol.  
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born during the Napoleonic War, considered by many the foundation of the Spanish modern 
Nation-State.  
 
Over four million signatures were collected in this campaign, later rejected in the Spanish 
Parliament (PSN060215). The governing Socialist Party (PSOE) was more divided around the 
Catalan Estatut, reflecting the existing division regarding the idea of nation among the Spanish 
left and the tensions between the discourses of asymmetric federalism with its emphasis on 
regional differences and equalitarianism, which advocates the idea of all Spanish citizens having 
equal rights and duties (Balfour & Quiroga, 2007). The Catalan Socialists (PSC) headed by 
Maragall, Zapatero and most members of the Government defended more or less 
enthusiastically the possibility of calling Catalonia a nation and Spain “a nation of nations” 
while other Socialist leaders such as Bono, Barreda, Guerra, Rodríguez Ibarra and, initially, 
Chaves expressed unitarist views close to those in the PP as PCN050619 illustrates:  
El presidente del Gobierno, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, aseguró ayer que no pondrá obstáculos para que 
Cataluña se denomine nación en el Estatuto reformado, aunque matizó que "siempre que, a la vista de los 
dictámenes que se realicen, dicho término sea compatible con la Constitución". Zapatero entiende que nación 
"no es un término estrictamente jurídico", y apeló a su significación histórico-cultural y sociológica. En la 
misma dirección, el ministro de Administraciones Públicas, Jordi Sevilla, estima que "Cataluña es una nación, 
entendida como nacionalidad en la Constitución" […] 
Algunas destacadas personalidades socialistas, como el presidente de la Comisión Constitucional del 
Congreso, Alfonso Guerra, y el ministro de Defensa, José Bono, se han pronunciado en contra. Otras, como el 
presidente de la Junta de Andalucía y presidente del PSOE, Manuel Chaves, dudan de su constitucionalidad. 
(PCN050619) 
 
An important moment from a discursive point of view was when Rodríguez Zapatero argued 
that the nation was “a debatable concept” (un concepto discutible) in the course of a 
parliamentary debate (PSN040179), a phrase the opposition would subsequently employ to 
attack the President of Government. Zapatero’s initial, and yet conditional support of the term 
“Nación” for Catalonia gradually waned and his discourse became more ambiguous, partly in 
response to a heated campaign by the Popular Party and a sector of the media headed by El 
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Mundo, who accused Zapatero and the Socialists of conniving with the nationalists in destroying 
the Spanish nation, partly in response to opinions polls where a majority of Spanish citizens 
disagreed with the initiative of calling Catalonia a nation (PCN050665). This shift in the 
Socialist leader’s discourse re-activated the terminological negotiation of the concept of nation 
among all stake holders, as phrases such as “término/ concepto/ palabra/ definición (de) nación” 
or “comunidad/ entidad/ realidad/ identidad/ carácter nacional” prove, with Zapatero at some 
point claiming to have “up to eight different alternative formulae to make compatible the 
sentiment of a majority of Catalans (who believe) that Catalonia is a nation with the sentiment of 
a majority of Spaniards that there is no other nation but Spain”:  
El presidente aseguró ayer que tiene "ocho fórmulas distintas" para compatibilizar el sentimiento de la 
mayoría de los catalanes de que Cataluña es una nación con el sentimiento de la mayoría de los españoles de 
que no hay más nación que España. Zapatero reconoció luego que quizá la cifra de ocho sea exagerada, y 
algunos de sus colaboradores admiten que aún es pronto para tener una solución que, en todo caso, debe ser 
consensuada. 
No obstante, entre las fórmulas estudiadas está definir a Cataluña como "país", que es el término usado 
habitualmente por los catalanes para referirse a su comunidad y que, según el diccionario de la Real 
Academia, significa "nación", pero también "región, provincia o territorio". O denominarla "comunidad 
nacional", fórmula que propuso el presidente del Consejo de Estado, Francisco Rubio Llorente, con un 
sentido más cultural que político. (PCN050232) 
 
At the same time, Rodríguez Zapatero toned down the identity debate arguing that “el proyecto 
de reforma no debe ser ‘ni las tablas de la ley ni un arma arrojadiza’",122 while claiming that 
he “no es ni un nacionalista ni un españolista” and "el mejor patriota es el que no presume de 
ello"
123
 (PCN050711). Another manoeuvre in the same direction consisted in eliminating the 
term “Nación” from the first article of the Estatut, much to the consternation of Catalan 
nationalists, and maintaining it in its Preamble, arguing that the preamble of a legal document 
lacked “legal force” (PCN050619, MCN060272). After arduous negotiation between the 
Socialist government and the more moderate nationalists of CIU in which Maragall was 
                                                 
122
 The Projected Reform [of the Estatut] should not become the [Mosaic] Tables of the Law, nor should it be 
an excuse for attacking each other. 
123
 He is neither a nationalist nor a Spanish nationalist and the best patriot is that who does not boast about it. 
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sidelined by Madrid (PCN060605), a trimmed text of the Estatut was eventually approved by the 
Spanish Parliament in March 2006 with the votes against it of PP and the Catalan independence 
supporters of ERC, who nevertheless admitted to agree with 85% of its contents (PCN060504). 
Although the PSOE voted in favour of the Estatut, the “guerrista” faction124 of the party 
admitted in private that they still did not like the text according to El Mundo (MCN060390). 
The Estatut was subsequently voted on a referendum in Catalonia on 18
th
 June 2006 and 
approved by 73.90% of the electorate with 20.76% against (including the pro-independence 
votes of ERC supporters and those of the PP). The abstention rate however was very high 
(49.42%).
125
Four years later, the Spanish Constitutional Court agreed with 90% of the Estatut, 
although 14 articles out of a total of 129 appealed by PP were declared unconstitutional. Another 
27 articles were re-interpreted by the Court. The resolution of the Constitutional Court has not 
been well-received in Catalonia, where the vast majority of political parties, including PSC, 
have vowed to continue their struggle for national recognition. 
 
4.6. Common collocates of “Nación” in El Mundo and El País News 
This section shows the most frequent collocates of “Nación” in the News section of El Mundo 
and El País. Mutual information scores are used to determine collocational strength. An MI 
score higher than 3 will be deemed indicative of strong collocation, following the specifications 
of Wordsmith Tools (Scott, 2008). Tables 4.7 to 4.13 show the most frequent lexical collocates 
of “Nación” clustered according to meaning. Given the size of this corpus, I only include those 
appearing a minimum of 20 times within a L5-R5 range in at least one newspaper and I only list 
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 Guerrista is a common term used to refer to a faction of PSOE led by Alfonso Guerra, a key figure in the 
Socialist Party in the last 30 years who was Deputy Prime Minister under Felipe Gonzalez between December 
1982 and January 1991.  
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L5-R5 El Mundo News MI El País News MI 
R1 Nación española (210) 7.601 Nación española (220) 7.977 
L3 & L2 España ** nación (69) 
España * nación (58) 
4.658 España ** nación (84) 
España * nación (41) 
5.069 
R1 Nación catalana (92)  6.871 Nación catalana (52) 6.337 
L3 & L2 Cataluña ** nación (180) 
Cataluña * nación (115) 
6.781 Cataluña ** nación (159) 
Cataluña * nación (239) 
7.019 
R1 Nación vasca (70) 5.412 Nación vasca (69) 5.317 
L2 Herria * nación (33) 6.276 Herria * nación (14) 5.942 
L3 Vasco ** nación (12) 1.982 Vasco ** nación (8) 1.514 
L3 & L2 Euskadi ** nación (12) 
Euskadi * nación (5) 
4.592 Euskadi ** nación (11) 
Euskadi * nación (8) 
3.756 
L3 & L2 Galicia ** nación (9) 
Galicia * nación (9) 
6.140 Galicia ** nación (12) 
Galicia * nación (20) 
6.806 
L4 & L3 Andalucía *** nación (2) 
Andalucía ** nación (3) 
4.723 Andalucía *** nación (7) 
Andalucía ** nación (5) 
5.144 
 
 Collocates of “Nación”: Candidate nations 
 
Table 4.8.  
L5-R5 El Mundo News MI El País News MI 
L3 & 
L4/L2, R3 
Comunidad ** nación  (11) 
Comunidad * nación  (9) 
Nación ** comunidad (13) 
5.235 Comunidad ** nación  (6) 
Comunidad *** nación  (9) 
Nación ** comunidad (13) 
5.356 
R4/R3 Nación *** Europa (9) 4.524 Nación ** Europa (5) 5.013 
 





Table 4.9.  
L5-R5 El Mundo News MI El País News MI 
L1 Término nación (216) 9.517 Término nación (185) 9.517 
L2 & L1 Concepto de nación (47) 
concepto nación (20) 
8.681 Concepto de nación (37), 
concepto nación (5) 
8.463 
L4 & L2 Definición *** nación (30) 
Definición * nación (20) 
9.190 Definición *** (101)  
Definición * nación (18) 
9.590 
L1 Palabra nación (41) 6.892 Palabra nación (31) 6.545 
L4, L3, 
L2 
Idea *** nación (8) 
Idea ** nación (7) 
Idea * nación (7) 
5.904 Idea *** nación (5) 
Idea ** nación (10) 
Idea * nación (8) 
5.672 
R2 Nación de naciones (52) 9.130 Nación de naciones (52) 9.119 
R2 Nación * patria (22) 8.325 Nación * patria (25) 8.475 
L2/L4 Denominación * nación (15) 6.184 Denominación *** nación (19) 
Denominación * nación (15) 
8.618 
R1 Nación sin (22) 3.385 Nación sin (12) 3.136 
R1 Nación dentro (19) 5.586 Nación dentro (18) 5.885 
R1 Nación propia (13) 5.392 Nación propia (3) 4.394 
R1 & R3 Nación nacional (4) 
Nación ** nacional (4) 
3.243 Nación ** nacional (6) 4.042 
R2 & R3 Nación * nacionalidad (7) 
Nación ** nacionalidad (4) 
7.991 Nación * nacionalidad (15) 
Nación ** nacionalidad (3) 
7.829 
R2 Nación * ciudadanos (16) 4.269 Nación * ciudadanos (11) 3.889 
R4 & R5 Nación *** todos (9) 
Nación **** todos (5) 
2.770 Nación *** todos (15) 
Nación **** todos (6) 
3.067 
R1 & R3 Nación nacional (4) 
Nación ** nacional (4) 
3.243 Nación ** nacional (6) 4.042 
 
Collocates of “Nación”: Concept 
 
Table 4.10.  
L5-R5 El Mundo News MI El País News MI 
L1 Única nación (26) 5.986 Única nación (40) 6.555 
L1 Nuestra nación (27) 6.224 Nuestra nación (16) 5.728 
L1 Gran nación (21) 4.653 Gran nación (17) 4.606 
R3 Nación ** común (21) 5.589 Nación ** común (23) 6.063 
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R1 Nación plural (20) 7.305 Nación plural (14) 7.031 
R1 Nación libre (14) 6.206 Nación libre (9) 5.770 
R5 Nación **** indivisible (18) 10.814 Nación **** indivisible (16) 10.855 
 
Collocates of “Nación”: Quality 
 
Table 4.11.  
L5-R5 El Mundo News MI El País News MI 
L3 Estado ** nación (380) 6.640 Estado **  nación (388) 6.813 
L5 Debate **** nación (91) 6.088 Debate **** nación (137) 6.092 
L2 Estatuto * nación (11) 4.781 Estatuto * nación (18) 4.707 
R2 Nación ** estatuto (19) 4.781 Nación ** estatuto (22) 4.707 
R3 Nación ** Estatut (5) 4.985 Nación ** Estatut (0)  
L4 & L3 Unidad ** nación (51) 
Unidad *** nación (15) 
6.295 Unidad ** nación (61) 
Unidad *** nación (12) 
6.238 
L4 & L3 Reconocimiento *** nación (11)  
Reconocimiento ** nación  (17) 
7.084 Reconocimiento *** nación (33)  
Reconocimiento ** nación (11) 
7.037 
L3 Defensa ** nación (36) 5.470 Defensa ** nación (19) 4.891 
L4 & L3 Constitución **** nación (6) 
Constitución ** nación (5) 
4.122 Constitución **** nación (15) 
Constitución *** nación (11) 
5.005 
R3 Nación ** Constitución (8) 4.122 Nación ** Constitución (8) 5.005 
L4/L3 Pueblo *** nación (10) 4.737 Pueblo ** nación (7) 5.037 
L3 Inclusión ** nación (20) 7.930 Inclusión ** nación (19) 8.251 
L3 Construcción ** nación (12) 6.738 Construcción ** nación (10) 5.733 
L2/L4 Denominación * nación (15) 6.184 Denominación *** nación (19) 
Denominación * nación (15) 
8.618 
R3 Nación **preámbulo (21) 8.849 Nación **preámbulo (20) 8.569 
R4 & R3 
/R2 
Nación ** derecho (12) 
Nación * derecho (7) 
4.673 Nación *** derecho (15) 
Nación ** derecho (12) 
4.786 
R5/R4 Nación **** derechos (9) 4.268 Nación *** derechos (5) 3.596 
R5/R3 & 
R2 
Nación **** soberanía (5) 6.034 Nación ** soberanía (4) 
Nación * soberanía (4) 
5.974 
R4/R3 Nación *** texto (4) 3.571 Nación ** texto (6) 4.199 
R3 Nación ** articulado (8) 8.077 Nación ** articulado (11) 7.836 
R2/R5 Nación * artículo (4) 4.460 Nación **** artículo (9) 5.079 
R4/R3 Nación *** proyecto (2) 3.445 Nación ** proyecto (5) 3.781 
 
Collocates of “Nación”: Issues  
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Table 4.12.  
L5-R5 El Mundo News MI El País News MI 
L3 Gobierno ** nación (136) 3.715 Gobierno ** nación (132) 3.624 
R2 & R3 Nación * presidente (14) 
Nación ** presidente () 
2.679 Nación * presidente (8) 
Nación ** presidente (6) 
2.280 
R4/R1 Nación *** Zapatero (8) 3.543 Nación Zapatero (10) 3.196 
R1 Nación Rajoy (7) 3.049 Nación Rajoy (6) 3.410 
 
Collocates of “Nación”: Participants (people & institutions) 
 
Table 4.13.  
L5-R5 El Mundo News MI El País News MI 
L2 Es * nación (262) 5.059 Es * nación (227) 4.997 
L2 Somos * nación (45) 7.694 Somos * nación (44) 7.476 
L2 & 
L3/L1 
Ser * nación (13) 
Ser ** nación (9) 
3.839 Ser * nación (13) 
Ser nación (6) 
3.911 
L2 & L3 Sea * nación (21) 
Sea ** nación (13) 
5.009 Sea * nación (29) 
Sea ** nación (9) 
5.292 
R1/R3 Nación  son  (7) 3.764 Nación ** son (8) 3.550 
R1 Nación está (4) 2.441 Nación está (5) 2.941 
L2 Hay * nación (14) 4.183 Hay * nación (20) 4.417 
R2 Nación * tiene (11) 3.437 Nación * tiene (16) 3.817 
R1 Nación debe (6) 3.837 Nación debe (5) 3.585 
R2 Nación * puede (6) 3.212 Nación * puede (7) 3.240 
L5 Dice **** nación (6) 4.195 Dice **** nación (10) 4.662 
R1 Nación dijo (11) 3.067 Nación dijo (4) 2.584 
R1 Nación dice (5) 4.195 Nación dice (1) 4.662 
R1 Nación añadió (6) 3.786 Nación añadió (0) 2.856 
L5 & L2 Defina **** nación (11) 
Defina * nación (5) 
10.051 Defina **** nación (8) 
Defina * nación (4) 
9.515 
L5 & L4 Define *** nación (4) 
Define **** nación (4) 
8.237 Define *** nación (16) 
Define **** nación (11) 
8.828 
R2 Nación * definir (15) 8.413 Nación * definir (13) 8.510 
L5 & L4 Reconoce **** nación (7) 
Reconoce *** nación (5) 
6.627 Reconoce **** nación (5) 
Reconoce **** nación (3) 
6.295 
L2 Construir * nación (16) 6.935 Construir * nación (11) 6.168 
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L2 Defender * nación (5) 4.881 Defender * nación (9) 5.528 
 
Collocates of “Nación”: Processes 
 
4.7. The discourses of “Nación” in El Mundo and El País News 
This section compares how the concept of nation is discursively constructed in the news section 
of both newspapers. The analysis, based on phraseological and whole-text evidence, is 
organized around a series of findings substantiated with evidence from the News corpus. The 
picture that emerges from the analysis corroborates the social constructivism advocated in this 
study and the key role played by discourse in nation-building. This is the story of several 
territories, identified in the category “Candidate Nations”, competing for nationhood (Table 4.7). 
A related category is “Geography”, associated to phrasal patterns such as 
“DEFINIR/LLAMAR/DENOMINAR/SER … Comunidad (autónoma) … Nación”, and “La 
nación más antigua/vieja de Europa” (referring to Spain in El Mundo News) or “Nación … en 
Europa” (referring to the Basque nation in El País News). Quantitatively speaking, Spain and 
Catalonia are the two main candidates followed by the Basque Country and Galicia. There are 
also occasional references to Andalusia as a nation.  
 
# Finding 1: There is ample evidence of negotiation around the concept of nation in both 
newspapers. 
 
The collocates listed under “Concept” and “Quality” (tables 4.9 and 4.10) reflect a discursive 
negotiation involving competing national claims. Expressions such as “Término”, “Concepto”, 
“Definición”, “Palabra”, “Idea” and “Denominación” tend to be used in very similar contexts 
and seem almost interchangeable in the following examples:  
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En el citado documento interno se establece, además, que el Preámbulo del Estatuto incurre en «fraude de 
interpretación» del artículo 2 de la Carta Magna «al equiparar el término nacionalidad al concepto de nación, 
configurando a Cataluña como un ente preexistente a la Constitución y cuyo autogobierno tiene una 
legitimidad anterior a ella». (MCN060317) 
 
Rodríguez Zapatero quiso restar importancia al debate en torno al término nación: «A estas alturas, en un país 
más de futuro que de pasado, lo peor sería dar una batalla por las palabras, por un concepto que a lo largo de 
la Historia ha tenido y tendrá contenidos distintos». (MSN060023) 
 
La identidad de Galicia se ha convertido en un problema insalvable: el PP aceptaba hablar del "sentimiento 
nacional" de los gallegos, pero no la mención de la palabra "nación" que proponían PSdeG y BNG. 
(PORN070095) 
 
Cuando nosotros defendemos la idea de nación catalana sin hacer redondeos, sin intentar buscar 
circunvalaciones extrañas para decir que Cataluña es una nación, seriamente lo decimos porque defendemos 
nuestra identidad. (PCN060123) 
 
Other collocates in these two categories are related to phrases such as “nación de naciones” or 
“nación de ciudadanos”, “única nación” or “nación en la que todos sus ciudadanos sean 
iguales…”. They also reflect this negotiation around what constitutes “a nation” and what 
community should be called “nation”.  The category “issues” (table 4.11) is more 
heterogeneous. Many collocates listed here also result from this discursive negotiation between 
competing nations. One particular group of collocates refers to the places where those territories 
aspiring to be recognized as nations state their claims: “Estatuto”, “Preámbulo”, “Articulado”, 
¨Texto¨, “Artículo”, referring nearly always to the Catalan Estatut. These terms tend to appear 
together with nominalized processes such as “inclusion”, “denominación” or with “processes of 
doing” realized as verbs such as “DENOMINARSE” or “DEFINIR”.126  
La inclusión del término nación en el preámbulo del Estatuto fue acordada el pasado 21 de enero por el 
presidente del Gobierno, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, y el líder de CiU, Artur Mas. (PCN060540) 
 
La ministra de Cultura, Carmen Calvo, consideró ayer que hay que desdramatizar la polémica sobre si 
Cataluña puede denominarse nación en su Estatuto argumentando que el término nación «es un comodín» y 
tiene muchos juegos en la historia política y más connotaciones políticas y culturales que jurídicas. 
(MCN050100) 
 
                                                 
126
 The use of capital letters here indicates the existence of a lemma with several lexical realizations. 
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Collocates like “Unidad”, “Reconocimiento”, “Defensa”, “Construcción” etc. refer to issues 
related to one of the nations under dispute, while “Estado” and “Debate” are related to the 
phrase “Debate del Estado de la Nación”, Spain’s foremost parliamentary debate. The category 
of “Participants” (table 4.12) refers to people and institutions mentioned in connection with 
Spain. The collocates under this category and that of “Issues” tend to refer to more external 
elements of the nation and they do not contribute to explaining the intrinsic meaning of nation in 
the same way as those collocates listed under “Concept”. The last category of collocates refers 
to processes associated to “Nación” lexicalized as verbs (table 4.13). One should bear in mind 
that many of these are closely related to some of the collocates listed under “concepts” and 
“issues” such as “Definición”, “Reconocimiento”, “Defensa” or “Construcción”, which could 
also be considered processes lexicalized as nouns as a result of grammatical metaphor (Halliday, 
1985; Halliday & Martin, 1993). This category of processes is sub-divided according to the 
process types of “being”, “doing”, “saying” and “sensing”, used in the systemic functional 
grammar tradition  (Martin & Rose, 2003).  
 
# Finding 2: Some of these collocates reveal different ideologies in the discourses of “Nación”. 
 
We can distinguish three major stances (unitarism, pluralism and nationalism) and two minor 
ones (post-nationalism and regionalism). Unitarism, or Spanish nationalism, is based on the 
premise that there is one indissoluble nation in Spain, as article 2 of the Spanish Constitution 





 National sovereignty resides in the Spanish people. Therefore, the principle of 
self-determination cannot be applied in the Basque Country or in Catalonia: 
Y al lehendakari le espetó (Rajoy): "España es lo que los españoles quieren que sea. Cuando se habla de 
derecho de autodeterminación, derecho a decidir, lo que se está diciendo es que ustedes que están sentados 
aquí no pueden decidir. Y la esencia de la Constitución, y de la nación española, es la soberanía nacional. Y 
que el voto de todos vale igual". (PSN070273) 
 
También Aguirre habló con Zapatero de las reformas estatutarias y dejó claro que "Madrid está muy cómoda 
en su encaje en España, en tanto que otros planteamientos atentan contra la soberanía nacional, porque la 
nación española es la suma de las voluntades de todos los españoles". Y añadió: "Cuando se dice que los 
vascos son titulares de soberanía, todos tenemos que oponernos".  (PSN040048) 
 
 Spain may well be “una nación plural” but everybody should enjoy equal rights and duties: 
Y dijo (Bono): "La España a la que han de defender es diversa y plural, pero es también vertebrada, en la que 
todo el mundo entiende no se puede atribuir más beneficio a quien más riquezas tenga, en el sentido de que 
pagar más impuestos no da más derechos". Y juzgó esta intención como "despreciable" e "insolidaria". "La 
igualdad de oportunidad de los españoles, que garantiza la propia nación española, es un valor constitucional", 
indicó. (PSN040028) 
 
«¿Considera conveniente que España siga siendo una única Nación en la que todos sus ciudadanos sean 
iguales en derechos y obligaciones, así como en el acceso a las prestaciones públicas?». Esta es la pregunta 
que el PP insta a Rodríguez Zapatero a someter a consulta popular.  (MCN060769) 
 
 Spain is not “a nation of nations”. It is a nation of citizens with equal freedoms and rights. 
(Bono): «No pienso pedir ni permiso ni perdón. No puedo evitar mis sentimientos y yo me siento español 
y, además, me gusta», afirmó. «España no es una casa en ruinas, ni un edificio a construir con elementos 
prefabricados que vayan aportando unos y otros a su antojo en una especie de romería solidaria. No veo 
que se precisen reformas generalizadas». «Y eso», recordó con la cita textual en la mano, «ya lo dijimos 
los socialistas en la declaración de Santillana del Mar». «Pretender refundar España constantemente», 
dijo tajante, «denota una cierta insolencia porque España, más que nación de naciones, es una nación de 
ciudadanos iguales en derechos y obligaciones». (MSN050070) 
 
 The New Catalan Estatut represents “a covert reform of the Spanish Constitution” whose 
Article 2 recognizes the unity of the Spanish nation. Therefore, the Catalan Statute threatens 
the existence of Spain as a nation. 
"España ha desaparecido del mapa", para pasar al núcleo de su estrategia de oposición: la nación española. 
Rajoy mantiene que Zapatero "está desguazando la Constitución disimuladamente", a través de las 
reformas de los Estatutos. (PSN060207) 
 




Pluralism is based on a central topos: While the Spanish Constitution acknowledges that the 
Spanish nation is one and indissoluble, there can be more than one nation within the Spanish 
Nation-State. It all depends on how “nation” is defined. Pluralists support the idea of a fully- 
fledged federal Spain, which can be considered “a nation of nations”, a concept coined by 
Anselmo Carretero, according to El País: 
Maragall dice que España debe confiar en una Cataluña que "no hace trampas"  
Mensaje del presidente catalán con motivo del Día de la Constitución 
En la estela también de Anselmo Carretero -nombre de cabecera autonómica para el presidente José Luis 
Rodríguez Zapatero y hombre que acuñó el término de España nación de naciones-, Maragall afirmó: "Ahora 
es el momento del reconocimiento constitucional de las autonomías y de dar cabida a las diversas realidades 
que quieren convivir en la nación de naciones que es España". (PSN040129) 
 
Other pluralist topoi found in the data are: 
 The idea of Spain being a nation of nations is already implicit in Article 2 of the Spanish 
Constitution because “nacionalidad” is a synonym of “nation”.  
Lo hizo casi a la misma hora en que Iceta explicaba en el Parlamento catalán que el PSC "no comparte las 
dudas" expresadas la víspera por el presidente del PSOE, Manuel Chaves, acerca de la constitucionalidad o no 
de la definición de Cataluña como nación. "Es totalmente constitucional", argumentó, "porque nación y 
nacionalidad son sinónimos". (PSN050065) 
 
La polémica sobre este asunto surgió a raíz de una entrevista con el presidente del Gobierno publicada en EL 
PAÍS el pasado 17 de octubre, en la que Zapatero restaba importancia a la reclamación catalana, considerando 
que los términos nación y nacionalidad no son tan precisos y quizás puedan ser empleados indistintamente. El 
PP respondió de inmediato que el presidente estaba jugando con la definición de España de un modo 
irresponsable. (PSN040173) 
 
Mas insistió en que, por primera vez, se reconoce en una ley orgánica que el término nacionalidad de la 
Constitución es sinónimo de nación. (MCN060724) 
 
(Llamazares): Eso es un debate semántico. La Constitución marca la pluralidad territorialidad: nacionalidades y 
regiones. La nación de naciones no es incompatible con la idea de nación española. En 1978 se buscó el 
eufemismo de nacionalidades en vez de naciones en el artículo 2 porque había presiones militares. Hoy no 
existen. (PSN050159) 
 
 The unity of the Spanish nation is not in danger because of the autonomic reforms. 
La presidenta del Tribunal Constitucional, María Emilia Casas, aseguró ayer que la unidad de España no 
está en peligro y que el alto tribunal está precisamente para garantizarla. (PSN060169) 
 
El Parlamento de Andalucía aprueba el Estatuto sólo con los votos de la izquierda   




Rubalcaba trató de tranquilizar a los que dudan de que el concepto de nación española esté en peligro: 
"Nadie va a tocar el artículo de la nación española en la Constitución. Jurídicamente no hay nada 
preexistente a la Constitución, salvo la soberanía nacional", insistió. (PCN050582) 
 
 Catalonia is a nation but not a nation without a State. 
La defensa de la nación catalana no significa, aseguró, la negación de la nación española "pues España es 
una nación de naciones". Y eso se inscribe en la voluntad de "superar la lógica de un Estado, una nación". 
Contra lo que muchos nacionalistas suelen decir, De Madre sostuvo que Cataluña no es una nación sin 
Estado. "Somos una nación que ya tiene un Estado, el español, que es el nuestro", precisó. (PCN050671) 
 
MADRID.- El portavoz de Convergència i Unió (CiU) en el Congreso de los Diputados, Josep Antoni 
Duran Lleida, quiso aclarar ayer «tantas falsedades» como, en su opinión, se han dicho últimamente.«Este 
no es un proyecto de Estatuto que pretenda la segregación de Cataluña del resto de España», indicó. «No 
es el primer paso hacia la independencia ni para crear un Estado propio para Cataluña», añadió. 
(MCN050371) 
 
 Catalan independence makes no sense in the context of the European Union. 
Europa, no independencia 
"¿Independencia, de qué, si todos somos europeos?", se preguntó el presidente en una conversación con 
periodistas ante el monumento a Rafael Casanova, máximo responsable político de Barcelona durante el 
asedio de las tropas borbónicas. Para Maragall, que ha venido reiterando que su futuro político pasa por el 
proyecto euromediterráneo, Europa es la garantía "de que nadie se come a nadie y todos continuamos 
siendo lo que somos: los catalanes, catalanes; y los castellanos, castellanos". Por ello, consideró 
"ridículo" querer avanzar por la senda independentista. (PCN060276) 
 
Nationalism (Basque, Catalan, Galician, etc.) is based on the idea that Spain is not a nation. 
Rather it is a State that houses true nations like Catalonia, Euskal Herria/Euskadi and Galicia 
who may aspire to constitute their own State: 
España, a juicio del presidente de la Generalitat, «no es sólo una realidad administrativa, sino una 
realidad afectiva, histórica, de intereses y de memorias comunes, pero no es una nación». Frente a esa 
realidad, Pujol sitúa a Cataluña, como una nación con personalidad propia en la que «la lengua es uno de 
los hechos más significativos». (MSN980099) 
 
Other common nationalist topoi are:  
 The true nations inside the Spanish State are not free. 
Sin embargo, Benach, en su discurso titulado La nación del siglo XXI y pronunciado en la sala Francesc 
Tarafa de Granollers, argumentó que la autodeterminación no es sólo «una necesidad para la nación 
catalana: también lo es para el Estado español, que nunca será un Estado normalizado mientras los pueblos 
que lo componen no sean libres». (MCN040139) 
 
Joan Puigcercós habló claro y alto. El suyo es un partido que aspira a conseguir "la nación catalana libre", 
pero dicho esto adelantó el voto favorable de su grupo a la investidura de Zapatero y se mostró dispuesto a 




 Basques and Catalans have the right to decide if they wish to be independent from Spain: 
La proximidad del referéndum del Estatut en Cataluña, previsto para el 18 de junio, convirtió la reunión 
de ayer en Sabin Etxea en un apoyo explícito al sí en la consulta en Cataluña y en una reivindicación del 
derecho de los ciudadanos a decidir de la "nación catalana, gallega y vasca" en España. (PCN060661) 
 
También quedan suprimidos del preámbulo "la vocación y el derecho de Cataluña a determinar 
libremente su futuro como pueblo". (PCN050564) 
 
A minority standpoint, hardly represented in the data, could be described as 
“post-nationalism”. Among its proponents we find intellectuals associated with movements 
such as ¡Basta Ya! and political parties such as Ciudatans de Catalunya or UPyD, although 
many members in these organization are probably closer to Unitarism. These social 
movements first appeared in the Basque Country and Catalonia in defense of individual 
freedoms being threatened by the nation-building policies of Basque and Catalan nationalist 
governments. Although they coincide with unitarism in advocating a strong State guarantor 
of citizen rights, they tend to see all forms of nationalism as a thing of the past and favour a 
society more tolerant with different national identities where individual rights and freedoms 
should come first. Fernando Savater’s thought-provoking statement, “la idea de España me 
la sopla”,127 constitutes a good example of this minority discourse, as in the following 
examples referring to Catalonia:  
El periodista Ivan Tubau, también fundador de Ciutadans, hizo el "ejercicio" de repetir las polémicas 
palabras del actor Pepe Rubianes, por las que se disculpó en su día, pero cambiando España por Cataluña 
en el sujeto. "La nación catalana me suda la polla", dijo entre aplausos. (PCN060262) 
 
Exigen recuperar la consideración de ciudadanía y de libertades civiles frente a «la nación catalana, 
soñada como un ente homogéneo, que ocupa el lugar de una sociedad forzosamente heterogénea». Y 
ponen de manifiesto que el victimismo nacionalista sólo sirve para ocultar la nefasta gestión del gobierno 
catalán. En Cataluña, dicen, «actúa una corrupción institucional, el requisito principal para ocupar una 
plaza o recibir una ayuda, es la contribución al mito identitario». (PCN050033) 
 
                                                 




Leaving aside the considerable frustration one detects here as a result of the identity 
straightjacket the authors have been subjected to for many years, I would argue that this 
post-nationalist discourse runs the risk of being engulfed by unitarism unless it begins to 
deviate significantly by including Spanish nationalism more often in their critique. It is 
important to note that these standpoints are not necessarily monoglotic. In fact, there can be 
significant variation in their discourses leading sometimes to intermediate positions like 
“moderate pluralism” or “regionalism” which represents a compromise between unitarism 
and pluralism. This is by no means a new phenomenon in Spanish politics. The discourse of 
regionalism was already present as a form of proto-nationalism in places like Catalonia and 
the Basque Country by the end of the 19
th
 century (Ucelay-Da Cal, 2003); (de Riquer i 
Permanyer, 2001) and it is still quite representative in Galicia and other regions as a 
consequence of the process of federalization undergone in Spain in the last decades (Balfour 
& Quiroga, 2007).  Nuñez Feijóo, the current president of the Galician Autonomous 
Community, Josep Piqué, a former leader of the right-wing People’s Party (PP) in Catalonia, 
or Socialist politician Manuel Chaves constitute good examples of this as the following 
quotations from the News Corpus illustrate. In MORN070158 it is reported that Nuñez 
Feijóo considers the reference to the unity of the Spanish nation in the new Andalusian 
Statute “an unnecessary excess” and “españolista”. He also defines Galicia as  “una 
nacionalidad con identidad propia”. PCN040116 and PCN040063 echo Josep Piqué 
ambiguous opinions in connection to the idea of Spain being a nation of nations: On the one 
hand, he declares not to accept the definition of Catalonia as a nation, although he admits 
that this territory has certain features which could fall into this category:  
Feijóo ve «españolista» el Estatuto de Andalucía 
SANTIAGO DE COMPOSTELA.- El presidente del Partido Popular de Galicia, Alberto Núñez Feijóo, 
afirmó ayer que el Estatuto de Autonomía andaluz (que va a ser votado en referéndum el domingo 
próximo) y de Castilla-La Mancha (que tramitan las Cortes) son «españolistas» por las definiciones que 
hacen de ambas comunidades. 
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Consideró «excesiva» la referencia que se incluye en ellos a «indisoluble unidad de la nación española», 
según dijo a la Radio Galega. Por eso, pidió al presidente de la Xunta, el socialista Emilio Pérez Touriño, 
buscar un acuerdo sobre el Estatuto gallego, porque «aún se está a tiempo». 
Indicó que en Galicia «no tiene sentido» aprobar un «Estatuto españolista», como el andaluz o el 
castellanomanchego, ni plantear un texto con «nación», como propone el BNG. 
«No es posible decir en Andalucía que la única nación es España y aquí que Galicia es una nación», 
afirmó. Ambas cosas le parecen «un exceso innecesario». «Proponemos que Galicia es una nacionalidad 
con identidad propia», dijo, aunque aclaró que la propuesta del PPdeG también hacía un guiño a los 
nacionalistas al incluir la frase «sentimiento nacional», añadió. «Nosotros no planteamos un Estatuto de 
nación, ni un Estatuto españolista, sino un texto galleguista porque es ahí donde coinciden la mayoría de 
los gallegos», declaró el dirigente del PP deG. (MORN070158) 
 
Durão Barroso hizo suyo, en una entrevista publicada ayer en este periódico, el criterio del líder del PP 
de Cataluña, Josep Piqué, de que la idea de España como nación de naciones puede estar bien "pero 
crearía más problemas de los que resolvería". (PCN040116) 
 
Tampoco quiso hablar sobre este asunto el portavoz parlamentario del PP, Eduardo Zaplana, a pesar de 
que su partido en Cataluña ha dado su plácet al término, por lo menos en el trámite inicial, tal como ayer 
reiteró Josep Piqué, presidente del PP catalán. Piqué subrayó, no obstante, que su partido no aceptará que 
se defina Cataluña como nación. A renglón seguido admitió que "Cataluña, por su historia y sus 
características, tiene rasgos que pueden ser susceptibles de ser calificados como de nación". 
(PCN040063) 
 
The right-wing People’s Party (PP) is overwhelmingly unitarist notwithstanding the 
regionalist undertones of some leaders. A majority of the Socialist Party (PSOE) tends to be 
pluralist, although the party appears more divided on this issue with several prominent 
figures frequently expressing unitarist views close to those of the PP. This difference in 
stance is clearly reflected in the terminology employed by both parties. PP’s most important 
committee is called “Dirección Nacional” (National Directorate) and then it has 
“Direcciones Regionales” (Regional Directorates) and ¨Presidentes Regionales”. 128 
PSOE’s top committees are called “Comisión Ejecutiva Federal” (Federal Executive 
Committee) and “Comité Federal” (Federal Committee) and thus PSOE appears constituted 
as “a federation of parties”. The terminology of the different Socialist parties in the 
federation seems to vary a lot. For instance, the “Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya” (PSC) 
has a “Comissió Executiva” (Executive committee) and a “Consell Nacional” (National 
                                                 
128
 Source: http://www.pp.es/esp/comite-ejecutivo-nacional_12.html (retrieved on 15 October 2009). 
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Council), the word “national” referring to Catalonia.129 The Basque and Galician branches 
of the Socialist Party also used the term “national” to refer to their respective areas in the 
parties’ terminology. Other Socialist parties, like the “Partido Socialista de Castilla La 
Mancha” (PSCM) prefer the term “Regional” and so they have an “Ejecutiva Regional” 
(Regional Executive Committee) while in Asturias they prefer the term “federation” instead 
of “party” in their official name. The case of Madrid is particularly interesting. The party 
was originally called “Agrupación Socialista Madrileña” when it was funded by Pablo 
Iglesias towards the end of the 19
th
 century. In February 1977 it adopted the name of 
“Federación Socialista Madrileña” and in 2004 it became “Partido Socialista de 
Madrid-PSOE”. In conclusion, the different stances with respect to the Spanish nation are 
reflected in the terminologies used by the PP and PSOE with the latter having significant 
terminological differences in different areas as well as some terminological variation over 
time. 
 
Collocates such as “única”, “gran”, or “defensa” are nearly always associated with a 
unitarist stance in El Mundo and El País News, whereas “libre” and “propia” are associated 
with nationalist views. “Nuestra nación” is equally used by unitarists and nationalists, and 
occasionally by pluralists. “Sin” tends to appear in the phrase “Nación sin Estado”, 
especially in El Mundo News, a term equally used by nationalists and pluralists, or 
attributed to them by unitarists. “Nación dentro”, on the other hand, tends to be used by 
pluralists:  
                                                 
129




www.pscm-psoe.com/pb/directorio/resultados.php?idc=2 (retrieved on 15 October 2009).  
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Por eso, la pregunta que el PP pide que se someta a referéndum insiste en que España es la "única 
nación" española. (PCN060741) 
 
A mediados de junio, durante una visita oficial a Palma, Bono salía al paso de la inclusión del término 
«nación» en el proyecto de Estatuto de Cataluña. «La única nación que reconoce la Constitución es la 
nación española. Cualquier otra creación nacional no cabe en la Constitución», aseguró. (MCN060553) 
 
Don Juan Carlos inició su tradicional mensaje navideño con una afirmación rotunda, "España es una gran 
nación", para ensalzar lo conseguido hasta ahora, con referencias constantes a los valores de la 
Constitución. (PSN050068) 
 
Mariano Rajoy (PP): El primer punto del programa electoral del PP en las próximas elecciones será la 
defensa de la nación española y de la Constitución. (PSN060215) 
 
La campaña electoral de EH tendrá una estrategia volcada en su presencia en la calle y bajo un lema: 
«Una nación libre está a punto de nacer. Y se llamará Euskal Herria». (MEN010356) 
 
Finalmente, los electos intentarán «proyectar en el ámbito internacional la existencia de Euskal Herria 
como nación propia y diferenciada, y actuar como tal en la futura configuración europea». 
(MEN990048). 
 
(Rajoy): No hablamos el lenguaje antiguo de los derechos históricos, las soberanías medievales o los 
pueblos irredentos. Nosotros defendemos los derechos individuales. Porque los integrantes de nuestra 
Nación no son las tierras ni la Historia: son las personas. (MSN050020) 
 
Pujol ha explicado que su nacionalismo no consiste en «agredir a nadie, es seguir siendo lo que somos, 
de forma positiva y constructiva» y se ha preguntado «¿en nombre de qué y con qué derecho nos vienen 
a decir que no podemos seguir defendiendo nuestra nación y nuestro idioma». (MCN990102) 
 
Sevilla consideró ayer que no existen contradicciones entre la propuesta del PSC y la Constitución 
porque «el concepto nacionalidad que figura en nuestra Carta Magna siempre se ha entendido como 
nación sin Estado». Contrariamente, López Garrido recordó que la Constitución reserva el concepto de 
nación para España, aunque se mostró partidario de que se produzca un debate «amplio y libre» al 
respecto. (MCN050607) 
 
Si hace unas semanas una encuesta revelaba que el 51% de los catalanes cree que Cataluña es una nación, 
hoy, otra encuesta encargada por la Generalitat al Instituto Opina asegura que el 60,4% de los catalanes 
cree que Cataluña es una nación dentro del Estado español, mientras que un 31,5% no está de acuerdo 
con esta afirmación.  (PCN050016) 
 
“Nación plural” constitutes an interesting case, used by unitarists and pluralists alike in 
negotiating their concepts of nation. A significantly higher number of occurrences attributed 
to the leaders of PP together with some textual evidence found in the corpus may indicate 
that this term could have been appropriated by Unitarism to engage pluralists while setting 




Pasqual Maragall, candidato socialista a la Presidencia de la Generalitat catalana, defendió anoche en 
Bilbao un proyecto para construir una "España plural" para el futuro, frente a los tres nacionalismos que, 
a su entender, están llevando a España a un "callejón sin salida": el español, el catalán y el vasco. Esa 
nación plural debe nacer, además, de la periferia geográfica, "sin que nunca más sea considerada 
periferia política", dijo. (PSN030060) 
 
Este estira y afloja se produjo en el contexto de la reafirmación por el presidente del Gobierno del 
carácter de España como nación plural. A la pregunta "¿hay algo que le impida decir que España es un 
Estado plurinacional", Aznar respondió: "No. Simplemente yo creo que no tengo una concepción de 
España como estado. España es en sí misma una gran nación. Una gran nación plural que se organiza en 
un Estado, en un Estado autonómico. Pero España es más que un estado. Es una nación". (PSN960320) 
 
CiU y CC, a través de sus respectivos portavoces, Xavier Trias y José Carlos Mauricio, confirmaron que 
en la votación de hoy apoyarán la investidura. Trias habló de «coherencia y sentido de la 
responsabilidad», emplazó al PP a especificar hasta dónde quieren llegar en su colaboración con los 
nacionalistas catalanes y se extendió sobre el sistema de financiación autonómica como condición para 
futuros acuerdos. Previamente, Aznar había hablado de «vertebración constitucional de España como 
nación plural», como guiño a los nacionalistas, mezclado con menciones al «proyecto común» o la 
«solidaridad» entre las comunidades. (MSN000044) 
 
El ex presidente del PP catalán parte de la base de que la privilegiada posición de bisagra que ocupan en 
el Parlamento "los nacionalismos segregadores y rampantes" ha colocado a España ante el dilema de 
elegir entre dos concepciones de su propia esencia. Una de ellas, defendida por el PP y el PSOE, es la de 
"España como nación plural, proyecto común, sustancia espiritual común, lengua común, matriz cultural 
común e historia común", estructurada en el Estado de las Autonomías. (PSN970225) 
 
Only one use of “Nación plural” referring to a nation other than Spain has been found, where a 
non-nationalist narrator quotes a Basque nationalist‘s use of the term “Nación plural” trying to 
play down a “biological justification” previously employed by the same person to justify Basque 
uniqueness: 
Para explicar esta decisión, Ortuondo sostuvo que el hecho diferencial vasco se basa en "muchos factores, 
entre ellos el histórico y el biológico". Este análisis causó cierta sorpresa en la Cámara. Ortuondo dijo 
también que el País Vasco ha sufrido en su historia "muchas derrotas y una inmigración masiva que lo ha 
desdibujado, provocando el conflicto político". Preguntado luego sobre esta argumentación para defender 
su abstención a la comisión de Prodi, Ortuondo explicó que había citado el factor biológico "porque así 
lo establecen los antropólogos" y añadió para suavizar el argumento de la inmigración que ésta "ha hecho 
una aportación que convierte a Euskadi en una nación plural". (PEN990386) 
 
4.8. Comparing the discourses of “Nación” in El Mundo and El País News 
This section compares the discourses of El Mundo and El País News by examining the 
phraseology of the different candidate nations identified as collocates of “Nación”. Table 
4.14 shows common collocates related to the different candidate nations. The figures in the 
first and last column indicate the total number of occurrences in both sub-corpora within a 
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L5-R5 range and the number of occurrences found in the most common positions are shown 
in the columns called El Mundo and El País News. The remaining columns show the Mutual 
Information scores for each collocate relation. A score higher than 3 is considered indicative 
of strong collocation.  
 




El Mundo News MI El País News MI Tot. P 
L5-R5 
440 Cataluña ** nación (180) 
Cataluña * nación (115) 
6.781 Cataluña ** nación (159) 
Cataluña * nación (239) 
7.019 512 
252 España ** nación (69) 
España * nación (58) 
4.658 España ** nación (84) 
España * nación (41) 
5.069 272 
49 Herria * nación (33) 6.276 Herria * nación (14) 5.942 30 
33 Vasco ** nación (12) 1.982 Vasco ** nación (8) 1.514 20 
31 Euskadi ** nación (12) 
Euskadi * nación (5) 
4.592 Euskadi ** nación (11) 
Euskadi * nación (8) 
3.756 35 
26 Galicia ** nación (9) 
Galicia * nación (9) 
6.140 Galicia ** nación (12) 
Galicia * nación (20) 
6.806 49 
229 Nación española (210) 7.601 Nación española (220) 7.977 244 
103 Nación catalana (92) 6.871 Nación catalana (52) 6.337 58 
80 Nación vasca (70) 5.412 Nación vasca (69) 5.317 77 
15 Nación gallega (15) 8.061 Nación gallega (6) 7.472 10 
5 Nación andaluza (5) 6.598    
 
Candidate nations in Mundo & El País News 
 
The most cited territories are Spain, Catalonia and the Basque Country. Galicia comes at a 
distant fourth place and there are also occasional references to Andalusia. Interestingly, 
“Cataluña” is the most common left collocate of “Nación”, especially in El País News, 
whereas “española” is much more common than “catalana” to the right in both 
sub-corpora. Also, three different ways to refer to the Basque Country, Euskal Herria, País 
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Vasco and Euskadi, appear on the list of the most common collocates of “Nación” in both 
newspapers, a probable sign of different ideologies present in the Basque nationalist 
discourse. All this initial evidence seems to point towards differences in the discourses 
associated with each candidate nation, something I will explore with detailed analysis of the 
collocates of “Nación”.   
 
The left collocate noun forms of the different candidate nations are associated with three main 
phraseological patterns shown in figure 4.6:  
 
Figure 4.6.  
A. Candidate nation  + PROCESS  + nación  + (MORE INFO) 
 NP VP NP PP/ADJ/Clause 
i.e. España es una nación plural.  
 
B. PROCESS/THING + Candidate nation + como (una) nación + (MORE INFO) 
 NP/ VP PP/NP  PP/ADJ/Clause  
 
i.e. La definición de Cataluña como una nación en la reforma de su Estatuto. 
i.e. [El artículo del Estatuto] que define a Cataluña como una nación. 
 
C. PROCESS/THING + […] nación + Candidate nation + (MORE INFO) 
 VP/NP NP PP/Clause PP/Clause   
i.e.  […] al uso del término nación para definir a Cataluña en el futuro Estatuto. 
 




As table 4.15 illustrates, the most common phrases are “Cataluña […] como […] nación […]” 
and “Cataluña […] es una nación […]”.130 A complete list of phrases can be found on tables 
1-3 in appendix 5.  
 
Table 4.15.  
  
El Mundo News Log-Likelihood El País News 
Cataluña […]  es una nación […] (128) +0.01 Cataluña […]  es una nación […] (114) 
España es […] nación […] (57) -2.42 España es […] nación (68) 
España […] nación de naciones […] (30) -1.94 España […] nación de naciones […] (38) 
Cataluña […] como […] nación […] 
(165) 
-49.98  Cataluña […] como[…] nación […] 
(292) 
España […] como […] nación […] (54) +0.25 España […] como […] nación […] (44) 
Euskal Herria como (una) nación […] 
(38) 
+6.22 Euskal Herria como (una) nación […] (17) 
Galicia como (una) nación […] (12) -4.74 Galicia como (una) nación […] (23) 
La inclusión del término nación […] (19) +0.00 La inclusión del término nación […] (17) 
Uso del término nación […] (10) +0.06 Uso del término nación […] (8) 
El término nación para definir […] 
Cataluña (10) 
-0.05 El término nación para definir […] 
Cataluña (10) 
Término nación en el preámbulo […] (9) -0.79 Término nación en el preámbulo […] (12) 
 
 Main phraseological patterns associated with candidate nations 
 
The higher frequency differences between El Mundo and El País News seem to occur with 
pattern B. A log-likelihood score of -49.98 indicates that “Cataluña […] como […] nación 
[…]” is unusually more frequent in El País News. If we just take the phrase “Cataluña como 
nación”, the score is even higher (-61.79). Although this could be attributed to stylistic 
nuances, such disparity is probably linked to differences in stance between the two 
newspapers. My hypothesis is that El País News favours a more pluralistic stance which 
                                                 
130
 Square brackets indicate the existence of extended phrasal patterns based on the core phrase “Cataluña 
como nación”: i.e. “Cataluña como (una) nación (con personalidad propia).  
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recognizes the possibility of various nations within the Spanish Nation-State and this would 
translate in a considerably higher number of voices in favour of “Catalonia as a nation”. The 
higher log-likelihood score of “Galicia como (una) nación […]” may corroborate this 
hypothesis. A much higher frequency of “Euskal Herria como (una) nación […]” in El 
Mundo News, on the other hand, would not disprove this hypothesis, as Euskal Herria is not 
a pluralist term but rather the preferred term of radical Basque nationalists and ETA 
supporters. Its higher frequency in El Mundo News could be part of a unitarist strategy of 
polarization by amplifying separatist views which also discredit pluralism. I will explore this 
hypothesis by examining the phraseology of patterns B and C in more detail next. 
 
Tables 4.16 and 4.17 compare the phrases “Cataluña/ España como (una) nación” by listing 
processes and things commonly associated with them in El Mundo and El País News. A 
complete list can be found on tables 1 and 2 in Appendix 5. 
 
 Table 4.16.  
El Mundo News (165 occurrences) El País News (292 Occurrences) 
DEFINIR (88): Definición (33); (se) defina (14); 
(PODER) definir(se) (13); (se) define (9); (se) ha 
definido (8); sea definida (3); haya definido (2); 
definía (2),  (se) definiera (2), definiendo, debe 
ser definida  
DEFINIR (169): Definición (101); (se) define 
(25); definir (13); (se) defina (15); ha definido (8); 
definía (2); definen; han definido; sea definida 
(2); se definiera.  
RECONOCER (18): Reconocimiento (10), 
reconoce (5), reconozca (2), reconocer, 
reconozcan 
RECONOCER (51): Reconocimiento (22); (será) 
(quedará) (se vea) (debe verse) reconocida (10); 
(se) reconozca (6); reconocer (6); reconoce (5); 
reconocía; había reconocido. 
 DENOMINAR (24): Denominación (18), 
denominar (5), denominará. 
SENTIR (10): Sienten (4), sentimos (4), sienta, no 
siente  




 PROCESS/THING + […] Cataluña como (una) nación 
 
 Table 4.17.  
El Mundo News (44 occurrences) El País News ( 37 occurrences) 
Idea (7) IDEA (5): Idea (4); ideas. 
CONCEPTO (6): Concepto (4), conceptos (2). Concepto (4) 
DEFINIR (4): Definición (de Aznar); definió; está 
definida; hubiera definido. 
DEFINIR (9): Definición (2); define (2); 
Definiendo, definen, definió, definir; está definida 
HABLAR DE (4): Hablar de, ha hablado, habla 
de, habló de. 
Hablar de. 
Futuro (3) Futuro.  
CONCEBIR (2): Conciben, concebida CONCEBIR (3): Concepción, concepciones, 
concibe.  
Acabar con (2) Acabar con. 
Ruptura (2)  
 
 PROCESS/THING + […] España como (una) nación 
 
# Finding 3: One important difference in the discourse of the various candidate nations is that 
Spain tends to be constructed as an “established nation” while the rest are usually presented as 
“aspiring nations” in both newspapers.  
 
The use of “DEFINIR”, “RECONOCER”, “DENOMINAR” and “SENTIR” 131  in 
connection with “CATALUÑA como (una) nación” indicates that Catalonia is mostly 
constructed as an “aspiring nation”, not always recognized as such by participants, as shown 
in the extracts below. “España como (una) nación”, is mainly associated with “DEFINIR” 
as well as with “IDEA”, “CONCEPTO” or “futuro”. Other less common collocates imply 
                                                 
131
 The use of capital letters on the table indicate a lemma with various lexical realizations (i.e. define, ha 
definido, definición, etc.) 
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the possibility of Spain as a nation being under threat, especially in El Mundo News.
132
 
Many of these collocates, with the possible exceptions of “DEFINIR” and “CONCEBIR”, 
give the impression of Spain being usually constructed as an “established nation”. A closer 
look at the texts associated with these two patterns corroborates this initial impression:  
Incluso hay quien cree, como Benegas, que este sistema «pone en riesgo la idea de España como nación», 
porque el PP y sus socios se empeñan en «deslegitimar un proyecto coherente de Estado», mientras 
«legitiman cualquier reivindicación autonómica, aunque sea inconstitucional o una barbaridad». 
(MSN960007) 
 
Para el diputado socialista, la reforma muestra que "la idea de España como nación" que tiene el PP 
quiere "convertir en enemigos o en antiespaña a todos los que les lleven la contraria". (PSN030091) 
 
[El senador de CiU Pere Macias] También se dirigió al PP, con una petición: «No utilicen más a 
Cataluña como elemento de su estrategia electoral de desgaste del Ejecutivo. No sé si han caído en la 
cuenta de los riesgos que entraña esa política para la convivencia de toda la ciudadanía española y para el 
concepto mismo de España como nación. ¿Qué nación es esa que maltrata a parte de sus hijos?». 
(MSN050382) 
 
Después de haber participado, durante más de un año y medio, en los trabajos de la ponencia estatutaria, 
Vendrell tiene muy claro que el proyecto que se debate en el Parlament «incluye aspectos claramente 
inconstitucionales», como el modelo de financiación, la definición de Cataluña como nación o la 
apelación a los derechos históricos. (MCN050643) 
 
"La única nación que la Constitución reconoce es la nación española", sentenció ayer el ministro de 
Defensa, José Bono, quien con mucho énfasis planteó sus discrepancias políticas ante la eventual 
definición de Cataluña como nación en la reforma de su Estatuto. (PSN050065) 
 
El ministro de Industria y secretario general del PSC, José Montilla, considera que España es una "nación 
de naciones", que en la reforma de la Constitución se debe recoger la "singularidad" o la vía por la que 
cada comunidad accedió a la autonomía y cree que el reconocimiento de Cataluña como nación es algo 
que formará parte de la reforma de la Ley Fundamental y del debate estatutario.  (PSN040137) 
 
Ángel Acebes, secretario general del PP, esgrimió ayer unas declaraciones del presidente del ERC, Josep 
Lluis Carod Rovira, para argumentar que la definición de Cataluña como nación "es el primer paso para 
declararla un Estado, porque toda nación quiere un Estado". (PSN050077) 
 
En Irún (Guipúzcoa), tras una ofrenda floral en el Monumento a las Víctimas, en la plaza del Árbol de 
Gernika, justo al lado de una fortificada comisaría de la Ertzaintza alrededor de la cual no se veía a 
ningún agente, Rajoy solemnizó el compromiso del PP de no modificar "ni una coma" de la Constitución 
en la definición de España como nación.  (PEN040249). 
 
MSN960007 constitutes an interesting example of how a Spanish nationalist discourse is 
often used as a tool against political rivals: here a Socialist politician, Benegas, makes use of 
unitarist arguments to criticize an agreement between the PP government and CIU on the 
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autonomic financing system arguing that this places the very idea of Spain, the established 
nation, under risk. Significantly this text was produced shortly after Aznar’s tight electoral 
victory followed by arduous negotiation with Catalan and Basque nationalists of CIU and 
PNV to secure enough votes to form a minority government in Spain. Although the PP had 
vigorously campaigned against further decentralization, the election results forced Aznar to 
negotiate with moderate nationalists to achieve a stable parliamentary majority (Magone, 
2004). The PSOE opted then for a brief shift towards unitarism in a remarkable reversal of 
roles.  
 
PSN030091 brings us back to more familiar territory with the Socialists adopting a pluralist 
position more tolerant with nationalist views against the PP’s proposal to penalize any 
Basque initiative of referendum proposed by Ibarretxe. Spain as a nation is nevertheless 
taken for granted in the text. In MSN050382 we hear the voice of a Catalan nationalist, Pere 
Macias, in defence of the Catalan Estatut. He argues that the PP’s unitarist position against 
the Estatut is an electoral manoeuvre that paradoxically places the idea of Spain as a nation 
under risk, because it “maltreats some of its own children”, the Catalans. It should be 
noticed that in addressing a non-nationalist audience Macias tries to undermine their position 
using an old Catalanist topos, namely that of “separatists versus separators” where unitarism, 
identified with castellanismo, denies the reality of a plural Spain (Ucelay-Da Cal, 2003). 
Interestingly, Macias’s argumentation makes him closer to pluralism than to present-day 
nationalism because in alerting his unitarist rivals of the dangers derived from using the 
Catalan question to weaken Zapatero’s pluralist government, he implicitly acknowledges the 




MCN050643 and PSN050065 illustrate the unitarist views of the PP and some Socialist 
leaders. The former argues that the definition of Catalonia as a nation in the Estatut is 
unconstitutional whereas the latter shows Bono’s opinion, a prominent Socialist politician 
with unitarist views. PSN040137 illustrates the pluralist view of many Catalan Socialists 
who advocate the idea of Catalonia being a nation inside a Spanish nation of nations. In any 
case, we can clearly see in this text the contrast between Spain being an “established concept” 
now being modified in order to accommodate Catalonia as a newly emerging nation, as 
stressed by the use of the word “reconocimiento”. Finally, if we compare the use of 
“definición” in PSN050077, PEN040249, MCN050643 and PSN050065 one can clearly see 
this distinction of established versus aspiring nation being reproduced: the definition of 
Catalonia as a nation is qualified as “inconstitutional” (MCN050643) and “eventual” 
(PSN050065) thus constructing Catalonia as an aspiring nation. If we look at “definición de 
España como nación”, on the other hand, we can sense an official nation on the defensive 
after Catalonia has been defined as a nation. The argument here is that one should not 
change “a comma in the Constitution as far as Spain’s definition as a nation is concerned”.  
 
The phraseology associated with other candidate nations also tends to reflect this “aspiring 
versus established” distinction, as can be seen in Appendix 4: the phrase “Galicia como 
nación” collocates with “DEFINIR”, “RECONOCER”, “despertar”, “triunfo”, etc. The 
various terms referring to the Basque Country, on the other hand, tend to be associated with 
different themes which reflect the ideological load they carry. The nationalist term “Euskal 
Herria”, commonly found among independence and ETA supporters and increasingly 
among PNV members, often reflects the idea of Euskal Herria as an “established nation” 
with concepts like “existencia”, “destino” and, like “España”, also can be constructed as 
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under threat (i.e. liquidación, destruir, puede sobrevivir etc.). Euskal Herria however is also 
associated with lexis that indicates that for some people this is an aspiring nation: 
“RECONOCER”, “construcción nacional”, etc. Euskadi, a term invented by Sabino Arana 
that has been common currency among PNV supporters and later adopted by pluralists, 
presents a similar prosody to that of “Galicia” and “Cataluña”. 
 
This dichotomy of Spain-official nation versus Catalonia-aspiring nation is further 
confirmed after examining the phrases “Término nación”, “Nación catalana” and “Nación 
española”. “Término nación” is the most common phrase used in the category of “Concept”, 
a group of collocates also including “concepto”, “definición”, “palabra”, “idea”, etc. 
employed in negotiating competing national claims. These are collocates clearly associated 
with aspiring nations because established ones do not need to be advocated explicitly. Table 
4.18 compares the use of “Término nación” in the news section of both newspapers while 
figure 4.7 tracks its use over time.  
Table 4.18.  
 
 El Mundo News El País News 
No. occurrences  
“Término  nación” […]   (L5-R5) 
225 198 
No. ocurrences “Término  nación” 216  185  
No. articles “Término  nación” 141 143 
No. articles “Término  nación” (Cataluña) *116  *110  
No. articles “Término  nación” (España) 4  2  
No articles “Término  nación” (Euskadi) *7  1 
No articles “Término  nación” (Galicia) 4 *14 
No articles “Término  nación” (Andalucía) 4 *10 
No articles “Término  nación” (Other) 7 4 
 
*Starred items indicate a dual reference of “Término nación” (i.e. Cataluña and Galicia). 
 “Término nación” in El Mundo vs. El País News 
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Figure 4.7.  
 
 Use of “Término nación” in El Mundo vs. El País News over time 
 
The phrase “Término nación” constitutes over 90% of the occurrences of “Término […] 
nación” within a L5-R5 range. This pattern can be found in 141 and 142 articles in each of 
El Mundo and El País News. As predicted, the phrase refers to Catalonia in over 82% and 
78% of the cases in El Mundo and El País News respectively whereas the references to 
Spain are reduced to a total of four articles in El Mundo and two in El País News, 
representing a mere 2.85% and 1.42% in each case. A closer look at the texts explains why 
Spain is seldom associated with this phrase. All of them could be considered 
counter-examples. In three cases (MSN040322, MCN050175 and PSN040179) it is argued 
that “the term nation is only applicable to Spain in the Spanish Constitution”. In two other 
cases (MSN07621 and PSN040129), “término” does refer to an emerging concept: that of 
“Spain as a nation of nations” and the last use of “Término nación” referring to Spain 
(MSN050024) is clearly tinged with irony:  
La primera respuesta no gustó a García-Escudero, que acusó a Rodríguez Zapatero de especular con 
conceptos muy importantes: «Cualquier estudiante de primero de Derecho sabe que en nuestra 





















Luego, entró en materia: «Yo mantengo que el término nación no es unívoco; que tiene muchos 
significados. Pero si se introduce en un texto legal, la evocación es jurídica y, en ese caso, la 
Constitución sólo menciona el término nación para referirse a España y sólo habla de nacional al 
referirse a la soberanía española».  (MCN050175) 
 
“Cualquier estudiante de Derecho sabe que en nuestra Constitución, el término nación se reserva 
exclusivamente a la española", le espetó Escudero, quien le pidió que hablara como ex profesor de 
Derecho Constitucional. Zapatero prefirió hacerlo "como persona que se aproxima sin ningún tipo de 
prejuicio a este concepto". Y desde allí recogió el guante: "Quizá no haya un concepto tan discutido en la 
teoría política y en la ciencia constitucional como el de nación, y es algo que sabe en efecto cualquier 
estudiante de Derecho". (PSN040179) 
 
Sosa, ex alto cargo en la anterior etapa del PSOE en el Gobierno, rechaza el término «nación de 
naciones» con el que coqueteó Zapatero y advierte sobre contenidos concretos del Estatuto de Cataluña, 
como los que tienen que ver con la lengua. (MSN070621) 
 
En la estela también de Anselmo Carretero -nombre de cabecera autonómica para el presidente José Luis 
Rodríguez Zapatero y hombre que acuñó el término de España nación de naciones-, Maragall afirmó: 
"Ahora es el momento del reconocimiento constitucional de las autonomías y de dar cabida a las diversas 
realidades que quieren convivir en la nación de naciones que es España". (PSN040129) 
 
Rajoy: Me sorprende que este debate se siga llamando del estado de la Nación, porque le debe de sonar 
rarísimo el término nación. No tiene una idea realista de España. (MSN050024) 
 
Tables 4.19 and 4.20 show the most common processes, things and qualities associated with 
“Nación catalana” and “Nación española”.  The former is associated with processes such as 
RECONOCER and AUTODETERMINAR and with qualities such as “nueva” and “libre”, all 
reinforcing the idea of Catalonia as an emerging nation. “Nación española”, on the other hand, 
is mainly associated with “unidad” and “DEFENDER”.  
 
 Table 4.19.  
El Mundo News ( 92 occurrences) El País News ( 52 Occurrences) 
RECONOCER (10) 
Reconocimiento (8), impide reconocer, se 
reconozca 
RECONOCER (2) 
Reconocimiento, No se reconozca,  
Concepto (6) Concepto (2) 
AUTODETERMINAR (2) 
Autodeterminación (2), se autodetermine (2) 
 
Término (1) Término (6) 




 El derecho […] a decidir (3) 
Anhelos (2)  
PROYECTO (2) 
Proyecto, proyectos (para crear) 
 
Nueva (2) Nueva 
Libre (2) Libre 
 





El Mundo News (210 occurrences) El País News (220 occurrences) 
Unidad de la nación española (41) 
Indisoluble unidad de la nación española (26) 
Unidad indisoluble de la nación española (15) 
Unidad de la nación española (55) 
Indisoluble unidad de la nación española (30) 
Unidad indisoluble de la nación española (7) 
Unidad indivisible de la nación española (2) 
la unidad de España y de la nación española (3) 
DEFENDER (37) 
Defensa de la nación española (30) 
Fundación para/por la Defensa de la Nación 
Española (23) 
Plataforma para la Defensa de la Nación Española 
(2) 
Asociación para la Defensa de la Nación Española 
(1) 
Defender la nación española (3) 
Defenderá la nación española (1) 
Defiende la nación española (1) 
Defendemos la nación española (1) 
Defendió a capa y espada la nación española (1) 
DEFENDER (19) 
Defensa de la nación española (12) 
Fundación para/por la Defensa de la Nación 
Española (5) 
Asociación para la Defensa de la Nación Española 
(1) 
Defender la nación española (6) 
Defiende la nación española (1) 
 
HABLAR (4) 
Habló de nación española (1) 
Habla de la nación española (1) 
Habla es la nación española (1) 
Hablar del Estado español y no hacerlo de la 
nación española (1) 
HABLAR (3) 
Se habla de nación española (1) 
habla de una única nación española (1) 





 “comunidad autónoma integrada en la nación 
española” (1) 




integrada por derecho propio en la nación 
española (1) 
comunidad foral propia y diferenciada, indivisible 
e integrada en la nación española (1) 
la Navarra del Amejoramiento integrada en la 
nación española (1) 
Castilla-La Mancha se define como una 
comunidad autónoma integrada en la nación 
española (1) 
(nacionalidades y regiones) que integran la nación 
española (4) 
Concepto nación española (1) 
Concepto de nación española (3) 
Concepto de nación española (7) 
DIGNIDAD (4) 
Dignidad de la nación española (3) 
Dignidad menoscabada a la nación española (1) 
Dignidad de la nación española (1) 
 
 UNA (5) 
Una nación española (4) 
una sola nación, única e indivisible, la nación 
española (1) 
 NEGAR (4) 
no supone negar la nación española 
tampoco niega la nación española” 
no niega la nación española  
quienes niegan la nación española  
DISCUTIR (3) 
Discusión sobre la nación española  
Se discute a la nación española  
Discutir la nación española  
Discusión sobre la nación española 
HABER (2) 
No hay otra/más nación que la nación española 
(2) 
HABER (3) 
"Hay una nación española y luego dentro hay 
nacionalidades y regiones"  
no hay más nación que la nación española (2) 
 




A closer look at a seemingly neutral term such as “Concepto de nación catalana” also 
reveals this “aspiring nation” theme if we compare it with “Concepto de nación española”:  
Acebes mantuvo que, "cuando se duda de si la nación es España o Cataluña, se producen estas 
consecuencias". Se refería, otra vez, a una respuesta del presidente del Gobierno en la entrevista que 
publicó este diario hace dos semanas, cuando dijo que no le "sonaba mal" el concepto de "nación 
catalana".  (PSN040059) 
 
Maragall también dijo que el presidente del Gobierno, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, está «demostrando 
determinación y coraje político para llevar a cabo las reformas institucionales necesarias». «Ha propuesto 
dos cosas: una revisión del concepto de nación española y más respeto para el concepto de nación 
catalana» subrayó. (MCN040223) 
 
Ningún Parlamento, Asamblea o Cortes de ninguna comunidad puede decidir por su cuenta cómo se 
organiza el Estado español, ni modificar el concepto de nación española", rezaba la declaración conjunta, 
en la que en ningún momento se mencionaba expresamente a Cataluña. Castilla-La Mancha se convierte 
de esta forma en la primera autonomía, que por escrito, manifiesta su oposición al Estatuto catalán. 
(PSN050164) 
 
The implication here is that the concept of a Catalan nation is considered as a disputed one 
(“it does not sound bad to Zapatero” and Maragall “demands more respect” towards this 
concept). The concept of the Spanish nation, on the other hand, is constructed as being 
revised or modified. Pluralists and unitarists seem to agree on that account in spite of their 
opposing views. 
 
# Finding 4: All the phraseological evidence confirms the impact of the new Catalan Statute 
of Autonomy in the discourses of “Nación” in both newspapers. 
 
Over 97% and 91% of the articles containing the pattern “Término […] nación” in El 
Mundo and El País News were written in the years 2005 and 2006, when the discussion of 
the Catalan Statute and the definition of Catalonia as a nation in its text occupied Spanish 
politics during months. The fact that 58.66% and 61.81% of all the articles containing the 
word “Nación” in El Mundo and El País were also written in 2005-2006 provides substantial 
evidence in support of this thesis, especially if we consider this is a much larger sample: 
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1,492 articles from El Mundo and 1,377 from El País News. This centrality of the Catalan 
Statute is enhanced by the fact that we can also find numerous references to the Estatut in 
articles linked to other issues such as “Constitutional reform” and especially to “other 
regional Statutes” with direct allusion to the Catalan law as a leading influence (i.e. 
PORN060120, PORN060027, PCN050473, MORN060119, MORN060028). The evolution 
of news articles dedicated to “Other Regions” between 1996-2007 also shows a substantial 
increase in the number of articles after 2004 in both newspapers, especially in El Mundo 
News, as figure 4.8 shows. 
 
Figure 4.8.  
 
 
 Evolution in the number of News articles dedicated to Other Regions 
 
All the evidence points towards another “Autonomic race” taking place as a result of the 
new status quo brought by the Catalan Statute. The numerous references to the Estatut in 
articles dealing with other regional Statutes can be explained by the anxiety the Catalan law 
provokes in other regions which seek not to be treated as second-class entities if the existing 
order of things is altered. This reveals a common trait in identity discourses in the Spanish 






































































State of the Autonomies, the tension between an asymmetrical configuration of the State 
championed by the “nacionalidades históricas”133 and a horizontal distribution of power 
with all the autonomies enjoying similar competency levels (Balfour & Quiroga, 2007).  
"Es una reforma con lealtad total a la Constitución y a la nación española", recalcó Agramunt, que 
calificó de "exageración que se hable de una reforma express" por parte de IU, CiU y el resto de minorías. 
"Alcanzamos un Estatuto de primera categoría y no deseamos que sea más que nadie, pero tampoco 
menos que nadie", indicó el popular, que destacó que con la reforma se aprueban dos cuestiones 
importantes pendientes: la recuperación del derecho foral valenciano y la capacidad plena de disolución 
de las Cortes valencianas para convocar elecciones. (PORN060046) 
 
En la misma línea, Soraya Sáenz de Santamaría -una de las artífices del acuerdo junto a Federico Trillo y 
Jaime Ignacio del Burgo- declaró a este diario que el nuevo Estatuto es «un antídoto contra el preámbulo 
catalán y otros futuros devaneos nacionalistas». Una afirmación que contrasta con la de Manuel Chaves. 
«El Estatuto es homologable al catalán y será referencia para el resto». (MORN060115) 
 
La andalucista Pilar González puso el acento en que se ha aceptado la inclusión de la palabra nación en el 
Preámbulo del Estatuto de Cataluña y no en el de Andalucía. "La nueva categoría, la de nación, la crea el 
PSOE y ustedes han de encontrar la solución. No podemos aceptar la discriminación, que se permitan 
privilegios a los que Andalucía no tiene acceso. Cuando nación es lo máximo a lo que podemos aspirar, 
no podemos ser realidad nacional”. (PORN060096) 
 
A particularly interesting article is PORN060120 (“La reforma del Estatuto Valenciano, Un 
nuevo Estatuto valenciano a mitad de camino del catalán”), where a detailed comparison 
between the Catalan and Valencian Statutes is made arguing that in spite of the PP’s support 
of the Valencian Statute and the nationalist flavour of the Catalan one, the two reforms have 
become more similar after key elements of the Catalan Statute that breached the Constitution 
had been trimmed.  
 
As mentioned in chapter 3, this egalitarian argument amply manifested in the corpus has 
been described as “comparative grievance”, one of the key components of the “multiple 
ethnoterritorial concurrence” model of relations in post-Franco’s decentralized Spain 
(Moreno, 2001). Comparative grievance was at the root of the disputes between territories 
seeking equal treatment during the arduous political negotiations that led to the 
                                                 
133
 The term “Nacionalidades históricas” refers to those territories that had Statutes of Autonomy in the 1930s 
(The Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia). Article 2 of the Spanish Constitution however speaks of 
“nacionalidades y regiones” without naming them. 
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establishment of the State of the Autonomies with the 1978 Constitution (Powell, 2001; 
Tusell, 2005). The phrase “café para todos”, attributed to centre politician Clavero 
Arevalo
134
 against the so-called asymmetrical federalism in democratic Spain epitomises 
this egalitarian discourse. If Andalusia, a territory known for its vibrant regional identity 
planted on broadly recognized Spanish roots, championed the discourse of “café para todos” 
once with a popular referendum demanding equal treatment to the one awarded to the 
so-called “nacionalidades históricas”, the Catalan move towards national recognition 
triggered an Andalusian response in a similar direction: Some Andalusian parties led by the 
Socialists (PSA) suggested to call the region “realidad nacional” in their newly-proposed 
Statute, much to the disgust of PP who argued against this and proposed a direct reference to 
the “indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation”.  
«De entrada, deduzco que Zapatero no ve obstáculos para que Andalucía esté en el mismo nivel que 
Cataluña, igual que lo estaba hace 25 años», señaló Álvarez. Según explicó, la inclusión del término 
nación en el Estatuto es «imprescindible» para garantizar la «igualdad absoluta» de los andaluces con 
respecto a cualquier otro pueblo del Estado.  (MORN060118) 
 
Catalans and Basques often consider that this equalitarian discourse undermines their right 
to a special relationship with the State, as the following quote by Maragall illustrates: 
BARCELONA.- El presidente de la Generalitat catalana, Pasqual Maragall, afirmó ayer que el espíritu 
de la Constitución establece diferencias entre «nacionalidades», como Cataluña, y «regiones», por lo que 
pidió que ese «espíritu inicial» de la Carta Magna sea respetado. 
En una declaración institucional con motivo del Día de la Constitución, que se celebra hoy, Maragall 
pidió «que las nacionalidades sean nacionalidades y las regiones, regiones». 
Con la futura reforma de la Constitución, añadió, es necesario que «cada nacionalidad histórica sea 
considerada como tal, como comunidad nacional».  (MCN040223) 
 
# Finding 5: Comparative phraseological analysis shows that Spain and the various aspiring 
nations are discursively constructed very differently. 
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 The phrase was pronounced on 4 December 1977 according to El Mundo:  




“Nación española” is commonly associated with three ideas: “Unity”, “defence” and 
“nation of nations”, a pluralist topos already discussed. The phrase “unidad de la nación 
española”, often modified by the adjective “indisoluble” and by the phrase “patria común e 
indivisible de todos los españoles” represents 27% and 29% of the occurrences of “Nación 




PHRASE El Mundo 
(hits) 
% of total hits El País (Hits) % of total hits 
Unidad de la nación española 57 27.14 65 29.54 
Indisoluble unidad/ unidad 
indisoluble… 
44 20.95 38 17.27 
“(como) patria común (e) 
indivisible de todos los 
españoles” 
19 9.04 22 10.00 
“patria común e indisoluble 
de todos los españoles” 
1 0.47 1 0.45 
“patria común e 
indestructible de todos los 
españoles” 
1 0.47 0 0 
“patria común de todos los 
españoles” 
0 0 2 0.90 
“Única e indivisible patria de 
todos los españoles” 
0 0 1 0.45 
 
The phrase “unidad de la nación española” in El Mundo vs. El País News 
 
Its origin is in Article 2 of the Spanish Constitution: 
La Constitución se fundamenta en la indisoluble unidad de la Nación española, patria común e 
indivisible de todos los españoles, y reconoce y garantiza el derecho a la autonomía de las nacionalidades 




                                                 
135
 Source: narros.congreso.es/constitucion/constitucion/indice/index.htm  (retrieved on 29-12-09) 
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(The Constitution is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation, common and indivisible fatherland 
of all Spaniards and it recognizes and guarantees the right to autonomy of the nationalities and regions that 
integrate (the Spanish Nation) as well as the solidarity among all).  
 
Article 2 is often used as a unitarist topos against the Catalan Statute or other Autonomic 
reforms as the extracts below illustrate. In MCN050590 it is used by the Popular Party as a 
red line any autonomic reform should not cross. Manuel Chaves, then Socialist president of 
Andalusia, similarly uses Article 2 in MCN050126 to disagree with the idea of calling 
Catalonia a nation in its newly proposed Statute. Interestingly, we can see the Andalusian 
Socialists adopting a pluralist stance later on when they propose calling Andalusia 
“Realidad nacional” in their Statute (PORN060010). The Popular Party sticks to their guns 
by referring to Article 2 of the Constitution and accuse the Socialists of being led astray by 
the Catalans.
136
 Article 2 is occasionally introduced in pluralist narratives like in 
PCN050619, where Rodríguez Zapatero and other Socialist leaders justify that Catalonia be 
called a nation in its Statute by arguing that the concept of nation is not necessarily a legal 
one, that “nacionalidad” is equivalent to “Stateless nation” and that the recognition of 
Catalonia as a nation would not have any political consequence because Spain is a nation of 
nations. 
El PP pide rechazar la reforma de un estatuto si cambia la financiación […] 
Según los populares, estas reformas ponen en discusión el modelo de Estado y generan «incertidumbre y 
preocupación» en la ciudadanía. Para hacer frente a esta situación, el PP plantea que el Congreso de los 
Diputados pida al Gobierno que establezca unos «criterios y límites claros para la reforma de los estatutos 
de autonomía», salvaguardando «la unidad, la soberanía nacional, la viabilidad del Estado, la igualdad y 
solidaridad interterritorial y garantizando que ninguna definición que se propugne vulnere el artículo 2 de 
la Constitución», que proclama la «indisoluble unidad de la Nación española» y reconoce el derecho a la 
autonomía «de las  nacionalidades y regiones que la integran y la solidaridad entre todas ellas». 
(MCN050590) 
 
EL MODELO DE ESTADO / DEBATE EN EL PSOE 
Chaves rechaza la inclusión del término 'nación' en un Estatuto 
El presidente de la Junta de Andalucía lo considera «incompatible» con el artículo 2 de la 
Constitución, que trata de la indisolubilidad de España 
SEVILLA.- El presidente de la Junta de Andalucía, el socialista Manuel Chaves, afirmó ayer que 
denominar nación a una comunidad autónoma en su correspondiente Estatuto -tal y como reclama el 
tripartito para Cataluña- resulta totalmente «incompatible» con la propia Constitución Española, en 
                                                 
136
 The phrase used by Arenas is that “los andaluces hagan de palmeros de Maragall”.  
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concreto con su artículo 2, en el que se apela, precisamente, a la «indisoluble unidad de la Nación 
española» y que, según el dirigente socialista, «no se debe modificar». (MCN050126) 
 
Chaves da por imposible el acuerdo con el PP sobre el Estatuto andaluz  […] 
La polémica en las últimas semanas se ha centrado en la decisión del PSOE de incluir en el preámbulo del 
Estatuto la expresión "realidad nacional" para definir a Andalucía, una fórmula que propuso el ex 
ministro de UCD Manuel Clavero Arévalo. Con esta iniciativa, los socialistas esperaban atraerse a la 
reforma a los andalucistas, que defienden el término nación. 
Excusa para el 'no'  
Pese a venir de Clavero Arévalo, un referente histórico de la derecha en Andalucía, el PP puso el grito en 
el cielo por la decisión del PSOE de incluir esta denominación, aunque los socialistas estaban y están 
convencidos de que este asunto no era más que una excusa para justificar el no a la reforma. 
Igualmente, en el texto articulado ha habido polémica con la definición. PSOE y PP coinciden en la 
denominación de Andalucía como nacionalidad histórica, pero las diferencias vinieron cuando los 
socialistas decidieron simplificar el farragoso artículo 1.1 del Estatuto. Así, el PSOE sustituyó la 
referencia "a la indisoluble unidad de la nación española, patria común e indivisible de todos los 
españoles" por una mención al artículo 2 de la Constitución española, que contiene esta cita. 
En su último intento para intentar el acuerdo con el PP, los socialistas plantearon este jueves volver a 
hacer una referencia expresa a la "unidad de España" y de la "nación española" tanto en el preámbulo 
como en el artículo 1.1. […] 
El enquistamiento de la negociación no afectó a Javier Arenas, quien ayer aseguró hará un esfuerzo "hasta 
la extenuación" por alcanzar un acuerdo con el PSOE sobre la reforma e, incluso, dijo estar dispuesto a 
"ceder" en algunas de sus "pretensiones", informa Diego Narváez. Pero entre estas cesiones no se 
encuentra, en ningún caso, su exigencia de que se elimine la expresión "realidad nacional", que da repelús 
en el PP y que ven "incompatible" con alusiones a la unidad de España y de la nación española. 
Arenas, en un acto de partido en Málaga, reclamó que el PSOE "también flexibilice sus posiciones" y 
reiteró el argumento de que el 90% de los andaluces está conforme con la denominación de nacionalidad 
histórica o comunidad autónoma. Añadió que incluir el término realidad nacional significa que los 
andaluces hagan de "palmeros" de Maragall, presidente de la Generalitat catalana. (PORN060010) 
 
LA REFORMA DEL ESTATUTO CATALÁN  
Zapatero admitirá el término nación para Cataluña si lo avalan los dictámenes  
El presidente del Gobierno afirma que la cuestión no es estrictamente jurídica […] 
A juicio del presidente del Gobierno, el concepto de nación "no es estrictamente jurídico sino que tiene 
diversos sentidos y diversas interpretaciones, como el histórico-cultural y el sociológico". No obstante, 
recordó que los límites de la reforma del Estatuto catalán, como la de los demás estatutos, son que "el 
contenido concreto de cada uno de los artículos a reformar respete la Constitución y sea fruto de un 
amplio consenso". 
En la misma dirección, el ministro de Administraciones Públicas, Jordi Sevilla, tampoco pone obstáculos 
a que se defina a Cataluña como nación en el Estatuto reformado "siempre que se entienda al equivalente 
a nacionalidad en la Constitución de 1978", lo que "tendrán que avalar los correspondientes dictámenes 
jurídicos". Sevilla recuerda que el término "nacionalidades", recogido en el artículo dos de la 
Constitución, es equivalente a "nación sin Estado" y que "los constituyentes así lo entendieron". 
El artículo dos de la Constitución distingue entre nacionalidades y regiones en estos términos: "La 
Constitución se fundamenta en la indisoluble unidad de la nación española, patria común e indivisible de 
todos los españoles, y reconoce y garantiza el derecho de autonomía de las nacionalidades y regiones que 
la integran y la solidaridad entre ellas". 
En el debate de la ponencia constitucional de 1978, fue el ponente de UCD (Unión de Centro 
Democrático), Miguel Herrero de Miñón, quien propuso el término "nacionalidad", que resultó definitivo. 
Previamente, el ponente de CiU, Miquel Roca, había propuesto el de "nación". El portavoz del PSC, 
Miquel Iceta, dijo hace dos días que "los términos nación y nacionalidad fueron considerados sinónimos 
para los constituyentes". 
El portavoz socialista en la actual Comisión Constitucional del Congreso, Ramón Jáuregui, estima 
también que el término nación, que se plantea introducir en el Estatuto reformado, "tiene una acepción 
histórico-cultural" que "puede hacerlo compatible con la Constitución". No obstante, Jáuregui cree que "si 
apareciese en el preámbulo del nuevo Estatuto y no en el articulado, se evitarían problemas jurídicos". 
Jáuregui admite que es "real" el riesgo denunciado por Alfonso Guerra de que los nacionalistas 
interpreten que el reconocimiento de nación en el Estatuto les anime a dar el paso de reclamar, más 
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adelante, un Estado propio. Cree, no obstante, que la propuesta de reforma de estatutos es para "una 
generación" y que serán las futuras generaciones las que deben decidir el futuro. 
El portavoz del PSC, Miquel Iceta, precisa que introducir la definición de Cataluña como nación sería un 
problema "si pusiera en duda que España es una nación de naciones" o "si preparan el camino para otra 
cosa". "Pero éste no es el caso, porque si España es una nación de naciones, Cataluña es una de ellas". 
(PCN050619) 
 
The association of “Nación española” with the idea of “defence” is particularly common in 
El Mundo News due to a significantly higher number of occurrences of the phrase 
“Fundación para/por la Defensa de la Nación Española (DENAES)”,137 an association of 
unitarist ideology created in January 2006 in response to what they perceive as a lack of 
Spanish patriotism and continued separatist attacks against the Spanish nation. Appendix 6 
reproduces an introductory text from the Association’s website. 138 This insistence on 
defending the Spanish nation obviously implies the existence of threat, something 
occasionally reflected in the discourse of the Spanish nation, especially in El Mundo News, 
with expressions such as “deshacer”, “acabar con” or “atacar a”. The Estatut is identified 
as a direct cause of threat in the examples below. MSN060025 is particularly interesting 
considering that the source of news is El Mundo’s own director who identifies himself with 
the unitarist discourse of PP. 
MODELO DE ESTADO / REACCIONES DESDE LAS AUTONOMIAS 
Fraga vetará la reforma en Galicia si no se retira el concepto de nación […] 
En todo caso, consideró que la reforma del Estatuto catalán «de ninguna manera puede ser aprobada en el 
Parlamento nacional porque es claramente inconstitucional». Al respecto, el presidente fundador del PP 
apreció que el nuevo texto catalán contribuye a «deshacer la nación española, patria común e 
indestructible, compatible con la autonomía» y pidió «no destruir la obra de los Reyes Católicos». 
(MORN050056) 
 
«Zapatero va a dejar un Estado inviable si la deriva nacionalista actual no se detiene» 
Pedro J. Ramírez afirma que EL MUNDO seguirá investigando el 11-M, al margen de lo que digan 
los partidos políticos y la sentencia judicial 
Pedro J. realizó un pormenorizado análisis sobre la delicada situación que atraviesa la nación española 
tras la aprobación del Estatuto de Cataluña y la presión de los nacionalismos catalán y vasco: «Veremos 
si la España constitucional es capaz de sobrevivir a las concesiones que está haciendo Zapatero en 
materia de soberanía».  (MSN060025) 
  
                                                 
137
 A L-L score of +10.77 where a critical value of 10.83 indicates a probability of <0.001 of this not being due 






Spain is also associated with “gran nación”, “nación de ciudadanos […] libres e iguales”, 
“nación más antigua de Europa” or “vieja nación”. However these ideas are seldom 
elaborated in the News Corpus. This is not surprising in the light of recent findings from 
corpus-based studies in genres like parliamentary debates, where one may have expected a 
higher degree of elaboration in the argumentation (Teubert, 2008). The examples below 
throw a bit more light into the way the Spanish nation is constructed. In MSN070135 the 
Spanish nation is considered to be 500 years old. This same idea of antiquity is stressed in 
PCN960108 together with those of diversity and plurality whereas in MORN050056 the 
Spanish nation is identified “as the work of the Catholic Kings”. In MSN060113 there is a 
reference to the 1812 Constitution as the foundation of a nation of citizens while 
MSN970048 refers to some new legislation to regulate the symbols of the Spanish nation.  
Ángel Acebes (PP). «Hoy es un gran día, una excelente ocasión para recordar que Ceuta y Melilla son dos 
ciudades plenamente españolas y que España es una gran nación con más de 500 años de historia y la 
voluntad cierta para seguir conviviendo en democracia y libertad». (MSN070135) 
 
El programa electoral del PP señala: "España es uno de los ejemplos más antiguos de gran nación europea. 
Como fruto del proceso histórico de su. formación, España es plural, diversa, multilingüe y pluricultural. 
El proyecto nacional que el Partido Popular impulsa. parte de la convicción de que España es una realidad 
viva, una sustancia común y no la mera agregación de las diversidades que se reconocen en su seno" 
(PCN960108) 
 
Al respecto, el presidente fundador del PP apreció que el nuevo texto catalán contribuye a «deshacer la 
nación española, patria común e indestructible, compatible con la autonomía» y pidió «no destruir la obra 
de los Reyes Católicos». (MORN050056) 
 
«La nación española no es una idea metafísica», dijo, «sino la reunión de las voluntades libres e iguales 
de todos los españoles, tal como la concibieron las Cortes de Cádiz». (MSN060113) 
 
Con la normativa que el Gobierno aprobará mañana queda totalmente regulado y homologado el Himno 
Nacional con lo que se completa, junto a la Bandera y el Escudo de España, la trilogía de símbolos 
representativos de la nación española.  (MSN970048) 
 
On the one hand, Catalonia and Euskadi are mostly associated with “Nación libre” and with 
“derecho”, both related to the nationalist topoi of oppressed nation and the right to 
self-determination. On the other hand, they are linked to a unitarist topos of rejection that 
denies the existence of these nations with phrases such as “no quieren”, “no hay”, 
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“estamos en contra”, “polémica” or “entelequia” “invención de la izquierda”. Some 
references to the Galician nation tend to be more restrained with nationalist voices speaking 
of a Galician nation inside Spain (PORN050024).  
 
The question of the antiquity of the Catalan and Basque nations seems rather contradictory. 
On the one hand, they are identified with the idea of new (nueva) and birth (nacimiento) 
although other texts like MCN970001 link the origins of the Catalan nation to the medieval 
figure of Gifré el Pelós while in MEN000418 Ibarretxe’s claim of Euskadi being older than 
the Spanish State is quoted.  
MODELO DE ESTADO / La estrategia 'popular' 
El PP implica ahora a sus barones en contra del Estatuto catalán en el debate del Senado 
Promueve a la vez la intervención de los presidentes autonómicos socialistas y anuncia su veto a la 
ley […] 
“El objetivo consiste en enfrentar a políticos como Ibarra, Chaves o Barreda con sus respectivos 
electorados a cuenta del reconocimiento de la nueva nación catalana.” (MCN060318) 
 
Ibarretxe acusa al PP y al PSE de intentar medrar a costa de dividir […] 
Otegi presentó también el cartel diseñado para las próximas elecciones vascas, en el que aparece el 
cuerpo desnudo de una mujer embarazada que, según dijo, pretende transmitir que 'Euskal Herria se 
encuentra ante la oportunidad histórica real de alcanzar un estatus de soberanía en Europa'. Su lema será: 
'Una nación libre está a punto de nacer'. (PEN010665) 
 
MODELO DE ESTADO / EL TEXTO DEL PROYECTO 
Los artículos más conflictivos del nuevo Estatut 
La definición de Cataluña como nación, la atribución a la Generalitat de competencias hasta ahora 
exclusivas del Estado, las nuevas atribuciones en inmigración y Justicia y, sobre todo, la 
financiación, centrarán la oposición al texto […] 
La nación catalana ha venido realizándose en el curso del tiempo con las aportaciones de energías de 
muchas generaciones, de muchas tradiciones y culturas, que han encontrado en ella una tierra de acogida. 
(MCN050273) 
 
El Gobierno le recuerda que es 'lehendakari' gracias a la Constitución 
El portavoz del Gobierno contestó así al lehendakari, que sostiene que «Euskadi es una nación anterior al 
Estado español» y que «el problema Euskadi-España» es anterior a ETA y dura ya «160 años». 
(MEN000418) 
 
Pujol llama a luchar contra la ridiculización del catalanista […] 
En su intervención, Jordi Pujol aludió a las críticas que recibió su proclama nacionalista durante la 
conmemoración del 1.100 aniversario de la muerte de Guifré el Pelós (Wifredo el Velloso), considerado 
el fundador de la nación catalana.  (MCN970001) 
 





El congreso del PI aclama a Colom y Rahola como líderes del partido 
El objetivo del PI, según las ponencias aprobadas en este congreso, es conseguir "la independencia y la 
unificación de la nación catalana, integrada por el Principado de Cataluña, el País Valenciano, las islas 
Baleares y Pitiusas, la Cataluña Norte [las comarcas del Rosellón, Capcir, Conflent y Vallespir, en 
Francia] y la Franja de Poniente [comarcas de habla catalana en la comunidad autónoma de Aragón] 
(PCN970061) 
 
Fin de la tregua. Texto del acuerdo entre ETA, PNV y ETA de agosto de 1999 
 I.- Contexto político e histórico del nuevo pacto 
- Euskal Herria es actualmente una Nación dividida entre dos estados, sin ninguna representación unitaria 
ni soberana. Es más, los territorios incluidos en cada Estado tienen dificultades para formar una única 
entidad: 
- En el territorio bajo dominio de España, Araba, Bizkaia y Guipuzkoa, conforman la Comunidad 
Autónoma denominada CAV, mientras Nafarroa forma una comunidad autónoma diferenciada. 
- En el territorio bajo dominio de Francia, Lapurdi, Baxenafarroa y Zuberoa están incluidos en un 
departamento más amplio que acoge también al Bearne. Dentro de ese departamento, se produce otra 
división, ya que Zuberoa está unida a la subprefectura de Oloron. (MEN990320) 
 
There are also differences in the identity markers related to these candidate nations. 
Catalonia tends to be identified with language and with a quasi-Renanian desire of “sharing 
a common project”. Language is also associated with Galicia whereas in the case of Euskadi 
we can find some criticism of a racial undercurrent in Basque identity: 
Carod se confiesa en el 'Magazine': «Soy la bestia negra de la derecha» […] 
«la nación catalana es una comunidad de personas que en el territorio de lengua catalana quiere 
compartir un proyecto colectivo común» (MCN060133) 
 
LA HERENCIA DE ARZALLUZ  
El pensamiento del ex presidente  
El presidente del PNV deja en las hemerotecas un legado de declaraciones impactantes, polémicas 
y contradictorias 
"Los vascos descendemos de los primeros neandertales de Europa y han conservado un patrimonio 
genético diferente (...) con una enorme cantidad de Rh negativo. En Europa, étnicamente hablando, si 
hay una nación, ésa es Euskal Herria. Primero anduvieron los antropólogos con sus craneotomías, luego 
vinieron los hematólogos con el Rh de la sangre. Siempre encontraron una especificidad entre los vascos. 
Ahora han venido los biólogos con el monogenismo y el neomonogeismo, concluyendo que esta 
humanidad, la humanidad de la que formamos parte, procede de una única pareja. Y cuentan, se trata de 
algo sorprendente, cómo vinieron a Europa y cómo su sangre (se trata de algo ocurrido hace 25.000 años, 
me refiero al hombre de Cromagnon) perdura solamente en los vascos" (1993). (PEN040078) 
 
4.9. Objective news? Analysing ideology in news-making 
 
Objectivity has often been identified as one of the core values in journalism. 
Notwithstanding the differences in its conceptualization among professionals from different 
cultural backgrounds (Donsbach & Klett, 1993), journalists have usually strived to portray 
themselves as neutral reporters of facts committed to segregating values in news-making 
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(Schudson, 1978). Objectivity however has been questioned from inside and outside the 
journalistic profession on a number of fronts: by advocacy and civic journalists, by critics 
accusing the media of bias  (Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Chomsky, 2002) and by critical 
discourse analysts employing linguistic analysis to prove that news objectivity is a 
problematic concept, if not a myth (Fowler, 1991). Although news report “facts” according 
to journalists, one may argue that objectivity is affected by a number of things such as 
editorial decisions on what is newsworthy, the angle adopted in reporting news and even 
occasional breaches in factual reporting by poor or biased professionals.  
 
# Finding 6: There is evidence of different ideologies in El Mundo and El País News in 
relation to what constitutes a nation, thus confirming the problematic nature of objectivity in 
news reporting.  
 
A sample of 507 news articles with 724 instances of phrases containing the word “Nación” 
from El Mundo and 576 articles featuring 795 phrases from El País was analyzed in terms of 
stance (table 4.22). These phrases were chosen due to their high raw frequency and high 
Mutual Information scores (table 4.23).  
Table 4.22. 
  







El País News 
No. Articles 
El País News 
Término […] nación 232 141 202 142 
Cataluña como (una) nación 138 105 269 185 
Nación catalana 92 62 52 43 
Nación española 210 158 220 170 
Nación de naciones 52 41 52 36 
 




Table 4.23.  
El Mundo News MI L-L El País News MI 
Término […] nación (216) 9.517 +0.27 Término nación (185) 9.517 
Cataluña como (una) nación 
(138) 
6.781 -57.42 Cataluña como (una) nación 
(269) 
7.019 
Nación catalana (92) 6.871 +7.54 Nación catalana (52) 6.337 
Nación española (210) 7.601 -2.39 Nación española (220) 7.977 
Nación de naciones (52) 9.130 -0.27 Nación de naciones (52) 9.119 
 
Comparative analysis of common phrases in El Mundo and El País News 
 
Each article was annotated and categorized as “Unitarist”, “Pluralist”, “Nationalist”, 
“Post-nationalist” or “Various” according to the stance of what it reported. A fairly 
restrictive policy was adopted in labeling articles as unitarist, pluralist or nationalist, thus 
making the “various” category comparatively looser. For instance articles were categorized 
as unitarist only if that was the only voice perceived throughout the text or if there was clear 
evidence that a unitarist voice was being introduced by the narrator as a value judgment 
against nationalist or pluralist voices. Articles echoing more than one voice without blatant 
intervention by the narrator were categorized as “various”, even if there was clear evidence 
of a unitarist or pluralist stance dominating the discourse. The results indicate the existence 
of sharp ideological differences between the two newspapers, with El Mundo constructing 
the nation mainly from a unitarist perspective and El País heavily leaning towards pluralism 





Figure 4.9.  
 
 
 Stance in El Mundo vs. El País News 
 
The phrases “Término […] nación”139 with 97% and 90% of occurrences and “Cataluña 
como (una) nación” with 82% and 86% of occurrences in 2005-2006 in El Mundo and El 
País News respectively are the most closely linked to the discussion following the 
introduction of the word “Nación” in the new Catalan Statute of Autonomy. The discourse 
associated with these two phrases echoes the idea of Catalonia as an emerging nation 
independently of the stance adopted. “Cataluña como (una) nación” is overwhelmingly 
more common in El País News with over 94% more occurrences. The articles containing 
these two phrases present notable differences in stance however: over 50% of the articles 
containing “Término […] nación” are pluralist in El País compared to less than 20% in El 
Mundo (figure 4.10). In the case of “Cataluña como (una) nación” the number of pluralist 
articles in El Mundo represents less than 15% while in El País the percentage is almost 53%. 
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 Square brackets are used to indicate that other words may appear between “término” and “nación”, i.e. “CiU 




























Less than 5% of the articles containing “Cataluña como (una) nación” belong to the 
nationalist stance in El País News compared to almost 24% in El Mundo (figure 4.11).  
Figure 4.10.  
 





 Stance in El Mundo vs. El País News, articles “Cataluña como (una) nación” 
 
“Nación española” is comparatively less closely associated with the debate provoked by the 
Catalan Statute with 56% and 61% of occurrences in 2005-2006 in El Mundo and El País 










































News, with “Nación catalana” and ¨Nación de naciones¨ somewhere in between.  
Compared with “Cataluña como (una) nación”, “Nación catalana” is more commonly 
associated with a nationalist stance in El País News (figure 4.12). ¨Nación de naciones¨ on 
the other hand is a predominantly pluralist term as proved by the higher percentage of 





 Stance in El Mundo vs. El País News, articles “Nación catalana” 
 
  






























 Stance in El Mundo vs. El País News, articles “Nación de naciones” 
 
The analysis shows that the two ideologies in El Mundo versus El País News are constructed 
according to different strategies. The main one is to create hegemonic discourses by 
emphasizing unitarist/pluralist voices in El Mundo and El País. I will illustrate how these 
newspapers create hegemonic discourses by comparing the frequencies of pluralist and 
unitarist participants in a small sub-corpus containing the articles with the phrase “Cataluña 
como (una) nación”, a term significantly more common in El País News.140 
 
Table 4.24.  
“Cataluña como (una) nación” El Mundo News EL País News 
No. articles 105 185 
No. tokens 81,088 142,986 
No. types 8,220 10,290 
TTR 38.67 38.65 
                                                 
140
 The Log-likelihood score is -57.42. 























Total No. Tokens 224,074 
 
Sub-corpus “Cataluña como (una) nación”, El Mundo vs. El País News 
 
Table 4.25 compares the frequencies of the main participants in this sub-corpus. Although  
El País tends to problematize the news about the Estatut acknowledging, like Rodríguez 
Zapatero, that some aspects may not be 100% constitutional, the voices of those radically 
rejecting the reform and considering it an initiative against Spanish unity are clearly a 
minority in this newspaper. The news are usually constructed as a negotiation among 
various stakeholders, mostly in favour of the new Catalan Statute in one way or another, 
such as “Consejo Consultivo” (-42.34), an advisory body of the Catalan government on 
legal matters,  “Esquerra” (-42.05), “Zapatero” (-23.06), “Unió” (-18.21) and 
“Presidente” (-16.32). Seemingly neutral terms such as “Parlamento” (-22.13), “ejecutiva” 
(-15.37), “ponentes” (-12.76), “sociedad” (-11.33), “negociadores” (-11.54), “entorno” 
(-10.37), “catedráticos” (-9.58) or “juristas” (-7.23) are mostly associated with pluralist 
voices:  
El consejero sostuvo que el Consultivo ha "avalado la columna central del proyecto, el esqueleto que lo 
sustenta". Enumeró rápidamente algunos de los puntos que han suscitado no poca polémica en los 
últimos meses y que el Consejo Consultivo ha dictaminado como constitucionales, como la definición de 
Cataluña como nación, la inclusión en el Estatuto de un título sobre derechos ciudadanos, el sistema de 
blindaje de las competencias de la Generalitat y la reforma de la Justicia. (PCN050390)  
 
El preámbulo pactado por PSOE y CiU dice: "El Parlamento de Cataluña, recogiendo el sentimiento y la 
voluntad de ciudadanos y ciudadanas catalanes, ha definido, de forma ampliamente mayoritaria, a 
Cataluña como nación […]. (PORN060081) 
 
La Ejecutiva Federal del PSOE asumió ayer el dictamen de los cuatro catedráticos de Derecho 
Constitucional que han analizado la propuesta de reforma de Estatuto de Autonomía aprobada por el 
Parlamento catalán […] 
Los catedráticos afirman que el término nación "referido a Cataluña tiene una dimensión teorética, que 
está condicionada de manera decisiva por el debate político, ideológico y cultural". Por ello, han optado 
por "no analizar la cuestión en este momento, circunscribiendo su análisis a una perspectiva 












L-L El País 
News 
% El País 
News 
Consultivo 3  -42.34 68 0.05 
Esquerra 25 0.03 -42.05 150 0.10 
Zapatero 149 0.18 -23.06 410 0.29 
Parlamento  95 0.12 -22.13 286 0.20 
Republicana 15 0.02 -21.75 84 0.06 
Unió 20 0.02 -18.21 92 0.06 
Cortes 44 0.05 -16.87 151 0.11 
Presidente  209 0.26 -16.32 510 0.36 
Ejecutiva 5  -15.37 41 0.03 
PSOE 142 0.18 -14.56 362 0.25 
Arzalluz 0  -14.38 16 0.01 
Ponentes 1  -12.76 21 0.01 
Partit 0  -12.58 14  
Socialistes 0  -12.58 14  
Tripartito 34 0.04 -12.39 115 0.08 
Republicanos 9 0.01 -11.70 48 0.03 
Negociadores 3  -11.54 28 0.02 
Sociedad 12 0.01 -11.33 56 0.04 
Aznar 4  -10.45 30 0.02 
Entorno 1  -10.37 18 0.01 
Central 23 0.03 -10.03 82 0.06 
Catedráticos 1  -9.58 17 0.01 
Puigcercós 17 0.02 -9.26 65 0.05 
CIU 162 0.20 -8.84 376 0.26 
Bargalló 2  -8.63 20 0.01 
Líderes 9 0.01 -8.50 42 0.03 
Universidad 1  -8.03 15 0.01 
Juristas 2  -7.23 18 0.01 
Votantes 18 0.02 +36.59 0  
President 21 0.03 +35.45 1  
Parlament 61 0.08 +30.64 34 0.02 
Govern 15 0.02 +30.49 0  
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Selección 18 0.02 +29.66 1  
Consell 10 0.01 +20.33 0  
Bono 29 0.04 +14.76 16 0.01 
Tributaria 28 0.03 +12.53 17 0.01 
Nadal 14 0.02 +11.05 5  
Populares 46 0.06 +10.03 41 0.03 
Magistrados 18 0.02 +9.08 10  
Ibarretxe 24 0.03 +8.43 17 0.01 
Guerra 39 0.05 +6.69 38 0.03 
 
Comparative frequencies of participants: “Cataluña como (una) nación”, El Mundo vs. 
El País News 
 
An exception to the pluralist orientation in El País is “Cortes” which often appears in 
articles containing “various voices”, including unitarist ones. Terms like “Arzalluz” (-14.38) 
and “Aznar” (-10.45) do not constitute any exception. All the occurrences of “Arzalluz” 
come from the same article (PEN000035), where his statement in favour of treating Spanish 
citizens as migrants in the Basque Country is heavily criticized by many people. In Aznar’s 
case, not a single article in El País News containing the phrase “Cataluña como (una) 
nación” subscribes to unitarism. On the contrary, Aznar is mentioned by participants 
constructing a pluralist argument: 
Fue cuando Duran reprochó a Mariano Rajoy que ahora defienda encendidamente la Constitución y el 
Estatuto de Cataluña de 1979 cuando dos de sus predecesores en el cargo de presidente del PP, José 
María Aznar y Manuel Fraga, se opusieron a ambos textos.  (PCN050038) 
 
De la actitud del PP y de José María Aznar, que han manifestado que España corre riesgo de 
desintegración con el Estatuto de Cataluña, [Zapatero] dijo que "confían muy poco en España. "Es la 
misma actitud que cuando el señor [José María] Aznar salía en televisión porque nos iba a embarcar en 
una guerra que ha costado miles de vidas en Irak y decía que no querían esa guerra. Es la misma actitud 
que cuando sufrimos la tragedia del 11 de marzo, que nos estuvieron engañando porque nos decían que 
no era terrorismo islamista.  (PCN050214) 
 
Many terms significantly more frequent in El Mundo News tend to be associated with voices 
opposing the idea of Catalonia being a nation, the most obvious case being “Populares” 
(+10.03). “Votantes” (+36.59) is restricted to three articles, two of which about polls where 
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a majority of people are said to oppose the Estatut. To a lesser extent, “Magistrados” (+9.08) 
is also used in articles with a unitarist orientation. “Bono” (+14.76) and “Guerra” (+6.69), 
two Socialist leaders opposing the idea of a Catalan nation are also significantly more 
frequent in El Mundo News: 
Bono vuelve a desmarcarse de la línea impuesta por Zapatero 
Desoye la orden de silencio y niega como Guerra que Cataluña sea nación - El presidente no valora la 
investigación al PCTV, pero el ministro la apoya.  (MSN050075).  
 
A second strategy involves the polarization of arguments in El Mundo News by using a 
comparatively higher number of nationalist voices within an overall context dominated by 
unitarism: By confronting “only one Spanish nation” against “Spain is not a nation”, the 
more moderate stance represented by pluralism is undermined. The opposite occurs in El 
País News, where nationalist voices linked to the Estatut are usually toned down or diluted 
in articles featuring competing stances. As figure 4.10 showed, “nationalist articles” in El 
Mundo represent 14.39% of the total, subsumed in a unitarist core of 50.69% of the articles. 
“Nationalist articles” in El País represent a mere 5.90% within a pluralist core of 43.05%, 
while the percentage of articles containing “various voices” is higher in El País: 26.90% 
versus 18.73%. 
 
The combination of a hegemonic discourse with a polarizing/de-polarizing strategy reveals 
the newsmaker operating as a hidden narrator who selects “who says what” in the news. This 
also seems to have an impact in the use of certain lexis. For instance, El Mundo shows a 
marked preference for Catalan terms like “President” (+35.45), “Parlament” (+30.64) and 
“Govern” (+30.49)  which add a nationalist flavour to its discourse in articles highly 
critical with pluralist or nationalist views by presenting nationalism with radical overtones. 
The most noticeable case is “President”, often referring to Pujol:  
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REFERÉNDUM EN CATALUÑA / La Junta Electoral Central desestima los recursos del PP y ERC por 
entender que «no cabe ejercer ninguna forma de censura previa» / Piqué acusa al 'president' de 
«desprecio a las leyes» 
Maragall incita a votar 'sí' porque 'sentimos Cataluña como nación'.  (MCN060614) 
 
La editorial suspende el acto ante la «posibilidad real» de que se produjeran incidentes - El 'president' se 
desmarca de las opiniones del histórico dirigente de ERC y de las de su mujer. Pujol evita presentar el 
libro racista de Barrera para frenar el escándalo.  (MCN010071) 
 
If we compare the frequencies of these terms in the much broader context of the news 
sub-corpus, the differences between both newspapers are even more striking, especially if 
we consider possible hyponyms (table 4.26). The figures clearly speak for themselves: this 
huge difference in log-likelihood scores in one direction or another, with the exception of 
“Montilla”, cannot be random. 
 
Table 4.26.  
  





L-L El País 
News 
% El País 
News 
President 801 - +806.81 32 - 
Presidente 25,624 0.24 -60.29 24,785 0.26 
Pujol 6,046 0.06 -121.41 6,637 0.07 
Maragall 5,132 0.05 -63.34 5,409 0.06 
Montilla 1,629 0.02 -0.50 1,508 0.02 
Parlament  1,350 0.01 +301.40 520 - 
Parlamento  7,442 0.07 -50.03 7,964 0.08 
Govern 1,222 0.01 +1,487.44 8 - 
Gobierno 48,315 0.45 -148.46 47,188 0.49 
 
Comparative frequencies of participants, El Mundo vs. El País News 
 
The unusually higher frequency of “Ibarretxe” and “Selección” in El Mundo News seems 
part of this polarizing strategy. Text analysis reveals that the “Ibarretxe connection” to the 
Catalan nation is used by PP to portray the Estatut in radical terms. Accordingly, the 
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discourses of El Mundo and El País are remarkably different: while El Mundo echoes the 
views of the Popular Party, El País criticizes the “Ibarretxe connection” by reproducing the 
Socialist discourse against this: 
Tres de cada cuatro españoles contra las exigencias de Maragall e Ibarretxe 
Un 75% se opone a que la Constitución o el Estatuto reconozcan a Cataluña como 'nación' - Un 62% 
frente a un 18% cree que el 'plan Ibarretxe' debe ser rechazado aunque lo apruebe el Parlamento vasco. 
(MSN040294) 
 
Debate sobre nación  
La tensión la introdujo Zaplana ya de entrada al manifestar que el proyecto catalán "rompe el consenso 
constitucional" y al equipararlo con el plan Ibarretxe. Todos los grupos de la izquierda y CiU le 
respondieron con duras respuestas. (PCN060149) 
 
“El PP "está haciendo tremendismo [...] comparándolo con el plan Ibarretxe", ha dicho Rubalcaba, que 
califica de "sorprendente" que este partido "esté tan preocupado por la unidad de España" y que al mismo 
tiempo trate de "enfrentar a Cataluña con el resto de España".  (PCN050703). 
 
 “Selección” (+29.66) reflects the emotionally-charged connection between sports and 
national identity. In the following example the newsmaker denounces the spread of Catalan 
nationalism in education and sports:  
SEMBRANDO LA DIFERENCIA / Radiografía del escándalo silencioso que va minando España (y 
VII) 
Un sueño llamado Cataluña-Brasil 
Los libros de texto recuerdan los JJOO de Barcelona como el inicio de la 'reconstrucción nacional' de 
Cataluña y alientan el deseo de que una selección propia alcance la final del Campeonato Mundial de 
Fútbol. (MSN070591) 
 
In a third strategy occasionally employed by both newspapers, the newsmaker blatantly 
inserts value judgments qualifying the views quoted in the text. Not surprisingly, the bias 
always leans toward a unitarist stance in El Mundo and a pluralist one in El País.  
MODELO DE ESTADO / Varias federaciones denuncian el «cansancio» de la ciudadanía y que no haya 
más asunto en la agenda política / Los 'guerristas' podrían asumir que el término 'nación' vaya en el 
preámbulo aunque no les guste 
Los barones pedirán a Zapatero que cierre ya el Estatuto y no ceda más 
Dirigentes de Madrid, Andalucía, Castilla-La Mancha, Extremadura y Galicia plantearán hoy al 
presidente en el Comité Federal que «la opinión pública está cansada y este debate no puede llenar la 
agenda». […] 
MANUEL SANCHEZ 
MADRID.- Con resignación, sin ningún entusiasmo, con la exigencia de que «se acabe cuanto antes» y, 
sobre todo, de que «no haya más concesiones a los nacionalistas», el PSOE afronta el Comité Federal de 




El PP catalán se opuso en la redacción de la ponencia parlamentaria del Estatuto a que Cataluña sea 
denominada nación, si bien Francesc Vendrell, portavoz parlamentario del PP en el Parlament, declaró en 
julio de 2004 que "si la mayoría de partidos cree que hay que hablar de nación catalana en vez de 
Cataluña, el PP no está en contra".  (PCN050268) 
 
El Gobierno y la Ejecutiva del PSOE admiten que el texto aprobado por el Parlamento catalán cogió 
desprevenidos a los cuadros del partido a los que alarmó su contenido, el apoyo del PSC y la actuación 
del presidente de la Generalitat, Pasqual Maragall. Éste, en el Comité Federal del PSOE, celebrado el 3 de 
septiembre, se comprometió a que el Parlamento catalán aprobaría un texto "políticamente realista y 
jurídicamente constitucional".  
A esta desorientación ha contribuido la "brutal campaña" del PP contra el Estatuto, centrada en el lema 
"se rompe España". (PCN050623). 
 
In MCN060560 and PCN050623 a newsmaker aiming to discredit the voices used in the 
narrative introduces comments against pluralism/unitarism. In MCN060560 the newsmaker 
even “impersonates” Socialist politicians using a language highly critical against the Estatut, 
where Zapatero is said to be “granting too many concessions to the nationalists”. In 
PCN050623 the newsmaker refers to PP’s campaign against the Estatut as “brutal”. In 
PCN050268 the narrator quotes a past statement in direct contradiction with the PP’s present 
stance. The newsmaker in MCN060560 goes even further when he uses quotation marks to 




4.10. Conclusions  
 
The analysis of the discursive construction of the term “Nación” in the News corpus proves 
the existence of an ongoing negotiation in El Mundo and El País around what constitutes a 
nation, with several territories being associated with this concept. Phraseological analysis 
reveals that the two newspapers tend to construct Spain as an “existing nation” while 
“Catalonia” above all, “Euskadi” and “Galicia” are usually constructed as “aspiring nations”.  
 
                                                 
141
 The use of the future tense “plantearán” is a clear indication of this. 
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All the evidence emerging from the diachronic analysis of the articles containing the term 
“Nación” and its associated phraseology indicates that the debate originated around the new 
Catalan Statute represented a milestone in the discursive construction of the nation in Spain 
between 1996 and 2007. Such debate reached a high point after the inclusion of the term 
“Nación” in the draft of the Estatut, which triggered much discussion in the media on the 
issue of nationhood. In this respect, textual analysis reveals the existence of three main 
ideologies: Unitarism (Spanish nationalism), Pluralism and Nationalism on the periphery, 
with El Mundo clearly advocating a unitarist stance and El País a pluralist one. A variety of 
strategies are used to construct these stances in both newspapers, the main one being the 
construction of a unitarist/pluralist hegemonic discourse by under-reporting opposing voices. 
El Mundo also employs a strategy of polarization within a predominantly unitarist discourse 
by introducing a comparatively higher number of nationalist voices whereas El País tends to 
moderate nationalist views in conjunction with its hegemonic pluralist discourse. Both 
newspapers occasionally make use of newsmaker bias in their discourses. These sharp 
differences between the two newspapers not only reveal the problematic nature of objectivity 




CHAPTER 5: THE DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTION OF 
“NACIÓN” IN OPINION ARTICLES 
Introduction 
This chapter analyses how the concept of “Nación” is constructed in a corpus of opinion and 
editorial articles totalling 9.37 million tokens (table 5.1). As with the News Corpus, the 
frequencies of “Nación” and “España” will be presented together with the diachronic 
analysis on the use of these expressions. I will then discuss how “Nación” and “España” are 
conceptualized in the discourses of El Mundo and País Opinion employing different kinds of 
analysis. I will consider common collocates and phrases as well as entire texts to identify 
main stances, definitions, paraphrases and themes. 
 
Table 5.1.  
 El Mundo Opinion El País Opinion 
No. articles 8,157 
 
5,557 
No. tokens 4,901,574 4,468,687 
No. types 93,022 85,270 
TTR 45.31 44.95 




# Finding 1: There are significant differences between the two newspapers in the number and 
distribution of opinion articles over time. 
 
One important difference with respect to the News corpus is a greater discrepancy in the 
number and distribution of opinion articles over time between the two newspapers, 
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notwithstanding some similarities such as a decreasing trend in articles between 2000-2003 
and an increasing one between 2004-2006 (figure 5.1). There are opposite trends in the years 
1997 and 2007 and, more significantly, greater discrepancy after 2004. A score of .022 in 
Statistical Variance (ANOVA), where ≤.05 indicates that the deviation is statistically 
significant, confirms that those differences are not due to chance. The sharp increase in the 
number of articles in both newspapers occurs after the return of the Socialists to power in 
March 2004, in the aftermath of a terrorist attack in Madrid with more than 200 victims and 
several hundreds injured, attributed to Al-Qaeda. Days before the election opinion polls 
indicated that the Popular Party could emerge victorious. Many in the PP still believe that the 
attack changed the fate of the elections because the party was punished for its alliance with 
Bush in the Iraq conflict. El Mundo still questions Al Qaeda’s involvement in the attack and 
demands that further investigation be conducted.  
 
As seen in the previous chapter, this power shift in Spanish politics laid the ground for a new 
wave of federalization spearheaded by the reform of the Catalan Statute, followed by other 
regional Statutes. These were at the centre of the political debate between 2005-2007, with 
the right fiercely opposing the Catalan reform, arguing that it was unconstitutional and that it 
endangered Spanish national unity. My hypothesis is that the significantly higher number of 
opinion articles in El Mundo during this period is related with its unitarist stance against the 
Estatut, resulting in the proliferation of opinion articles on Spanish identity. Although the 
political debate created around the Estatut was also echoed in El País, the paper’s pluralism 
may explain a more restrained attitude resulting in significantly fewer articles. This is 
something that detailed phraseological analysis largely confirms as we will see. 
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Figure 5.1.  
 
Distribution of opinion articles in El Mundo and El País  
 
# Finding 2: There are important stylistic differences in how opinion articles and editorials 
are written in the two newspapers.  
 
The analysis of a large sample of articles in the Opinion corpus revealed two main writing 
styles distinguishable from each other in how appraisal resources are employed by the 
authors as well as by other discourse features. Focusing primarily on English, the language 
of evaluation has been theorized by different linguistic schools (Hunston & Thompson, 
2000). The Systemic Functional approach has been chosen here for two reasons. Firstly, 
comparatively more descriptive work has been carried out using this approach. Secondly, the 





Martin and White (2005, p.1) define appraisal as “concerned with the interpersonal in 
language, with the subjective presence of writers/speakers in texts as they adopt stances 
towards both the material they present and those with whom they communicate”. Operating 
at the level of discourse semantics, appraisal is mainly realized prosodically throughout a 
continuous stretch of discourse. These authors place appraisal resources across three 
interacting domains: “Attitude”, “engagement” and “graduation” (figure 5.2): 
 
Figure 5.2.  
 
 


















According to them:  
Attitude is concerned with our feelings, including emotional reactions, judgments of 
behavior and evaluation of things. Engagement deals with sourcing of attitudes and the 
play of voices around opinions in discourse. Graduation attends to grading phenomena 
whereby feelings are amplified and categories blurred (ibid, p.35). 
 
Attitude is subsequently sub-divided into “affect”, “judgment” and “appreciation” where 
affect is said to deal with the resources for construing emotions, judgment with resources for 
evaluating behavior (social esteem or social sanction) and appreciation with resources for 
construing the value of things. Engagement could be “monogloss” if the author’s voice is 
unmediated or “heterogloss” if alternative voices can be detected in the text. Finally 
graduation deals with gradability, the level of force and focus in the messages.  
 
The first writing style identified in the corpus features an extended use of what Martin and 
White call “commentator voice”, characterized by unconstrained authorial judgment and a 
tendency towards monoglossia. Other common features include mentioning an event, usually 
at the beginning of the text, and the extended use of human agents associated with processes.  
Authorial judgment often takes place in a highly-charged tone. MCOP980047 constitutes a 
good example of this. The event triggering the editorial is a manifesto by 113 town councils 
in Catalonia announcing their decision not to display the Spanish flag on the “Catalan 
national day”. Most clauses feature the same institutional agent explicitly or implicitly (los 
ayuntamientos nacionalistas). Alternative voices are only allowed as quotes from the 
manifesto intended to expose a radical nationalist discourse to a unitarist readership. The 
entire text is colored by negative authorial judgment where the initiative is scoffed. The only 
occasion where positive judgment appears is when the nationalist campaign is contrasted 
with the attitude of “many other Catalan town councils” which exhibit the Spanish national 




Viernes, 28 de agosto de 1998   
IMPRESIONES  
Una «guerra de las banderas» de Gila [-ve social sanction: impropriety] 
Un total de 113 ayuntamientos, gobernados casi en su totalidad por partidos nacionalistas, han lanzado un 
manifiesto dirigido a todos los municipios de Cataluña para que el próximo 11 de septiembre, Diada 
Nacional de Catalunya, sólo ondee la senyera en las balconadas consistoriales. No es la primera vez que 
[los ayuntamientos nacionalistas] lo hacen. El texto de su manifiesto de este año afirma: «El hecho de 
poner sólo la bandera de Cataluña en el balcón del Ayuntamiento es una afirmación de nuestra 
catalanidad y, en caso contrario, es abonar un proyecto expansivo de la nación castellana, también 
llamada España». Pero [los ayuntamientos nacionalistas] lo reclaman sólo para el Onze de Setembre 
[-ve social sanction: impropriety]. ¿No condenan esos consistorios «el proyecto expansivo de la nación 
castellana, también llamada España», que «abonan» muchos Ayuntamientos catalanes -todos los 
más importantes- [+ve social esteem: appreciation] exhibiendo la bandera española... el resto del 
año?  
[los ayuntamientos nacionalistas] Convertir el nacionalismo político en un ejercicio de charanga y 
pandereta como éste resulta, en realidad, de lo más celtibérico [-ve social sanction: impropriety]. Se 
ve que los responsables de estos 113 ayuntamientos de Cataluña tienen mucho tiempo libre. [-ve social 
sanction: impropriety] 
 
The predominant voice in the second writing style is that of an “essayist”, characterized by 
no/minimal authorial inscribed social sanction, similar to the journalistic “reporter voice” or 
the “interpreter voice” found in history textbooks according to Martin and White (2005).  
Heteroglossia also prevails in this style together with the usual absence of events related with 
the article and the presence of abstract things as agents of processes instead of human agents, 
giving an impression of detachment and objectivity. The following extracts from 
PSOP050156 constitute a rather extreme example of this style. They bear remarkable 
resemblance to academic texts, including references to published authors: Álvarez Junco, 
Berger and Luckmann, Searle. Reasoning constitutes the basis of this text. The author puts 
forward a thesis, that of reality being a social construct mainly through language, and 
elaborates on this like in an essay. The only apparent shift in authorial voice comes when 
Zapatero is criticized for ignoring the differences in language contexts, academic versus legal, 
when the PM did not oppose the idea of Catalonia being called a nation in its Estatut. Even 
so, this proposition is conveniently hedged with expressions such as “parece ser ignorada” 
or “viene a afirmar”, thus reinforcing the heteroglossia in the text.  
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Palabras, contextos y realidad  
JOSÉ MARÍA RUIZ SOROA  
EL PAÍS - Opinión - 08-09-2005  
Nación, nacionalidad, comunidad nacional, región, catalán, valenciano, español, castellano, matrimonio, 
unión civil, y tantas otras palabras, no son sino los nombres que damos a las cosas, a la realidad. [ø] 
Discutir sobre su respectiva mejor o peor adecuación a esta última es tanto como recaer en la vieja 
querella nominalista tardoescolástica, una pérdida del tiempo, pues lo que importa (lo que existe) es la 
realidad, no el nombre que le damos. Esto nos decía hace poco el admirable historiador José Álvarez 
Junco como prólogo a sus reflexiones sobre el concepto de nación. Pero, ¿de verdad es esto así de 
sencillo?, ¿de verdad existe una realidad objetiva extralingüística más allá de las palabras, una realidad a 
la que éstas simplemente denotarían? Lo cierto es que no, por lo menos en el ámbito social, en el que la 
realidad se construye socialmente y no tiene una existencia objetiva independiente de los hombres 
(Berger y Luckmann). Las instituciones (el dinero, el Estado, la familia o el fútbol), aunque en ocasiones 
tienen un remoto soporte físico, son artefactos socialmente elaborados mediante convenciones soportadas 
por una intencionalidad colectiva. Y el meollo de esa elaboración social de la realidad es lingüístico; el 
lenguaje es el elemento que constituye esencialmente la realidad social, gracias al hecho de que las 
palabras son mecanismos simbólicos que por convención representan o significan algo que va más allá de 
ellas mismas.   Cierto, el lenguaje es él mismo también una institución social, pero posee una 
naturaleza muy especial: es la institución social básica presupuesta por todas las demás. Una sociedad 
puede poseer el lenguaje y no el matrimonio, la propiedad o el Estado. Pero [una sociedad] no puede 
poseer éstos si no posee el lenguaje (John R. Searle) […] 
Esta relevante diferencia entre contextos lingüísticos es la que parece ser ignorada por aquellos de 
nuestros políticos, y pienso ante todo en el presidente del Gobierno, que se refugian en el relativismo de 
los conceptos científicos (relativismo epistemológico) para declararse indiferentes ante su utilización 
legal (relativismo jurídico). Dado que el concepto de nación tiene contornos borrosos y discutidos en la 
teoría política (lo que es cierto), me declaro indiferente en cuanto a su uso normativo constitucional, viene 
a afirmar Rodríguez Zapatero. El nombre no tiene mayor importancia. Olvida nuestro hombre que la 
Constitución no es un tratado universitario, sino una norma, nada menos que la norma de normas. 
(PSOP050156) (“Palabras, contextos y realidad” by José María Ruiz Soroa). 
 
#Finding 3: The writing style featuring the commentator’s voice is the most common one in 
both newspapers, but significantly so in El Mundo Opinion.   
 
727 articles containing the expression “nación española” and the pattern “España […] 
nación” (5L-5R) from El Mundo and País Opinion were analyzed in terms of style.  
Articles predominantly written in the commentator voice appear to be more common in both 
newspapers but much more so in El Mundo Opinion, where they represent over 87% of the 
articles sampled. Comparatively, the essayist voice seems to be more extensively employed 
in El País Opinion: Over 34% of the articles examined tend to conform to this style 






   
 
 Writing styles in El Mundo vs. País Opinion 
 
I will re-examine these different styles when discussing some differences in the discourse of 
the two newspapers towards the end of this chapter. 
 
5.1. “Nación” and “España” in the Opinion corpus 
As we can see in tables 5.2 and 5.3 “Nación” and “España” have a similar distribution in 
both newspapers. “España” is the 30th and 32nd most common term in El País and Mundo 
Opinion while “Nación” occupies the 156th and 157th place. A low Log-likelihood score in 
both cases shows no significant differences in relation to keyness (“España” -0.35); 
“Nación” (-0.26) where p < 0.05; critical value = 3.84).  
 
Table 5.2. 
 No. of tokens % Tokens No. of texts % of texts 
El Mundo Opinion 2,845 0.058 1,445 17.71 
País Opinion 2,630 0.053 1,018 18.23 
 


















Table 5.3.  
 No. of tokens % Tokens No. of texts % of texts 
El Mundo Opinion 12,984 0.26 4,745 58.16 
País Opinion 11,927 0.26 3,971 71.36 
 
“España” in El Mundo & País Opinion 
 
Figures 5.4 and 5.5 illustrate the diachronic evolution of “Nación” and “España” between 
1996-2007. We can observe a sharp rise in the use of these terms in 2005. This is particularly 
the case with “Nación” which increases around 178% in El Mundo Opinion and 417% in El 
País Opinion, coinciding with the debate generated around the use of the term “Nación” in 
the Catalan Statute. This is followed by a decrease in the number of occurrences from 2006, 




Distribution of “Nación” in El Mundo and País Opinion over time 
 















































The trends in the use of “España” are similar to those of “Nación” although the changes are 
more gradual, particularly in El Mundo Opinion. This may be explained by the fact that 
“España” is a more general term than “Nación”, employed in a broader range of contexts. 
Therefore it is probably less affected by the time-bound initiative to use the term “Nación” 











Distribution of “España” in El Mundo and País Opinion over time 
 
Tables 5.4 and 5.5 show the most common collocates of “Nación” and “España” in El 
Mundo vs. País Opinion grouped according to semantic category and ordered according to 
raw frequency within each category, independently of whether these terms are widely used in 
just one newspaper or in both. Appendices 7 and 8 offer a more detailed comparison of these 
collocates. Generally speaking there is an unsurprising degree of overlap as well as 
complementarity in the collocational profiles for both terms. There is an additional category 
of collocates associated with the concepts of time and space in “España”. There are also 
occasional differences in some collocates associated with the different categories. 
 




































































Table 5.4.  
GEOGRAPHY nación española; España […] nación; Cataluña […] nación;  nación catalana; 
Catalunya […] nación; nación vasca; País Vasco […] nación; Euskadi […] 
nación; Euskal Herria […] nación; Andalucía […] nación; nación andaluza; 
Galicia […] nación; nación […] Europa; nación europea;  comunidad […] 
nación; nación […] comunidad; territorio […] nación; nación alemana 
CONCEPT término(s) […] nación; nación de naciones; Estado(s) […] nación; concepto(s) 
[…] nación; nación  […] nacionalidad(es); definición […] nación; nación sin 
Estado; palabra(s) nación; idea […] nación; concepción […] nación; nación 
[…] patria; dentro […] nación;  nación de ciudadanos; nación política; nación 
[…] nacional; nación […] sujeto (político/ de soberanía); propia[…] nación; 
carácter […] nación; nación cultural; denominación […] nación; nombre […] 
nación; nación […] región(es); pueblo(s) […] nación;  nación […] étnica; 
sentimiento […] nación; nación […] proyecto; expresión nación; distinción 
[…] nación; alma […] nación; nación cívica; nación sin cabeza; condición de 
nación; sentido […] nación; nación asociada  
QUALITIES  
 
Indisoluble […] nación; gran(de) nación; única nación; nación plural; nación 
[…] posible; una sola nación; nación democrática; nación […] indivisible; 
nación […] común; nueva nación; vieja nación; nación soberana; nación 
independiente; nación moderna; nación […] libre; nación […] antigua; pequeña 
nación; nación real; nación […] plurinacional; nación unida; nación plena 
ISSUES (Debate) Estado de la nación; unidad […] nación; nación […] Constitución; ; 
reconocimiento […] nación; nación […] soberanía; nación […] estatuto; 
construcción […] nación; existencia […] nación; nación […] preámbulo; 
símbolos […] nación; defensa […] nación; nación […] constitucional; lengua 
[…] nación; futuro […] nación; nación […] derecho(s); identidad […] nación; 
fin […] nación; liquidación […] nación; ensayos […] nación; supervivencia 
[…] nación; historia […] nación; discurso […] nación; nación […] libertad(es); 
nación […] régimen; vida […] nación; texto  […] nación; camino […] nación; 
fuerza […] nación; nación […] competencias;  nación […] financiación; 
nación […] artículo; voluntad […] nación; tiempo […] nación; independencia 
[…] nación; pertenencia […] nación; inclusión […] nación; afirmación […] 
nación; uso […] nación; nacimiento […] nación;  intereses […] nación; 
Estatut […] nación; integridad […] nación; tradición […] nación; nación […] 
igualdad; continuidad […] nación; tema […] nación; autogobierno […] nación; 
problema […] nación; representación […] nación; patriotismo […] nación; 
articulación […] nación 
PEOPLE &  
INSTITUTIONS  
 
Gobierno […] nación; presidente de la nación; parlamento de la nación; nación 
[…]  Zapatero; derecha […] nación; PP […] nación; nacionalistas […] 
nación; congreso […] nación; izquierda […] nación; ETA […] nación; 
instituciones […] nación; enemigos […] nación; nación […] rey; Maragall […] 
nación; comunidades autónomas […] nación 
PROCESSES 
(BEING) 
SER […] nación; hay […] nación; nación […] está; nación […] TENER; existe 
[…] nación; FORMAR […] nación; nación […] parece; constituye […] nación; 
nación […] resulta; nación […] implica; pertenecer […] nación 
PROCESSES 
(DOING) 
construir […] nación; defender […] nación;  nación […] PODER; hacer […] 
nación; nación […] debe; convertir […] nación; destruir […] nación; liquidar 
[…] nación; pretenden […] nación;  
PROCESSES 
(SAYING) 
DEFINIR […] nación; Nación […] DECIR; RECONOCER […] nación; 
nación […] llamada; HABLAR […] nación 
PROCESSES 
(SENSING) 
QUERER […] nación; nación […] ENTENDER; cree […] nación 
DEICTICS Nuestra nación; esa nación; esta nación; otra nación; toda nación; misma […] 
nación; aquella nación, tal nación; ninguna nación; cada nación; cualquier 
nación   
PARTITIVES Toda la nación; Conjunto […] nación; media nación; nación entera; resto de la 
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nación; mayoría de la nación 
 
“Nación” in El Mundo/ País Opinion: Main Categories of collocates 
 
 
Table 5.5.  
GEOGRAPHY Cataluña […] España; España […] Europa; España […] Francia; Vasco […] 
España; Euskadi […] España; lugares […] España; capital de España; Partes de 
España; España […] Marruecos 
CONCEPT Idea de España; España […] nación; España plural; España constitucional; 
España democrática; España de las autonomías; España autonómica; 
Anti-España; Reino de España; Palabra España; nombre de España; concepto 
[…] España; visión de España; España invertebrada; concepción de España; 
España federal; España oficial; España plurinacional; España eterna; España 
contemporánea; España real; España roja; España negra; España republicana; 
España imperial; España […] tierra 
QUALITIES  
 
nueva España; libre […] España; España […] gran; España moderna; vieja 
España; España fuerte; España […] diferente; España […] unida; España […] 
diversa; España […] abierta;  
ISSUES historia de España; unidad de España; futuro de España; pueblos de España; 
política/o […] España; territorial […] España; nacional […] España; 
problema(s) […] España; democracia […] España; ruptura […] España; 
proyecto […] España; realidad […] España; odio a España; Constitución […] 
España; intereses […] España; símbolo(s) […] España; histórica […] España; 
identidad […] España; España: Modelo de Estado; gobernabilidad de España; 
banderas de España; caso de España; España […] antiterrorista; España […] 
libertad; relaciones […] España; social […] España; España; relaciones […] 
España; liquidación de España; España: Referéndum; Balcanización de 
España; libertad […] España; peligro […] España; cohesión […] España; 
destrucción de España; defensa […] España; imagen […] España; modelo […] 
España; integridad […] España; paz […] España; estabilidad […] España; 
menos España; mapa de España; interés […] España;  terrorismo […] España; 
vida […]  internacional […] España; separación […] España; modernización 
[…] España; independencia […] España;  
PEOPLE &  
INSTITUTIONS  
 
Gobierno(s) de España; Banco de España; rey(es) de España; presidente […] 
España; España […] ETA; Partido […] España; PP […] España; España […] 
españoles; España […] Zapatero; España […] Aznar; derecha […] España; 
enemigos […] España; corona […] España; socialistas […] España; comunista 
[…] España; monarquía […] España; ciudadanos […] España; España […] 
PSOE; izquierda […] España;  
SPACE/TIME España […] hoy; España actual; Fuera de España; dentro de España; España 
[…] años; España […] siglo; España siempre; España tras; España después; 
España antes;  
PROCESSES 
(BEING) 
España […] SER; España como; España HABER; España […] ESTAR; 
España TENER; España va; España parece; España sigue 
PROCESSES 
(DOING) 
HACER […] España; gobernar […] España; defender […] España; romper 
España; destruir España; separarse de España; cierra España 
PROCESSES 
(SAYING) 
LLAMAR España; DECIR […] España; hablar […] España  
PROCESSES 
(SENSING) 
ODIAR a España; QUERER […] España; ver […] España; CREER […] 
España; España […] sabe; ENTENDER España; duele España 
DEICTICS esta España; esa España; otra España; aquella España; nuestra […] España; 
propia España 
PARTITIVES Resto de España; toda España; una España, media España; conjunto de España; 
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parte de España; España entera; mayoría […] España 
 
“España” in El Mundo/ País Opinion: Main Categories of collocates 
 
As in the News corpus, the collocational profiles “Nación” and “España” in El Mundo and 
País Opinion reflect the same negotiation on the issue of nationhood resulting from the 
claims about the various emerging nations, mainly Catalonia and the Basque Country, versus 
the established nation of Spain. The high frecuency of some phrasal patterns under the 
categories of “Concept” and “Quality” like “Nación de naciones”, “España plurinacional”, 
“España federal”, “Estado-nación”, “nación y/o nacionalidad(es)”, “Nación sin Estado”, 
“Nación española, patria común […], “Nación política”, “Nación cultural”, “Nación de 
ciudadanos [libres e iguales]”, “nación [española como] sujeto político/de soberanía”, 
“Pueblo […] nación”, “[Nación] concepto discutido y discutible”, “Nación étnica”, 
“Propia nación”, “Única nación”, “Nación plural” or “España plural” are a direct 
consequence of this discursive negotiation. This is also the case with other common 
collocates belonging to the same category of “Concept” such as “Término(s)”, 
“Concepto(s)”, “Definición”, “Palabra”, “Idea” or “Concepción”, “Visión”, etc. as the 
examples below illustrate: 
Las omisiones de Benach cuadran con el «camino sin retorno hacia una nación plena» que quiere iniciar. 
La idea de «nación plena» es incompatible con la Constitución, que reconoce una nación, la española, y 
varias nacionalidades y regiones, entre ellas Cataluña. (MCOP030007) (“Ahora Cataluña”, by Justino 
Sinova) 
 
En tal sentido, pues, la palabra nación utilizada en el artículo 2 de la Constitución Española significa sin 
ambages dos cosas y nada más que dos: por una parte, que sólo hay una nación, la española, que es 
indivisible, y que es la patria común de todos los españoles. Y, por otra, que no obstante se trata de una 
nación plural o compuesta, formada por nacionalidades y regiones, pero no es una nación de naciones ni 
nos hallamos ante un Estado plurinacional.  (MSOP040138) (“La deconstrucción constitucional” by 
Jorge de Esteban) 
 
Si se acepta liberalmente esta redacción, el término nación aplicado a Cataluña, Euskadi y Galicia no 
debería asustar a nadie con la sospecha que tras ese término subyace la voluntad de crear otro Estado. 
Porque las mismas razones existen para abrigar esa sospecha con el término nacionalidad, ya que 
nacionalidad se diferencia de nación en que esta acepción suele aplicarse a las naciones que son a la vez 




The remaining categories of collocates also replicate many of the patterns already discussed 
in the News corpus. The category of “Participants” includes collocates referring to 
institutions, organizations or individuals mentioned in connection with “Nación” such as 
“Gobierno”, “Presidente”, “Banco”, “Rey(es)”, “Parlamento”, “Zapatero”, “La derecha”, 
“Congreso”, “ETA”, etc., the most common phrases being “gobierno de España”, 
“gobierno de la nación”, and “presidente del gobierno de la nación”. The category of 
“Processes” includes verb collocates where processes of “being”, especially “SER” and 
“HABER”, dominate, followed by Processes of “doing” and “saying” with collocates like 
“Construir”, “HACER”, “gobernar”, “RECONOCER” or “DEFINIR”. The most common 
collocates of “Nación” in the category of “Issues” are “Estado” and “Debate”, both 
appearing in the phrase “Debate del/sobre el estado de la Nación”. “Historia” is the most 
common collocate of “España” in this category. Other frequent collocates like “Unidad”, 
“Reconocimiento”, “Soberanía”, “Derecho”, “Lengua”, “Identidad”, “Pertenencia”, 
“Inclusión”, “Afirmación”, “Modelo”, “Separación” or “Independencia”  are usually 
connected with competing national claims, while “Constitución”, “Estatuto”, “Preámbulo” 
or “Constitucional” usually refer to the sources where these claims are stated: 
El líder del PP sigue clamando que hablar de Cataluña como nación es reconocerle carácter de Estado 
soberano, pero ocurre que en el Estatuto anterior y en el nuevo no se habla para nada del Estado nación ni 
de soberanía, sino de nacionalidad, término empleado tanto en el artículo 2 de la Constitución como en el 
primero del Estatuto de 1979 y que todos los constituyentes y la doctrina constitucional al completo 
consideraron sinónimo del de nación. (PCOP060040) (“Del Estatuto catalán al vasco” by J.A. González 
Casanova) 
 
En términos políticos, la banda obsequia a ZP una holgada mayoría en las urnas, a cambio de lo cual 
obtiene por vía indirecta el reconocimiento implícito de que Euskadi, al igual que Cataluña, es una nación 
con derecho a constituirse en Estado cuando lo considere oportuno.  (MEOP050126) (“El precio de la 
tregua” by Isabel San Sebastián) 
 
More significantly, a group of collocates under the categories of “Issues” and “Processes of 
Doing” are employed to colour the discourse of the Spanish nation with an aura of weakness 
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(i.e. “problema(s)”, “cohesión”) or to convey the idea of the Spanish nation being under 
threat by the emergence of the Catalan and Basque nations and the deeds of those people 
actively promoting these rising constructs or even tolerating them: “Defensa”, “Defender”, 
“Futuro”, “Fin”, “Liquidación”, “Liquidar”, “Supervivencia”, “Integridad”, 
“Continuidad” and “Destruir”, “Ruptura”, “Odio”, “Balcanización”, “Peligro”, 
“Destrucción”. This threat theme is practically non-existent in the phraseology of El País 
Opinion, where the possibility of threat is occasionally minimized or even flatly denied. 
Incidentally, the idea of the Spanish nation being under threat is seldom conveyed in Mundo 
News, to the point of not being an issue worth mentioning there. This will be discussed in 
detail later on in this chapter. 
 
The category of “Deictics” includes determiners and pronominal forms used to refer to 
“Nación”. The most common phrases found are “nuestra nación”, “esta nación”, “esa 
nación” and “otra nación”. The last category of collocates is that of “Partitives” with 
phrases such as “toda la nación”, “conjunto de la nación”, “media nación” or “la nación 
entera”. 
 
5.2. Stance in the discourses of “Nación española” in El Mundo and País Opinion 
 
#Finding 4: The Unitarist/Pluralist stances observed in the discourses of El Mundo and País 
News are clearly confirmed in the Opinion corpus.  
 
This is evidenced at various levels of analysis, no matter whether we compare whole texts, 
phraseology or even grammar. This arguably reinforces the importance of multi-level 
analysis because discrepancies in the frequency of some key phrases alone may not always 
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be linked to differences in stance, although it often is. The stances of El Mundo and País 
Opinion in relation with the Spanish nation were analysed by examining a sample of 727 
articles containing a total of 560 occurrences of “nación española” and 449 cases of the 
pattern “España […] nación”, including phrases such as “España como (una) nación”, 
“España (no) es una nación […]” among others. The results clearly confirm the trends seen 
in the News corpus with roughly 90% of the articles in El Mundo Opinion adhering to 
Unitarism and around 70% of articles in El País Opinion showing a pluralist stance (figures 
5.6 and 5.7).  
Figure 5.6.  
 
Stance El Mundo vs. País Opinion, articles “nación española” 
  
  



















































 Stance El Mundo vs. País Opinion, articles “España […] nación” 
 
Likewise, the phraseologies of El Mundo and País Opinion also reflect this Unitarist/Pluralist 
distinction, in spite of some discrepancies in the frequencies of some key phrases. Table 5.6 
shows common phrases ordered according to log-likelihood scores. Critical values higher 
than 3.84 (p < 0.05) are considered statistically significant for the purposes of this study. 
  
Table 5.6.  
El Mundo Opinion MI L-L El País Opinion MI 
Estado-nación (37) 5.651 -35.36 Estado-nación (99) 6.154 
Nación política (9) 2.256 -24.16 Nación política (40) 3.628 
Nación cultural (5) 5.149 -21.03 Nación cultural (29) 6.637 
Nación real (0) NA -19.25 Nación real (13) 4.749 
Nación de naciones (67) 8.155 -15.98 Nación de naciones (112) 8.306 
Nación española (334) 7.694 +12.17 Nación española (226) 7.051 
Única nación (21) 6.028 +4.90 Única nación (8) 5.569 
Nación única (6) 6.028 -1.41 Nación única (10) 5.569 
España como (una) nación (50) 5.015 -0.92 España como (una) nación (55) 4.927 
España […] es una nación  […] 
(44) 




Comparative frequencies of common phrases in El Mundo vs. País Opinion 

























































 “Nación de naciones” (-15.98), a pluralist notion, is unsurprisingly far more common in El 
País Opinion. Also “nación política (-24.16) and “nación cultural” (-21.03) which tend to 
be employed in this newspaper to categorize the various nations it recognizes according to 
Meinecke’s old distinction, as we will see later on (Meinecke, 1970). Phrases such as 
“nación española” (+12.17) and “única nación” (+4.90) are typical of the unitarist discourse 
whereas “nación única” (-1.41) is slightly more common in El País Opinion. This difference 
reflects a key distinction in Spanish grammar between descriptive adjectives (epithets) and 
classifying ones: As the following examples illustrate, única before the head noun functions 
as an epithet because it does not qualify nación in order to differentiate it from others. Rather, 
it attaches an unsurprising epithet to nación confirming its expected uniqueness. The 
opposite occurs when única is placed after nación thus acknowledging the existence of 
several nations in Spain:  
El nacionalismo vasco plantea, con el plan Ibarretxe, la creación de un Estado-nación asociado a lo que 
quede de España y el nacionalismo catalán trabaja para que se acepte la existencia de la nación catalana, 
significativo paso para la independencia con que sueña Carod-Rovira. Esto lo ve un ciego pero Zapatero 
no concibe preocupación alguna. Debe leer el artículo 2 de la Constitución, en el que se hallan estos dos 
enunciados: «indisoluble unidad de la Nación española» y «nacionalidades y regiones que la integran». O 
sea, que la nación en España es una (y la ley la cita con mayúscula) y las nacionalidades son componentes 
de la única nación.  (MSOP040132) (“Jugando con fuego”, by Justino Sinova) 
 
Si lo que se quiere es que el Estado español se autodefina constitucionalmente como Estado plurinacional, 
la reforma es imprescindible porque la Constitución actual no se fundamenta en la existencia de una 
pluralidad de naciones, sino de una nación única dentro de la que existen nacionalidades y regiones. 
Como la diferencia entre nacionalidad y nación se basa en argumentos siempre discutibles, hace tiempo 
que muchos hemos aceptado una idea de España como nación de naciones, pero en esa idea España no 
deja de ser una nación que engloba a las demás, ni, de otra parte, la confluencia de las distintas sociedades 
nacionales en un solo Estado tendría explicación racional si entre ellas no hubiese algún tipo de unidad 
previa.  (PSOP980132) (“La reforma de la Constitución”, by Francisco Rubio Llorente) 
 
The unusually higher frequency of “Estado-Nación” in El País Opinion (-35.36) deserves 
special attention. Both newspapers normally use this concept in general terms or with 
specific reference to Spain. Those rare references to Catalonia and Euskadi as “Estados 
Nación” are always constructed as nationalist aspirations rather than facts and usually have 
negative connotations independently of the authors’ pluralist or unitarist ideology. A closer 
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look at the significantly more frequent use of “Estado-Nación” in El País Opinion reveals 
that both the general concept of Nation-State and the Spanish Nation-State are often 
perceived as problematic. This is accomplished by means of three related topoi: One consists 
in presenting the Spanish Nation-State as inherently weak due to deficient nation-building 
throughout history. In a second topos, the Nation-State is considered an obstacle to a 
peaceful solution of the Spanish national problem. Thirdly, there is a tendency to consider 
the general concept of Nation-State as something outdated and increasingly irrelevant in a 
post-national world.  
 
By problematizing the concept of Nation-State, El País Opinion not only tends to adhere to a 
post-national view of Spain and the world as a whole but it also advances its pluralist agenda 
because a diluted post-modern Spanish Nation-State leaves room for the recognition of the 
various national identities present in the Spanish society and thus may lead to a peaceful 
resolution of the Spanish national problem, provided that the aspirations of the newly 
emerging nations to statehood are kept at bay. The following extracts illustrate the discourse 
of El País Opinion in connection with this idea of the Nation-State. PSOP980042 stresses the 
weak economic, cultural and political foundations of the Spanish Nation-State. PSOP070204 
attacks the Spanish nationalism of the PP and the Foro de Ermua and wonders whether 
Spain can eventually accept “a post-national government” where citizens may eventually 
“emancipate from an old and frustrating Nation-State like Spain”. PSOP060044 criticizes the 
concept of Nation-State calling it “harmful lie” and “Jacobin invention” which “caused 
millions of deaths in the 20
th
 century” and then attacks the Popular Party’s nationalist 
discourse in connection with the Catalan Statute. PSOP960066 explains how the pluralist 
notion of “nación de naciones” adequately reflects Spain’s weaknesses with respect to 
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nation-building resulting in the various unfinished national projects. The conclusion is that 
we should assume this pluralism as a good starting point for a peaceful solution to the 
Spanish national problem in spite of the tensions and uncompromising attitudes it provokes.  
Eso no significa ignorar el esfuerzo modernizador del ochocientos, pero tampoco cabe infravalorar los 
estrangulamientos económicos, culturales y a la postre políticos, que gravitan sobre la construcción del 
Estado-nación en la España del siglo pasado. Son ésos precisamente los que afloran en la crisis del 98, 
aunque nada esencial cambie después de la misma en la superficie. Ningún Estado de la Europa 
centro-occidental pasa por una crisis de identidad como la que afecta desde entones -y hasta hoy, 
subrayado- España. En ninguno fracasan e modo tan evidente, lo que se hace visible bajo Cánovas, los 
mecanismos de integración económica, política y cultural que en España se ponen en marcha siguiendo el 
patrón francés. Y en ninguno, como consecuencia de la forma que asume el desastre colonial, los 
fenómenos de militarismo y antimilitarismo con más activos, también hasta la fecha. (PSOP980042) 
(“Crisis de imperio”, by Antonio Elorza) 
 
Un Gobierno posnacional  
JOSEP RAMONEDA  
EL PAÍS  -  España - 08-02-2007  
El pasado lunes, EL PAÍS publicaba los dos rostros de las dos manifestaciones de respuesta al atentado de 
la T-4. La primera, la de los ecuatorianos y de los sindicatos, secundada por la mayoría de fuerzas 
políticas, era una ordenada exhibición, en la que sólo lucían pancartas estrictamente ajustadas a los 
eslóganes pactados. La segunda, la del Foro Ermua y de la derecha, era un mar de banderas rojigualdas. 
En mi condición de periférico y agnóstico en materia de fe nacionalista -venga de donde venga- mi 
empatía estaba, por supuesto, con la primera manifestación. Pero, por un momento, me imaginé a 
Zapatero contemplando estas imágenes. Intenté ponerme en su lugar y pensé que me resultaría inevitable 
un punto de preocupación: ¿a estas alturas de la historia, es posible que el grado de emancipación de los 
ciudadanos de un viejo y frustrante Estado-nación como España sea ya tan alto que un presidente pueda 
ganar las elecciones con los emblemas nacionales en manos de la oposición? ¿Es el Gobierno de Zapatero 
el primer Gobierno posnacional de la historia? Me gustaría poder confundir mis deseos con la realidad y 
poder contestar que sí. Pero tengo mis dudas. Sería realmente muy sano que la ciudadanía española 
demostrara con sus votos que está más allá de himnos y banderas. Lo cual haría todavía más absurdo 
tener a la séptima potencia mundial encallada en un debate de patrias y territorios, propio del siglo XIX. 
Y, sin embargo, me temo que o Zapatero recupera las banderas o tendrá problemas. En cualquier caso, el 
Partido Popular está convencido de ello. (PSOP070204) (“Un gobierno posnacional”, by Josep 
Ramoneda) 
 
Nada puede ser más nefasto que confundir la idea del "Estado", una comunidad de ciudadanos libres, 
iguales en derechos y en deberes, ligados al gobierno por un pacto social que se renueva en cada votación 
general, con la de la "nación", un concepto de identidad cultural que ninguna ley -ni constitución, ni 
estatuto- puede imponer o prohibir, porque pertenece al dominio de la conciencia. 
Esa dañina mentira que es el "Estado-nación", una invención jacobina que sirvió en el siglo XIX para 
completar el proceso de homogeneización de algunos Estados que llevaban ya siglos por este camino, ha 
originado en la Europa del siglo XX millones de muertos y procesos monstruosos de limpieza étnica, que 
han implicado el desplazamiento de grandes masas de población. 
Hay en el mundo actual unos 200 Estados y más de 2.000 etnias y nacionalidades. Empeñarse en esta 
malsana identificación entre el Estado y la nación podría conducir o a 2.000 guerras de independencia, 
con muchos millones de muertos, o a 2.000 actos de asimilación forzada y de genocidio cultural, no 
menos condenables. La única salida racional de una situación semejante es la del Estado plurinacional 
que garantice la convivencia en paz y tolerancia de etnias y naciones. […] 
Nada puede ser más peligroso que remover imprudentemente, como está haciendo en la actualidad el PP, 
un complejo mal definido de sentimientos, más que de ideas, nacionalistas, que la propia voluntad de 
confusión ha llevado a que nunca se clarifiquen adecuadamente. (PSOP060044) (“El Partido Popular y la 




Cuando hablamos de "nación de naciones" en España nos estamos refiriendo precisamente a ese 
encabalgamiento de varios procesos de construcción nacional en torno al dato central de los bloqueos que 
a lo largo del siglo XIX afectan a la consolidación del Estado-nación español. Los antecedentes políticos 
de éste coincidían, en calidad de first comer, con otras monarquías de agregación de Europa' occidental, 
tales como Francia o Inglaterra. Pero sobre esa orientación de signo unitario se acumulan a lo largo del 
siglo XIX los elementos negativos, con el telón de fondo del atraso y de la desagregación que marcan el 
tránsito del Antiguo Régimen a la España liberal. La tardía constitución de un débil mercado nacional y 
una industrialización focalizada, una centralización política que recoge los efectos negativos del atraso, 
un sistema educativo insuficiente que mantiene altas tasas de analfabetismo y evita la imposición del 
idioma nacional sobre los periféricos, son factores que dejan maltrecho el intento de reproducir el modelo 
francés. Además, por un azar histórico, y a excepción de Galicia, las regiones que experimentan un 
proceso de modernización económica coinciden con las que poseen rasgos culturales y antecedentes 
políticos propios. 
El resultado no es un Estado estrictamente plurinacional, porque España es mucho más que un aparato 
estatal bajo el que se encuentran las auténticas naciones, y cabe, en consecuencia, hablar de un 
nacionalismo español con la misma legitimidad que de un nacionalismo vasco, incluso aplicado el 
término a muchos ciudadanos de Euskadi. Pero tampoco es un Estado-nación unitario donde catalanes, 
gallegos y vascos hayan sido reducidos a la condición de lo que Engels denominaba Völkerruinen, ruinas 
de pueblos, destinadas a desaparecer a corto plazo de la escena europea. Los dos procesos, el de la 
frustrada construcción nacional española y el de la construcción nacional de los pueblos periféricos, se 
encuentran imbricados. "Nación de naciones" no es mala expresión para designar esa peculiar situación 
de formaciones nacionales coincidentes en torno a una principal que ha registrado estrangulamientos 
fundamentales para su desarrollo. Esto genera, indudablemente, tensiones e intransigencias, pero 
precisamente para resolver unas y otras está el sistema democrático. Francia, Italia o Inglaterra no tienen 
este problema, nosotros sí. Hay que asumirlo y buscar soluciones. (PSOP960066) (“El discreto encanto 
de la burguesía”, by Antonio Elorza) 
 
Although El Mundo Opinion reflects some pluralist views similar to those in El País in 
around 20% of the articles containing the term “Estado-Nación”, over 62% of its articles still 
adhere to strict unitarist principles where the Spanish Nation-State is staunchly defended 
against alternative national constructs, always negatively presented in this unitarist discourse. 
Some articles acknowledge the ideas of a historically weak Spanish nation-building (i.e. 
MSOP070371) or the crisis of the current Nation-State model in an increasingly globalized 
world (i.e. MSOP980051, MSOP990069, MCOP070074), but the conclusions usually put 
forward here do not subscribe to El País’s pluralist agenda. Instead, they tend to portray the 
Spanish Nation-State as something which should be defended from the threats of Catalan and 
Basque nationalism as well as from its own internal weaknesses. For instance, MSOP050045 
supports the “utopia of a United States of Europe” and yet uses the metaphor of “a home 
where people are about to bring down its master walls” to refer to Spain, labelled “the most 
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ancient Nation-State in the old Europe”. MSOP050057 warns us about “Spain’s possible 
balkanization” in the face of a constitutional reform where the so-called “nations without 
State” in Spain take for granted the “long term decline of the Nation-State model” for their 
own spurious motives and provoke an introspective mood within Spain at a time when we 
should all be looking outwards. MCOP050202 warns us against “a Catalan Statute which 
destroys Spain and founds a new Nation-State purporting to be the metropolis of what is left 
from Spain”: 
España, por el contrario, es el Estado-nación más antiguo de la vieja Europa y el que se ha 
descentralizado más honda y aceleradamente. Acabamos de refrendar un proyecto de Constitución 
Europea (los primeros) porque queremos caminar hacia la utopía de unos EEUU de Europa, al tiempo que 
en casa parece que estamos por tirar los tabiques de carga, dañando la estructura del edificio. 
(MSOP050045) (“Contra el Estado federal”, by Martín Prieto) 
 
Siempre que se habla de reforma de la Constitución, o que se dibuja la idea de una confederación de 
naciones, no puedo evitar el recuerdo de esa anécdota. Sobre todo teniendo en cuenta el desenlace de ese 
estupendo proyecto -yugoslavo- cuyas virtudes ponderaba, con gran regocijo, ese prócer nacionalista 
catalán tan perspicaz. 
Algún medio norteamericano de la prensa señala estos días, con no disimulada complacencia, la posible 
balcanización de España. Y el carácter de bomba de relojería que puede poseer una España en proceso de 
balcanización respecto al proyecto europeo. 
Muchos nos preguntamos: ¿por qué ahora, justamente ahora, se plantea con tal virulencia algo a todas 
luces innecesario: la reforma de la Constitución? Está claro que es la cita europea lo que determina esa 
nerviosa urgencia. Se teme que la Europa que se constituya lo sea de estados-nación, y que allí no tengan 
lugar alguno las llamadas naciones sin Estado. Se da por sentado el declive del Estado-nación, en grave e 
irresponsable confusión de una tendencia a largo plazo, y de lenta erosión, que puede dar lugar a 
importantes reflexiones de filosofía política, y una realidad que se halle al alcance de la mano, y que 
puede generar opciones en el ámbito de la política real. 
Con todo lo cual se desvía lo que en estos momentos se debiera estar discutiendo aquí en España, como 
sucede en Francia, en Alemania, en Suecia, en Dinamarca o en Italia: la Constitución Europea. Una vez 
más, España se encierra, en momentos decisivos, en esas tétricas introspecciones que evocan precedentes 
funestos.  (MSOP050057) (“Defensa de las nacionalidades históricas”, by Eugenio Trías) 
 
Dicen los sicarios de Montilla que estamos contra ese Estatuto que supone la liquidación del régimen 
constitucional español. Bueno, ¿y qué? ¿No tenemos derecho a estarlo? Casi toda España lo está, 
empezando por Córdoba, de la que renegó Montilla. Ese Estatuto destruye España, hunde la solidaridad, 
destruye el mercado único y funda de hecho un nuevo Estado-nación que se pretende metrópoli del resto 
de España.  (MCOP050202) (“Montilla, dimite”, by Federico Jiménez Losantos) 
 
The last piece of evidence concerning the differences in stance between both newspapers 
comes from the analysis of “nación española”, a term unusually more common in El Mundo 
Opinion as the +12.17 L-L score shows. This expression typically appears in three main 
positions in both sub-corpora: (i) embedded in a NP functioning as a modifier, (ii) in subject 
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position or (iii) as part of a VP, normally functioning as an object. There are also a few cases 
of “Nación española” in appositional structures or in NPs where the phrase is post-modified 
by another NP preceded by the conjunction “como”. The use of qualifying adjectives is fairly 
rare. The analysis of “Nación española” post-modifying an NP reveals a number of themes 
associated with this concept while the analysis of this phrase associated with verbs illustrates 
a number of processes in which the Spanish nation is a participant, either its agent or its 
recipient. Finally, appositional structures and phrases of the type “Nación española como…” 
contain paraphrases that explain the concept of “Spanish nation” much like definitions that 
employ copulative verbs such as “es” or “se define”.  Table 5.7 shows the different lexical 
realizations of NP + Spanish Nation in both newspapers. As we can see, this is the most 
common position of “nación española” in both sub-corpora, with 56.15% of cases in El 
Mundo and 53.81 cases in El País.  
 
Table 5.7. 
PHRASE El Mundo 
Opinion (hits) 
% total hits El País 
Opinion 
(Hits) 
% total hits 
NP+ de la nación española 155 46.54 83 37.21 
NP+ a la nación española 16 4.80 8 3.58 
NP+ de nación española 6 1.80 13 5.57 
NP+ una nación española 0 0.00 12 5.38 
NP+ prep + la nación 
española 
10 3.00 4 1.79 
TOTAL 187 56.15 120 53.81 
 
“Nación española” in complex NPs 
 
Interestingly, the pattern featuring the indefinite article “NP+ una nación española” does not 
exist in El Mundo Opinion but it represents 5.38% of the occurrences of “Spanish nation” 
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embedded in an NP in El País Opinion. This constitutes further evidence of the latter’s 
pluralism because one of the referential functions of the indefinite article is to encode nouns 
as “non-unique”. A closer examination of the concordances partly confirms this idea and 
reveals another interesting use of the indefinite article in encoding the Spanish nation, 
namely the possibility of presenting it as something hypothetical that cannot be taken for 
granted:  
Con independencia de la actitud política de cada cual, parece claro que no se puede describir a Cataluña, 
Galicia o el País Vasco como meras subunidades de una nación española que, tomada en este sentido 
primario, no existe como referente nacional común de todos los ciudadanos. El uso secundario de nación 
española es el que considera a. España como una "nación de naciones", concepto que pretende: incorporar 
a todos los ciudadanos del Estado independientemente de cuál sea su afinidad nacional dominante a nivel 
primario. (PSOP960008) (“¿Nación de naciones?”,  by Ferrán Requejo) 
 
Los no nacionalistas carecemos de argumentos cuando nos empeñamos en razonar con los nacionalistas 
en su terreno que es fundamentalmente sentimental y solemos resultar contradictorios y hasta algo 
ridículos. Así, por ejemplo, el intento de imponer como más deseable una nación española (con inclusión 
de Euskadi) al independentismo vasco suele correr paralelo a la afirmación de que los nacionalismos son 
"algo trasnochado".  (PSOP990008) (“¿Por qué lleva la iniciativa el nacionalismo?”,  by Ramón 
Cotarelo). 
 
The single most frequent phrase associated to “nación española” is “unidad de la nación 
española”, often modified by the adjective “indisoluble” and post-modified by the phrase 
“patria común e indivisible de todos los españoles” (in 7 out of 8 cases). “Unidad de la 
nación española” roughly represents 13% of the occurrences of “Spanish nation” in both El 
Mundo and País Opinion. The origin of this phrase can be traced to Article 2 of the Spanish 
Constitution:  
La Constitución se fundamenta en la indisoluble unidad de la Nación española, patria común e indivisible 
de todos los españoles, y reconoce y garantiza el derecho a la autonomía de las nacionalidades y regiones 
que la integran y la solidaridad entre todas ellas.
142
 
(The Constitution is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation, common and indivisible 
fatherland of all Spaniards and it recognizes and guarantees the right to autonomy of the nationalities and 
regions that integrate (the Spanish Nation) as well as the solidarity among all).  
 
As stressed in chapter 3, the Spanish Constitution distinguishes between “nationalities” and 
“regions” but it does not name or define them. This ambiguity in the Constitution leaves 
                                                 
142
 http://narros.congreso.es/constitucion/constitucion/indice/index.htm (retrieved on 1-7-12).  
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room for negotiation along the unitarist and pluralist lines, as these two quotations illustrate: 
Fancelli argues in PCOP050158 that the term “nacionalidad”, used in the Spanish 
Constitution to describe some of the territories integrated in Spain in addition to “regions” 
cannot be explained according to the way dictionaries define “nacionalidad” (an “attribute” 
or an abstract condition rather than a concrete noun). However, the inclusion of the phrase 
“nacionalidades y regiones” in the Constitution can be explained from the point of view of 
an encyclopaedia: The historical division between Spanish, Basque and Catalan nationalism 
had resurfaced once again when the Constitution was being drafted. The military could not 
accept the Basque and Catalan nationalist proposal of Spain being composed of “nations and 
regions” and so, the term “nacionalidades” was created to secure a way forward in this 
dispute. However, the political situation in Spain has changed and the army no longer 
represents a threat. And yet, people still seem scared of calling Catalonia “a nation” and 
Spain “a nation of nations”, Fancelli wonders. He concludes by saying that “a nation of 
nations” may constitute a tautology according to the dictionary, but not according to the 
encyclopaedia.  
Volvamos un momento a los fundamentos de derecho que la Constitución se otorga. Afirma basarse en 
"la indisoluble unidad de la Nación española", pero a la vez reconoce "la autonomía de las nacionalidades 
y regiones". De nuevo el diccionario nos deja en la estacada: por "nacionalidad" no registra más que 
"condición y carácter peculiar de los pueblos y habitantes de una nación". Es decir, estamos ante un 
atributo que nuestro texto normativo convierte en substantivo, contra toda norma sintáctica y semántica. 
¿Cómo es eso posible? El diccionario no puede explicarlo y no lo registra: está fuera de sus normas, al 
menos hasta tanto no decida incorporarlo como neologismo. En cambio, la enciclopedia política registra 
que en 1977 en este país se estaba elaborando con penas y fatigas una carta a satisfacción de sectores 
duramente enfrentados. Y que buena parte de los militares, que en 1981 llegarían a dar un golpe de 
Estado, no tragaban con la pretensión nacionalista de que España fuera definida como un conjunto de 
naciones y regiones autónomas. De modo que Adolfo Suárez, a la sazón presidente del Gobierno, llamó a 
Miquel Roca, ponente nacionalista de la Constitución, y acordaron salvar el temible escollo -detrás había 
espadones en alto, poca broma- dejando la cosa en "nacionalidades". También así se construye la lengua, 
aunque el diccionario no lo admita. Han pasado casi 30 años y el contexto ha cambiado radicalmente. Los 
militares se dedican mayormente a tareas solidarias en el marco europeo y no existe más presión que la 
política en una democracia normalmente construida. Pero parece que todavía asusta que Cataluña se 
nombre a sí misma como nación y que también lo haga España, que en este caso pasaría a denominarse 
una "nación de naciones" (y regiones). Desde luego, el diccionario se limitará a subrayar la tautología y 
ahí te las compongas. Estos días ha surgido ya, como ejemplo para ridiculizar la fórmula, la expresión 
"bicicleta de bicicletas". ¿Alguien en su sano juicio se atrevería a utilizarla? Bueno, el diccionario no, ya 
se ha dicho, pero la enciclopedia lo hace con absoluta tranquilidad. (PCOP050158) (“La nación, entre el 




Robles-Piquer, a former politician from the centre-right Popular Party, argues that the 
authors of the Constitution used the term “nationality” in a novel way143 (i.e. “correcting the 
dictionary”) to satisfy those (nationalists) who were not happy with something as honourable 
as being part of a Spanish region. He further argues that this proved a serious (linguistic) 
licence, made in order to guarantee a consensus, which can only be understood if we 
acknowledge the fact of the “indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation”. He then introduces 
the threat theme and identifies several threat agents, observing how this unity is neglected by 
“third-world nationalist demands supported by “terror” in the Basque Country, also shown in 
Ibarretxe’s separatist Plan. The paragraph concludes with an attack to the president of the 
Catalan Government for applauding the Catalan pro-independence flag. 
 
[…] Los constituyentes del 78 creyeron conveniente corregir el diccionario y la sustantivó, sin duda para 
complacer a quienes no se contentaban con algo tan honroso como ser parte de una región española y 
aducían títulos históricos que, aunque resulte increíble, negaban así a tierras tan cargadas de siglos como 
Aragón, Castilla o Andalucía, por ejemplo. Fue, ésta, una licencia grave cometida en aras del consenso y 
que sólo se entiende sobre la base del reconocimiento expreso y pleno, en la propia Constitución, de "la 
indisoluble unidad de la Nación española, patria común e indivisible de todos los españoles". Todo ello lo 
olvida la lacrimosa reivindicación tercermundista que el terror apoya en el País Vasco y que se expresa en 
el plan separatista del presidente del Gobierno autónomo vasco y en los aplausos a las banderas 
independentistas del presidente del Gobierno autónomo catalán. (PSOP040127) (“Palabras 
presidenciales”, by Carlos Robles Piquer) 
 
Once again, El Mundo’s stance is overwhelmingly unitarist whereas the differences between 
unitarism and pluralism in El País are not so sharp this time. This is not surprising, given that 
we are now dealing with articles featuring the phrase “(indissoluble) unity of the Spanish 
nation”, where one can reasonably expect a favourable stance. 
  
                                                 
143
 He mistakenly calls it “nominalization” when in reality it means using the term “nationality” in a concrete 
way, to refer to some territories, instead of using it to refer to the condition associated with the membership to a 




Table 5.8.  
 
 EL MUNDO OPINION EL PAÍS OPINION 
No. of articles (“unidad de la 
nación española”) 
37 24* 
Unitarist Stance 34 (91.89%) 11 (44%) 
Pluralist Stance 2 (5.40%) 12 (48%) 
Non-specified Stance 1 2 
 
*one article in El País presents multiple stances because it summarizes the opinions of experts from a wide 
ideological spectrum on the possible unconstitutionality of the new “Catalan Estatut”. 
 
Unitarism vs. Pluralism in “unidad de la nación española” 
 
91.89% of the articles in El Mundo Opinion present a unitarist stance whereas the position in 
El País Opinion is quite evenly spread between Unitarism and Pluralism with 44% of articles 
subscribing the former and 48% the latter. The year of publication of the articles and the 
themes explicitly mentioned there as leitmotiv also offer interesting clues on the conditions 
of production and reception, helping us contextualize the use of the phrase “indissoluble 
unity of the Spanish nation […]” in relation with the main events marking the political 
agenda in  Spain during these years. Thirty out of thirty-seven articles containing this 
phrase were published between 2004-2006 in El Mundo, which represents 81.08% of the 
total number of articles. In the case of El País, the number of articles published in the same 
period is 12 (50% of all the articles). The Catalan Statute is a key topic related with the 
phrase “(indissoluble) unity of the Spanish nation” in both El Mundo and El País while the 
Andalusian Statute also features quite prominently in El Mundo, but not in El País. This 
contributes to the unitarist argument developed in El Mundo by arguing that if more 
concessions are granted to the Catalans, demands from other regions will follow suit and this 
will in turn trigger further demands from the nationalists on the periphery. Those articles that 
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adopt a pluralist stance in El País justify the possibility of Catalonia being a nation and Spain 
“a nation of nations” and/or play down the consequences of recognizing new nations inside 
Spain. In doing so, they make use of different topoi: 
 
Relativisation/perspectivisation: The idea of national unity may appear problematic when 
considered from different perspectives. Similarly, national plurality can be possible if we 
adopt different points of view. For instance: 
(i.) The question whether Catalonia can be defined as a nation constitutes a symbolic and 
linguistic debate rather than a legal one (PCOP050022). 
(ii.) The phrase “unity of the Spanish nation” mentioned in the Constitution does not 
describe a reality. Rather, it creates one. If we adopt of sociological, political or historical 
perspective, one may say Spain never achieved national unity or that it has lost it if it ever 
had it (PSOP980132). 
(iii.) A nation of nations is not a tautology if we look at an encyclopedia instead of a 
dictionary (PCOP050158). 
(iv.) A political nation (Spain) is different from a cultural nation (Catalonia) (PSOP050159).  
Legalese: 
(i) The definition of a territory as a nation does not necessarily imply that a nation can 
automatically become a sovereign State (PCOP050022). 
(ii) Art. 2 of the Spanish Constitution is contradictory and ambiguous and leaves the question 
of the structure of the State open to discussion. Acknowledging the indissoluble unity of the 
Spanish nation and recognizing at the same time the right to autonomy of nationalities and 




(iii) Art. 2 of the Spanish Constitution establishes that Spain is “a nation of nations” 
(PSOP040064). 
Double-sided argumentation as a pretext to invoke tolerance. 
 
(i) The rhetoric in Art. 2 of the Spanish Constitution seems as strong as that of the Catalan 
Statute in its national identity claims. Let us be tolerant with the rhetoric from both camps 
because Catalonia is plural and so is Spain (PSOP070131). 
(ii) Art. 2 represents a political compromise between those who see Spain as one nation and 
those who see it as “plurinational” (PSOP040064; PSOP050159; PSOP010074).  
 
Also, many articles in El Mundo containing “unidad de la nación española” portray the idea 
of Spain being under threat, with threat agents identified in 22 cases (59.47% of all the 
articles containing the phrase “unity of the Spanish nation”). The idea of threat seldom 
appears in those articles of El País that adopt a unitarist stance: only three articles imply 
threat, out of which two include threat agents. Interestingly, these two articles are signed by 
members of the right- wing Popular Party, not usually favoured by the editorial line of El 
País. 
 
5.3. The Discourses of the Spanish Nation in El Mundo vs. País Opinion 
This section examines how the Spanish nation is conceptualized in the narratives of El 
Mundo and País Opinion. The discussion is primarily based on detailed analysis of the 
concordances of “nación española” and “España […] nación” (5L-5R) followed by more 
qualitative analysis of whole articles containing these phrases. This is complemented by the 





Linguistic analysis reveals that definitions and paraphrases are mainly encoded as VPs 
containing defining expressions (i.e. “es”, “se define”, “entendida como”, etc.) or as 
complex NPs encoded in various ways: (i) post-modified by the phrase “de la nación 
española” (i.e. “idea de la nación española); (ii) headed by the conjunction “como” (i.e. 
“España como nación de naciones”); (iii) in appositional structures (i.e. “la nación 
española, «patria común e indivisible»”). Appositional structures are also occasionally 
realised as VPs (i.e. “lo que se está fraguando a todo lo largo del siglo XIX: la nación 
española moderna”). Such definitions and paraphrases were extracted from all the 
concordances in País and El Mundo Opinion and the texts in which they appeared were 
analysed in search of the themes, concepts and strategies employed. The concept of Spanish 
nation was also examined in relation to historical time so as to determine how both 
newspapers explain the origins and evolution of the Spanish nation. 
 
The NPs associated with “nación española” reflect the social constructivist underpinnings 
of its discursive construction in both newspapers: “concepto”, “concepción”, “idea”, 
“término”, “sentidos”, “discurso”, “argumento”, “construcción”, “proyecto”, 
“configuración”, “modelo final”, “creación”, “mitos”, “relatos fundadores”, “hecho”, etc. 
The language employed unequivocally portrays the Spanish nation as a socio-discursive 
historically evolving artefact. An extensive analysis of the texts containing definitions and 
paraphrases of “nación española” reveals interesting differences and similarities in how 
these newspapers discursively construct the Spanish nation around various themes, mainly 
related with history, law, politics and, less commonly, language, culture and religion. Such 
themes are not necessarily presented independently in separate texts. Instead, they often 
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combine in single texts creating complex clusters of interrelated themes where the Spanish 
nation is simultaneously portrayed as a socio-political construct enshrined in a legal 
framework which is also a product of history. In view of this, the discursive construction of 
the Spanish nation could be explained in terms of a series of interconnected and overlapping 
themes that include history, politics, law, as well as socio-cultural manifestations such as 
language, religion or traditions. Such themes tend to be quite broad and polyphonic in nature. 
For instance, history would not only include a collective perception of continuity but also 
elements like foundational myths and fables, whereas political themes would range from the 
institutional and legal to the ideological and sentimental, closer to Renan’s notion of daily 
plebiscite. 
 
# Finding 5: The discourses of the nation in El Mundo and País Opinion are characterized by 
significant phraseological differences in line with the unitarist vs. pluralist distinction 
explained before. 
 
Table 5.9 shows the most common keyphrases in the discourses of the nation in both 
newspapers, where we can observe significant differences in frequencies in line with the 
unitarist vs. pluralist distinction already explained. 
Table 5.9. 
  
El Mundo Opinion MI L-L El País Opinion MI 
España plural (102) 7.270 -41.44 España plural (199) 7.402 
Anti-España (5) 5.019 -36.82 Anti-España (42) 7.470 
Nación política (9) 2.256 -24.16 Nación política (40) 3.628 
Nación cultural (5) 5.149 -21.03 Nación cultural (29) 6.637 
Nación de naciones (67) 8.155 -15.98 Nación de naciones (112) 8.306 
España constitucional (72) 4.228 +13.21 España constitucional (31) 3.327 
Nación española (334) 7.694 +12.17 Nación española (226) 7.051 
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Única nación (21) 6.028 +4.90 Única nación (8) 5.569 
España democrática (57) 5.250 -4.41 España democrática (75) 4.611 
Historia de España (236) 5.508 -2.30 Historia de España (247) 5.403 
Nación única (6) 6.028 -1.41 Nación única (10) 5.569 
Nación plural (23) 7.262 +1.04 Nación plural (15) 5.765 
Idea […] de España (174) 6.077 +0.20 Idea […] de España (160) 5.576 
España como (una) nación (50) 5.045 -0.92 España como (una) nación (55) 4.927 
España […] es una nación  […] 
(44) 
5.045 -0.19 España […] es una nación  […] 
(44) 
4.927 
España autonómica (22) 4.621 -1.08 España autonómica (27) 4.659 
España de las autonomías (31) 4.776 +0.03 España de las autonomías (27) 3.842 
 
Common keyphrases in the narratives of the Spanish nation 
 
5.3.1. “Nación de naciones” vs. “única nación” 
The most important difference between the discourses of El País and Mundo Opinion is the 
recognition by the former of Spain being “a nation of nations”, something rejected by the 




 El MUNDO OPINION El PAÍS OPINION 
No. of articles (“nación de naciones) 56 112 
Yes 6 (10.71%) 52 (62.65%) 
No 48 (85.71%) 13 (15.66%) 
NEUTRAL/NON-SPECIFIED 2 (3.57%) 18 (21.68%) 
 
Stance towards Spain as “una nación de naciones” El Mundo vs. País Opinion 
 
El Mundo Opinion criticises the concept of “nación de naciones” as “feo terminacho” 
(MSOP000083), “bobada” (MSOP000089), “totum revolotum” (MSOP050057), “noción 
falaz” (MSOP050092), “fraude histórico” (MSOP050134), “ocurrencia de un idiota, 
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historiador aficionado, Luis Carretero y su hijo Anselmo” (MSOP050040), in allusion to a 
well-known pluralist ideologue admired by Maragall. Notwithstanding this criticism, it is 
also interesting to note that four out of the six articles acknowledging the possibility of Spain 
being “a nation of nations” were written in 1996, a time when the PP was negotiating with 
Catalan and Basque nationalists to form a minority government and compromise was needed. 
In this context, El Mundo’s director, Pedro J. Ramírez, suggests in MSOP960243 that Aznar 
should abandon “his reticence towards accepting the idea of Spain being a nation of nations”. 
The same author will categorically reject this possibility in subsequent articles. For instance, 
in MSOP070349, he alludes to the idea of “nation of nations” echoing a well-known 
anti-pluralist argument put forward by Sosa Wagner et al (Sosa Wagner et al 2006): That of 
Spain increasingly looking like the Habsburg Empire “with its monumental and paralyzing 
mess”:  
Eso significa que Aznar debe ponerse a la cabeza de un proceso de transformación, aceptando ejercer un 
poder compartido y dotando al concepto de «segunda transición» de un contenido mucho más rico y 
audaz que el que bajo dicho título se reflejaba en su libro. Sus expresas reticencias a aceptar la idea de 
que España ha sido en el fondo una «nación de naciones» y su rechazo al federalismo deben dar paso a 
una nueva mentalidad, equivalente a la que llevó a Suárez a devolver a la sociedad parte del poder 
acumulado por el franquismo en las instituciones de la Administración central. (MSOP960243) (“Seis 
bases para un compromiso histórico”, by Pedro J. Ramírez) 
 
¿Hacia dónde nos dirigimos? Sólo voy a recoger aquí un diagnóstico al que sin duda el presidente 
Zapatero concederá autoridad y crédito por proceder de su viejo y creo que apreciado profesor el 
catedrático Francisco Sosa Wagner: «A fuerza de insistir en lo que nos separa y olvidar lo que nos une, a 
fuerza de complacernos y ensimismarnos con las naciones y con la 'nación de naciones', con las 
diferencias de la España 'plural' y manosearlas todas las mañanas y en todas las ocasiones, a fuerza de 
idear o magnificar litigios lingüísticos y rememorar agravios y distinguir en nuestro patrimonio créditos 
inextinguibles contra la cuenta de unos derechos históricos, en rigor prehistóricos y fantasmales... 
podemos llegar en efecto pasito a pasito, con frívola parsimonia, a montar algo parecido al Imperio 
Austrohúngaro, con sus monumentales y paralizantes líos». (MSOP070349) (“Sobre la paz, el diálogo y 
el Imperio... Austrohúngaro”, by Pedro J. Ramírez) 
 
Other common expressions employed in the unitarist narrative of El Mundo Opinion are 
“España constitucional” (+13.21) and “nación plural” (+1.04), whereas “España plural” 
(-41.44) features prominently in the pluralist narrative of El País. This kind of expressions 
may result from a recurrent need in political discourse for new labels which on the surface 
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look non-controversial. They tend to function as “slogans” to advance certain political 
agendas among mass audiences (Teubert, 2008).  
Further analysis reveals that “España plural” is frequently associated with the discourse of 
the PSOE and its leaders, particularly Maragall and Zapatero (PSOP050083, PSOP030058, 
PCOP050048, PCOP050056), to promote a federal agenda and that this term is usually 
employed by the pluralist left to criticize the unitarist right. PSOP020014 is an open letter to 
Zapatero from Maragall announcing a new impulse towards federalism described as 
“España plural”. PSOP030008 opposes the idea of “una España plural y dinámica” of 
Maragall and the PSOE to that of “la España una y estática” of the PP. After recognizing 
Catalonia as a nation, PCOP050053 announces “a second transition” which may result in “a 
plural Spain with a federal structure”. PSOP000086 accuses the PP of marginalizing the 
Autonomous Communities in an attempt to return to the old Francoist idea of “una España 
una y grande” when the future lies in “a plural Spain within a plural Europe”. 
El nuevo socialismo está ya en marcha. El nuevo federalismo, o como le llamamos tú y yo, la España 
plural, está a punto.” (PSOP020014) (Carta abierta a José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, by Pasqual Maragall) 
 
Maragall tiene argumentos para aceptar el debate de tú a tú con el presidente del Gobierno: ha sido él, por 
lo menos aparentemente, el que ha conseguido que el discurso sobre España del PSOE se distanciara del 
PP, y que frente a la España una y estática empezará a tomar consistencia como alternativa posible una 
idea de España plural y dinámica.” (PSOP030008) (Aznar y Maragall, by Josep Ramoneda) 
 
Cataluña es una nación. Es decir, Cataluña es una comunidad con conciencia clara de poseer una 
personalidad histórica diferenciada y voluntad firme de proyectar esta personalidad hacia el futuro 
mediante su     autogobierno. [..] 
La segunda transición que ahora se inicia culminará, si prospera, con la consolidación de la única España 
posible: una España plural de estructura federal.” (PCOP050053) (Desde Cataluña, by Juan José López 
Burniol) 
 
¿Por qué el PP no ha aprovechado la ocasión para dar más legitimidad y más presencia a las comunidades 
autónomas? ¿Por qué las ha marginado de la idea presente y futura de España? ¿Por qué nos quiere hacer 
regresar a la vieja idea de una España una y grande cuando nuestro futuro será el de una España plural en 
el seno de una Europa plural? (PSOP000086) (La chapita española,  by Jordi Solé Tura) 
 
The significantly fewer cases of “España plural” in El Mundo Opinion are also usually 
associated with the PSOE and its leaders. The articles contain a somewhat unusual 
proportion of favourable voices, over 28% of the articles versus 54% against, together with a 
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majority of articles attacking this concept and some cases illustrating attempts to 
re-formulate “España plural” in terms more amenable to Unitarism. MSOP050105 blames 
Zapatero for promoting “the mess” with “his plural Spain”. MSOP040179 conflates 
Zapatero’s plural Spain with nationalism on the periphery and suggests that this has only 
lead to a new “caciquismo” (see chapter 3 p. 202). In MSOP980102 Aznar states his belief 
in a plural Spain re-formulating the discourse usually associated with “plural Spain” by 
advocating the validity and continuity of the Spanish nation while dismissing the 
nationalisms on the periphery as something of the past. Finally, MSOP990005 reformulates 
“plural Spain” using the label of “nación plural” according to a unitarist interpretation of 
the Constitution which recognizes the existence of Autonomous Communities in the context 
of national unity.  
Tal vez pueda culparse a Zapatero de haber alentado el lío con su España plural, tal vez sea, como el casto 
José, un soñador en la España faraónica de la corrupción, que toca la flauta y el camarillo mientras crece 
la riada del Nilo. (MSOP050105) (El lío, by Raúl del Pozo) 
 
Zapatero ha querido abrir las puertas a la España plural y nacionalista donde todo es posible, pero lo que 
ha entrado de momento es una nueva generación de caciques que invocan su nacionalidad festiva y tienen 
confidencia directa con Madrid. (MSOP040179) (Los neocaciques, by Francisco Umbral) 
 
No soy un nacionalista español, pero sí un español en sentido constructivo que cree en la vigencia, en la 
continuidad y en el futuro de la nación española. Yo creo que una España plural ganará más en las urnas 
del futuro. A mi modo de ver, la historia de los nacionalismos es la Historia de un siglo XIX que se 
adentró demasiado en el XX.” (MSOP980102) (Una paz para nuestra Historia, by José María Aznar) 
 
Son palabras de Javier Arenas recogidas en su ponencia: «España plural, un proyecto de futuro en 
común», en la que se ve a nuestro país como una nación plural que tiene en la Constitución de 1978 el 
motor y garantía del Estado de las Autonomías, con sus elementos homogéneos y heterogéneos en el seno 
de la unidad nacional. (MSOP990005) (“La metamorfosis de AP o la resurrección de UCD. El Partido 
Popular pretende convertirse en el referente del centro político”, by Raúl Heras) 
 
 
“Nación plural”, on the other hand, is used in El Mundo Opinion to re-affirm unity of the 
Spanish nation while confining pluralism to the current State of the Autonomies regulated by 
the Constitution. In MSOP040115 Rajoy reminds Zapatero that Spain is ONE, just ONE 
“Nación plural” while Arenas emphasizes the idea of “national unity” in his description of 
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Spain as a plural nation. In MSOP040138 the idea of “Nación plural” is equated to that of 
“only one nation which is indivisible and the common fatherland of all Spaniards”. 
MSOP000083 arguably shows the true face of staunch Unitarism by caricaturing “the plural” 
as a “terminacho” only welcome if safely wrapped in “the unitary”.  
Si para Rodríguez Zapatero esto es discutido y discutible, para la Constitución de 1978 que, precisamente, 
hemos festejado hace una semana, no lo es. Le recuerdo a nuestro presidente que España es 
constitucionalmente una nación plural, articulada en nacionalidades y regiones, pero «una», insisto, una 
nación.  (MSOP040115) (“España es una nación”, by Mariano Rajoy) 
 
España ha sido y es una nación plural que, gracias a la Constitución, motor y garantía del Estado de las 
Autonomías, se afirma como tal, acepta sus elementos homogéneos y heterogéneos en el seno de la 
unidad nacional y proyecta la cohesión de esta pluralidad constitutiva en sus objetivos compartidos. 
(MSOP990003) (“Un esfuerzo de convivencia”, by Javier Arenas) 
 
En tal sentido, pues, la palabra nación utilizada en el artículo 2 de la Constitución Española significa sin 
ambages dos cosas y nada más que dos: por una parte, que sólo hay una nación, la española, que es 
indivisible, y que es la patria común de todos los españoles. Y, por otra, que no obstante se trata de una 
nación plural o compuesta, formada por nacionalidades y regiones, pero no es una nación de naciones ni 
nos hallamos ante un Estado plurinacional. (MSOP040138) (“La deconstrucción constitucional”, by Jorge 
de Esteban) 
 
Si España es, como bien dice Aznar, una nación plural, pluralísima, pluralérrima 
hiperpluralisticoespialidosa, es porque algo unitario la mantiene. De otro modo no sería plural sino que 
habría desaparecido. Para que algo sea plural debe existir como algo. Hasta el feo terminacho de «nación 
de naciones» afirma la pluralidad partiendo de la unidad. Lo heterogéneo necesita algunos elementos de 
homogeneidad para no volatilizarse. La pluralidad lingüística de España es tan cierta como la unidad 
forjada desde la baja Edad Media, con el castellano como koiné de la comunidad, mecanismo para que el 
hablante vascuence y el gallego se entiendan en una lengua común, cuyo nombre correcto es español. 
¿Que se quedan contentos diciendo cada diez minutos o cada diez líneas que España, la «cosa enorme» de 
Pujol, es plural? Bienvenido el terminacho. Pero conste que cuanto más se insiste en la pluralidad de 
España más resalta la continuidad y, en definitiva, la unidad. Si durante mil o dos mil años España ha 
sido y es tan plural, qué poco centralismo represor ha habido. Y cuantísima España. (MSOP000083) (Lo 
plural, by Federico Jiménez Losantos) 
 
 
The existence Spain as “a nation of nations” is attributed by Elorza in El País Opinion to the 
co-occurrence of various nation-building processes blocking each other along the 19
th
 
century which hindered the consolidation of a Spanish Nation-State (PSOP960066). In view 
of this, El País Opinion constructs its “nation of nations” narrative in a number of ways. First 
it affirms that Spain is a nation and not just a State (PCOP960052), in opposition to what 
nationalists on the periphery claim. It then identifies the term “nacionalidades” mentioned 
in the Spanish Constitution with the concept of nation (PCOP050002, PCOP050164, 
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PCOP050022) and opts for an asymmetrical model by referring to Spain as “nación de 
naciones y de regiones” (PSOP050159, PEOP030069, PSOP010022):  
En realidad, el término nación en lugar del término nacionalidades es el que estaba en la cabeza de los 
constituyentes cuando se redactó el artículo 2 de la CE y si no se pudo incluir en el texto constitucional y 
posteriormente en los estatutos de autonomía fue porque en 1978-79 el horno no estaba para bollos. Así 
se deduce claramente del debate sobre el artículo 2 en la Comisión de Asuntos Constitucionales y 
Libertades Públicas del Congreso de los Diputados. Todos los parlamentarios que intervinieron, tanto 
fuera para apoyar como para oponerse a la inclusión del término "nacionalidades", afirmaron 
expresamente que nación y nacionalidad eran sinónimos. Entre los que se oponían estaban Manuel Fraga, 
quien partía del "hecho indiscutible de que nacionalidad y nación es lo mismo" o Licinio de la Fuente, 
para quien "nacionalidad es equivalente a nación" u  Ortí Bordás, que afirmó de manera tajante que 
"nacionalidad es exactamente igual que nación". En esto es en lo único en que coincidían con quienes 
apoyaban la inclusión del término nacionalidades en la Constitución, como Roca, para quien 
"nacionalidades o nación quieren decir exactamente lo mismo" o Peces Barba, que decía que "para 
nosotros nacionalidad y nación es lo mismo", por lo que podría hablarse de que "España es una nación de 
naciones" (Constitución Española. Trabajos Parlamentarios. T. I. Cortes Generales 1980, páginas 658, 
812, 838, 816, 846 y 847). (PCOP050002) (“¿Por qué no?”, by Javier Pérez Royo) 
 
Estoy muy a gusto con la definición de España como nación de naciones y regiones (y ya sé que la 
Constitución dice nacionalidades); me satisface sobremanera que el catalán, el euskera o el gallego sean 
otras lenguas españolas oficiales; he defendido y defiendo un federalismo asimétrico que otorgue 
mayores competencias a las nacionalidades que a las regiones y lamento que esas lenguas no tengan 
mayor presencia oficial, por ejemplo, en el Senado. (PSOP010022) (“Carta abierta al señor Varela i Serra” 
by Emilio Lamo de Espinosa) 
 
Third, it tends to place the Spanish nation at a higher level than the rest. For instance, it 
speaks of “nación mayoritaria” vs. “naciones minoritarias” within the Spanish State 
(PCOP050164), “Nación (con mayúscula)” vs. “nación (con minúscula)”, Catalonia, 
(PCOP050002), “nación/Estado nacional” vs. “naciones subordinadas” –“which are not 
Nation-States” (PEOP010226). Or it talks of superposición de naciones” (PCOP970020) and 
employs the metaphor of “Russian dolls” to describe “a more comprehensive Spanish nation 
which houses other nationalities” (PSOP980074). The distinction between “nación política” 
(-24.16) and “nación cultural” (-21.03), significantly more common in El País Opinion, is 
key in explaining this differentiation between the Spanish nation and the rest: Spain is 
commonly associated with the former, in connection with the notion of sovereignty whereas 
other nations tend to be relegated to the category of “naciones culturales”. In PSOP020080, 
Peces-Barba, a former Socialist politician who participated in the committee which drafted 
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the Constitution, associates the Spanish nation with the notion of sovereignty (which is only 
one, he argues). He then considers the terms “nacionalidad” and “nación” as synonyms and 
speaks of “hechos diferenciales de character cultural”. A similar argument is presented in 
PSOP040120 where “nacionalidad” is equated with a “cultural nation” distinguishable from 
a “political nation”:  
En la Constitución de 1978, las bases de la unidad se basaban en los siguientes principios: 
Primero. España se constituía en un Estado social y democrático de derecho cuya soberanía nacional 
correspondía al pueblo español en su conjunto. Esta idea de la unidad de la soberanía se correspondía con 
la realidad histórica, porque nunca habían existido en la España moderna otras naciones soberanas. 
Segundo. Se reconocía la autonomía de las nacionalidades y de las regiones, dentro de esa sociedad plural. 
Nacionalidad y nación son conceptos sinónimos en la Constitución. Se distinguía la única nación 
soberana, España, y además se reconocía que en su interior existían hechos diferenciales nacionales de 
carácter cultural. Por eso algunos hablamos de España como nación de naciones y de regiones. 
(PSOP020080) (“Los vascos y la Constitución: el pájaro pequeño y el grande”, by Gregorio Peces-Barba 
Martínez) 
 
Todavía cabría señalar otro significado para la idea de nacionalidad: el vínculo afectivo que une al 
ciudadano con su nación. De estos significados, ha permanecido, sin embargo, la distinción entre una idea 
de nación política, ligada a la realización de un orden político liberal-democrático, y una idea de 
nacionalidad o "nación cultural", susceptible de reconciliarse con la existencia de una nación política 
equiparada en la práctica al papel de los Estados soberanos. (PSOP040120) (“Nación y nacionalidad”, by 
Andrés De Blas Guerrero) 
 
Fourth, in spite of the above, the concept of sovereignty tends to be underemphasized in El 
País Opinion. Instead there is much greater emphasis on identity in conceptualizing the 
nation, proved by the numerous articles stressing this aspect: PSOP050017, PSOP040047, 
PCOP970020, PCOP960065, PCOP050169, PCOP050110, etc. This arguably fits well with 
El País’s pluralist agenda given the unquestionable existence of multiple national identities 
in Spain and the limitations traditional definitions of the Spanish nation in terms of 
sovereignty pose for a pluralist solution to the Spanish national conundrum. For instance, 
PSOP970106 proposes “to obviate hard/univocal interpretations of terms like nation, 
sovereignty and State” in re-defining Spain and “explore those of “supra-nationality, 
cultural/linguistic/patriotic pluralism, federalism and subsidiarity”. PSOP050106 concludes 
that Spain is a nation of nations based on the various national sentiments that can be found in 
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Spain. This reasoning often leads to the defence of various forms of federalism, as illustrated 
in PEOP070040 below (but also PSOP020069, PCOP060056). 
Pues bien, desde la perspectiva europea, la redefinición de España debería obviar el sentido duro y 
unívoco de términos como nación, soberanía y Estado y explorar los de supranacionalidad, pluralismo 
cultural, lingüístico y patriótico, federalismo, subsidiariedad y otros por el estilo. 
No sé si de ahí resultaría una España pensada como nación de naciones, como un Estado plurinacional o 
si seguiría concibiéndose, en expresión de la Constitución, como una patria común entre otras patrias más 
altas y más chicas. (PSOP970106) (“La "reinvención' de España”, by Juan Antonio Ortega 
Díaz-Ambrona) 
 
Con arreglo, sin embargo, al mismo argumento, siguiendo una lógica estrictamente paralela, hay que 
concluir que también España es una nación. Quienes reclaman el derecho a ser incluidos en esta categoría 
no pueden, a continuación, negar ese título a España aduciendo que sólo es un "Estado". Porque hay 
muchos millones de personas que se sienten españoles, que quieren ser españoles (muchos más, entre 
paréntesis, que quienes se sienten catalanes; no en términos absolutos, es decir, no más millones de 
personas, dato que no sería decisivo, sino muchos más en términos relativos también: si hay, supongamos, 
un 60% de catalanes que creen que Cataluña es una nación, el porcentaje de ciudadanos españoles que 
sienten a España como nación no baja del 90%; y habrá que despreciar mucho la realidad para no tener en 
cuenta ese dato); si toda esta gente cree en España como nación, por la misma razón antes explicada, 
España es una nación. 
Si tanto Cataluña como España son naciones, por tanto, la fórmula "nación de naciones" está servida. 
(PSOP050106) (“La disputa nominalista”, by José Álvarez Junco) 
 
Así las cosas, ¿qué opciones tiene hoy la España que se siente española a la hora de afrontar el problema 
vasco? Sólo dos, basadas ambas en el mismo presupuesto, a saber: que el Estado autonómico fruto de la 
Constitución, desarrollado con coraje y vigor hasta convertirlo en un auténtico Estado federal, es el único 
marco -no inmutable, sino modificable según sus propias reglas- que la nación española acepta como base 
de su proyecto común. (PEOP070040) (“Conllevancia o autodeterminación”, by Juan-José López 
Burniol) 
 
The opposite occurs in El Mundo Opinion where identity is comparatively less prominent 
than sovereignty, always understood as exclusive to the Spanish nation. In MCOP050227 
Rajoy is quoted as saying that “sovereignty resides in the Spanish nation” whereas Jiménez 
Losantos accuses the State in MSOP060220 of “having abandoned all its obligations… first 
of which is to protect the origin of sovereignty: The Spanish nation”. The same author 
proclaims in MSOP050188 that all constitutions in Spanish history “have been based on the 
Spanish nation, understood as unique and indivisible:” 
Rajoy resumió la filosofía de las enmiendas en cuatro principios: la soberanía reside en la nación española, 
existe igualdad de derechos entre todos los españoles, el Estatuto debe respetar la Constitución y también 
debe ofrecer garantías de los derechos de los ciudadanos frente al intervencionismo del proyecto 
aprobado en Cataluña. (MCOP050227) (“PP y PSOE acercan posiciones pero Zapatero no quiere pactar 




El problema de España es el de la dimisión del Estado de todas sus obligaciones, la primera de las cuales 
es proteger el origen de la soberanía, que es la nación española. (MSOP060220) (“Moratorias”, by 
Federico Jiménez Losantos) 
 
Sin embargo, sucede que la Constitución española de 1978, como todas desde la gaditana de 1812, se 
basa en la Nación española como sujeto político. Y que la actual define a España como patria común, 
única e indivisible. Difícilmente puede ser única la Nación española si alberga en su interior a la nación 
catalana con los mismos títulos de soberanía. Si la soberanía reside en el pueblo español, no cabe otra 
Nación. Y si cabe, adiós soberanía nacional y adiós igualdad de los españoles ante la ley. (MSOP050188) 
(“La gran estafa”, by Federico Jiménez Losantos) 
 
Sovereignty is associated with the concepts of citizenship, freedom, equality and statehood in 
phrases such as “nación de ciudadanos libres e iguales” (MSOP050164, MSOP070162, 
MSOP060078), “sujeto político” (MSOP050274, MSOP050241), “fuente de soberanía” 
(MSOP040033, MSOP980054),  “origen de soberanía” (MSOP060220), “fundamento de 
toda legalidad” (MCOP050180), “piedra angular de la constitución” (MSOP040026), “la 
nación que garantiza la igualdad” (MSOP040067), etc.  
 
Similarly to what we saw in the News Corpus, another feature in the narrative of the Spanish 
nation in El Mundo Opinion consists in introducing a polarizing discourse by echoing the 
views of Basque and Catalan nationalists, usually in critical terms. A common theme is the 
belief that Spain is not a nation:  
Y todo ello después de afirmar con la mayor desfachatez que España «no es una nación» sino un 
conglomerado estatal donde conviven naciones como la catalana y autonomías, o resto de España. 
Semejante locura es lo que vende el jefe de Unió, el amigo de Aznar, a quien en la sede del PP y Moncloa 
veían como el probable sustituto de Vidal-Quadras -quien, a la vista de todo esto debería replantearse su 
dimisión- en una relación «confederal», por supuesto, entre Unió y el PP. (MSOP960171) (“La unidad 
nacional”, by Pablo Sebastián) 
 
Leyendo así a Maquiavelo parece San Juan de la Cruz, o San Francisco de Asís, el amante del hermano 
lobo y de toda la flora y fauna de esa España que fue imperio donde nunca se puso el sol, que llevó y 
arraigó su cultura y culturas (¡mejor me lo ponéis!) por medio mundo y que unos catetos e 
indocumentados de CiU dicen que no es una nación. (MSOP960088) (“El príncipe enseña la España 
salvaje”, by Aurora Pavón) 
 
 
This polarizing discourse is rare in El País Opinion. On the contrary, presenting Spanish 
nationalism and nationalism on the periphery as equally problematic is common 
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(PEOP000103, PEOP980242, PEOP980095). This is clearly reflected in the unusually high 
frequency of expressions like “nacionalismo español” (Table 5.11):  
 
Table 5.11.  
El Mundo Opinion MI L-L El País Opinion MI 
Nacionalismo español (83) 5.902 -72.56 Nacionalismo español (214) 6.404 
Nacionalista español (16) 4.253 -3.42 Nacionalista español (26) 4.137 
 
“nacionalismo español” in El Mundo vs. País Opinion 
 
This pluralist equidistance between nationalisms in the discourse of El País Opinion can 
sometimes be interpreted in post-national terms. For instance, by equating the conception of 
the Spanish and Basque nations, Aranzadi seems to question the validity of this concept in 
PEOP000046. Cotarelo distances himself from all nationalists and accuses Spanish 
nationalism of trying to impose the Spanish nation while accusing nationalism on the 
periphery of being outdated in PSOP990008:  
Y desde el punto de vista de una ideología democrática que haga hincapié en la fundamentación exclusiva 
del Estado en la voluntad de los ciudadanos, la concepción de la nación (de la nación española) que la 
Constitución consagra es tan naturalista, tan organicista, tan esencialista y supravoluntarista, tan 
antidemocrática en suma, como la concepción de la nación (de la nación vasca) del Pacto de Lizarra y de 
los documentos soberanistas del PNV. (PEOP000046) (“Apostillas de un inocente”, by Juan Aranzadi) 
 
Los no nacionalistas carecemos de argumentos cuando nos empeñamos en razonar con los nacionalistas 
en su terreno que es fundamentalmente sentimental y solemos resultar contradictorios y hasta algo 
ridículos. Así, por ejemplo, el intento de imponer como más deseable una nación española (con 
inclusión de Euskadi) al independentismo vasco suele correr paralelo a la afirmación de que los 






5.3.2. Two uncanny associations? Religion and language in the national narratives of 
El Mundo and País Opinion 
This section discusses two identity markers conspicuously unusual in the discursive 
construction of the Spanish nation in El Mundo and País Opinion, in the context of 
expressions such as “España […] nación” and “nación española”: Religion and language. 
 
#Finding 6: Religion and language do not feature prominently in the discourses of the 
Spanish nation of El Mundo and País Opinion. 
 
Long considered the cornerstone of Spanish identity, Catholicism no longer plays this 
defining role in Spanish society nowadays (Payne, 2006). On the one hand, religious practice 
has dramatically declined decline coinciding with Spain’s modernization and secularization 
processes, initiated in the 60s and 70s. On the other hand, any attempt to link Catholicism 
with Spanish identity in 21
st
 century Spain will arguably be hindered by the 
National-Catholic association so prevalent during Francoism. Neutral references to religion 
in connection with the Spanish nation are very rare in El Mundo Opinion (MSOP980103, 
MSOP060045) and non-existent in El País Opinion. The expressions “nacionalcatolicismo/ 
nacional-católico” mark this general trend to dissociate Catholicism and the Spanish nation 
and to criticize any attempt to bring religion in general and the Catholic faith in particular to 
center stage. 
Table 5.12.  
El Mundo Opinion MI L-L El País Opinion MI 
Nacionalcatolicismo (19) 8.606 -30.10 Nacionalcatolicismo (64) 8.729 
Nacional-católico (8) 6.553 -0.79 Nacional-católico/a (11) 6.973 
 




MSOP070191 criticizes the interference of the Church in education and declares the end of 
“nacionalcatolicismo” while MSOP000150 objects to the celebration of the Spanish national 
day on the 12
th
 of October due to its religious connection, arguing that linking politics and 
religion is not proper in modern Spain. PSOP070072 discusses the current discredit suffered 
by religion identifying it with Spanish nationalism. PSOP060130 emphasizes the difficulties 
in establishing a non-denominational State, even under a Socialist government, while 
PSOP010103 criticizes the PP’s proposal in defense of Catholic instruction in Catalan 
schools labeling it a return to “nacionalcatolicismo”. 
Se ha acabado el nacionalcatolicismo. Vamos en busca de la laicidad. Y es, en efecto, el Estado quien 
ahora debe educar «a la sociedad, a la nación y al hombre». Profese la religión que profese, o no profese 
ninguna... (MSOP070191) (“La Ciudadanía”, by Antonio Gala) 
 
No sin dudas (a mi entender más que razonables) en España se ha instaurado como Fiesta Nacional el día 
de la Virgen del Pilar, tradicional conmemoración de la Hispanidad: la proyección de España en América. 
¿Aglutinan ambos rasgos a los españoles de hoy? La hispanidad, ahora, es cultura, no política. Y no 
debiera pertenecer a la España moderna, unir política y religión. Pues precisamente tal unión caracterizó a 
la España vieja, y no hablo sólo del nacionalcatolicismo franquista, sino de la España del Siglo de Oro, la 
España imperial, que llevaba la cruz indisolublemente unida a la espada. No, el día del Pilar o de la 
Hispanidad -que se imbrican- no es el día adecuado para la Fiesta Nacional de un país que se quiso nuevo 
con la Constitución de 1978.  (MSOP000150) (“Una ilustre fiesta vieja”, by Luis Antonio de Villena) 
 
Quizá ese desprestigio de la religión en general se deba entre nosotros a algo más que al esquematismo de 
epígonos tardíos de la Ilustración, es la repulsa hacia la Iglesia católica que ha condicionado tanto 
nuestras vidas y la sociedad. Pues el catolicismo para nosotros tiene rasgos propios, es la ideología 
nacional, y nacionalista, española. El nervio del argumento de la nación española fue escrito por clérigos 
y el supuesto continuo histórico católico-castellano se basa en la continuidad de la Iglesia católica 
española. Las crónicas medievales de Ximénez de Rada pretenden continuarse ahora en el discurso de 
Rouco Varela. Es lógico que frente a ese argumento de la esencia de España exista un contradiscurso 
comunitario nacional en las diócesis vascas y catalanas. (PSOP070072) (“El fracaso del catolicismo 
español”, by Suso de Toro) 
 
La construcción del Estado laico se está convirtiendo en misión casi imposible. No vivimos, es verdad, en 
un Estado confesional como lo fuera el de la época del nacionalcatolicismo, pero tampoco en un Estado 
laico o sencillamente no confesional. Quedan todavía no pocos restos de confesionalidad. Algunas de las 
actuaciones recientes del Gobierno socialista nos alejan todavía más de la laicidad. (PSOP060130) 
(“Estado laico, ¿misión imposible?”, by Juan José Tamayo) 
 
El nacionalcatolicismo español amenaza con volver por sus fueros en versión actualizada por el Partido 
Popular catalán. Una proposición no de ley presentada por el PP en el Parlamento de Cataluña insta al 
Gobierno de la Generalitat a tomar medidas para que otras confesiones no desplacen en los centros 
escolares la asignatura de religión católica. 
El Estado, a juicio del PP, debe intervenir para evitar que los minaretes suplanten al románico. La vieja 
identificación entre la fe y la patria asoma de nuevo ante la amenaza de la competencia de otras creencias. 




The association of Spanish identity and language seem problematic a priori given that 
several languages are spoken in Spain and that Catalan and, to a lesser extent Basque, have 
been key identity markers in alternative nation-building projects. The official recognition of 
the various regional languages and the acknowledgment of the concept of “lengua propia” 
in the Constitution, a notion further consolidated in several regional statutes, do not facilitate 
the identification of the Castilian language with the Spanish nation despite its official status 
and its widespread use across Spain. The evidence from the Opinion Corpus seems to 
confirm this impression. References to language in the definitions of the Spanish nation are 
rare in both newspapers (PCOP970020, PCOP050137, MSOP980103, MCOP020015) while 
phrases like “lengua catalana” are more common than “lengua castellana” or “española” 
(table 5.13).  
Table 5.13.  
El Mundo Opinion MI L-L El País Opinion MI 
Lengua catalana (82) 8.311 -0.35 Lengua catalana (82) 7.824 
Lengua propia (61) 7.505 -6.90 Lengua propia (86) 7.684 
Lengua castellana (45) 10.546 -3.76 Lengua castellana (60) 10.402 
Lengua española (40) 5.976 -0.09 Lengua española (39) 5.424 
Lengua común (33) 7.125 -1.48 Lengua común (40) 6.721 
Lengua materna (32) 11.811 -3.99 Lengua materna (46) 11.497 
Lengua vehicular (29) 11.721 +19.13 Lengua vehicular (4) 10.912 
Lengua oficial (38) 8.371 -0.74 Lengua oficial (42) 8.513 
Lengua vasca (12) 4.738 -30.79 Lengua vasca (52) 5.926 
Lengua valenciana (9) 8.373 +4.19 Lengua valenciana (2) 7.453 
 
Language and the nation, El Mundo vs. País Opinion 
 
Notwithstanding the occasional pluralist voices (MSOP030057, MSOP010108, 
MCOP980057, MCOP960032), El Mundo Opinion’s unitarist narrative generally advocates 
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the right to be taught in Castilian in Catalonia and denounces the discrimination against this 
language in Catalonia and the Basque Country. The pluralist narrative of El País Opinion is 
more miscellaneous. It supports full bilingualism in those territories with more than one 
official language while echoing different viewpoints in connection with the situation of 
Castilian in Catalonia. There are occasional voices denouncing the discrimination against 
Castilian, usually in less vehement tone than in El Mundo Opinion (PCOP980015, 
PCOP070007, PCOP980042, PCOP980002) much in contrast with voices denying or 
relativizing this discrimination in defence of Catalonia’s language policy (PSOP060210, 
PSOP000148, PCOP980029, PCOP960024, PCOP060217, PCOP060126, PCOP060028). 
There are also examples reminding us of how the Castilian language was imposed on the 
Catalans in different periods (PSOP010056, PSOP010052, PSOP010045, PSOP000040). The 
following examples illustrate these differences in the narratives of both newspapers. 
PSOP070130 questions the idea of a Spanish nation associated exclusively with the Castilian 
language, precisely the argument proposed in MCOP020015 where this language is said to 
be persecuted. The discrimination against Castilian in Catalonia is denied in PCOP960024 
while El Mundo and other media, accused of spreading this myth, are labelled 
“separadores”.  
Los diferentes nacionalismos que existen en España son criaturas de una misma época, y han sobrevivido 
en gran medida gracias a la escalada que se estableció entre ellos desde el siglo XIX en adelante. Frente a 
la arbitraria idea de que España era Castilla y de que, por tanto, la lengua castellana y, de paso, la religión 
católica definían la condición de español, surgieron otras ideas no menos arbitrarias y que reproducían el 
mismo razonamiento en una escala territorial más reducida. (PSOP070130) (“La importancia de España”, 
by José María Ridao) 
 
El consenso de fondo entre los escasos partidos antifranquistas y los abundantes franquistas dispuestos a 
democratizarse en 1977 fue y es el de la deslegitimación radical de España. Como nación, es decir, como 
comunidad histórica multisecular, y como cultura basada en una lengua común, que es la española. No 
importa que la Constitución hable de «patria común e indivisible de todos los españoles», no importa que 
de la lengua común diga que «todos los españoles tienen el deber de conocerla y el derecho a usarla». 
España y todos sus símbolos, empezando por la bandera, han sido borrados de la vida cotidiana en todas 
las regiones donde los nacionalistas mandan. La lengua española ha sido prohibida y perseguida en todos 
los ámbitos de la vida pública donde los nacionalistas imponen su ley. Véase la Administración Pública y 
la Educación en Cataluña tras un cuarto de siglo de pujolismo. Véase cómo los jueces prohíben al alcalde 
de La Coruña llamar La Coruña a La Coruña. Tanto comisario político en Prado del Rey con tanta 
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derecha y tanta izquierda centralistas para que al final llueva «en todo el Estado Español» y se esperen 
«precipitaciones en Girona, Lleida, Ourense y A Coruña». Toda precipitación es poca para no hablar en 
español donde los nacionalistas no quieren ni oírlo. (MCOP020015) (“Pujol no mintió”, by Federico 
Jiménez Losantos) 
 
Los separadores de la COPE y de Abc y El Mundo han hecho creer que el predominio del catalán en la 
escuela pública (no en la privada) está erradicando a la lengua castellana no solamente en la enseñanza, 
sino de toda Cataluña. Sólo hace falta pasearse por el Ensanche barcelonés, ya no, digo por Nou Barris, y 
coger diariamente el metro para percatarse de que en la calle la lengua mayoritaria es el castellano. Si se 
acerca a un quiosco, el 95% de las revistas son en castellano, y sólo uno de los cuatro periódicos de 
Barcelona, está escrito en catalán. Si usted va al cine, predominan en un 90% las películas en castellano. 
¿Dónde está, pues, la amenaza de extinción del castellano? Durante cuarenta años el régimen franquista 
combatió genocidamente la lengua y la cultura catalanas, aunque en los últimos 15 o 20 años aflojó su 
presión y permitió la publicación de libros y alguna revista, pero jamás de ningún periódico, y con sólo 
algunas concesiones en la radio y la televisión. El libro reciente de Josep Benet Intent franquista de 
genocidi cultural contra Catalunya es un alegato incontestable. (PCOP960024) (“Don Pedro Laín, 
tranquilícese”,  by Albert Manent) 
 
5.3.3. History in the narratives of El Mundo and País Opinion 
 
This section discusses how history is portrayed in the narratives of the Spanish nation in El 
Mundo and País Opinion. I will first examine how the origins of Spanish nation are narrated. 
This will be followed by a comparative analysis of common themes in the historical 
narratives of the nation, both in general terms and with specific reference to various 
characters and periods. The data are extracted from a sample of 727 articles containing a 
total of 560 occurrences of “nación española”, 449 cases of the pattern “España […] nación” 
and 671 articles containing 983 occurrences of “historia […] España”, “nuestra historia” 
and “historia española”.  
 
# Finding 7: History appears to be the most frequent identity marker in the discourses of the 
Spanish nation in El Mundo and País Opinion. There are however differences as well as 
similarities in the historical narratives of the Spanish nation in both newspapers.  
 
Detailed analysis of the articles containing the expressions “nación española” and “España 
[…] nación” reveals history as a key feature in the discursive construction of the Spanish 
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nation in both newspapers. This is also confirmed at the phraseological level (table 5.14) 
where Spanish history features more frequently in the narrative of El País Opinion. The three 
most common patterns are “historia de España”, “nuestra historia” and “historia 
española”. In all cases the log-likelihood scores indicate that these phrases are more 
common in El País, especially “nuestra historia” where a -14.48 log-likelihood score 
indicates that the differences in frequency are statistically significant. 
 
Table 5.14  
 
El Mundo Opinion MI L-L El País Opinion MI 
Historia de España (236) 5.495 -2.30 Historia de España (247) 5.422 
Nuestra historia (186) 7.781 -14-48 Nuestra historia (245) 7.413 
Historia española (28) 5.287 -3.81 Historia española (41) 5.101 
 
Phraseology related with “history of Spain”, El Mundo vs. País Opinion 
 
# Finding 8: Unitarism tends to conceptualize the Spanish nation in perennialist terms 
whereas Pluralism generally conceives it as a modern construct. 
 
El Mundo Opinion emphasizes the idea of the Spanish nation being a historical construct 
resulting from a long historical evolution. This is clearly reflected in its phraseology: 
“unidad histórica y política” (MSOP040178), “hecho histórico” (MEOP970165), “vieja” 
(MSOP980141, MSOP060257, MSOP040120), “la nación más vieja de Europa” 
(MSOP040115), “la nación más antigua de Europa” (MSOP070162, MSOP060235, 
MSOP060001), “nación antiquísima” (MSOP070217),  “el Estado-nación más antiguo de 
la vieja Europa” (MSOP050045), “la Nación-Estado más antigua de Europa” 
(MSOP060093), “comunidad histórica multisecular” (MCOP020015), “la bimilenaria 
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historia de España” (MSOP040148), “milenaria andadura histórica” (MSOP070248), 
“hecho histórico bimilenario” (MSOP050061), “el Estado más viejo y cohesionado de 
Europa” (MSOP050137), “uno de los primeros estados de Europa” (MSOP000165), 
“nación cargada de siglos y de experiencia” (MSOP000173), “la más vieja de las naciones 
y el más antiguo de los Estados nacionales de Occidente” (MSOP060113). In line with this 
perennialist stance, El Mundo Opinion is critical with social constructivist approaches which 
conceive the Spanish nation as “a modern invention”. MSOP030120 suggests that a book 
titled “Spain: Three millennia of history” should be compulsory reading for “our feral 
nationalists” and even “for the more cultivated ones” this proves that the Spanish nation did 
not begin around 1492 but that it existed “fuzzily” long before. MSOP040189 argues that the 
Catholic Monarchs did not have to invent the Spanish nation because this had always existed, 
or at least for a very long time.  
España: tres milenios de Historia del sabio Antonio Domínguez Ortiz, que acaba de morir, debería ser 
lectura obligada y acotada para nuestros nacionalistas asilvestrados y hasta para los cultos, porque hasta 
los fastos sevillanos del 92 por la llegada de Colón a América parecía que coincidían con la creación de 
España por Isabel de Castilla y Fernando de Aragón. El cocinamiento de sangres, culturas, artes e idiomas 
en la Península Ibérica alcanzó su hervor con la toma de Granada y el horizonte traspasado de los mares 
tenebrosos en cuyo confín las tripulaciones eran devoradas náufragas por inconmensurables monstruos 
oceánicos, pero España, aunque fuera de manera brumosa, existía ya desde antes que el oso de Don Favila 
y no terminaba en el castillo de Doña Urraca. (MSOP030120) (“Tres mil años”, by Martín Prieto) 
 
Igual que no tuvieron que hacerlo los Reyes Católicos, tampoco en 1808, en 1812 o en 1820 hubo que 
inventar la nación española porque, parafraseando a Lincoln, «siempre» -o por lo menos desde 
muchísimo tiempo antes que Kentucky- había estado ahí. (MSOP040189) (“Mirando hacia atrás sin hiel”, 
by Pedro J. Ramírez) 
 
In theorizing this perennialism, some unitarist voices in El Mundo Opinion use Ortega y 
Gasset’s concept of “razón histórica” also employed by Julián Marías in “España inteligible” 
(Marías, 1985), where the Spanish nation is conceived as a historical project gradually built 
layer by layer as a result of a “vast process of incorporation”. This is what differentiates 
Spain, “the only true nation”, from Catalonia and Euskadi, only “poetic nations based on the 
lesser notion of collective spirit” in MSOP060104:  
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En naciones como España, que recibió su primer impulso unificador hace más de 2.000 años, el criterio 
racional y realista para definir la nación es «la razón histórica» (Ortega, Julián Marías), desde la cual 
deben juzgarse los sentimientos y la voluntad de todos los grupos. La razón histórica trata de descubrir en 
un concepto -el de nación, el de España o romanticismo- el núcleo permanente que nos permite usarlo con 
sentido en distintas épocas, y a la vez acomoda ese núcleo a las formas concretas que ha tomado a través 
del tiempo.  
La nación se forma desde la Historia compartida del pasado, las referencias compartidas en el presente, y 
el proyecto de vida en común para el porvenir. El proyecto de futuro comporta un ingrediente de 
imaginación, pero fundado en una herencia. La España de hoy es una realidad formada por la convivencia 
de comunidades que, habiendo sido reinos y jurisdicciones diferentes, fueron fraguando su mutua relación 
en distintas formas de Estado hasta culminar en la Constitución de 1978.” […] 
Los nacionalismos regionales no se pueden comparar con la realidad nacional de España, porque no 
tienen más fundamento que la noción de «espíritu» colectivo, indigna de una sociología contemporánea. 
Los separatistas vascos y catalanes conciben sus «nacionalidades» como «familias que han engordado», a 
pesar de que esos territorios fueron y siguen siendo marmitas de fusión de inmigrantes. España, en 
cambio, es el resultado «de un vasto proceso de incorporación». Cuando algunos distinguen, de manera 
vaga, desde luego, entre España como la única nación verdadera y Cataluña y Euskadi como «naciones 
poéticas», se refieren al discurso del «alma catalana» y «el alma vasca», reflejado en los juegos florales 
en torno a 1900, y en libros como El alma castellana (1900) de Azorín o Campos de Castilla (1912), de 
Antonio Machado, entre otros muchos. 
La idea de nación de los separatistas es a la vez medieval y de un futurismo utópico. Desde esa postura 
escriben una historia falsificada del pasado y diseñan planos de «comunidades imaginadas» para el futuro. 
(MSOP060104) (“España: ¿nación de naciones?”, by Ciriaco Morón Arroyo) 
 
El Mundo Opinion highlights various periods within this vast process of historical 
incorporation whose roots are found in Christianity and the Greco-Roman civilization 
(MSOP070418, MSOP050140, MSOP060045, MSOP040061). The Christian Reconquest is 
described as “the founding epic of the modern Spanish nation” (MEOP010304) “which 
brought back the Christian and Roman unity which has defined our nation for 2,000 years” 
(MSOP060239). Other articles are less assertive about the Middle Ages arguing that Spain as 
a political body did not exist then but that a certain idea of Spain was already present 
(MSOP040146, MSOP040051). The reign of the Catholic Monarchs is seen by many as the 
birth of the Spanish Nation-State (MSOP020086, MSOP070094, MSOP040051, 
MSOP000173, MSOP020086, MSOP980141, MSOP070162, MSOP060151, MSOP050122) 
while others distinguish between the formation of the Spanish Nation-State after the 
unification of the different kingdoms under a single crown and the modern notions of 
“nación constitucional”, “nación como sujeto politico”, “nación de ciudadanos”, 
“patriotismo” and “soberanía” dated around 1808 when the first Spanish constitution was 
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approved (MCOP050282, MSOP050164, MSOP050061, MSOP050221, MSOP040051, 
MSOP060222, MEOP050301) when the Spanish nation “awakes to modernity” according to 
Aznar (MSOP070181). The essence of this perennialist conceptualization of the Spanish 
nation is captured in MSOP070418 where the author lectures Zapatero about the antiquity of 
the Spanish nation. This is in clear contrast to the pluralist and post-national narrative of 
MSOP040221 where Aznar’s perennialism is mocked by arguing that his nationalism is not 
different from that of Carod, Otegi, Arzalluz and Maragall in the way it is used to manipulate 
history with proposals such as Spanish history having started with the Big bang:  
España tiene 3.000 años de civilización (léase el libro póstumo de Domínguez Ortiz), más de 2.000 de 
civilización grecorromana (léase a Sánchez Albornoz), más de 1.500 de independencia nacional dentro de 
esa civilización cristianorromana  (léase a Menéndez Pidal), más de 500 de Estado nacional (léase algo), 
200 de civilización constitucional (léase la Constitución de Cádiz) y, aparte del latín, el griego, el hebreo 
e incluso el árabe, muchos siglos de una lengua común de cultura, la española, que es de las más 
importantes del mundo (aprenda a leer). (MSOP070418) (“Zetapé pedagogo”, by Federico Jiménez 
Losantos) 
 
Parece que los nacionalistas, sean del signo que sean, tienen patente de corso para tratar la Historia como 
si fuera plastilina. Quito un principado acá, remuevo un poco las fechas y me invento un Reino de 
Cataluña que nunca existió. Mezclo una teoría genetista nazi con un poco de filología del siglo XIX y me 
sale una raza no indoeuropea. Con sus últimas declaraciones en la Universidad de Georgetown, Aznar se 
ha sumado al síndrome napoleónico que padecen Carod Rovira, Otegi, Arzalluz y Maragall. En el 
manicomio del nacionalismo patrio, el español no se queda atrás en el arte de la mentira y la 
manipulación histórica. «Los problemas de Al Qaeda con España empiezan en el siglo VIII». Toma ya. 
No sólo Bin Laden es inmortal, sino que, al igual que los catalanes se inventan un reino, Aznar adelanta 6 
o 7 siglos el nacimiento de España. Para él, los visigodos, los romanos y los iberos tenían claro que eran 
españoles. En sus sueños, hasta los mamuts llevaban la banderita impresa.  
De hecho, para Aznar, España existe desde siempre en el continuo espacio-temporal: TVE se encargó de 
demostrarlo con una serie sobre la Historia de España que empezaba con el big bang. España no sólo es 
una unidad de destino en lo universal sino que no pueden con ella ni los agujeros negros de Hawking. 
Siguiendo las enseñanzas del maestro, hay historiadores que han vuelto a presentar la Reconquista no 
como un largo proceso de convivencia más o menos violenta entre distintas civilizaciones sino como una 
cruzada al estilo del Guerrero del Antifaz. De ser así, hay que señalar que tomarse ocho siglos para 
reconquistar la Península supone el récord bélico más lento de la Historia. Alfonso X, Alfonso XII, Jaime 
I y los demás monarcas asturianos, castellanos, leoneses, aragoneses, navarros y mallorquines 
(curiosamente no hubo reyes vascos ni españoles ni catalanes, qué lástima) eran unos perfectos inútiles. 
(MSOP040221) (“Rebuznos políglotas”, by David Torres) 
 
Pluralist voices in El País Opinion tend to see the Spanish nation as a modern construct 
emerging towards the second half of the 18
th
 century and the beginning of the 19
th
 century, 
although some may admit a prior substratum of cultural identity (PSOP010008). Despite 
some exceptions (PSOP990060, PSOP980109), these authors emphasize that the modern 
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concept of nation is a product of the liberal-nationalist ideology which only emerged in the 
modern era. PSOP960013 describes “the modern idea of nation as a liberal invention” while 
PSOP020080 explains that the idea of nation “related with that of a communis patria 
substituted the prior construct of propriae patriae represented by the Crown”. PSOP050078 
traces the origins of the Spanish nation to the war against Napoleon in the early 19
th
 century.  
Frente al encendido debate que a veces se presencia en los medios de comunicación, en realidad los 
historiadores están de acuerdo en algunas ideas esenciales acerca de la Nación española. Pocos la 
remontarían a tiempos medievales, aunque en ellos y en los modernos sea posible detectar un sustrato de 
identidad cultural a partir del cual pudo surgir. El tiempo de su nacimiento, de su eclosión sentimental y 
de la conversión de éste en un factor de cohesión esencial para la colectividad, fue al final del XVIII o 
comienzos del XIX. (PSOP010008) (“El nuevo nacionalismo español”, by Javier Tusell) 
 
La idea moderna de nación es un invento del liberalismo. Fueron los ilustrados y los constituyentes 
gaditanos los que crearon la nación política, compuesta por ciudadanos libres, como algo equivalente a 
igualdad civil, a Constitución, a Estado limitado. (PSOP960013) (“¿Quién teme al nacionalismo 
español?”, by Javier Varela) 
 
La idea de la communis patria ha estado más presente que la de la propiae patriae. Hasta el siglo XIXesa 
figura la representaba la Corona, y a partir de 1812 lo hizo la idea de nación. Incluso en muchas ocasiones 
la religión católica fue usada también como elemento unificador desde la idea, a mi juicio equivocada, del 
Estado Iglesia. (PSOP020080) (“Los vascos y la Constitución: el pájaro pequeño y el grande”, by 
Gregorio Peces-Barba Martínez) 
 
Ocurre sin embargo que desde principios del XIX, como paradójico efecto de la lucha contra la invasión 
napoleónica, la diosa nación comenzó a sentar sus reales entre los españoles. (PSOP050078) (“España 
tripartita”, by Juan Antonio Ortega Díaz-Ambrona)  
 
Any perennialist attempt to historicize the nation is seen as a nationalist strategy of 
ideological manipulation where present concepts and assumptions are projected towards the 
past in an attempt to present the nation as something ancient. This argument, repeated ad 
nauseam in pluralist articles in El País Opinion (PSOP010079, PSOP000010, PSOP970031, 
PSOP980093, PSOP970074, PSOP980122, PSOP980109, PSOP010008), is illustrated in the 
following examples: PSOP000046 links the origins of modern national history to the 
emergence of the Nation-State and argues that this led to a manipulation of the past in the 
service of a project for the future, namely the affirmation of national differences. This 
argument is echoed in PSOP970031 when Álvarez Junco speaks of collective memory “as 
ideological re-constructions of the past in the service of present political goals”.  He then 
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questions the perennialist concepts of a Roman or a Medieval Spain arguing that these were 
mere geographical terms. A similar argument is presented in PSOP970082, where history as 
an academic discipline is linked to the nationalist ideology and is seen as a tool to educate 
the citizens of the new Nation-States which emerged in liberal Europe.  
A nadie se le escapa que la aparición del Estado-nación coincide en el tiempo con el desarrollo de la 
historia nacional moderna. Mediante un cuidadoso juego de olvidos y manipulaciones el pasado se pone 
al servicio de algo que es, en realidad, un proyecto de futuro; en este caso, la afirmación de las diferencias 
nacionales. Y se contamina también de una conciencia "presentista" que tiende a proyectar hacia atrás la 
visión de la nación tal y como existe en el presente. Las tres dimensiones temporales coexisten así en una 
misma actividad. No estamos hablando, claro está, de la actual historiografía académica, sino de la 
historia como disciplina escolar. (PSOP000046) (“El futuro del pasado”, by Fernando Vallespín) 
 
La llamada ''memoria colectiva'' consiste, por tanto, en reconstruciones ideológicas del pasado -esto es, al 
servicio de fines políticos del presente-. El caso más claro es el de las historias nacionales, que por mucho 
que se pretendan disciplinas académicas tienen como fin primero y principal el reforzamiento de un ente 
político actual. De lo que se trata en ellas es de explicar a los ciudadanos que los estados en los que viven 
son el producto de la existencia inmemorial de un mismo pueblo sobre un mismo territorio; de ahí el aura 
de respetabilidad con que rodean a la autoridad política, la legitimidad básica de que la dotan, al margen 
incluso de la opinión de sus ciudadanos. Por eso se ha hablado a los niños desde hace siglos de una 
''España romana'', pese a que nada hubo en la era romana que se pareciera a la actual España; hubo, sí, 
una ''Hispania'', de nominación meramente geográfica que incluía toda la Península Ibérica, dividida a su 
vez en varias provincias, nunca coincidentes con las actuales España y Portugal. ''Hispania'' la llamaba, 
con buen criterio, el fenicido programa del Ministerio de Educación. Texto que, incoherentemente, se 
refería de seguido a una ''Edad Media española'' y a una ''España, eslabón entre la Cristiandad, el Islam y 
el Judaismo'', pese que al significado de este término en la Edad Media no fue menos geográfico que el de 
la era romana y siguió incluyendo, por supuesto, a Portugal. (PSOP970031) (“De historia y amnesia”, by 
José Álvarez Junco) 
 
No en vano, la Historia surgió en el siglo XIX como una disciplina académica en la que el nacionalismo 
era su piedra angular. Una disciplina, de marcado contenido ideológico-político, necesaria para la 
formación de los ciudadanos de los nuevos Estados-nación que emergen en la Europa liberal. En España, 
la Constitución de Cádiz de 1812 alumbra una nación que define nuestra identidad colectiva. Los 
historiadores comienzan la titánica tarea de buscar la "identidad" y la "diferencia" sobre la base de un 
proceso que, como ha señalado Anderson, trata de definir la esencia nacional, desde su genealogía. Se 
trata de ajustar, a veces "recreando", a veces "inventando", el hilo unitario de tradiciones, héroes, lenguas, 
acontecimientos y monumentos que vinculan, a lo largo del tiempo, un pueblo al territorio en el que se 
conforma la nueva nación. (PSOP970082) (“ideologías y nacionalismos en la enseñanza de la historia”, 
by Clementina Díez de Baldeón) 
 
Similarly to what we saw in the scarce pluralist voices in El Mundo Opinion, El País 
Opinion also questions the perennialist stance of the PP and its ideologues. PSOP000077 
criticizes the government’s policy of exhibitions and their historical bias while PSOP040053 
criticises the mediocre TV series “Memoria de España” and the work of Jon Juaristi for their 
perennialist interpretations of Spanish history. 
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En esto, el PP ha sido más activo en todos los planos, pero su decidida orientación conservadora 
difícilmente favorece la integración en una cultura política democrática. La línea de grandes exposiciones 
trazada por María del Carmen Iglesias y por los "historiadores de confianza" del ministerio borra 
cuidadosamente todas las aristas -insistiendo en la modernidad de la Restauración o minimizando el 
alcance de los desastres de la Invencible o del 98-, para desembocar en la identificación entre Nación y 
Monarquía. Incluso puede llegarse a decir que la nación española existía ya en tiempo de los visigodos 
-catálogo de Carlos V y su mundo- o sugerir que la monarquía encarnó siempre la grandeza de España. 
Pero esto, más allá de la obtención de honores para los servidores antaño izquierdistas de un Gobierno 
que se premian a sí mismos, sólo puede tener en política un efecto bumerán. Como el famoso informe de 
la Academia de la Historia. (PSOP000077) (“Imágenes y creencias”, by Antonio Elorza) 
 
Al margen de la calidad de sus asesores, la mediocre serie televisiva Memoria de España fue presentada 
como la demostración de la existencia de un pueblo común desde tiempos remotos, en directa 
correspondencia con el planteamiento electoral de quienes estaban en el poder hasta marzo pasado. Y un 
brillante escritor como Jon Juaristi ha dedicado su último libro, farragosa enumeración de leyendas 
medievales, a "la reconstrucción del imaginario español", "condición necesaria para la existencia de la 
nación española". Como si no supiéramos que los Estados-nación no tienen su origen, sino mucho 
después en el siglo XVIII. (PSOP040053) (“El revisionismo histórico español”, by Javier Tusell) 
 
# Finding 9: El Mundo and País Opinion coincide in presenting a general picture of the 
Spanish nation and its history as something problematic. However they differ in how they 
construct the different periods and historical characters.  
 
A negative impression characterises the narratives of both newspapers where Spain is seen as 
a weak Nation/State and Spanish nation-building as a failure or at least as an incomplete 
process. For instance, Spain is described as “an old nation and a weak State” (MSOP000173, 
MSOP050051), national articulation considered “a failure” (PSOP980097), “an unsolved 
problem” (PSOP980147) and Spanish identity as “feeble” (PSOP020017) and “unclear” 
(MSOP040136, PSOP050130). In more extreme cases, authors speak of “a history which 
was never fully accomplished” (MSOP050166), “a cultural and moral vacuum” in Spanish 
society (PSOP050121) and even conclude that this lack of unity may be interpreted by some 
as a proof of Spain’s non-existence (MSOP070006): 
España es una nación vieja y un Estado débil. (MSOP000173) (“El Estado débil”, by Raúl Heras) 
 





Resulta bien conocido el fracaso histórico del Estado español en el momento de acomodar sus distintas 
realidades nacionales a lo largo de los últimos siglos. (PSOP980097) (“Federalismo: sí, pero ¿para qué?”, 
by Ferrán Requejo) 
 
Es relativamente cierto afirmar que el problema histórico de la articulación de España, en tanto que 
Estado, es muy antiguo y que no está resuelto. (PSOP980147) (“Los confederales”, by José Antonio 
Ayestarán) 
 
España, desde 1898, no ha creído de forma estable y tranquila en sí misma. (PSOP020017) (“Creer en 
nosotros mismos”, by Pasqual Maragall) 
 
Llevamos toda la historia preguntándonos qué cosa sea España. (MSOP040136) (“La churriguera”, by 
Francisco Umbral) 
 
El problema, desde el punto de vista histórico, tiene raíces más hondas, y es que en nuestro país no hemos 
tenido nunca una idea clara del concepto de nación. (PSOP050130) (“La unidad de España”, by José Luis 
Abellán) 
 
Quizá la historia de España no se ha terminado de hacer. (MSOP050166) (“Historia de España”, by 
Antonio Gala) 
 
El principal rasgo de la sociedad española actual seguramente sean la delgadez y fragilidad del suelo 
sobre el que se levanta. Y debajo de ese suelo, un vacío cultural y aun moral. Un vacío que nace de la 
falta de continuidad, de la ruptura. (PSOP050121) (“La nación española”, by Suso de Toro) 
 
En resumen, hay poco sentimiento de ser una nación unida, y en consecuencia es imposible estar de 
acuerdo sobre un himno. En muchos aspectos, los españoles como nación no existen porque no tienen 
sentimientos compartidos. Quizá eso explique por qué en muchas universidades y colegios no es posible 
insistir en enseñar la Historia de España, ya que (opinan) España no existe. (MSOP070006) (“¿Debería 
tener letra el himno nacional?”, by Henry Kamen) 
 
Compared to other nations, Spain and its history are usually presented as exceptional and this 
is said to result in a weak nation-building. Those rare attempts to play down Spain’s 
historical exceptionality (see Joseph Pérez in PSOP990104) are swiftly contested by 
reinforcing the mainstream discourse of negativity (PSOP990005). The examples below 
illustrate how Spain’s exceptionality is constructed in El Mundo and País Opinion. 
PSOP000046 compares the expanding historical narratives from the national to the European 
in the majority of European States with the shrinking into the national-regional in Spain, 
attributed to a fragile Spanish identity. PSOP060071 argues that Spain has been different in 
its history due to a difficult past and MSOP960180 compares Spain’s “grandiloquent 
patriotism, tainted with tragic nuances and assumed fatalism” with France’s “patrimony of 
grandeur” and English unquestioned patriotism, “printed in people’s genes”. 
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Mientras en la mayoría de Estados europeos la gran cuestión gira en torno a la necesidad de suplir o 
compaginar las historias nacionales con una común historia europea, aquí nos vemos obligados a reducir 
la escala hacia lo nacional-regional. Esto atestigua la fragilidad de nuestra misma autocomprensión 
nacional […] (PSOP000046) (“El futuro del pasado”, by Fernando Vallespín) 
 
No nos engañemos. España ha sido diferente en su historia y aunque con el tiempo nos hayamos ido 
normalizando, todavía presentamos rasgos singulares heredados de un pasado difícil. (PSOP060071) 
(“Discutida guerra civil”, by Francisco Bustelo) 
 
La idea de patria se hereda sin duda alguna, como la tendencia al reuma, como las fincas rústicas. A 
nosotros, la Historia de España nos ha legado un sentimiento patriótico grandilocuente, con ribetes 
trágicos y fatalismo asumido. Heredamos España con lúgubre responsabilidad, como hidalgos arruinados 
prestos sin embargo a mantener alto el nombre del abuelo, lleno de deudas seculares. Algo muy diferente 
a la idea de un francés, que se siente siempre agraciado con su patrimonio de «grandeur», o a la de un 
inglés, para quien la patria está impresa en sus genes y ni se le ocurrirá ponerse a considerarla en 
abstracto. (MSOP960180) (“Líderes y patrias”, by Alicia Jiménez Bartlett) 
 
Ningún Estado de la Europa centro-oriental pasa por una crisis de identidad como la que afecta desde 
entonces –y hasta hoy, subrayado- España. En Ninguno fracasan de modo tan evidente, lo que se hace 
visible bajo Cánovas, los mecanismos de integración económica, política y cultural que en España se 
ponen en marcha siguiendo el patrón francés. (PSOP980042) (“Crisis de imperio”, by Antonio Elorza)  
 
A series of inter-related themes are employed in the problematisation of Spanish national 
history in both newspapers. One is Spain’s socio-economic and cultural backwardness, 
reflected in expressions like “atraso” and “decadencia”. Another is the fragility of the State 
and Spanish society, captured in the expression “España invertebrada” famously coined by 
Ortega y Gasset in 1921. A closely related theme is Spain’s perennial political rivalry 
characterized by a culture of intolerance epitomized by the violent confrontation of “las dos 
Españas”, also reflected in expressions such as “cainita”, “cainismo” and “anti-España”. 
Table 5.15 compares these phrases in the Opinion corpus. 
Table 5.15.  
 
El Mundo Opinion MI L-L El País Opinion MI 
Atraso (25) NA -1.03 Atraso (30) NA 
Decadencia (12) NA -7.39 Decadencia (27) NA 
Problema de España (25) 4.321 -1.63 Problema de España (32) 4.507 
España como problema (5) 4.321 -8.07 España como problema (17) 4.507 
España invertebrada (15) 8.564 +0.60 España invertebrada (10) 7.940 
Las dos Españas (91) 9.007 +2.56 Las dos Españas (64) 9.122 
Cainita (38) NA +5.57 Cainita (18) NA 
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Cainismo (13) NA +0.16 Cainismo (10) NA 
Anti-España (17) 5.019 -13.37 Anti-España (42) 7.470 
 
Phraseology related with the problematisation of the Spanish nation 
 
Examples of these themes abound in the narratives of El Mundo and País Opinion without 
significant differences in stance in their generalizations. The following examples capture the 
essence of this problematisation. MSOP040189 echoes the views of Spanish intellectuals in 
connection to Spain’s backwardness while PSOP960063 emphasizes how the idea of 
decadence has been part of the Spanish psyche since the second half of the 17
th
 century. In 
PSOP970086 Menéndez Pelayo is quoted in connection with Spain’s problematic national 
unity, which MSOP980047 attributes to the traditional lack of consensus on the form of the 
State among Spaniards. This lack of articulation is linked to cainismo in MSOP070348, a 
malaise which has infected Spain during much of its history and has given rise to the idea of 
“las dos Españas” destined to eliminate each other (PSOP990056). After some respite 
provided by the arrival of democracy after Franco cainismo is said to have made its 
comeback with Zapatero (MSOP060182, MCOP050036). Zapatero’s government is also 
blamed in MSOP060067 for having resurrected the invertebrate Spain while El País Opinion 
puts the blame on the right for Spain’s cainismo (PSOP000162, PSOP040015):  
 
Sobre estos escenarios, Ortega legitima la grotesca descalificación de España por los enciclopedistas, 
admitiendo, por lo tenues de las luces del siglo XVIII, que <<nos faltó el siglo educador>> y presenta a 
Europa como una solución lejana y pendiente; Unamuno clama que le <<duele España>> por formar 
parte de <<esa minoría de europeos>> que no logra imponerse a la <<mayoría de berberiscos>> que le 
rodea; Américo Castro explica que la esencia de lo español está en el <<vivir desviviéndose>>; Claudio 
Sánchez Albornoz residencia en los delirios expansionistas de los primeros Austrias el <<cortocircuito de 
la modernidad>> que nos condena a la oscuridad; Vicens Vives define el <<problema de España>> como 
nuestra incapacidad de asimilar el capitalismo, el racionalismo y el liberalismo y el propio Salvador 
Espriu arrastra melodiosamente su <<desesperat dolor>> por <<aquestar meva pobra, bruta, triste, 
dissortada pàtria>>, refiriéndose no a Cataluña sino a España. (MSOP040189) (“Mirando hacia atrás sin 




Proclividad relacionada con ese síndrome de "decadencia" tan vivo en la conciencia histórica de los 
españoles desde la segunda mitad del siglo XVII, que he intentado analizar con algún detenimiento en 
otras ocasiones. (PSOP960063) (“El centenario que viene”, by José María Jover) 
 
Como decía Menéndez Pelayo de la unidad nacional, qué le vamos a hacer, no tenemos otra. 
(PSOP970086) (“La culpa es del Estado”, by Santos Juliá) 
 
Desde la efímera experiencia de la Primera República en el siglo pasado, nunca había existido consenso 
entre los ciudadanos sobre la forma de Estado. (MSOP980047) (“Una Constitución de todos y para 
todos”, Editorial) 
 
Si quiero apuntar un viejo problema que ha agudizado ese cainismo que caracteriza nuestra historia: la 
falta de vertebración del Estado. (MSOP070348) (“Sobre la crispación”, by Pedro G. Cuartango) 
 
Un ejemplo de esa incorrecta interpretación de la historia puede ser la bien acreditada, entre muchos de 
nosotros, teoría de las "dos Españas", a cuya consolidación ha contribuido decisivamente la reiteración de 
guerras civiles durante el siglo XIX. El hecho de que éstas tuvieran lugar avalaba la existencia de "dos 
Españas" irreconocibles entre sí, cada una de las cuales se arrogaba el privilegio de ser la auténtica y, por 
lo tanto, con el derecho de eliminar a la contraria. (PSOP990056) (“La concepción excluyente de la 
historia española”, by José Luis Abellán) 
 
Aunque durante un breve periodo en la Transición pareció difuminarse el tópico de las dos Españas, el 
cainismo que caracteriza a nuestro espíritu nacional ha vuelto a aflorar con vigor inusitado. […] 
<<Españolito que vienes al mundo te guarde Dios, una de las dos Españas ha de helarte el corazón>>, 
escribió Antonio Machado. (MSOP060182) (“Las dos Españas”, by Pedro G. Cuartango) 
 
Los acontecimientos que se están precipitando desde la llegada al poder del actual gobierno socialista han 
provocado que uno de los libros de Ortega y Gasset, España invertebrada, haya cobrado nueva actualidad. 
[…]  
La invertebración de la que habla podría resumirse como <<una debilidad congénita de la unidad de 
España>>, que diagnostica en el momento en que la escribe y que define como una enfermedad crónica 
en el proceso de su continua tendencia a la desmembración, tras la aparente unidad conseguida en el siglo 
XVI. (MSOP060067) (“El bienio desvertebrador”, by Jorge de Esteban) 
 
[…] la inmensa mayoría de los graves problemas políticos que hemos sufrido como pueblo, han tenido su 
origen en la imposición de una determinada visión de España de unos sobre otros […] 
Quizá pueda usted hacerlo –y es evidente que puede-, pero incurrirá una vez más en el gran error de 
nuestra historia: una parte de España impone a la otra su parcial visión del Estado. (MCOP050036) 
(“Carta abierta a José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero”, by Adolfo Suárez Illana) 
 
La derecha española no ha tolerado que hubiera otra visión política de España que no fuera la suya. Ésta 
ha sido la esencia del nacionalismo español, que, justamente por eso, por ser un nacionalismo 
exclusivamente de derechas, ha sido un nacionalismo brutal y débil. Solamente podía imponerse por la 
fuerza, porque su capacidad de convencer y de integrar era escasísima. […] 
Teníamos que acabar con la repetición de ese ciclo infernal de nuestra historia, que había conducido a que 
ninguna Constitución fuera aceptada por el conjunto de la sociedad española, sino únicamente por una 
parte de la misma.  (PSOP000162) (“Vuelta a las andadas”, by Javier Pérez Royo) 
 
Aquí también se diría que andamos en el empeño de reconstruir a toda velocidad las dos Españas, que 
pensábamos reconciliadas en el yunque de la Constitución después de tanto cainismo guerracivilista. Es 
como si se quisieran borrar los años de la concordia para reeditar los pasados rencores, como si de la 
convivencia inaugurada se quisiera pasar a la invalidación del discrepante, como si la disidencia se 
entendiera en términos de penosa decadencia a extirpar. Algunos líderes del PP han dado en pensar que 
vale la pena tener toda la razón aun al precio de aniquilar a quienes se resisten a acompañarles para 




The weakness of the Spanish nation throughout history explains the emergence of alternative 
national sentiments and nation-building projects in Spain in both narratives. The two 
newspapers however differ in how they deal with this plurality of national sentiments, as we 
have seen before: While pluralism is acknowledged in the discourse of El País Opinion as a 
natural consequence of this problematic nation-building (PSOP960066), alternative 
nationalisms are perceived as a threat in the unitarist discourse of El Mundo Opinion 
(MSOP070162):  
Cuando hablamos de "nación de naciones" en España nos estamos refiriendo precisamente a ese 
encabalgamiento de varios procesos de construcción nacional en torno al dato central de los bloqueos que 
a lo largo del siglo XIX afectan a la consolidación del Estado-nación español. (PSOP960066) (“El 
discreto encanto de la burguesía “, by Antonio Elorza)  
 
Los españoles volvemos a estar inquietos por el futuro de nuestra nación. Parece como si España 
padeciera un siniestro maleficio y estuviéramos condenados a replantearnos una y otra vez lo que fuimos, 
lo que somos y lo que queremos ser. Presumimos, y con razón, de ser uno de los países más prósperos del 
mundo. Hemos alcanzado cotas de bienestar inimaginables hace unas décadas. Somos la octava potencia 
industrial, al menos según las estadísticas. Disfrutamos de un régimen de libertades fruto de la voluntad 
de concordia y entendimiento de nuestro pueblo. Llevamos 30 años de democracia ejemplar. Y, sin 
embargo, los gérmenes de la disgregación y el desencuentro han anidado entre nosotros. ¿Qué nos 
ocurre?” […] 
No contábamos tampoco con que ciertos gobiernos nacionalistas acabaran haciendo uso y abuso de sus 
profundas competencias autonómicas para imponer su peculiar visión de la Historia y, so pretexto de 
promover las lenguas vernáculas, hayan implantado auténticas barreras lingüísticas que amenazan con 
convertirse en fronteras políticas capaces de hacer saltar por los aires el fundamento mismo de la 
Constitución. (MSOP070162) (“España, nación de ciudadanos libres e iguales”, by Jaime Ignacio del 
Burgo) 
 
Sharp differences between the historical narratives of El Mundo and País Opinion also 
emerge in connection with specific historical periods and characters. This is not the case with 
Francoism, unanimously seen as a sinister dictatorship characterized by cruel political 
repression, but it clearly applies to the Second Republic and the Civil War. El Mundo 
Opinion tends to see the Republic as an undemocratic fiasco, a period of disillusionment, 
turmoil, division and confrontation culminating in a tragic civil war. That is the stance 
observed in over 69% of the articles with just over 7% offering a positive view of this period.  
El País Opinion on the other hand is usually supportive of the Republic in different degrees. 
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Over 48% of the articles examined construct this as a period of democracy and 
modernization and over 16% as a laudable modernization attempt which tragically failed. 
Less than 10% of the articles share the predominantly negative view of El Mundo. While the 
Civil War is unanimously perceived as a tragedy, El País Opinion tends to put all or most of 
the blame on Franco and the right (over 65% of the articles examine), with only 24% of the 
articles attributing equal guilt to both sides. The stance in El Mundo Opinion is markedly 
different, with over 51% of the articles equally blaming both sides and only over 28% of the 
articles either putting all the blame or more blame on Franco’s side. The unusually high 
occurrence of “Anti-España” in El País Opinion (-13.37) clearly reflects these differences of 
stance. Not so much connected with a pluralist stance per se but rather with a liberal-leftist 
view of Spanish history, this is a term associated with the Francoist stigmatization of its 
opponents in the Spanish Civil War. The following examples illustrate these differences. 
MSOP060074 contrasts the success of the monarchy with a republic “which brought the civil 
war and the burning of convents and private buildings” and “could not become the system of 
freedom intended”, while MSOP070086 warns us against “mythologizing the Second 
Republic’s virtues” concluding that “this period was a disgrace in which all political 
tendencies should be blamed”. A similarly negative view is presented in MEOP060417 
contrasted with Zapatero’s sympathy for this period. PSOP060152 on the other hand 
constructs the Republic as “a democratic project of broad social reform” while PSOP020062 
blames the right for not admitting the progressive nature of the republican regime and for 
having brought it down with a military coup. Finally, PSOP050113 questions the rightist 
narrative of a failed republic eventually leading to the Civil War.  
Las dos repúblicas, una muy corta, y la otra, que trajo la Guerra Civil, y la quema de conventos y 
edificios privados, quisieron, pero no fueron ni pudieron ser el sistema de libertades pretendido. 




Ese intento de mitificación de las virtudes de la II República no se corresponde con lo que pasó. En mi 
opinión, ese periodo, seguido de la demencial Guerra Civil, fue una desgracia en la que están 
involucradas todas las tendencias políticas. (MSOP070086) (“El apagón”, by Jorge de Esteban) 
 
Se cumplen hoy 75 años de la proclamación de la II República; ese periodo de nuestra historia cuya 
evocación resulta especialmente grata para el presidente del gobierno. Quienes los vivieron desde las 
calles de un pueblo, fuera de los despachos oficiales y apartados de los cenáculos de la intelectualidad, no 
suelen recordarlo con la misma añoranza que José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, tal vez porque los valores 
que sufrieron en carne propia no fueran tan dignos de encomio como algunos se empeñan en hacernos 
creer ahora. […] 
Fueron aquellos tiempos de miseria, desigualdad, opresión, incultura, odios viscerales, marginación de los 
más débiles –empezando por las mujeres-, sectarismo de uno y otro bando y, finalmente, guerra. 
(MEOP060417) (“'Valores' republicanos” by Isabel San Sebastián) 
 
La República de 1931 pretendió ser el primer proyecto democrático y de amplia reforma social que 
acabara por fin con el monopolio secular del poder político y de la riqueza nacional en manos de una 
minoría privilegiada, conservadora, reaccionaria y autoritaria. Al bienio de su intento reformador, su 
moderación desesperó a los proletarios superexplotados, pero fue suficiente para encender las iras del 
bloque conservador, incluida la jerarquía eclesiástica, su máximo agente ideológico y movilizante en una 
sociedad inculta y retrógada. (PSOP060152) (“La guerra que no cesa”, by José Antonio González 
Casanova) 
 
Nadie discute, salvo la derecha interesada y recalcitrante, que la breve experiencia vivida por nuestro país 
con motivo de la proclamación de la II República Española el 14 de abril de 1931 fue una opción 
renovadora. El proyecto de España que se puso en marcha entonces marcó una línea de progreso capaz de 
homologarse con los países más avanzados. Tampoco nadie pone en cuestión que el 18 de julio de 1936 
un golpe de Estado militar derrocó al poder legítimamente constituido, salvo la derecha que se aprovechó 
del botín de guerra durante más de 40 años. Así las cosas, y por una ausencia de debate nacional, sin 
complejos, sobre el periodo republicano, la guerra civil y la dictadura, seguimos ocultando y 
oscureciendo el periodo histórico más progresista de la España del siglo XX. (PSOP020062) (“La II 
República Española”, by Pedro Taracena Gil) 
 
La memoria de los vencedores de la Guerra Civil española, amos absolutos durante la dictadura de Franco, 
ocupa todavía un espacio preeminente en comparación con la de los vencidos. […] 
Las televisiones más poderosas e influyentes, las que llegan hasta el último rincón de España, rara vez se 
adentran en la historia de esas décadas del siglo XX, entre otras cosas porque esa historia de sueños de 
libertad, conflictos y violencia política no casa bien con la sucia realidad que inunda sus programaciones. 
Pero cuando lo hacen, exhiben lo que podría denominarse el síndrome neofranquista: recordar la 
República como un gran fracaso que condujo a una guerra civil, drama y tragedia en la que todos los 
combatientes cometieron barbaridades, y ocultar, o relatar de pasada, los asesinatos, las torturas y 
violaciones sistemáticas de los derechos humanos que cometieron Franco y su dictadura hasta el último 
momento de su existencia. (PSOP050113) (“La historia que nos cuenta TVE”, by Julián Casanova) 
 
In spite of the difficulties faced then, the transition to democracy after Franco’s death is 
almost unanimously perceived as an exception to Spain’s problematic history in the 
narratives of the two newspapers, an unprecedented period of democracy, freedom, peace 
and modernization which has finally brought the normalcy Spain lacked throughout much of 
its tragic history. Much of the credit is given to King Juan Carlos and Adolfo Suárez and also 




Differences between the narratives in both newspapers however appear when Spain’s present 
political situation under Zapatero is contrasted with this immediate past, as we will see next. 
 
5.3.4. Is the Spanish nation under threat? 
  
# Finding 10: One of the most significant differences between the discourses of the Spanish 
nation in both newspapers is the narrative of threat found in El Mundo Opinion, especially 
between 2005-2006. 
 
This threat narrative is present in approximately 35% of the NPs and in 41% of the sentences 
containing “nación española”, while 70% of the articles containing this phrase reflect some 
kind of threat. Figures 5.8 and 5.9 illustrate the repercussion of this threat narrative in El 
Mundo Opinion by tracking its evolution over time in articles containing “nación española” 
and by comparing the presence of threat versus non-threat at different levels of analysis, 
namely the lexico-grammatical, in the immediate context of the phrase “nación española”, 
and the broader context where entire texts are examined in search of this narrative. This 
arguably provides a more accurate measurement of the impact of threat because by relying 
solely on phraseological analysis there is a risk of misrepresenting linguistic phenomena 
operating at different levels of analysis. We can see once again a dramatic increase in the 
number of articles containing threat narratives in 2005 and a sharp decline after 2006, pretty 
much coinciding with the distribution of the word“nación” in the Opinion corpus shown in 





Figure 5.8.  
 
 
Threat across time in the discourse of El Mundo Opinion 
 











Types of threat versus non-threat over time in El Mundo Opinion 
 
This broader textual analysis proves to be essential in El País Opinion, where a closer look at 
the rare threat lexis detected reveals that the possibility of threat to the Spanish nation is 
actually being rejected or contested; or when acknowledged, it is considerably toned down. 



























































































PSOP060227 criticizes the suggestion that the Spanish nation is in danger because of the 
Estatut, as claimed by the Association for the Defence of the Spanish nation, an institution 
close to the Popular Party. In PSOP030004, Catalan Socialist politician and José Montilla, 
criticizes Aznar’s unitarist ideology, the politization of Spanish national unity and the threat 
discourse promoted by the PP to attack the pluralism of the PSOE.  
El jueves de la semana pasada tuvo lugar en Madrid la presentación de la Fundación para la Defensa de la 
Nación Española, según los portavoces de la cual España "peligra" y está "en serio riesgo de 
desaparición"; "la máxima expresión del ataque a la Constitución, la soberanía nacional y España misma 
es el proyecto de Estatuto catalán", aseveró el presidente de la nueva entidad, Santiago Abascal, antes de 
añadir que "el reconocimiento de la nación catalana es demoledor para la unidad nacional". El acto, 
celebrado en un céntrico hotel, no reunió a un puñado de freakies o de extremistas lunáticos, sino a un 
selecto elenco de próceres que ocupan o han ocupado altísimos cargos públicos y tienen vendidos 
millones de libros. (PSOP060227) (“Tragedia o engaño” by Joan B. Culla i Clarà). 
 
El presidente del Gobierno, José María Aznar, desde su llegada al poder en 1996, ha fijado un rumbo a su 
política interior que es cada día más excluyente de la realidad constitucional y más intolerante con la 
realidad nacional. El presidente Aznar, en estos casi ocho años de mandato, ha convertido en tema 
recurrente la unidad de España como arma arrojadiza contra la oposición de izquierdas y contra los 
nacionalismos periféricos. Para Aznar y el Partido Popular, el PSOE es un partido que, si gobernara, 
propiciaría la fractura interna de la nación española con temas tan diversos y conceptos tan alejados de la 
realidad de la mayoría natural como España plural, plurinacional y federal. El agente disolvente de la 
unidad patria, para José María Aznar, son Pasqual Maragall y sus malas influencias en un partido 
socialista que debe mantenerse en la oposición para preservar la unidad milenaria de la vieja Iberia. 
(PSOP030004) (“¿Quién protege a España de Aznar?” by José Montilla). 
 
While acknowledging the existence of alternative nation-building processes in Spain centred 
in denying the Spanish nation, PSOP050127 starts by emphasizing “the nation’s good health” 
as well as “its overwhelming recognition”.  
Pese a la ofensiva de los nacionalismos periféricos reforzada desde los años finales de la dictadura, pese a 
las ambigüedades de una parte de las fuerzas políticas democráticas, mi impresión es que la nación 
española sigue gozando de buena salud. Es demasiado honda la génesis del surgimiento histórico de 
España, demasiado significativa nuestra vida en común en la modernidad, demasiado profunda la 
construcción de un orden liberal de 1808 a 1936, demasiado larga la dictadura, suficientemente eficaz la 
vida de nuestra restablecida democracia, para que la vida de la nación española no alcance un 
reconocimiento abrumador en el mundo actual. La nación de España, entendida como una comunidad de 
ciudadanos sujeta a un régimen común de derechos y libertades, espacio de una solidaridad histórica 
renovada día a día por los avatares de una vida en común, pienso que se sostiene firme, hoy por hoy, por 
debajo de los datos políticos cotidianos... […]  Nos encontramos hoy en España con unos procesos muy 
intensos de construcción de unos hechos nacionales distintos al español. A su servicio se han puesto unos 
gobiernos subestatales que han entendido el Estado de las Autonomías no como un marco de convivencia 
de distintas sensibilidades nacionales, sino como rampa de lanzamiento para la construcción de unos 
hechos nacionales que no se satisfacen con su afirmación, sino que prolongan su acción en la negación de 
la común nación española. Porque negación es, al fin y al cabo, la afirmación de una nación catalana o 
vasca junto al reconocimiento de una "nación de naciones", España, en la que no cabe ver sino la vieja 
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categoría de un Estado que engloba en su seno auténticas y genuinas naciones. (PSOP050127) (“La salud 
de la nación española” by Andrés de Blas Guerrero).  
 
Figure 5.10 shows the most frequent lexical realizations of El Mundo’s threat discourse 
together with common threat agents and causes. Threat processes are encoded as verbs in 
sentences where the “Spanish nation” features as agent or as recipient, but more significantly, 
they are even more frequent in headwords of complex NPs of the type “destruction of the 
Spanish nation”. Grammatical metaphors (nominalization) are employed to thematize 
processes otherwise lexicalized as verbs (defend, destroy, liquidate, etc.). Arguably, this 
thematization enhances the effect of the threat discourse because it turns threat into a topic 
which could even be taken for granted. The threat agents and causes associated with this 
discourse can be divided into several groups: (i) President Zapatero, his government, the 
Socialist Party and several of its leaders; (ii) The Catalan, Basque and other nationalist 
people; (iii) ETA and its associates; PRISA, El País’s publisher, and its people; The Catalan 
and other new Statutes as part of the Autonomic System; The “Basque nationalist offensive” 
after the Estella Agreement, especially the Ibarretxe Plan and its “Referendum” where the 
Basque people are supposed to decide on the issue of “self-determination”.144  
 
  
                                                 
144
 Ibarretxe does not use the term “Referendum”. He prefers the term “consulta” –consultation- because 
according to Spanish law, only the State can call a referendum. Using the word “referendum” could have 







Threat discourse in El Mundo Opinion 
 




       
desprecio 
guardián          fin    
existencia 
continuidad     destrucción    
 
coherencia destructora        vigencia   
demolición                 deconstrucción 
desarticulación       descuartizamiento 
despiece  escombros   negación   quiebra 
subsistencia   destino aciago   cadáver  
cáncer 
cenizas   tragedia   pervivencia  agresiones 
ataque jaque mate   odio   ultrajes  
violencia  crimen  fuerzas hostiles   
planteamiento suicida 
 
flaco servici  
Zapatero 
los nacionalistas   el 
Estatut 
 
PNV  ERC   CIU   Batasuna  
BNG   ETA 
PSOE  PRISA   Polanco  
Maragall 
PRISOE  Carod  Pujol   
Arzalluz 
Otegi  Mas  Plan Ibarretxe   







salvar   herida    sepulta   enterrar    
hacer saltar por los aires 
llevarse por delante   disuelve   cuestione 
inocular la enfermedad  asesinar   
no queda mucha  niegan    deroga 
no respetan   tenemos menos 
conspirando  machacada  arrastrada 
corre peligro   expulsada   sobreviviera 
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# Finding 11: A single author, Federico Jiménez Losantos,
145
 contributes significantly to 
this threat discourse in El Mundo Opinion.  
 
His are more than 36% of the articles containing the phrase “Spanish nation”, 98% of which 
contain some kind of threat implication. Jiménez Losantos launches scathing attacks against 
what he considers the enemies of a moribund Spanish nation (“a corpse”, “in ruins”, 
“reduced to ashes”. Prime Minister Zapatero (ZP or Zetapé), his government and the 
Socialist Party feature highly on this list. Considered “a traitor” for his “dealings with 
Basque and Catalan nationalists” and for “having surrendered to ETA”, Zapatero is labeled 
one of the main culprits in the destruction of Spain, together with Socialist leaders such as 
Maragall (“a nationalist”). Theirs is the “anti-constitutional” and “separatist” Estatut which 
marks “the end of the Spanish nation”, “destroys freedom” (“like in North Korea”) and 
“solidarity among all Spaniards”. Basque and Catalan nationalist parties and leaders also 
feature highly on Jiménez Losantos’s list (“PNV/Arana’s children”, “Ibarretxe and his plan”, 
“Arzalluz”, “Otegi”, “Carod-Rovira/Roviretxe”, “Pujol”, ERC, CIU, etc.). They are 
“separatists” dedicated to destroying the Spanish nation together with ETA, another major 
culprit. They are assisted by “Zapatero and his gang” in this enterprise (“Zapatero has 
thrown himself into ETA’s arms”) and helped by PRISA’s146 media empire (“the PRISOE”, 
“the Polanquist Empire/Komintern”). Lesser culprits in frequency terms are other regional 
Statutes, Spain’s Autonomic system (“a failure”, “hugely expensive”), an ambiguous 
Spanish Constitution and those leftist parties who have “deserted the idea of Spain”.  
                                                 
145
 Jiménez Losantos conducts a popular talk show in the Spanish radio and writes opinión articles in El Mundo 
on a regular basis. Author of several books, he has been listed among the most influential Spaniards in recent 
years. http://www.elmundo.es/especiales/2006/01/sociedad/500del2006/poder1.html#17 (retrieved on 7-7-12) 
 
146
 The PRISA Group is one of Spain’s largest media empires. Its leading newspaper is none other than El País, 




MSOP050055 shows the extent to which this threat discourse can operate in El Mundo 
Opinion, especially in Jiménez Losantos’s writing, characterized by the use of the 
commentator voice discussed earlier on (p. 321). The writer’s is the only voice being heard 
making frequent use of inscribed social sanction. The target of the diatribe is Zapatero, 
caricatured as “Don Zetapé”. He is the agent, overt or implied, in most clauses being 
accused of “deceit”, “treason”, “blatant complicity with ETA”, “presumption”, “attempting 
to marginalize the opposition” and “demolition and liquidation of the Spanish nation”. 
Grammatical metaphor (traición, demolición del pacto constitucional, liquidación de la 
nación española) plays a key role in constructing this threat discourse. It not only provides 
the writer with additional rhetorical resources by enabling the thematization or objectivation 
of verbal processes but also conveys the impression that these accusations are factual and 
need no further proof. Much of this criticism is also amplified by graduation, in terms of 
quantity and intensity (underlined) as well as by hyperbolic metaphor (Don Zetapé; 
comunista de zulo y checa).  
Como ya se cree sus novelas Don Zetapé dice que las elecciones muestran la voluntad de cambio de la 
sociedad vasca [-ve social sanction: impropriety]. ¡Que forma de engañarse y de engañarnos [Don 
Zetapé]! [-ve social sanction: impropriety] La triste verdad es que su traición al Pacto Antiterrorista y a 
la Ley de Partidos, su abierta complicidad con la ETA [-ve social sanction: impropriety] para que 
vuelva a sentarse en el Parlamento del que legalmente había sido expulsada se han traducido en una 
clara radicalización del separatismo, cuya fuerza emergente es el partido de la ETA, comunista de 
zulo y checa hasta en el nombre y totalitario hasta las cejas [-ve social sanction: social esteem]. ¿De 
qué se engríe, pues, Don Zetapé? [-ve social sanction: impropriety] [Don Zetapé] ¿De haber obtenido un 
escaño menos que el PP cuando gobernaba, con Mayor de candidato? [Don Zetapé] ¿De contar con la 
ETA para doblegar al PNV, y con el PNV y la ETA para marginar al PP? [-ve social sanction: 
impropriety] Lo que tan turbiamente trama [Don Zetapé] es una tregua de ETA que le permita ir a las 
elecciones con un turbio plan de demolición constitucional y liquidación de la nación española 
presentado como el triunfo de la paz y de la siesta [-ve social sanction: impropriety]. Pero no hay paz 
sin libertad. Ni en los cementerios. (MSOP050055) (“De turbio en turbio” [-ve affect], by Federico 





5.4. The discourses of emerging nations in El Mundo and País Opinion 
This section discusses how alternative national constructs are represented in the discourses of 
El Mundo and País Opinion. Table 5.16 shows common phrases associated with the various 
emerging nations specifying the total number of occurrences within a L5-R5 span, the most 
common positions and Mutual Information scores. As in the News Corpus, Catalonia and the 
Basque Country are the only candidates with real impact. Andalusia and Galicia present a 
similar number of occurrences, although in the first case no real aspiration towards acquiring 
a national status is conveyed. There is only one occurrence attributing nationhood to the 
Canary Islands coming from a nationalist voice. These three minor candidates are usually 
mentioned as a sequel to Catalan national claims. 
Table 5.16.  
Total 
L5/R5 
El Mundo Opinion MI El País Opinion MI Total 
L5/R5 
266 Cataluña ** nación (97) 
Cataluña * nación (83) 
6.377 Cataluña ** nación (66) 
Cataluña * nación (49) 
5.887 170 
81 Nación catalana (71) 6.931 Nación catalana (71) 6.692 77 
1 Catalunya ** nación (1) 
 
 Catalunya ** nación (2) 
Catalunya * nación (2) 
4.155 4 
58 Nación vasca (53) 5.446 Nación vasca (71) 5.686 88 
19 Vasco ** nación (5) 
Vasco **** nación (5) 
Vasco *** nación (3)  
1.846 Nación *** vasco (5) 
Vasco ** nación (4) 
Vasco * nación (4) 
1.920 18 
11 Euskal Herria como nación 
(5) 
Euskal Herria ** nación (2) 
5.883 Euskal Herria como nación (6) 4.629 9 
11 Euskadi ** nación (12) 
Euskadi * nación (5) 
4.592 Euskadi ** nación (4) 
Euskadi *** nación (3) 
Euskadi **** nación (3) 
3.232 17 
13 Andalucía ** nación (4) 
Andalucía * nación (2) 
5.196    
6 Nación andaluza (5) 7.121    
11 Galicia **** nación (4) 
Galicia * nación (3) 
3.039 Nación **** Galicia (2)  2 
2 Nación gallega (2) NA Nación gallega (1) NA 1 
   Canarias ** nación (1) NA 1 
 
Emerging nations in El Mundo vs. País Opinion 
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Figures 5.11 and 5.12 illustrate the diachronic evolution of all the terms associated with the 
Catalan and Basque nations in El Mundo versus País Opinion. The pattern in the former case 
generally coincides with that of the more general term “Nación” shown in figure 5.4, 
whereas that of the Basque nation differs considerably. This is arguably another proof of the 
centrality played by the Catalan Statute in starting a period of discursive negotiation on the 
national issue in recent years.  
 
Figure 5.11.  
 
 The CATALAN NATION, El Mundo vs. País Opinion 
  














































 The BASQUE NATION, El Mundo vs. País Opinion 
 
# Finding 12: The discourse of the Catalan and Basque nations in El Mundo Opinion is based 
on the categorical rejection of these emerging national constructs whereas that of El País 
Opinion tends towards their conditioned critical acceptance.   
 
The discourses of the Catalan and Basque nations in both newspapers portray these as 
emerging constructs alternative or complementary to the existing Spanish nation, usually 
associated with qualities like “posible”, “presunta”, or processes like “DEFINIR, 
RECONOCER, DENOMINAR, CONVERTIR, CONSIDERAR, etc”. “SER” is still the most 
common process, but it often appears embedded in periphrasis like “DECIR QUE SER” 
conveying the idea of novelty. 
 
The unitarist vs. pluralist ideologies in El Mundo and El País are corroborated (figure 5.13). 
El Mundo’s discourse is characterized by its categorical rejection of the Catalan nation while 













































El País tends towards its conditional acceptance while reflecting considerable distrust in the 
face of the aspirations towards self-determination allegedly implicit in the Estatut. There is 
also frequent criticism of Catalan nationalism for trying to reproduce the nationalist-unitarist 
discourse in Catalonia. 
 
Figure 5.13.  
 
 Stance towards the Catalan nation, El Mundo vs. País Opinion 
 
El Mundo Opinion’s critique is occasionally angry and disrespectful. The Catalan nation is 
described as “cuento de payeses” and “una nación de la que huían sus reyes” 
(MCOP050232). It is also argued that “la presunta nación catalana se afirma en la negación 
de la actual nación española” (MCOP050240). Statements by Pujol and other nationalist 
leaders affirming the existence of the Catalan nation and denying the Spanish one are widely 
criticised (MCOP960033, MSOP990039, MSOP980083, MCOP980043) together with the 
efforts by the Catalan government to promote an image of Catalonia as an oppressed 
stateless nation abroad (MCOP070079). Counter arguments such as “Cataluña no es ni más 
ni menos que una comunidad autónoma a punto de rozar su altísimo techo competencial” 



























































(MSOP980133) or “Cataluña no es una nación sino el Condado de Barcelona que ostenta el 
Rey” (MSOP050137) abound.  
 
The Catalan nation criticised in El Mundo Opinion is seen as a social construct 
(MCOP050006, MCOP050030, MCOP050277) based on several arguments: Socio-historical, 
linguistic, sentimental-symbolic and politico-legal. The socio-historical argument is often 
contrasted with the politico-legal one. Zapatero is criticised for conflating these two in 
MCOP040021, unable to differentiate between “nacionalidad/nación (Catalonia) cultural” 
and “nación política” (Spain). Catalonia is said to possess “una personalidad histórica 
peculiar y diferenciada” (MCOP960071, MCOP040021), ironically attributed “a Catalan 
history of no less than 3,000 years” (MCOP960029), a long history Catalan nationalists deny 
to the Spanish nation (MSOP000095). This Catalan national history is considered “a 
falsification” (MCOP050030, MCOP050277). Historical milestones in Catalan 
nation-building, from the Corpus de Sang de 1640 to Francoism, The War of Succession and 
the Republic, are relativized arguing that these were periods of inner tension among Catalans 
to emphasize how weak Catalan national sentiment was. 
 
Language is identified as the most defining feature of anything Catalan: “único hecho 
diferencial” (MCOP960044), “seña de identidad prácticamente única” (MCOP970017). 
The concept of “lengua propia” is considered “a myth” (MCOP050030) and Catalan 
nationalists are accused of trying to impose monolingualism with their nation-building 
policies (MCOP060067, MCOP050143),  “la obligación de hacer coincidir nación y 
lengua” (MCOP060239), “un mercado lingüístico unificado” (MSOP050195), “construir 
una nación catalana poblada únicamente por patriotas que hablan sólo catalán” 
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(MCOP050006), ignoring, according to pluralist Cristina Peri Rossi, that “Cataluña es y 
será una nación bilingüe” (MCOP070089).  
 
The symbolic-sentimental argument is based on a strong sense of belonging to the Catalan 
nation promoted by Catalan nationalism (MCOP960071, MCOP050112, MCOP060054, 
MCOP060025), an identifiable and differentiated Catalan identity (MCOP060253), reflected 
in a national anthem and a flag according to pluralist Henry Kamen (MSOP010119). This 
discourse, whose popularity is questioned (MSOP050310), is identified with the romantic 
essentialism of the jocs florals where Catalonia appears as “una nación poética contrapuesta 
a la verdadera nación española” (MSOP06104). The Catalan education system is accused of  
presenting Catalonia as “nación símbolo enfrentada históricamente a otra nación símbolo y 
tabú: España”, thus converting the Catalan nation into “una especie de religión laica” 
(MCOP050143).  
 
The politico-legal argument is the one most commonly found in El Mundo Opinion. The 
emphasis here is on the concepts of sovereignty and self-determination (MCOP050277, 
MSOP060164, MEOP060406, MCOP060302, MSOP050024, MSOP040250, MEOP060436, 
MSOP050092, MCOP060215, MCOP060195, MCOP070081, MCOP050119, MCOP030050, 
MCOP050245, MCOP050158, MCOP050167, MCOP050282) arguing that Catalonia’s 
definition as a nation has legal consequences (MCOP050086) because “every nation requires 
an State” (MCOP050112) and that behind Catalonia’s definition as a nation “se oculta la 
deseada capacidad para decidir su propio destino, al margen de la nación española, 
basándose en un poder constituyente y soberano genuinamente catalán” (MCOP050266), 




The various definitions of Catalonia presented reflect the negotiations around the Estatut 
(MCOP060016, MCOP050001). Zapatero is accused of indifference when it comes to 
defining “España y a Cataluña como nación, nacionalidad, entidad nacional o cualquier 
otra variedad semántica” (MCOP050013, MSOP040194). As a result of that, “media 
España ni siquiera sabe ya si debe llamarse España o Cataluña, nación o país, estado o 
palangana o cuarteto de cuerdas” (MSOP060108).  
 
CiU’s definition of Catalonia as “nación con soberanía propia aunque asociada al Estado 
español” (MCOP030015)  is criticised as well as the idea of Catalonia “única nación 
dentro de un Estado plurinacional español” which “condescendientemente acepta 
relacionarse en un marco de libre solidaridad con las demás con rango inferior de 
nacionalidades y regiones” (MCOP050277). Pluralist views associated with Maragall are 
also questioned. For instance, Catalonia’s definition  as “una nación que forma parte de la 
España plural reconocida por la Constitución” (MCOP030016) or the aspiration to become 
“una nación con pleno derecho, pero dentro del Reino de España” (MCOP060010), “una 
nación dentro del Estado español” (MCOP050007) or “una nación en términos de igualdad 
con España” (MCOP040021); or the “nuevo basilisco estatutario”: “La nación catalana 
constituida en comunidad autónoma española” (MCOP070090), “una entidad nacional 
constituida en comunidad autónoma… Un poco más que el Valle de Arán” (MCOP050102). 
Given the Valley of Aran’s recognition as “entidad nacional” in the Estatut, El Mundo 
Opinion takes the opportunity to mock Catalanism calling Catalonia a “nation of nations” 
(MCOP050131, MSOP050160). It is concluded that “Catalonia can be either a nation or an 
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autonomous community” (MCOP050283) and Maragall is accused of proposing to 
“convertir a Cataluña en una nación al margen de España” (MCOP050004).  
 
Pluralist and nationalist arguments eventually come together in El Mundo Opinion in the 
face of a Catalonia finally becoming “nación independiente con derecho a expansionarse” 
(MCOP050172) and annexing all the territories which historically, linguistically and 
culturally have been considered Catalan: Valencia, the Balearic Islands, Aragon and Alghero 
(MSOP060167). The “pre-political” concept of “pueblo” (MCOP050092) with the right to 
self-determination is contrasted with that of “individuos con derechos, libertades y 
obligaciones” (MCOP050257, MCOP060034) arguing that “nación catalana significa la 
reducción artificial y negativa del demos ciudadano” (MCOP060294). 
 
El País Opinion’s stance regarding the Catalan nation is eminently pluralist in many respects. 
It is considerably more heteroglossic than that of El Mundo Opinion, showing a wider 
variety of views, including unitarist ones, albeit within a strong pluralist core. Generally 
speaking, Catalonia is recognised as “nación con minúscula” (PCOP050002, PCOP050158) 
inside Spain, understood as “nación de naciones” (PSOP060178, PSOP040165, 
PCOP970020): “Un conjunto nacional inserto en el seno de otro conjunto nacional” 
(PCOP970020), “estable e irreversible” (PCOP030038). Accordignly, it is argued that the 
terms “nación” and “nacionalidad” are synonyms (PSOP980052, PCOP060167, 
PCOP060040), something rejected by some unitarist voices (PCOP050170, PCOP050132). 
 
Various pluralist voices emphasize the symbolic, not legal, character of the concept of nation 
applied to Catalonia (PCOP050022, PCOP050002, PCOP060167), its sociological and 
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cultural sense (PCOP050022, PCOP050013), the idea of “territorio compartido memoria 
colectiva y tradición común” (PSOP960162), “historia” (PCOP050154, PCOP050017, 
PCOP030022), “sujeto/realidad histórico/a” (PCOP050111, PSOP060043) or  
“personalidad histórica diferenciada” (PCOP030016), as well as the Renanian notion of 
“collective national conscience” (PCOP050169, PCOP050034, PCOP050158, PCOP050156, 
PCOP050106, PCOP000014, PCOP030016, PCOP050040, PCOP060167, PCOP050053, 
PCOP970020, PCOP060075, PCOP060043, PCOP960065, PCOP040047, PCOP060028); or 
even the racial component found in Almirall or Gener (PSOP030022). On occasion it is 
argued that such national conscience is “plural, dual y aparece debilitada” (PCOP050071, 
PCOP060075), “coja” (PCOP030007), “desgarrada por particularismos sectarios” 
(PCOP050152). The idea of a Catalan nation as political construct is also emphasized 
(PCOP050166, PCOP050127, PCOP050038, PCOP060075) together with the importance of 
culture (PCOP050154, PCOP050156, PCOP050017, PCOP050106, PCOP960050) and 
“lengua propia” (PCOP010004, PSOP960162, PCOP050166, PCOP060043, PCOP050154, 
PSOP050078, PCOP050156) without the inclusion of Valencia and the Balearic Islands 
(PSOP050209), although some isolated voices question the importance of language in a 
multi-lingual Catalonia (PCOP050071). 
 
Discrepancy within pluralism is manifested when it comes to defining the terms of a Catalan 
nation within the Spanish nation. Some authors opt for the distinction between cultural 
nation (Catalonia) and political Nation-State (Spain) (PCOP050004, PCOP050010, 
PCOP050169), despite Catalonia eventually becoming a political nation “por aburrimiento” 
(PCOP060147). Alongside this dichotomy, the Catalan nation would not be considered 
“sujeto de soberanía, portadora de estatalizad” (PCOP050002, PCOP050013, PCOP050022, 
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PCOP010004, PCOP050010, PCOP050110), “Un sujeto singular desligado de la nación 
española” (PCOP050166, PSOP050203). It would be  “una nación sin estado propio” 
(PCOP050034), “no independiente” (PCOP960050). This pluralist discourse therefore 
rejects the dichotomy of Catalan nation vs. Spanish State typical of Catalan nationalism 
(PCOP050164, PCOP040067) advocating instead a Catalonia “nación plural” 
(PSOP040165, PCOP960015, PCOP970020, PSOP040047 and “plurinacional” 
(PCOP960061, PCOP050169). Other authors do not agree with the distinction between 
cultural and political nation and speak of Catalonia as “a political nation within another 
political nation called Spain” (PSOP050182, PSOP060154).   
 
This insistence in comparing the Spanish and the Catalan nation provokes suspicion in a 
significant number of pluralist articles critical with the Estatut (PSOP050017, PCOP050155), 
accused of converting the Catalan nation into “sujeto soberano” (PCOP050018, 
PCOP060019, PCOP050132), “nación completa” (PEOP040009), “única” (PSOP030061), 
“homogenea” (PSOP060181, PCOP050169), “unitaria a pesar del Valle de Arán” 
(PCOP050137), “nación con dimensión de Estado” (PCOP050060), “con la voluntad de ser 
Estado” (PSOP960162), when “neither Catalonia nor Spain are homogeneous” 
(PCOP970020, PSOP040165) but “naciones plurales” (PCOP960015), “plurinacionales” 
(PCOP960061) . This conditioned national recognition of Catalonia by some pluralist 
authors is accompanied by strong criticism towards Catalan nationalism, accused of 
“curtailing the cultural and linguistic pluralism of the Catalan nation” (PCOP960001, 
PCOP050166) and “aiming to construct an essentialist Catalan nation” (PCOP050011), “an 
homogeneous Catalan nation by imposition” (PSOP060181), “eliminating the nation of 
nations” (PCOP050111, PSOP030061, PCOP050137). Perceiving nationalism in 
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quasi-religious terms (PSOP050078, PCOP990031), these pluralist authors propose a 
concept of Catalan nation removed from the nationalist uniformity advocated by the 
defenders of an ethnic essentialism which identifies nation and people (PCOP030018), a 
metaphysical and transcendental concept which has nothing to do with the nation of citizens 
(PCOP020025).  
 
The unitarist/pluralist distinction in the discourses of El Mundo vs. País Opinion is partly 
diluted in the case of the Basque nation. Having acknowledged Spain’s national plurality, 
many voices in El País Opinion tend to put this debate aside and concentrate on criticizing 
peripheral nationalism. The pluralist presence also seems to increase in El Mundo Opinion 
with the contribution by Joseba Arregi, a former PNV politician turned pluralist ideologue.
147
 
He authors twenty-five articles in El Mundo Opinion related with Basque issues starting 
from 2004. Despite his pluralist inclination, Arregi’s contribution is reduced to criticizing the 
exclusionist unitarism of Basque nationalism and other nationalist movements on the 
periphery, which deny the national plurality of their respective territories while preaching 
that very same plurality for the Spanish State (MEOP070478). In his critique of Ibarretxe’s 
policies, Arregi opposes the PNV’s ethnic nationalism to a civic nationalism where citizens 
come before abstract concepts like “pueblo” (MEOP070005). Arregi also criticizes any 
strategy by the PNV accommodating towards ETA (MEOP070301). He even advocates the 
ascension of Spanish parties to the Basque government as a basis for the construction of a 
plural Euskadi within a plural Spain: 
Lo que Euskadi necesita es reafirmar la transversalidad entre los demócratas que le hace ser sociedad en 
sentido político, no necesariamente un gobierno transversal. Y la transversalidad debe incluir al Partido 
Popular. Y es preciso no olvidar quién ha puesto en duda, entre paréntesis, en riesgo y bajo sospecha la 
                                                 
147
 Arregi’s pluralist proposal of a Basque civic nation has been expounded in books like “La nación vasca 
possible” (see references).  
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transversalidad existente, pretendiendo sustituirla por la unilateralidad nacionalista. (MEOP050069) 
(“Contra el catastrofismo”, by Joseba Arregi). 
 
All this does not exclude the frequent anti-pluralist views in El Mundo Opinion where the 
possibility of a Basque nation is compared with the existence of an Andalusian or Cantabrian 
nation (MSOP040178) or nations called Galicia, Castilla, Toledo or Cartagena 
(MSOP060004).  
 
While recognizing the Basque and the Catalan nations, El País Opinion is mostly critical 
with peripheral nationalism. The main accusation is also the lack of pluralism in Basque 
nation-building (PSOP980074, PSOP990102, PSOP050182, PEOP000144, PEOP000073, 
PEOP000007, PCOP960005, PEOP990176, PEOP990030, PEOP980214, PEOP980165, 
PEOP070012, PEOP050103, PEOP000354, PEOP000211, PEOP050047, PCOP050169, 
PSOP980052) and this same argument is occasionally extended to Spanish unitarist 
nationalism (PEOP000046, PSOP050071), something rare in El Mundo Opinion 
(MEOP000503).  
 
Much of the discourse in both newspapers questions the nationalist idea of the Basque nation 
based on five main interrelated postulates: identity, history, self-determination, ethnic nation 
and nation as a social construct. A common pluralist topos postulates a Basque nation based 
on identity while agreeing at the same time with the existence of a Spanish identity also 
present in Catalonia and Euskadi (PCOP960005, PCOP050169, MEOP010140). The 
historical and ethnic postulates are criticized in El Mundo Opinion labelling the Basque 
nation as “virtual” (MEOP980211), “hipotética” (MEOP030010, MEOP060056), “nonata” 
(MEOP060056),  “nunca existió” (MEOP060233), “imaginaria” (MEOP050245), “a la 
vez medieval y de un futurismo utópico” (MSOP060104), “ensoñación” (MSOP07162), 
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“sueño loco” (MEOP030006), “invención nacida de la cabeza de un visionario, Sabino 
Arana, que creyó ver en los Fueros el origen de la identidad nacional, cuando 
históricamente representaban el vasallaje a la corona española (sic)” (MEOP030185), 
“falsificación de la historia” (MEOP030185), “nación poética” as opposed to the Spanish 
nation, “la única verdadera” (MSOP060104). El País Opinion describes it as “nación 
imaginaria”, the product of Romantic nationalism (PEOP000211); “una tribu” 
(PEOP000144), “nación de patriotas impositivos y excluyentes” (PEOP020221), 
“constitucionalmente inmanejable” (PEOP050047). Nationalists are accused of “mistaking 
ethnic and cultural communities for political ones” (PEOP070169). This ethnic conception of 
things Basque is contrasted with a more integrative Catalan identity (PEOP050094) while 
advocating a civic and pluralistic notion of the Basque nation (PEOP000257) which does not 
place the nation above civic liberties (MEOP000395). Both newspapers emphasize the idea 
of a Basque nation as a social construct rather than a historical reality (MEOP980211, 
PEOP980214) while criticizing the exclusion of many citizens (PEOP000211) and the 
violence (MEOP990179, PEOP020198). 
 
5.5. Conclusions 
Chapters 4 and 5 have illustrated how corpus-based discourse analysis can be used in 
empirical social research enhancing the representativity of the data, offering a standardized 
replicable method of text analysis and allowing us to make reliable generalisations about the 
construction of national narratives in the Spanish press. The analysis of opinion articles 
confirms the differences in stance on nationhood observed in the News Corpus at various 
levels of linguistic analysis: Phraseological, whole-text and grammatical. El Mundo largely 
reproduces the mainstream unitarist discourse of the right whereas the left’s pluralist 
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discourse of asymmetrical federalism dominates the narratives of El País. Other discourses 
identified by Balfour and Quiroga (2007) are less common: the views of “right-wing 
modernizing regionalism”148are rare in El Mundo. Faithful to its pluralism, the discourse of 
El País is more polyphonic. An asymmetrical federalist narrative epitomized in the 
expression “Nación de naciones” and civic nationalism with post-national features, tolerant 
with alternative identities, dominate its discourse. 
 
In both El Mundo and País Opinion Spain is constructed as an “established nation” while 
Catalonia and Euskadi are considered “emerging nations”. Other territories like Galicia are 
practically ignored. As we saw in the News Corpus, the political climate created by the 
inclusion of the term “Nación” in the Catalan Statute plays a central role in the construction 
of national narratives here. This is evidenced by the sharp increase in articles containing the 
terms “Nación” and, to a lesser extent, “España” between 2005 and 2006, when the Estatut 
occupied the centre of the political debate, as well as by detailed phraseological and 
whole-text analysis of a large sample of articles containing these terms. Probably, the Estatut 
is behind the statistically significant differences in the number of articles found in El Mundo 
and País Opinion between 1996 and 2007, given that the spike in the number of articles takes 
place after 2004. The higher number of articles in El Mundo Opinion may be attributed to the 
greater impact the campaign against the Estatut launched by the Popular Party had in this 
newspaper. Additional evidence in support of this hypothesis comes from the markedly 
unitarist stance in El Mundo as well as by the widespread use of threat themes during that 
period. However, there may be additional causes behind the higher number of opinion 
                                                 
148
 Regionalist modernisers of the PP like Núñez Feijoo, Piqué or Zaplana emphasise the growing importance 
of the regions without questioning Spanish unity. They also tend to support a civic form of nationalism with 
some post-national influences, a discourse which is closer to the views of moderate pluralists in the PSOE than 
the traditionalist centralist discourse of the right according to the above-mentioned authors.  
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articles in El Mundo Opinion given that the increasing trend continues in 2007 when the 
number of articles containing the terms “Nación” and “España” had significantly dropped. 
 
The threat discourse associated with the Spanish nation in El Mundo Opinion constitutes the 
most significant difference between the two newspapers and between the Opinion and the 
News Corpus. Threat is facilitated by an editorial style characterized by monogloss 
unconstrained authorial judgment leading to highly charged remarks about the fate of the 
Spanish nation, not only at the hands of Catalan and Basque separatists but also as a result of 
the policies of the Socialist government presided by Zapatero. One regular contributor, 
Jiménez Losantos, is largely responsible for this discourse. His remarks are usually the most 
inflammatory prose found in El Mundo Opinion, although the use of the commentator voice 
and the threat discourse also feature in the writing of other authors. 
 
The Opinion Corpus provides additional evidence on how the unitarist and pluralist 
narratives of El Mundo and País are constructed. References to history are central in both 
cases at the expense of alternative identity markers like symbols, religion, language, the 
monarchy, etc. The analysis of historical narratives reveals some similarities as well as 
differences. While both newspapers conceive the nation as a social construct, El Mundo 
generally opts for Perennialism and El País adheres to Modernism. The two newspapers 
coincide in problematizing nation-building, although the periods and historical figures 
generally praised and criticized are different. The conclusions derived from this 
problematisation are also different. El Mundo emphasises the staunch defense of a Spanish 
nation under threat by alternative emerging national constructs while El País generally opts 
for recognizing Spain as a nation of nations in the context of an increasingly plural and 
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post-national society, although this post-nationalism is not elaborated in sufficient detail. 
This recognition of a plurality of nations within the Spanish Nation-State is however 
accompanied by criticism of Catalan and Basque nationalism for sharing with españolismo a 
unitarist conception of their nation.   
 
The analysis of national narratives in the Spanish press evidences the polyphonic nature and 
inherent instability of the discourse, subject to frequent re-formulation and shift 
(Angermüller, 2012), (Teubert, 2010), revealing at the same time far-reaching paradoxes in 
the discursive construction of nationhood. Identity appears central to Spanish politics but it is 
often fragmented and controversial. On the one hand, there is little banality in how the 
nation(s) is narrated, as the proliferation of articles including the term “Nación” and the 
threat discourse in connection with the Estatut indicate. Nationhood may even be used, for 
spurious political agendas, to discredit rivals and undermine policies. On the other hand, we 
are presented with divergent narratives of a Spanish nation largely understood in historical 
terms whose history unanimously perceived as plagued with weakness and internal conflict.   
 
As Balfour and Quiroga (2007) stress, the construction of a Spanish identity ‘above politics’ 
is still pending or remains a work in progress given the divide between the right and the left 
on how the past should be interpreted and how Spanish nationalism should project into the 
future. In a way, there is considerable symbiosis between unitarist españolismo and 
peripheral nationalisms. Both discourses share historicist, teleological and non-inclusive 
conceptions of nationhood where españolismo often appears as defensive and reactive 





 As Spain’s de-centralisation peaked towards 2001, the dynamics of multiple 
ethnoterritorial concurrence identified by Moreno (2001)
150
 seem to have been substituted 
by more confrontational strategies openly questioning the State of Autonomies. Examples of 
this can be found in the “Plan Ibarretxe”, the new Estatut, the current plans for a referendum 
on self-determination and the creation of a Catalan State
151
or the growing calls for 
re-centralisation coming from the centre (see p. 1). In response to this polarisation, the 
pluralist discourse of El País seems more rational and innovative. This rationality is reflected 
in the editorial style of the newspaper, far less reliant on authorial judgement. By advocating 
a relativist and tolerant form of civic nationalism one could argue that El País provides an 
innovative alternative to the dichotomy of mutually exclusive identities from the centre and 
the periphery. However, the risk that the way-out advocated by El País may end up being 
silenced as the confrontation between nationalisms grows is real. After all, discursive 
rationality and innovation may not always constitute advantages in what Teubert (2008) calls 
“the age of spin”, dominated by arthritic politics and media discourses void of new ideas, full 
of blatant repetition. 
 
One last paradox is worth noticing: the growing calls in support of Catalan and Basque 
nationhood come at a historical time when a “post-national mode of organization” seems 
more than plausible, with Nation-States appearing increasingly dysfunctional as social 
processes are being re-scaled at world-level and societies become ethnically and culturally 
hybrid. The current economic crisis and the numerous corruption cases dominating Spanish 
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 Mater dolorosa is the metaphor employed by (Álvarez Junco, 2001)  in his study of the idea of Spain in 
the 19
th
 century.  
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 See pp. 232-233. 
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 See Noguer, M. (2013) Mas encarga el diseño de un Estado catalán. El País [online], Friday 12 April. 




politics nowadays are adding fuel to the fire as Spanish society faces peripheralisation in 
world-system terms and politics appear increasingly delegitimized amid growing pessimism 
and distrust (Juliana Ricart, 2012). And yet, in accordance with Sewel’s axiom of 
multiplicity of structures (see p. 73) national identities seem impervious, at least for now, to 
these changes:  
[…] economic globalization has progressed with tremendous speed, but politics and 
the media have remained primarily national. Or, using Appadurai’s concepts, we 
might say that the financescape has moved much faster than the ideoscape. As a 
result, we see a disjuncture between the two scapes and a sharp rise of nationalism in 







I have proposed a theoretical model and a methodology for the study of nationhood based on 
a social-constructionist perspective, assuming that nations are historically evolving 
constructs and that nationhood is largely a modern phenomenon, inscribed in the context of 
world capitalist expansion, albeit with pre-modern antecedents. Such a model and 
methodology capture the extreme complexity of the nation-building phenomenon 
satisfactorily, taking into account both its macro and micro dimensions and allowing us to 
combine nomothetic analysis with idiographic accounts based on empirical data.    
 
Nations are said to have been constructed discursively, by means of semiotically-mediated 
social action situated across time-space. This discursive construction has operated on two 
main fronts: it shaped the national mode of organization, associated with State-building, and 
it led to the creation and diffusion of narratives constituting national identities. Structured at 
different scales, nation-building is characterized by its complex dynamics and changing 
nature. Ideographic analysis works best with myriad micro-events at the bottom level of 
structuration, as micro-events are easily quantifiable and have identifiable agents. In the case 
of meso-processes, roughly allocated in time-space and operating along complex chains of 
causes and effects, agency is diluted, quantification is often problematic and so is 
explanation. Nomothetic analysis is needed with structures, highly abstract agent-less 
phenomena situated at the longue durée consisting of a duality of virtual cultural schema and 





By applying this theoretical model to the study of Spanish nation-building, I have analysed 
the historical process of State-formation and the development of the national mode of 
organisation in Spain, illustrating my analysis with concrete examples from different periods. 
It has been concluded that Spanish nation-building was weak and problematic due to a 
number of factors: an unyielding geography hindering communications; a long history of 
political and cultural fragmentation rooted in Spain’s medieval past; Spain’s complex 
transition from world Empire into Nation-State; a late and uneven modernisation which 
delayed the consolidation of the national mode of organisation and contributed to the 
Castilian economic and demographic decline; and a long history of confrontation between 
antithetical ways of conceiving the nation, starting with the divide between liberals and 
traditionalists in the early 19
th
 century and continuing with the emergence of peripheral 
nationalisms and “las dos españas” which fought the Civil War. 
 
In the second part of the thesis, I have analysed how the nation is being narrated in the 
Madrid press employing a corpus-based discourse analytical approach. By combining the 
more quantitative, lexically oriented methodology of corpus linguistics with by the 
qualitative analysis of entire texts, such an approach has helped minimize the micro-macro 
gap, favouring objectivity and representativity and providing a more balanced and 
comprehensive method of linguistic analysis at different levels. It can be concluded from this 
analysis that no hegemonic national discourse from the centre’s perspective seems to have 
emerged, as the narratives of El Mundo and El País are markedly different. This 
methodology could be applied to further mapping the discursive construction of the nation in 
Spain in multiple directions. For instance, from a bottom-up perspective, corpus-based 
analysis of historical texts, regional and local newspapers, textbooks, TV programs, etc. 
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could provide information on how the nation has been/is being narrated in different 
discursive domains. Similarly, more studies on the symbolic representation of the nation 
could throw light on how this all-important area is being constructed. Last but not least, 
given the dynamic and polyphonic nature of discourse, it would also be useful to study how 
readers interpret the narratives of El Mundo and El País analysed in this thesis, how they 
attempt to “reduce the complex indexical  organization of texts to interpretive schemes 
which  represent the  relevant subject positions of discourse” (Angermüller, 2011 p. 
2998). From a top-down point of view, one could analyse how the re-scaling of social 
processes caused by dissolution of time-space is affecting national identities at both 
individual and societal levels. Elaborating on Eugene Weber’s metaphor (Weber, 1976): will 
the former paisans turned citoyens ever become globalites? Identity may remain anchored at 






Sample news articles from El Mundo News and El País News 
 
Text 1: A typical hard news item from El Mundo News (MCN000072) 
ESPAÑA  
Domingo, 21 de mayo de 2000   
Pujol anima a defender Cataluña «de los ataques que sufre todavía hoy» 
[HEADLINE] 
BARCELONA.- Jordi Pujol, presidente de la Generalitat, pidió ayer a los catalanes que 
recuperen «la fortaleza» y el sentimiento de «autoestima» que les llevó a «no rendirse» hace 
40 años, cuando el catalanismo era reprimido por el régimen de Franco, para que así afronten 
«los ataques» que, en su opinión, Cataluña sufre todavía hoy.[ARTICLE LEAD: WHO, 
WHAT, WHERE] 
 «Pese a que hemos arrastrado grandes decepciones en los últimos años, todavía estamos 
aquí, molestando a mucha gente» añadió. «Y si se producen reacciones duras es porque 
somos más importantes y, por eso, también hay ataques más duros. Nadie ataca al que va 
cayendo sino al que se levanta», señaló el jefe del Ejecutivo catalán. Llamó a la sociedad 
catalana a actuar con «patriotismo» y a «plantar cara» a las dificultades que se presenten 
desde fuera de Cataluña, durante la conmemoración de los Hechos del Palacio de la Música, 
de 1960, cuando una protesta de jóvenes catalanistas provocó la detención y el 
encarcelamiento del propio Pujol. «Este no es un acto dedicado a la nostalgia», dijo, «sino a 
recordar que hoy necesitamos la misma fortaleza y autoestima porque, ahora, también 
existen dificultades muy insidiosas». 
 
 
Text 2: A typical hard news item from El País News (PSN060040) 
El Congreso admite una propuesta para publicar leyes en las lenguas 
cooficiales [HEADLINE]  
C. V.  -  Madrid  
EL PAÍS  -  España - 15-02-2006  
El Pleno del Congreso tomó ayer en consideración una proposición de ley de Izquierda 
Verde (IV) en la que se pretende regular la publicación de todas las normas jurídicas de 
aplicación general en todas las lenguas que son cooficiales en las distintas comunidades 
autónomas. La proposición fue admitida por 182 votos a favor y 124 en contra, del PP. 
[ARTICLE LEAD: WHO, WHAT, WHERE…] 
Joan Herrera defendió el texto de su grupo y logró el apoyo de los nacionalistas, pero el 
portavoz socialista Pedro Muñoz rebajó el entusiasmo de los proponentes al advertir de que, 
aunque votarían favorablemente la toma en consideración de la proposición, ésta será 
severamente corregida durante el trámite parlamentario. Muñoz aseguró: "No podemos 
referirnos a España, en un sentido estricto, como un Estado plurilingüe", y subrayó que no 
puede admitirse que la publicación en las distintas lenguas pueda ser "condición necesaria" 
para que entren en vigor en los distintos territorios. El portavoz socialista se refirió al decreto 
de 1997, que dictó el PP con un presidente que "hablaba catalán en la intimidad", ironizó, 
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para regular esta cuestión. Es necesario, dijo, "avanzar" sobre aquel decreto, pero dejando 
claro que la propuesta de IV será muy corregida. 
 
 
Text 3: A typical soft news item from El País News (PSN060190) 
REPORTAJE 
Los obispos repiensan España   
La Conferencia Episcopal debate desde hoy, muy dividida, si emite un 
documento pastoral sobre la unidad nacional [HEADLINE] 
JUAN G. BEDOYA  -  Madrid  
EL PAÍS  -  España - 20-06-2006  
 ¿Está en juego la unidad de España? La primera reunión extraordinaria en la historia de la 
Conferencia Episcopal se enfrenta desde hoy a esta pregunta. Esta mañana empieza el debate 
su Comisión Permanente -24 prelados, entre ellos tres cardenales y siete arzobispos-, que 
intentará llegar unida y con algún documento a la Asamblea Plenaria de mañana y el jueves. 
[ARTICLE LEAD: WHO, WHAT, WHERE…] 
Los cardenales de Madrid y Toledo, Antonio María Rouco y Antonio Cañizares, y varios 
arzobispos del centro peninsular, reclaman que de la reunión debe salir una instrucción 
pastoral, convencidos de que, en efecto, "está en juego la unidad de España". Lo ha 
declarado, con un titular en grandes dimensiones, Rouco en una llamada "entrevista 
institucional" concedida a la revista del arzobispado Alfa y Omega, con motivo de la 
presentación de su libro España y la Iglesia católica. Cañizares, primado de Toledo, va más 
lejos que Rouco. "La unidad de España es una cuestión moral", sostiene. Es el más 
empeñado en la necesidad de emitir una instrucción sobre la cuestión, y lleva meses 
trabajando para ello. En el camino ha recibido el respaldo de Roma, que lo ha hecho cardenal. 
Pero no ha convencido al presidente del organismo, el obispo de Bilbao, Ricardo Blázquez 
-Cañizares es su vicepresidente-, y menos al resto de los prelados que ejercen en territorios 
nacionalistas, especialmente catalanes y vascos. No son mayoría ni sus iglesias son las más 
dinámicas -la crisis del catolicismo es muy aguda en estas dos comunidades-, pero parecen 
contar con el apoyo de los obispos andaluces, entre muchos otros. 
El resto del episcopado, entre otros el arzobispo de Pamplona, Fernando Sebastián, podría 
compartir alguna de las ideas de Rouco y Cañizares, pero no ven la necesidad de que la 
Iglesia católica vuelva sobre un tema sobre el que ya se ha pronunciado con severidad. El 
arzobispo Sebastián, uno de los teólogos más relevantes del episcopado, que ha ocupado los 
más altos cargos de la Conferencia Episcopal, excepto la presidencia, desde los tiempos del 
cardenal Tarancón, fue el autor de uno de esos documentos, titulado Valoración moral del 
terrorismo en España, de sus causas y de sus consecuencias. 
Esta Instrucción Pastoral aprobada en una de las dos asambleas plenarias de 2002, se 
ocupaba extensamente del problema nacionalista español cuando se expresa de "forma 
inmoderada, pierde el sentido cristiano de la vida y alimenta una concepción nihilista de la 
sociedad y de su articulación política". 
Otro sector del episcopado recela del documento propuesto por Cañizares por razones más 
prácticas. Oponen primero un argumento de oportunidad. Son muchos los conflictos entre la 
Iglesia romana y el Gobierno español -cuestiones de moral y familia, además del problema 
de la enseñanza de la religión y la renovación del sistema de financiación eclesiástica-, para 
introducir uno nuevo, advierten. Ponen otra objeción: el viaje de Benedicto XVI a Valencia 
el próximo mes de julio. El Papa será visitado por el jefe del Estado, Juan Carlos I, y el 
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presidente del Gobierno, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, y un documento episcopal poniendo 
sobre papel que los actuales gobernantes ponen en riesgo la unidad de España no sería la 
mejor credencial para ese encuentro. Desde la creación de las conferencias episcopales 
nacionales por el Concilio Vaticano II, en 1965, es la primera vez que la española celebra 
una sesión extraordinaria, aunque no es la primera ocasión en que los prelados exponen sus 
preocupaciones sobre la organización del Estado y los nacionalismos. Ocurrió en 1978, con 
motivo del referéndum para aprobar la Constitución. Entonces, el primado de Toledo, 
cardenal Marcelo González, encabezó la revuelta de una decena de obispos. Finalmente, 
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Most frequent left and right lexical collocates in the News Sub-corpus 
 
Tables 1 and 2 show the most frequent left and right lexical collocates of “Nación” in the 
News section of El Mundo and El País arranged in descending order frequency in El Mundo 
News. The first and last columns show the total number of occurrences of each collocate 
within a L5/R5 span. The columns called “El Mundo” and “El País” show the collocate in 
question separated from the node word (Nación) by a number of *, indicating the distance 
between the node word and the collocate. The figure between brackets shows the frequency 
of the collocate in that particular position. MI stands for “Mutual Information” score, 
measuring the strength of the relationship between the node word and each collocate. MI 
scores have been calculated with Wordsmith 5.0. It is assumed that a score around 4 or above 
indicates a strong collocation. 
 
Table 1. Left lexical collocates of “Nación” in Mundo & País News  
Tot. M El Mundo MI El País MI Tot. P 
520 Es * nación (262) 5.059 Es * nación (227) 4.997 446 
484 Estado ** nación (380) 6.640 Estado **  nación (388) 6.813 478 
440 Cataluña ** nación (180) 
Cataluña * nación (115) 
6.781 Cataluña ** nación (159) 
Cataluña * nación (239) 
7.019 512 
252 España ** nación (69) 
España * nación (58) 
4.658 España ** nación (84) 
España * nación (41) 
5.069 272 
231 Término nación (216) 9.517 Término nación (185) 9.517 205 
170 Gobierno ** nación (136) 3.715 Gobierno ** nación (132) 3.624 164 
110 Debate **** nación (91) 6.088 Debate **** nación (137) 6.092 179 
82 Concepto de nación (47), 
concepto nación (20) 
8.681 Concepto de nación (37), 
concepto nación (5) 
8.463 55 
75 Estatuto * nación (11) 4.781 Estatuto * nación (18) 4.707 101 
72 Unidad ** nación (51) 
Unidad *** nación (15) 
6.295 Unidad ** nación (61) 
Unidad *** nación (12) 
6.238 79 
60 Somos * nación (45) 7.694 Somos * nación (44) 7.476 52 
60 Definición *** nación (30) 
Definición * nación (20) 
9.190 Definición *** (101)  
Definición * nación (18) 
9.590 127 
53 Hay * nación (14) 4.183 Hay * nación (20) 4.417 59 
49 Euskal ** nación (33) 5.729 Euskal ** nación (11) 5.165 30 
49 Herria * nación (33) 6.276 Herria * nación (14) 5.942 30 
49 Palabra nación (41) 6.892 Palabra nación (31) 6.545 34 
48 Ser * nación (13) 
Ser ** nación (9) 
3.839 Ser * nación (13) 
Ser nación (6) 
3.911 44 
48 Sea * nación (21) 
Sea ** nación (13) 
5.009 Sea * nación (29) 
Sea ** nación (9) 
5.292 47 
47 Reconocimiento *** nación (11)  
Reconocimiento ** nación  
(17) 
7.084 Reconocimiento *** (33)  
Reconocimiento ** (11) 
7.037 57 
46 País *** nación (11) 
 País ** nación (10) 
3.365 País *** nación (10) 
 País ** nación (7) 
2.728 58 
45 Indisoluble *** nación (26) 
Indisoluble ** nación (16) 
11.36
0 
Indisoluble *** nación (33) 




44 Presidente **** nación (7) 
Presidente ** nación (3) 
2.679 Presidente **** nación (10) 




43 Nuestra nación (27) 6.224 Nuestra nación (16) 5.728 27 
43 Sólo * nación (45) 3.790 Sólo ** nación (11) 4.267 57 
40 Defensa ** nación (36) 5.470 Defensa ** nación (19) 4.891 25 
36 Única nación (26) 5.986 Única nación (40) 6.555 54 
35 Constitución **** nación (6) 
Constitución ** nación (5) 
4.122 Constitución **** nación (15) 
Constitución *** nación (11) 
5.005 67 
33 Vasco ** nación (12) 1.982 Vasco ** nación (8) 1.514 20 
31 Euskadi ** nación (12) 
Euskadi * nación (5) 
4.592 Euskadi ** nación (11) 
Euskadi * nación (8) 
3.756 35 
30 Pueblo *** nación (10) 4.737 Pueblo ** nación (7) 5.037 33 
26 Idea *** nación (8) 
Idea ** nación (7) 
Idea * nación (7) 
5.904 Idea *** nación (5) 
Idea ** nación (10) 
Idea * nación (8) 
5.672 23 
26 Galicia ** nación (9) 
Galicia * nación (9) 
6.140 Galicia ** nación (12) 
Galicia * nación (20) 
6.806 49 
24 Gran nación (21) 4.653 Gran nación (17) 4.606 22 
24 Inclusión ** nación (20) 7.930 Inclusión ** nación (19) 8.251 24 
23 Dice **** nación (6) 4.195 Dice **** nación (10) 4.662 21 
22 Construir * nación (16) 6.935 Construir * nación (11) 6.168 13 
21 Defina **** nación (11) 
Defina * nación (5) 
10.05
1 
Defina **** nación (8) 
Defina * nación (4) 
9.515 16 
21 Reconoce **** nación (7) 
Reconoce *** nación (5) 
6.627 Reconoce **** nación (5) 
Reconoce **** nación (3) 
6.295 19 
20 Construcción ** nación (12) 6.738 Construcción ** nación (10) 5.733 15 
5 Denominación * nación (15) 6.184 Denominación *** nación (19) 
Denominación * nación (15) 
8.618 36 
18 Define *** nación (4) 
Define **** nación (4) 
8.237 Define *** nación (16) 
Define **** nación (11) 
8.828 34 
12 Andalucía *** nación (2) 
Andalucía ** nación (3) 
4.723 Andalucía *** nación (7) 
Andalucía ** nación (5) 
5.144 20 
14 Defender * nación (5) 4.881 Defender * nación (9) 5.528 20 
 
 
Table 2. Right lexical collocates of “Nación” in El Mundo and El País News  
Tot. M El Mundo  MI El Pais  MI Tot. P 
229 Nación española (210) 7.601 Nación española (220) 7.977 244 
103 Nación catalana (92) 6.871 Nación catalana (52) 6.337 58 
80 Nación vasca (70) 5.412 Nación vasca (69) 5.317 77 
75 Nación ** estatuto (19) 4.781 Nación ** estatuto (22) 4.707 101 
70 Nación * naciones (52) 9.130 Nación * naciones (53) 9.119 65 
57 Nación **preámbulo (21) 8.849 Nación **preámbulo (20) 8.569 53 
57 Nación pero (26) 3.405 Nación pero (23) 3.209 54 
53 Nación ** comunidad (13) 5.235 Nación ** comunidad (13) 5.356 53 
48 Nación ni (13) 3.814 Nación ni (18) 3.617 39 
45 Nación sin (22) 3.385 Nación sin (12) 3.136 35 
44 Nación * presidente (14) 
Nación ** presidente () 
2.679 Nación * presidente (8) 
Nación ** presidente (6) 
2.280 34 
43 Nación *** Zapatero (8) 3.543 Nación Zapatero (10) 3.196 31 
40 Nación ** derecho (12) 
Nación * derecho (7) 
4.673 Nación *** derecho (15) 
Nación ** derecho (12) 
4.786 39 
39 Nación sino (13) 4.421 Nación sino (6) 3.910 23 
37 Nación  son  (7) 3.764 Nación ** son (8) 3.550 28 
36 Nación * también (8) 2.804 Nación * también (7) 2.352 24 
35 Nación ** Constitución (8) 4.122 Nación ** Constitución (8) 5.005 67 
 445 
 
35 Nación dentro (19) 5.586 Nación dentro (18) 5.885 39 
34 Nación * tiene (11) 3.437 Nación * tiene (16) 3.817 41 
34 Nación * definir (15) 8.413 Nación * definir (13) 8.510 37 
29 Nación * patria (22) 8.325 Nación * patria (25) 8.475 35 
28 Nación * ciudadanos (16) 4.269 Nación * ciudadanos (11) 3.889 19 
28 Nación propia (13) 5.392 Nación propia (3) 4.394 12 
27 Nación nacional (4) 
Nación ** nacional (4) 
3.243 Nación ** nacional (6) 4.042 36 
27 Nación según (11) 2.623 Nación según (9) 3.023 26 
26 Nación **** soberanía (5) 6.034 Nación ** soberanía (4) 
Nación * soberanía (4) 
5.974 25 
26 Nación * nacionalidad (7) 
Nación ** nacionalidad (4) 
7.991 Nación * nacionalidad (15) 
Nación ** nacionalidad (3) 
7.829 32 
26 Nación **** indivisible (18) 10.81
4 
Nación **** indivisible (16) 10.85
5 
27 
26 Nación *** todos (9) 
Nación **** todos (5) 
2.770 Nación *** todos (15) 
Nación **** todos (6) 
3.067 30 
25 Nación plural (20) 7.305 Nación plural (14) 7.031 22 
24 Nación debe (6) 3.837 Nación debe (5) 3.585 18 
24 Nación dijo (11) 3.067 Nación dijo (4) 2.584 19 
23 Nación dice (5) 4.195 Nación dice (1) 4.662 21 
23 Nación * puede (6) 3.212 Nación * puede (7) 3.240 21 
23 Nación ** común (21) 5.589 Nación ** común (23) 6.063 32 
22 Nación libre (14) 6.206 Nación libre (9) 5.770 15 
22 Nación **** nuevo (6) 
Nación ** nuevo (5) 
3.212 Nación *** nuevo (6) 
Nación ** nuevo (9) 
3.333 25 
22 Nación está (4) 2.441 Nación está (5) 2.941 28 
22 Nación ** Estatut (5) 4.985 Nación ** Estatut (0) 0 0 
21 Nación añadió (6) 3.786 Nación añadió (0) 2.856 7 
21 Nación **** derechos (9) 4.268 Nación *** derechos (5) 3.596 14 
20 Nación **** iguales (16) 8.415 Nación **** iguales (8) 7.696 10 
20 Nación *** Europa (9) 4.524 Nación ** Europa (5) 5.013 17 
43 Nación sólo (11) 
Nación * sólo (9) 
3.790 Nación sólo (12) 
Nación * sólo (9) 
4.267 57 
16 Nación *** texto (4) 3.571 Nación ** texto (6) 4.199 25 
19 Nación ** articulado (8) 8.077 Nación ** articulado (11) 7.836 23 
15 Nación * artículo (4) 4.460 Nación **** artículo (9) 5.079 23 
17 Nación Rajoy (7) 3.049 Nación Rajoy (6) 3.410 22 
15 Nación *** proyecto (2) 3.445 Nación ** proyecto (5) 3.781 21 
18 Nación ** constitucional (2) 
Nación * constitucional (2) 
3.746 Nación *** constitucional (6) 3.758 20 





Most common phrases associated with candidate nations 
 
Tables 1 to 3 show the most common phrases associated to the different candidate nations 
grouped according to the following patterns patterns:  
 
A. Candidate nation + PROCESS + nación + (MORE INFO) 
 
B. PROCESS/THING + Candidate nation + como (una) nación + (MORE INFO) 
 
C. PROCESS/THING + […] nación + Candidate nation + (MORE INFO) 
 
The use of square brackets indicates the possibility of additional elements in the phrasal 
pattern The numbers in brackets correspond to the actual number of occurrences found in 
each case. The middle column shows the Log-likelihood scores for each phrase. A score of 
3.84 or above (p < 0.05) constitutes strong evidence of unusual frequency differences 
between El Mundo and El País News. 
 
 
 Table 1. Phraseology: Candidate nation + PROCESS + nación + (MORE INFO) 
Mundo News Log-Likelihood País News 
Cataluña […]  es una nación […] (128) +0.01 Cataluña […]  es una nación […] (114) 
Cataluña es una nación […] (124) +0.17 Cataluña es una nación […] (106) 
Cataluña sea una nación (7) -1.35 Cataluña sea una nación […] (11) 
Cataluña no es una nación […] (10) +5.03 Cataluña no es una nación […] (2) 
Cataluña se defina como nación (5) +0.03 Cataluña se defina como nación (4) 
Cataluña no se llamará nación (5) +6.43  
España es […] nación […] (57) -2.42 España es […] nación (68) 
España es una nación […] (32) -1.90 España es una nación […] (40) 
España […] nación de naciones […] (30) -1.94 España […] nación de naciones […] (38) 
España […] es una nación de naciones 
(18) 
-0.41 España […] es una nación de naciones (20) 
La única nación es España (6) -0.03 La única nación es España (6) 
España es […] una gran nación […]  (6) +0.74 España es […] una gran nación […] (3) 
España no es una nación […]  (18) +2.99 España no es una nación […]  (8) 
España siga siendo una única nación (4) -3.31 España siga siendo una única nación (10) 
Euskadi es una nación […] (8) +0.12 Euskadi es una nación […] (6) 
Euskal Herria es una nación […] (5) +0.32 Euskal Herria es una nación […] (3) 
El País Vasco es una nación […] (5) +1.04 El País Vasco es una nación […] (2) 
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Galicia […] es una nación (8) -0.04 Galicia […] es una nación (8) 
Andalucía es una nación (3) -0.02 Andalucía es una nación (3) 
 
 Table 2. Phraseology: PROCESS/THING + Candidate nation + como (una) 
nación + (MORE INFO) 
Mundo News Log-Likelihood País News 
Cataluña […] como […] nación […] 
(165) 
-49.98  Cataluña […] como[…] nación […] (292) 
Cataluña como nación […] (109) -61.79 Cataluña como nación (236) 
Cataluña como una nación […] (27) -0.27 Cataluña como una nación (28) 
España […] como […] nación […] (54) +0.25 España […] como […] nación […] (44) 
España como nación […] (40) +1.08 España como nación […] (28) 
España como una nación […] (6) -1.46 España como una nación […] (10) 
Euskal Herria como (una) nación […] 
(38) 
+6.22 Euskal Herria como (una) nación […] (17) 
Euskadi como (una) nación […] (6) -0.53 Euskadi como (una) nación […] (8) 
País Vasco como (una) nación […] (7)  País Vasco como (una) nación […] (1) 
Galicia como (una) nación […] (12) -4.74 Galicia como (una) nación […] (23) 
Andalucía como nación (4) -3.31 Andalucía como nación […] (10) 
 
Table 3. Phraseology: PROCESS/THING + […] nación + Candidate nation + (MORE 
INFO) 
Mundo News Log-Likelihood País News 
La inclusión del término nación […] (19) +0.00 La inclusión del término nación […] (17) 
Uso del término nación […] (10) +0.06 Uso del término nación […] (8) 
El término nación para definir […] 
Cataluña (10) 
-0.05 El término nación para definir […] 
Cataluña (10) 
El término nación para Cataluña (7) +0.01 El término nación para Cataluña (6) 
Término nación en el preámbulo […] (9) -0.79 Término nación en el preámbulo […] (12) 
Término nación en […] Estatuto […] (8) +0.12 Término nación en el Estatuto […] (6) 
Término nación en el articulado […] (2) -1.65 Término nación en el articulado […] (5) 
Palabra nación […] en el Preámbulo […]  
(8) 







Processes and things associated with candidate nations 
 
Tables 1 to 6 show the PROCESSES and THINGS associated to the different candidate nations 
appearing in the pattern “X como una nación”. The numbers in brackets correspond to the actual 
number of occurrences found in each case. 
 
 Table 1. PROCESS/THING + […] Cataluña como (una) nación  
Mundo News (165 occurrences) País News (292 occurrences) 
DEFINIR (88): Definición (33); (se) defina (14); 
(PODER) definir(se) (13); (se) define (9); (se) ha 
definido (8); sea definida (3); haya definido (2); 
definía (2),  (se) definiera (2), definiendo, debe 
ser definida  
DEFINIR (169): Definición (101); (se) define 
(25); definir (13); (se) defina (15); ha definido (8); 
definía (2); definen; han definido; sea definida 
(2); se definiera.  
RECONOCER (18): Reconocimiento (10), 
reconoce (5), reconozca (2), reconocer, 
reconozcan 
RECONOCER (51): Reconocimiento (22); (será) 
(quedará) (se vea) (debe verse) reconocida (10); 
(se) reconozca (6); reconocer (6); reconoce (5); 
reconocía; había reconocido. 
 DENOMINAR (24): Denominación (18), 
denominar (5), denominará. 
SENTIR (10): Sienten (4), sentimos (4), sienta, no 
siente  
SENTIR (3): Sienten (2), sentimos. 
DERECHO (4): Derecho, derechos (2) 
Derecho de autogobierno 
 
PRESENTAR (4): 
Presenta (2), presentó, presentar 
 
DEFENDER (3): 
Defender, defiende, defienden 
Defensa 
CAFIFICAR (2): Calificación, calificar. CALIFICAR (3): Calificar (2), calificación. 
Autogobierno (2) Autogobierno (5) 
Futuro (2)  
(se) Habla de (2)  
IDENTIFICAR (2): 
Identifica, se identifique. 
 
Identidad (2). IDENTIDAD (4): identidad (3), cuestiones 
identitarias. 
Personalidad (2)  
Referencia (2) Referencia; se hace referencia. 
FIGURAR (2): podrá figurar, figure.  
DERECHO (4): Derecho, derechos (2) 
Derecho de autogobierno 
Derecho 
Aceptación.  
Afirmación.   
Autoproclamación.   
Argumentario.   




Condición.   
Confíen en.  
Configuración.   
Consideración.  Consideración (2) 
Designación.   
Imagen.  
Realidad nacional. Realidad 
Represente.   
Restablecimiento.   
Puntos más arduos de la negociación  
Sea descrita  
Quedar como  
No han asumido nunca  
Sitúa   
 Especificidad 
 Existencia 
 Condición histórica 
 Legitimidad 
 No ha asumido 
 Una mayor participación 
 Aparece 
 Singularidad 
 Caracterización  
 Se constituye 
 Cuestiones identitarias 
 Mención  
 Sea catalogada 
 
 
 Table 2. PROCESS/THING + […] España como (una) nación  
Mundo News ( 44 occurrences) País News (37 occurrences) 
Idea (7) IDEA (5): Idea (4); ideas. 
CONCEPTO (6): Concepto (4), conceptos (2). Concepto (4) 
DEFINIR (4): Definición (de Aznar); definió; está 
definida; hubiera definido. 
DEFINIR (9): Definición (2); define (2); 
Definiendo, definen, definió, definir; está definida 
HABLAR DE (4): Hablar de, ha hablado, habla 
de, habló de. 
Hablar de. 
Futuro (3) Futuro.  
CONCEBIR (2): Conciben, concebida CONCEBIR (3): Concepción, concepciones, 
concibe.  
Acabar con (2) Acabar con. 
Ruptura (2)  
VERTEBRAR (2): Vertebrar, vertebración 
constitucional. 
 
Considera. Considera (2). 




Ha terminado con.  





Alto grado de identidad.  
Mi  opción.  
Modelo.  
Presentó.  






Calificar   
 Contemplan. 
 Carácter.  
 Nueva configuración. 
 Consolidar. 
 Reafirmación irrenunciable.  
 Tesis. 






 Reivindicaron  
 Está constituida 
 
 Table 3. PROCESS/THING + […] Euskal Herria como (una) nación  
Mundo News (38  occurrences) País News (17 occurrences) 
Existencia (9) Existencia (6) 
RECONOCER (5) 
Reconocimiento (oficial) (4); Sea reconocida 
RECONOCER (4) 





Estrategia de (2) 
 
Derechos (3) Derechos  
HABLAR (2) 
Habló, aceptaron hablar 
HABLAR (2) 
Hablar, se hable 
El derecho a concebir   
Camino político  
Soberanía Soberanía 
Promover  
Respetar   
Destino  
Se refieren a   
Proyección y difusión internacional  
Se puede edificar  
Hacer desaparecer  
Destruir Destruir 




 Presentar  
 
 
 Table 4. PROCESS/THING + […] Euskadi como (una) nación 
Mundo News (5 occurrences) País News (8 occurrences) 
Los derechos  
La posibilidad de definir  
La realidad  
La existencia  
considerar Sea considerada 
 DENOMINAR (3) 
Denominación (2); proponía denominar 
 Concepción 
 Desarrollo 
 RECONOCER (2): 
Reconocimiento; reconozca  
 
 Table 5. PROCESS/THING + […] País Vasco como (una) nación 
Mundo News (7 occurrences) País News (1 occurrence) 
Reconocimiento (2) 
De la condición 
Se reconozca 
Desarrollo   
Existencia   
Ha defendido  
Definiese   
Sienten  
 
 Table 6. PROCESS/THING + […] Galicia como (una) nación 
Mundo News (12 occurrences) País News (24 occurrences) 
DEFINIR (4) 
Defina (3); Define  
DEFINIR (6) 
Definición (2); definir; se define; sea definida; 
defina 
El despertar (3)  
Triunfo (2)  
Consideración  Consideración  
Se reconozca Reconocer (8): 




 Singularidad (2) 









Source: http://www.nacionespanola.org/esp.php?articulo6 (retrieved on 29-12-2009) 
¿Quiénes somos? 
Viernes 14 de diciembre de 2007 
La Fundación DENAES, para la defensa de la Nación Española, tiene desde su origen la pretensión de 
recuperar e impulsar desde la sociedad civil el conocimiento y la reivindicación de la Nación Española; 
su realidad histórica, política, social y cultural. 
La Fundación DENAES, para la defensa de la Nación Española, se constituye como punto de 
encuentro de cuantos españoles, hombres y mujeres de cualquier lugar de nuestra geografía, sin 
perjuicio de sus diferentes planteamientos ideológicos y de sus diversas y peculiares pertenencias o 
identidades regionales, quieran reivindicar su condición de españoles y su identificación con ese 
proyecto nacional, histórico, político y cultural de primer orden que se llama España. 
España es una de las más importantes y antiguas naciones europeas, y así pues debemos rebelarnos 
contra el estado de ánimo del pensamiento dominante en algunas zonas geográficas y ambientes 
políticos que pretende sacrificar la enorme riqueza de este acervo común español por intereses 
espurios o a razones de oportunismo político. 
La Fundación DENAES, para la defensa de la Nación Española, lleva en su seno el ánimo de aunar 
voluntades, liderar la sociedad civil en defensa de la Nación Española y fortalecer nuestras 
instituciones políticas y jurídicas comunes, así como reivindicar nuestros símbolos y lazos de unión. 
Hoy, en España, el patriotismo está siendo sistemáticamente desacreditado por determinadas 
ideologías y grupos de interés. Constituye un hecho insólito en el concierto de las naciones civilizadas, 
casi una anormalidad política y social, el abandono y la práctica desaparición del patriotismo en 
España. Y todo ello a pesar de que se trata no sólo de un sentimiento natural y sano -sólo equiparable 
a un sentir tan noble como el del amor a la propia familia- sino de una práctica política absolutamente 
esencial para la pervivencia de cualquier sistema democrático basado en la soberanía nacional. Uno 
de los valores esenciales de las grandes naciones civilizadas es el patriotismo de sus ciudadanos, que 
se unen en torno a su profunda conciencia de pertenencia a un proyecto político e histórico común. 
La identificación con España no es solo una cuestión emocional. El patriotismo es un proyecto político 
común en el que todos los españoles nos hemos de sentir integrados y del que hemos de sentirnos 
legítimamente orgullosos. El patriotismo garantiza que los españoles, vivan donde vivan, sean 
realmente iguales, que las libertades individuales estén garantizadas, que la integridad de la Nación 
no se cuestione y que el orden constitucional sea escrupulosamente respetado. El patriotismo de los 
ciudadanos garantiza la libertad en las naciones soberanas y es por eso un proyecto común de 
crecimiento y convivencia. En este sentido, el patriotismo comporta también una serie de exigencias: 
el valor de defender determinados planteamientos, aunque sean políticamente incorrectos; la 
honestidad en la acción política, la defensa de los intereses de España, la exigencia crítica hacia 
nuestra propia realidad. 
La actitud patriótica se funda en la conciencia de pertenecer a una gran Nación, pero el patriotismo 
no puede ser completo ni sano sin el ánimo crítico para mejorar nuestra propia Nación. 
Sin embargo, resultaría estéril fustigarnos con nuestras insuficiencias y defectos sin defendernos de 
sus causantes. Es necesario poner en evidencia la obsesión antiespañola promovida por los 
movimientos separatistas que sistemáticamente niegan y humillan a España como Nación o la 
reducen, para imbuir de provisionalidad a su existencia, a una estructura meramente jurídica; a un 
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Estado, a una cáscara. Es esa una actitud de desprecio, cuando no de ignorancia, que no pretende 
más que la desaparición paulatina de la Nación española y la posterior desaparición del Estado al que 
la Nación Española otorga existencia. El objetivo de tales grupos antiespañoles es que España deje 
de existir. Y eso se pretende lograr a través de múltiples estrategias: bien incumpliendo las leyes que 
emanan de la soberanía nacional española, bien atacando y ocultando los símbolos nacionales, bien 
cuestionando la igualdad de todos los españoles, bien silenciando a quienes discrepan de la 
estrategia dominante, o, simple y llanamente, persiguiendo y asesinando a quienes defienden la 
unidad de la Nación Española, la existencia de sus símbolos o la riqueza de su cultura común 
expresada a través de la lengua. 
Como reacción a los ataques continuados y a los ilegítimos impulsos de aquellos que quieren destruir 
España, y con la intención de oponerse con firmeza a la indolencia de nuestros gobernantes y a las 
acciones disgregadoras de algunas elites políticas locales, expresadas hoy del modo más drástico y 
extremo en el Plan Ibarreche y en la aprobación en Cortes del nuevo Estatuto para Cataluña, tiene su 
razón de ser la Fundación DENAES, para la defensa de la Nación Española. La intención de este 
proyecto nacional y cívico es recuperar el proyecto nacional de España, reclamando -en una etapa en 
la que los caciquismos locales se han disfrazado de nacionalismo- su conveniencia histórica, su 
vocación de garantizar la libertad y la igualdad de todos los españoles. 
Por tanto la Fundación DENAES, para la defensa de la Nación Española, asume como fin principal el 
articular una ofensiva, en todos los frentes legales, contra quienes han decidido socavar los 






COLLOCATES OF NACIÓN, MUNDO VS. PAÍS OPINION 
 
Collocates of Nación: Candidate Nations  
 
Total L5-R5 Mundo Opinion MI País Opinion MI Total 
365 R1 Nación española (334) 7.694 Nación española (226) 7.051 258 
244 L3 / L2 España ** nación (45) 
España * nación (58) 
5.015 España ** nación (53) 
España * nación (48) 
4.927 204 
266 L3 / L2 Cataluña ** nación (97) 
Cataluña * nación (83) 
6.377 Cataluña ** nación (66) 
Cataluña * nación (49) 
5.887 170 
1 L3/L2 Catalunya ** nación (1) 
 
 Catalunya ** nación (2) 
Catalunya * nación (2) 
4.155 4 
81 R1 Nación catalana (71) 6.931 Nación catalana (71) 6.692 77 
58 R1 Nación vasca (53) 5.446 Nación vasca (71) 5.686 88 
19 L3/L5/L4 
R4/L2 
Vasco ** nación (5) 
Vasco **** nación (5) 
Vasco *** nación (3)  
1.846 Nación *** vasco (5) 
Vasco ** nación (4) 
Vasco * nación (4) 
1.920 18 
11 L2/L3 Euskal Herria como nación 
(5) 
Euskal Herria ** nación 
(2) 
5.883 Euskal Herria como nación (6) 4.629 9 
11 L3/L2 
L4/L5 
Euskadi ** nación (12) 
Euskadi * nación (5) 
4.592 Euskadi ** nación (4) 
Euskadi *** nación (3) 
Euskadi **** nación (3) 
3.232 17 
13  L3/L2 Andalucía ** nación (4) 
Andalucía * nación (2) 
5.196    
11 L3 / L2 
R5 
Galicia **** nación (4) 
Galicia * nación (3) 
3.039 Nación **** Galicia (2)  2 
6 R1 Nación andaluza (5) 7.121    
2 L1 Nación gallega (2) NA Nación gallega (1) NA  
 
 
Collocates of “Nación”: Geography 
Total L5-R5 Mundo Opinion MI País Opinion MI Total 
37 L4 /L3/R3 
L2/L3/R2 
 
Comunidad *** nación  
(8) 
Comunidad ** nación  (5) 
Nación ** comunidad (5) 
5.503 Comunidad * nación  (9) 
Nación ** comunidad (7) 
Nación * comunidad (5) 
5.045 34 
14 R5/ R4 & 
R3/R2 
Nación *** Europa (7) 
Nación **** Europa (3) 
 
4.648 Nación * Europa (4) 
Nación ** Europa (2) 
Nación *** Europa (2) 
 
4.025 13 
5 R1 Nación europea (3) 3.673 Nación europea (6) 3.837 9 
5 L2 & 
L3/L4 
Territorio ** nación (1) 
Territorio *** nación (1) 
Territorio **** nación (1) 
3.662 Territorio * nación  (3) 
Territorio ** nación (3) 





 R1   Nación alemana (6) 7.211 9 
 
Collocates of “Nación”: Concept 
Total L5-R5 Mundo Opinion MI País Opinion MI Total 
91 L1 Término nación (82) 8.402 Término nación (65) 7.939 77 
12 L1/L2 & 
L3 
L4/L5 
Términos nación (3) 
Términos * nación (2) 
Términos ** nación (2) 
5.004 Términos nación (2) 
Términos ** nación (2) 
Términos *** nación (2) 
Términos **** nación (2) 
 
4.627 14 
80 R2 Nación de naciones (67) 8.155 Nación de naciones (112) 8.306 137 
275 L1/R1 Estado nación (37) 
Nación Estado (11) 
5.651 Estado nación (99) 
Nación Estado (8) 
6.154 392 
67 L2 & L3 Concepto de nación (37) 
concepto **  nación (10) 
7.823 Concepto de nación (29) 
concepto **  nación (11) 
7.796 60 
9 L2 Conceptos de nación (6) 6.706 Conceptos de nación (5) 6.582 10 
49 R2 & R1 
L2 
Nación * nacionalidad (25) 
Nación  nacionalidad (9) 
Nacionalidad * nación (5) 
8.688 Nación * nacionalidad (20) 
Nación  nacionalidad (10) 
Nacionalidad * nación (10) 
8.143 58 
34 L4 & L2 Definición *** nación (20) 
Definición * nación (8) 
7.856 Definición *** (32)  
Definición * nación (12) 
7.545 51 
61 R1 Nación sin Estado (13)  Nación sin Estado (5)  60 
18 R4/R3 
R2/R5 
Nación *** nacionalidades 
(8) 
Nación ** nacionalidades 
(4) 
7.021 Nación * nacionalidades (6) 
Nación *** nacionalidades 
(6) 
Nación **** nacionalidades 
(6) 
6.263 25 
22 L1 Palabra nación (21) 5.277 Palabra nación (15) 5.554 21 
29 L2/L3/L4 Idea ** nación (8) 
Idea * nación (10) 
Idea *** nación (6) 
5.509 Idea *** nación (22) 
Idea ** nación (10) 
Idea * nación (38) 
6.498 83 
17 L3/L4 Concepción ** nación (9) 
Concepción *** nación (5) 
6.920 Concepción ** nación (6) 
Concepción *** nación (5) 
6.385 14 
25 R2 Nación * patria (10) 
Nación ** patria (3) 
6.156 Nación * patria (17) 
Nación ** patria (9)  
6.597 37 
28 L3/ R1 Dentro ** nación (12) 
Nación dentro (7) 
4.994 Nación dentro (6) 
Dentro ** nación (4) 
4.321 16 
21 L1 Estados nación (12) 5.767 Estados nación (24) 5.886 31 
21 R2-R4 Nación * ciudadanos (12) 
Nación de ciudadanos (11) 
3.617 Nación de ciudadanos (6) 
Nación *** ciudadanos (17) 
4.361 41 
 R4 Nación de ciudadanos 
libres e iguales (7) 
Nación de individuos 
libres e iguales (1) 
6.246    
 R3 Nación de ciudadanos 
libres e iguales (7) 
Nación de individuos 
libres e iguales (1) 
5.977    
25 R1 Nación política (9) 2.256 Nación política (40) 3.628 72 
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30 R3 / R4 
R2 
Nación ** nacional (8) 
Nación *** nacional (4) 
3.771 Nación ** nacional (7) 
Nación * nacional (3) 
4.154 29 
12 R2/R3 Nación * realidad nacional 
(3) 
Nación ** realidad 
nacional (3) 
3.226 Nación * realidad nacional 
(2) 
Nación ** realidad nacional 
(1) 
4.154 25 
16 R3 & R2 Nación ** sujeto (7) 7.176 Nación * sujeto (3) 6.000 10 
17 R3 & L4 Nación ** sentido (7) 3.846 Sentido *** nación (5) 3.604 18 
18 L3/ R1 
L1 
Propia ** nación (4) 
Nación propia (3) 
4.257 Propia nación (8) 
Nación propia (3) 
3.811 15 
6 L2 & L4 Carácter * nación (6) 4.085 Carácter *** nación (4) 
Carácter * nación (3) 
4.332 11 
10 R1 Nación cultural (5) 5.149 Nación cultural (29) 6.637 44 
7 L2/L1 
L4/L5 
Denominación * nación 
(4) 
Denominación nación (1) 
7.178 Denominación nación (3) 
Denominación *** nación 
(1) 




13 L3/L2 Nombre ** nación (5) 
Nombre * nación (3) 
4.415 Nombre ** nación (13) 
Nombre * nación (4) 
5.421 27 
11 R5 Nación **** regiones (5) 5.865 Nación **** regiones (10) 5.503 15 
10 R2 Nación sin cabeza (5) 4.682    
14 L2-L3/R2 
R3 
Pueblo * nación (3) 
Nación * pueblo (3) 
Nación ** pueblo (3) 
3.608 Pueblo * nación (10) 
Pueblo ** nación (9) 





Nación *** histórica (3) 
Histórica ** nación (3) 
Nación histórica (2) 
Nación * histórica (2) 
4.803 Nación histórica (3) 
Histórica * nación (2) 
Histórica ** nación (2) 




Étnica * nación (3) 
Étnica ** nación (3) 
7.630 Nación étnica (7) 




Sentimiento **** nación (3) 
Sentimiento *** nación (3) 
5.723 Sentimiento * nación (3) 
Sentimiento **** nación (2) 
5.442 11 
8 L5/L2 Palabras **** nación (3) 
Palabras * nación (2) 
3.005    
5 L2 Título * nación  (4) 4.340    
 L2 Sinónimo * nación (4) 7.340    
11 R3/L2 Nación ** proyecto (3) 
Proyecto * nación (1) 
3.279 Nación ** proyecto (5) 





Nación ** fórmula (3) 
Fórmula * nación (2) 
5.301 Fórmula nación (2) 
Fórmula ** nación (2) 
4.353 7 
6 R1/R2 Nación asociada (3) 
Nación * asociada (2) 
8.687    
6 L3 Imagen ** nación (3) 3.930    
6 L3 Atributos ** nación (3) 8.243    
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6 L3 & L5 Significado ** nación (3) 5.418 Significado **** nación (2) 5.285 6 
7 L1/R2 
R3/R2 
Región nación (2) 
Nación * región (2) 
5.931 Nación ** región (6) 
Nación * región (3) 
7.256 21 
5 L5 Pueblos **** nación (2) 4.289 Pueblos **** nación (3) 4.189 6 
5 L4 & L3 Cuerpo *** nación (2) 4.560 Cuerpo ** nación (3) 4.840 5 
 R1   Expresión nación (10) 4.904 16 
 L2/L5   Distinción * nación (8) 
Distinción **** nación (2) 
6.625 11 
 L3   Alma ** nación (6) 6.143 7 
 R1   Nación cívica (5) 6.076 7 
 L3   Jurídico ** nación (3) 4.674 7 
 L2   Condición de nación (5) 3.421 6 
 R1   Nación imaginada (4) 8.789 6 
 L2   Secundario * nación (3) 7.612 6 
 R4   Nación *** cultura (3) 3.978 11 
 L3   Seno ** nación (3) 5.103 6 
 L3   Primario ** nación (3) 7.657 5 
 
 
Collocates of “Nación”: Issues 
Total L5-R5 Mundo Opinion MI País Opinion MI Total 
275 L3 Estado ** nación (133) 5.651 Estado **  nación (150) 6.154 392 
54 L5 Debate **** nación (41) 5.756 Debate **** nación (30) 4.835 40 
58 L4 & L3 Unidad ** nación (38) 
Unidad *** nación (10) 
6.108 Unidad ** nación (25) 
Unidad *** nación (10) 
5.495 40 
80 R3-R4 Nación ** Constitución  
(21) 
 
4.988 Constitución *** nación (7) 
Constitución ** nación (5) 
3.311 29 
38 L4/ L2 
L4/L3 
Reconocimiento *** 
nación (13)  
Reconocimiento * nación  
(11) 
7.117 Reconocimiento *** nación 
(6)  
Reconocimiento *** nación 
(9) 
5.319 23 
37 R4/L3/ R2 
R1/R3/R4 
Nación *** soberanía (7) 
Nación * soberanía (4) 
Soberanía ** nación (6) 
6.299 Nación soberanía (6) 
Nación ** soberanía (6) 




Nación *** estatuto (6) 
Nación ** estatuto (5) 
Estatuto *** nación (5) 
3.501 Estatuto *** nación (3) 
Estatuto **** nación (3) 
2.587 13 
16 L3 Construcción ** nación (14) 6.161 Construcción ** nación (13) 5.830 22 
23 L4/L3 Existencia *** nación (9) 
Existencia ** nación (8) 
 
6.184 Existencia *** nación (3) 
Existencia ** nación (3) 
 
4.379 10 
18 R5/ R3 
& L5 
Nación **** preámbulo (6) 
Nación **preámbulo (5) 
7.515 Nación **preámbulo (4) 




15 L3 Símbolos ** nación (10) 6.201 Símbolos ** nación (3) 5.131 5 
14 L3/L4 Defensa ** nación (10) 
Defensa *** nación (2) 







3.892 Constitucional *** nación (6) 




Lengua ** nación (5) 
Lengua nación (4) 
 
4.739 Nación ** lengua (7) 
Nación *** lengua (6) 
5.343 37 
13 L3/L4 Futuro ** nación (8) 
Futuro *** nación (3) 
3.695 Futuro *** nación (6) 




Nación **** derecho (7) 
Nación *** derecho (4) 
 
3.526 Nación * derecho (7) 




Identidad ** nación (3) 
Identidad **** nación (3) 
5.137 Identidad ** nación (7) 
Nación *** identidad (3) 
 
4.652 17 
13 L3/L2 Fin ** nación (6) 
Fin * nación (1) 
3.408    
9 L3/L4 
L5 
Liquidación ** nación (6) 
Liquidación *** nación (2) 
Liquidación **** nación (1) 
6.687    
7 L5 Ensayos **** nación (7) 8.061    
13 R5/R4 
L3 
Nación **** derechos (4) 
Nación *** derechos (2) 
3.762 Nación *** derechos (6) 
Derechos ** nación (5) 
 
3.819 18 
11 L3/L4 Supervivencia *** nación 
(4) 
Supervivencia ** nación (4) 
6.948    
13 L3/L5 
R5/L4 
Historia ** nación (4) 
Historia **** nación (3) 
2.964 Nación **** historia (4) 





Discurso ** nación (3) 
Nación **** discurso (3) 
3.786 Discurso **** nación (2) 
Discurso ** nación (2) 
3.445 8 
12 R4/R3 Nación *** libertad (3) 
Nación ** libertad (2) 
2.987    
10 R3 Nación ** régimen (5) 4.027    
9 L4/L3 Vida *** nación (4) 
Vida ** nación (2) 
2.701 Vida ** nación (4) 
Vida *** nación (3) 
3.160 12 
8 R3 & L5 Nación ** texto (4) 3.535 Texto **** nación (5) 3.258 7 
7 L5 Camino **** nación (4) 3.235    
8 R4 Nación *** competencias 
(3) 
3.940    
6 L3 Fuerza ** nación (4) 3.156    




Nación  **** 
financiación (3) 
Nación  *** financiación 
(2) 
 
4.410 Financiación **** nación (2) 
Financiación *** nación (2) 
Nación financiación (2) 
Nación *** financiación (2) 
3.964 9 





Intereses **** nación (2) Intereses *** nación (2) 
 
7 L5 Estatut **** nación  (3) 4.839    
6 L3 Integridad ** nación (3) 6.308    
6 L4 Tradición *** nación (3) 4.973    
6 R4 Nación *** igualdad (3) 4.592    
5 L3 Continuidad ** nación (3) 5.167    
6 R4/R2 
L5/L2/R3 
Nación *** artículo (3) 
Nación * artículo (2) 
2.767 Nación **** artículo (3) 
Nación * artículo (3) 




Voluntad **** nación   (2) 
Nación ** voluntad (2) 
3.385 Voluntad *** nación   (5) 




Tiempo **** nación (2) 
Nación **** tiempo (2) 
1.811 Tiempo *** nación (4) 
Nación *** tiempo (2) 
2.504 10 
9 L3/L4/ L5 Independencia ** nación (2) 
Independencia **** nación 
(2) 
3.937 Independencia ** nación (3) 
Independencia *** nación (1) 
Independencia **** nación 
(1) 
3.491 8 
 L3/L4/L5   Pertenencia ** nación (6) 
Pertenencia *** nación (1) 
Pertenencia **** nación (1) 
6.040 9 
 L3/L5   Inclusión ** nación (6) 
Inclusión **** nación (1)  
7.040 9 
 L3/L4   Afirmación ** nación (5) 
Afirmación *** nación (2) 
5.309 9 
 L3   Uso ** nación (5) 5.157 13 
 L3/L4   Nacimiento ** nación (5) 
Nacimiento *** nación (1) 
6.297 7 
 L5   Estatutaria **** nación (4) 5.630 8 
 L3   Tema ** nación (4) 3.919 7 
 L3/R5   Autogobierno ** nación (3) 
Nación **** autogobierno 
(3) 
4.549 11 
 L4/R4   Problema *** nación (3) 
Nación *** problema (3) 
2.551 8 
 L3/L4   Representación ** nación (4) 
Representación *** nación 
(2) 
4.751 8 
 L4/L2   Patriotismo *** nación (3) 




  Articulación *** nación (3) 
Articulación ** nación (1) (1 
Articulación * nación (1) 
Articulación **** nación (1) 
6.173 6 
 L3   Religión ** nación (3) 5.010 8 
 L5   Propuesta **** nación (3) 2.791 7 
 L3   Desarrollo ** nación (3) 3.454 5 
 L4   Relación *** nación (3) 2.880 5 
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Collocates of “Nación”: Participants (people & institutions) 
Total L5-R5 Mundo Opinion MI País Opinion MI Total 
139 L3 Gobierno ** nación (120) 4.105 Gobierno ** nación (100) 4.128 114 
28 L5 /l3 Presidente **** nación 
(13) 
Presidente ** nación (3) 
3.035 Presidente **** nación (3) 
Presidente ** nación (2) 
2.294 9 
15 L3 Parlamento ** nación (10)  3.546    
16 R1 & L4 Nación  Zapatero (4) 1.809 Zapatero *** nación (2) 1.896 5 
9 L5 Derecha **** nación (4) 
 
3.323    
11 L5 PP **** nación (4) 1.067 PP **** nación (3) 0.830 7 
8 L3/L4 
R5/L5 
Nacionalistas ** nación 
(3) 
Nacionalistas *** nación 
(3) 
1.772 Nación **** nacionalistas (4) 
Nacionalistas **** nación (3) 
2.287 15 
7 L4 Congreso *** nación (4) 2.698    
6 L3 Izquierda ** nación (4) 2.067    
11 L5/R2 ETA **** nación (3) 
Nación * ETA (3) 
0.265    
8 L5/L3 Instituciones **** nación 
(3) 
Instituciones ** nación (2) 
3.513    
5 L3 Enemigos ** nación (4) 4.710    
7 R5 Nación **** rey (3) 3.101    
7 L5 Maragall **** nación (3) 2.436    
6 L5 Comunidades **** nación 
(3) 
2.854    
6 L4 Autónomas *** nación (3) 3.831    
 L5/R4   Partido **** nación (4) 
Nación *** partido (4) 
2.285 15 
 
Collocates of “Nación”: Processes 
Total L5-R5 Mundo Opinion MI País Opinion MI Total 
457 L2 Es * nación (165) 4.079 Es * nación (156) 4.140 431 
78 L4/L3/L2/
L1 
Ser *** nación (22) 
Ser * nación (16) 
4.021 Ser ** nación (10) 
Ser nación (15) 
4.007 84 
46 L2 & L3 
L2/R1 
Sea * nación (16) 
Sea ** nación (9) 
4.322 Sea * nación (9) 




Nación ** son (12) 
Nación  son  (5) 
3.259 Nación son (8) 




55 L2-L1 Hay * nación (22) 3.688 Hay  nación (11) 3.604 45 
40 R2/R1 Nación * está (10) 
Nación está (7) 
3.081 Nación está (8) 
Nación * está (2) 
2.584 20 
32 R2/R1 Nación * tiene (12) 
Nación tiene (6) 
3.129 Nación tiene (9) 
Nación * tiene (6) 
3.590 35 
20 L2 Construir * nación (16) 6.928 Construir * nación (17) 6.753 25 
18 L2/L3 Somos * nación (12) 
Somos ** nación (4) 
5.804 Somos * nación (10) 5.445 17 
21 L2 Existe * nación (11) 5.242 Existe * nación (6) 4.555 15 
19 L4 /L5/ 
L2 
Define *** nación (9) 
Define **** nación (3) 
Define * nación (3) 
7.636 Define *** nación (2) 
Define **** nación (1) 
Define * nación (1) 
6.461 8 
21 R2 & L5 
L4 
Nación * decir (6) 3.369 Decir **** nación (4) 




Nación * forma (5) 
Forma *** nación (4) 
Forma *** nación (4) 
3.524 Forma *** nación (5) 
Forma ** nación (3) 




Nación era (4) 
Nación * era (3) 
Nación ** era (3) 
2.834 Nación era (6) 




Reconoce *** nación (7) 
Reconoce * nación (3) 
6.586 Reconoce ** nación (2) 
Reconoce *** nación (1) 
Reconoce **** nación (1) 
5.148 6 
17 R3/R2 Nación ** sido (6) 
Nación * sido (3) 
2.718 Nación ** sido (5) 
Nación * sido (3) 
2.880 19 
16 L3/L2 Quieren ** nación (5) 
Quieren * nación (4) 
4.517 Quieren ** nación (2) 
Quieren * nación (2) 
4.542 9 
42 R1-R2 Nación  puede (8) 3.315 Nación * puede (12) 3.449 45 
8 R1/R2 Nación parece (5) 
Nación * parece (2) 
2.423 Nación parece (3) 




Definir *** nación (4) 
Definir **** nación (4) 
7.226 Definir ** nación (5) 
Definir **** nación (4) 
6.286 11 
14 L2/L5 Defender * nación (4) 
Defender **** nación (4) 
4.684    
16 L5 Dice **** nación (4) 3.774 Dice **** nación (4) 3.434 9 
14 R2/L1 
L2 
Nación * será (4) 
Será nación (3) 
3.663 Será * nación (3) 
Nación * será (2) 
3.367 10 
14 R2/R3 Nación * llamada (4) 
Nación ** llamada (3) 
5.772    
13 R1-R2 Nación fue (4) 
Nación * fue (1) 
2.188 Nación fue (5) 




Hacer *** nación (4) 
Nación ** hacer (3) 
2.595 Hacer nación (3) 
Hacer ** nación (3) 




Nación ** poder (3) 
Nación *** poder (2) 
2.755 Poder ** nación (4) 
Nación *** poder (4) 
2.823 14 
11 R3 & 
L5/L4 
Nación ** quiere (4) 3.154 Quiere **** nación (3) 
Quiere *** nación (2) 
3.246 7 
10 R2/L3 Nación * integrada (4) 8.113 Nación integrada (5) 7.574 10 
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R1/R3 Integrada ** nación (3) Nación ** integrada (3) 
6 R1/R2 Nación constituida (3) 
Nación * constituida (2) 
8.630    
11 R1/R2 Nación debe (3) 2.649 Nación debe (5) 
Nación * debe (4) 
3.516 18 
11 L4 Dijo *** nación (4) 3.722    
7 R3 Nación ** seguir (4) 3.169    
10 L3/R3 Significa ** nación (3) 
Nación ** significa (2) 
5.009    
9 L5 Reconocido **** nación 
(4) 
6.871    
9 L3 Creen ** nación (4) 5.191 Creen ** nación (3) 5.523 8 
9  L2/L4 
L5 & L3 
Defina * nación (4) 
Defina *** nación (2) 
Defina **** nación (2) 
 
10.009 Defina ** nación (2) 
Defina * nación (2) 
8.950 7 
7 L5 Convertir **** nación (4) 5.106 Convertir **** nación (2) 4.882 6 
5 L2 Definirse * nación (4) 7.424    
7 L2 Crear * nación (4) 4.762    
5 R3 Nación ** sustenta (4) 6.820    
6 L2/L5 Destruir * nación (3) 
Destruir **** nación (2) 
5.973    
8 R2 Nación * decidir (3) 4.991    
8 L3 & R5 Pretende ** nación (3) 3.932 Nación **** pretende (2) 3.694 5 
7 L3 & L2  Hablar ** nación (3) 3.246 Hablar * nación (2) 
Hablar ** nación (1) 
3.454 7 
7 R2 Nación * supone (3) 4.006    
7 L2 Definida * nación (3) 7.968    
7 R1 Nación va (3) 1.716    
5 R1 Nación tendrá (3) 3.635    
5 L4 Aspiran *** nación (3) 6.528    
5 L5/L4/L2 
& L3 
Formar **** nación (3) 
Formar *** nación (1) 
Formar * nación (1) 
4.667 Formar *** nación (5) 
Formar ** nación (4) 
 
5.501 9 
5 L2 Liquidar * nación (3) 6.692    
11 L3 & L2 Siendo ** nación (3) 3.873 Siendo * nación (3) 3.797 9 
5 L3 & L5 
L4 
Considera ** nación (2) 4.007 Considera **** nación (5) 
Considera *** nación (4) 
5.709 17 
7 R1/R2 Nación sería (2) 
Nación * sería (1) 
2.467 Sería * nación (6) 




Nación * pueden (2) 
Pueden *** nación (2) 
2.935 Nación * pueden (3) 




Tenemos **** nación (2) 
Nación ** tenemos (2) 
3.679 Nación ** tenemos (3) 
Tenemos *** nación (2) 
3.881 7 
9 L4/L5 Dicho **** nación (2) 3.452 Dicho **** nación (3) 2.993 6 
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Dicho *** nación (2)  
5 L3/L2  
& L5 
Habla ** nación (2) 
Habla * nación (1) 
3.614 Habla **** nación (5) 
Habla ** nación (4) 
 
5.263 12 
7 L2/L3 Constituye * nación (2) 
Constituye ** nación (1) 
5.286 Constituye * nación (3) 
 
4.671 7 
6 L3/L4 & 
R2 
Pretenden ** nación (2) 
Pretenden *** nación (1) 
4.859 Nación * pretenden (3) 
Pretenden ** nación (1) 




Nación tener (1) 
Nación ** tener (1) 
2.605 Nación ** tener (4) 




  Nación ** resulta (4) 
Nación resulta (3) 
Nación * resulta (2) 
3.361 10 
 L2   Entender * nación (4) 3.805 6 
 L3/L4/L5   Cree **** nación (2) 
Cree *** nación (2) 
Cree ** nación (2) 
5.406 8 
 R1/R2   Nación entendida (3) 
Nación * entendida (2) 
7.505 9 
 R2/R1   Nación * implica (3) 
Nación implica (2) 
5.323 8 
 R4   Nación *** corresponde (3) 4.879 8 
 R2   Nación * hablan (3) 5.614 8 
 L3   Pertenecer *** nación (4) 7.448 7 
 L3/L4   Consideran *** nación (3) 
Consideran ** nación (3) 
4.895 7 
 R1   Nación decía (3) 4.210 6 
 R3   Nación ** pasaría (3) 7.295 5 
 
Collocates of “Nación”: Qualities 
Total L5-R5 Mundo Opinion MI País Opinion MI Total 
36 L4/L3 Indisoluble *** nación (24) 
Indisoluble ** nación (10) 
10.331 Indisoluble *** nación (19) 
Indisoluble ** nación (3) 
10.180 26 
35 L1 Gran nación (24) 4.328 Gran nación (17) 4.305 27 
43 L1/R1 Única nación (21) 
Nación única (6) 
6.028 Única nación (8) 
Nación única (10) 
 
5.569 30 
32 R2 Nación plural (23) 7.262 Nación plural (15) 5.765 21 
21 R2  Nación * posible (16) 4.113 Nación * posible (3) 2.736 10 
15 L1 Una sola nación (13) 6.049 Una sola nación (8)  14 
18 R1/R3 Nación democrática (11) 
Nación ** democrática (1) 
4.683 Nación democrática (5) 
Nación ** democrática (2) 
3.576 13 
17 R5/R3 Nación **** indivisible (11) 
Nación ** indivisible (3) 
9.133 Nación **** indivisible (10) 
Nación *** indivisible (2) 
9.540 18 
20 R3 Nación ** común (9) 
Nación común (2) 
4.804 Nación ** común (11) 
Nación común (8) 
5.499 38 
11 L1/R1 Nueva nación (8) 
Nación nueva (1) 
3.476 Nueva nación (8) 




16 R4/R5 Nación *** discutible (7) 
Nación **** discutible (5) 
7.596    
14 R2/R3 Nación * discutido (6) 
Nación ** discutido (5) 
8.825    
15 L1/R1 Vieja nación (6) 
Nación vieja (2) 
6.409 Vieja nación (6) 
 
5.733 8 
10 R1/R3 Nación soberana (7) 
Nación ** soberana (2) 
7.980 Nación soberana (5) 
 
7.585 6 
11 R1 Nación independiente (6) 6.172 Nación independiente (5) 5.449  
10 R1/R2 
L1 
Nación moderna (6) 
Nación * moderna (3) 
Moderna nación (1) 
6.536 Nación moderna (5) 
Moderna nación (1) 
6.192 10 
15 R3/R1 Nación ** libre (4) 
Nación libre (2) 
4.344 Nación libre (7) 




Nación * antigua (3) 
Nación antigua (2) 
Antigua nación (2) 
6.756    
8 L1/R1 Pequeña nación (4) 
Nación pequeña (1) 
6.080 Nación pequeña (4) 
Pequeña nación (1) 
6.250 7 
6 R1/R2 Nación unida (3) 
Nación * unida (1) 
4.803    
5 R1 Nación plena (3) 4.556    
6 R1 Nación grande (1) 4.930 Nación grande (3) 4.989 5 
 R1   Nación real (13) 4.749 15 
 R5/R4   Nación **** plurinacional 
(5) 
Nación *** plurinacional (4) 
6.552 13 
 R1   Nación unitario (3) 6.279 6 
 
Collocates of “Nación”: Deictics 
Total L5-R5 Mundo Opinion MI País Opinion MI Total 
60 L1 Nuestra nación (37) 5.679 Nuestra nación (14) 4.070 23 
44 L1 Esta nación (16) 3.574 Esta nación (6) 2.866 24 
25 L1 Esa nación (15) 3.060 Esa nación (17) 3.164 30 
24 L1 Otra nación (8) 3.527 Otra nación (16) 4.137 38 





Misma ** nación (6) 
Nación misma (3) 
4.258 Misma ** nación (5) 
Misma nación (4)  
4.284 23 
8 L1 Aquella nación (5) 4.246 Aquella nación (5) 4.596c
on 
10 
16 R1 & L1 Nación tal (5) 3.296 Tal nación (5) 2.707 11 
6 L1 Ninguna nación (4) 3.034 Ninguna nación (6) 4.034 10 
5 L1 Mi nación (4) 2.513 Mi nación (3) 3.631 14 
11 L1 Cada nación (3) 2.643 Cada nación (10) 3.240 17 





Collocates of “Nación”: Partitives 
 
Total L5-R5 Mundo Opinion MI País Opinion MI Total 
34 L1 Toda la nación (16) 
Toda una nación (4) 
 
4.486 Toda la nación […]  (2) 
Toda una nación (1) 
4.339 26 
24 R3/ L3 
R4 
Nación ** conjunto (7) 
Conjunto ** nación (6) 
5.757 Nación *** conjunto (5) 
Conjunto ** nación (4) 
4.959 19 
8 L1 Media nación (6) 4.715    
8 R1 Nación entera (5) 6.679    
6 L3 Resto ** nación (5) 3.164 Resto ** nación (3) 3.310 6 





COLLOCATES OF “ESPAÑA” MUNDO VS. PAÍS OPINION 
 
Collocates of España, Concept 
 
L5-R5 Mundo Opinion MI L-L País Opinion MI 
L2 Idea * España (131) 
Idea de España (129) 
6.077  Idea * España (112) 




España * nación (58) 
España ** nación (43) 
España nación (9) 
5.045  España ** nación (53) 
España * nación (48) 
España nación (12) 
4.927 
R1 España plural (102) 7.270  España plural (199) 7.402 
R1 España constitucional (72) 4.228  España constitucional (31) 3.327 
R1 España democrática (57) 5.250  España democrática (75) 4.611 
R3 España ** autonomías (37) 
España de las autonomías 
(31) 





Reino * España (31) 
Reino de España (30) 
España ** reino (9) 
5.965  Reino de España (8) 
España ** reino (8) 
 
5.199 
L1 Palabra España (28) 3.958  Palabra España (17) 3.575 
L2 Nombre de España (23) 4.057  Nombre de España (20) 3.878 
R1 España autonómica (22) 4.621  España autonómica (27) 4.659 
L2/L3/ 
L5 
Concepto * España (18) 
Concepto **** España (4) 
4.785  Concepto * España (13) 




R1 España invertebrada (15) 8.564  España invertebrada (10) 7.940 
L2/L3 Visión de España (10) 
Visión ** España (6) 
4.953  Visión de España (15) 
Visión ** España (13) 
5.178 
L2/L3 Concepción * España (10) 
Concepción ** España (7) 
5.174  Concepción * España (4) 
Concepción ** España (8) 
4.638 
R1 España federal (12) 4.326  España federal (23) 5.249 
R1 España oficial (12) 4.331  España oficial (13) 4.476 
R1 España plurinacional (12) 7.274  España plurinacional (19) 6.850 
R1 España eterna (12) 6.443  España eterna (15) 6.881 
R1 España contemporánea (9) 5.979  España contemporánea (34) 6.979 
R1 España real (9) 3.533  España real (30) 4.347 
R1 España roja (9) 5.713  España roja (10) 6.986 
R1 España negra (9) 5.140  España negra (8) 5.711 
R1 España imperial (9) 6.426  España imperial (7) 5.874 
R1 España republicana (8) 3.820  España republicana (10) 4.391 
R2/R3 España * patria (8) 
España ** patria (4) 
4.418  España * patria (4) 




R3 España ** transición (8) 3.721  España ** transición (9) 3.218 
L2/L4 Sentido * España (7) 2.664  Sentido *** España (3) 1.107 
L2/L3 Definición de España (7) 
Definición ** España (2) 
4.287  Definición de España (9) 
Definición ** España (2) 
3.763 
R1 España liberal (7) 4.188  España liberal (6) 4.094 
L3/L2 
L5 
Estructura ** España (6) 
Estructura * España (3) 
4.054  Estructura ** España (8) 
Estructura **** España (3) 
4.207 
R1 España profunda (6) 3.920  España profunda (9) 4.473 
R1/R3 España ** católica (5) 
España católica (4) 
5.323  España católica (6) 
España * católica (3) 
4.526 
L2 Esencia de España (5) 3.994  Esencia de España (7) 4.772 
L1 Anti España (17) 5.019 -13.37 Anti España (42) 7.470 
R1/R4 España centralista (5) 5.631  España *** centalista (5) 4.305 
R2 España * tierra (5)  3.751    
L1 Tercera  España (4) 3.167  Tercera España (8) 4.013 
R1 España franquista (3) 3.706  España franquista (9) 4.172 




Collocates of España, People & Institutions 
 
L5-R5 Mundo Opinion MI L-L País Opinion MI 
L1 Gobierno * España (220) 
Gobierno de España (211) 
3.188  Gobierno * España (150) 
Gobierno de España (133) 
Gobierno legítimo de 
España (7) 
3.031 
L2 Pueblos de España (40) 5.514  Pueblos de España (77) 6.152 
L4 Presidente *** España (37) 2.403  Presidente *** España (14) 2.686 
L2 Rey * España (37) 
Rey de España (34) 
4.199  Rey de España (26) 
 
4.031 
L2 Banco de España (37) 6.740  Banco de España (21) 7.033 
R4/R5 España **** ETA (31) 2.050  España *** ETA (22) 1.421 
R2/R3 España * Aznar (28) 2.944  España ** Aznar (9) 2.460 
L3/L4 Partido ** España (27) 
Partido *** España (16) 
2.567  Partido *** España (9) 




PP ** España (23) 
PP **** España (19) 
2.259  PP **** España (14) 





España * Zapatero (19) 
Zapatero *** España (14) 
Zapatero ** España (12) 
2.497  España ** Zapatero (6) 
Zapatero **** España (10) 
Zapatero *** España (3) 
2.786 
R3/R4 España *** españoles (17) 3.151  España ** españoles (16) 3.136 
L2 Gobiernos * España (15) 3.836  Gobiernos * España (14) 3.606 
L5/L4 Derecha **** España (12) 3.219  Derecha *** España (8) 3.133 
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Derecha **** España (6) 
L2 Corona * España (12) 4.508  Corona * España (3) 3.669 
L2 Enemigos de España (12) 4.206  Enemigos ** España (4) 




Socialistas *** España (11) 2.369  Socialistas * España (5) 
Socialistas ** España (4) 
1.891 
L2 Comunista * España (11) 4.212  Comunista * España (6) 4.003 
L2 Reyes * España (11) 5.174  Reyes * España (5) 4.362 
L3/L2 Monarquía ** España (10) 
Monarquía * España (9) 
5.013  Monarquía * España (8) 
Monarquía ** España (4) 
4.122 
L2 Ciudadanos * España (10) 2.535  Ciudadanos * España (11) 2.566 
R2/R3 España ** PSOE (10) 1.924  España * PSOE (7) 2.237 
L4/L5 Izquierda *** España (9) 2.944  Izquierda **** España (5) 2.320 
L2 Trono * España (9) 5.362  Trono * España (3) 5.396 
R2/R3 España * Franco (8) 
España ** Franco (3) 
3.760  España * Franco (11) 4.203 
R3/L3 España ** Ibarretxe (8) 
Ibarretxe ** España (6) 
1.875  Ibarretxe ** España (5) 
Ibarretxe ** España (5) 
1.285 
L2 Embajador * España (7) 5.493  Embajador * España (8) 6.212 
L5/L4/ 
L3 
Nacionalista **** España (6) 
Nacionalista *** España (4) 
2.977  Nacionalista **** España 
(5) 
Nacionalista ** España (4) 
1.390 
L3 Maragall ** España (6) 2.354  Maragall ** España (13) 3.499 
L1/L5 Arzalluz España (6) 2.140  Arzalluz **** España (3) 1.754 
L1 Príncipe de España (6) 3.403  Príncipe de España (3) 3.703 
R3 España ** OTAN (6) 5.415  España ** OTAN (3) 4.514 
L1/L2/ 
L5 
Pujol España (5) 
Pujol * España (4) 
2.964  Pujol **** España (6) 2.484 
L4/L5 PNV *** España (5) 
PNV **** España (4) 
0.534  PNV **** España (8) 0.359 
L2 Enemigo * España (5) 3.567  Enemigo * España (3) 3.642 
R2/R3 España ** partidos (4) 1.647  España * partidos (5) 1.008 
R3 España ** UE (4) 4.197  España ** UE (9) 4.571 
L3/L5 González **** España (3) 2.011  González ** España (10) 3.574 
R3/R4/ 
R5 
España **** gente (2) 
España *** gente (2) 
2.953  España ** gente (11) 2.742 
 
 Collocates of España, Issues 
 
L5-R5 Mundo Opinion MI L-L País Opinion MI 
L2 Historia * España (238) 
Historia de España (236) 
5.508  Historia * España (250) 
Historia de España (247) 
5.403 
L2 Unidad * España (213) 
Unidad de España (212) 
6.101  Unidad de España (172) 5.884 
 469 
 
L2 Futuro * España (45) 
Futuro de España (44) 
4.486  Futuro * España (24) 
Futuro de España (20) 
3.682 
R1 España Modelo de Estado 
(43) 
4.973    
R1/R2/ 
R3 
España Elecciones (37) 3.305  España ** elecciones (2) 
España * elecciones (2) 
1.842 
L2 Territorial * España (33) 5.067  Territorial * España (45) 5.018 
L2 Política * España (32) 2.518  Política * España (59) 2.758 
L2 Nacional * España (32) 3.716  Nacional * España (32) 3.415 
L2 Problema * España (30) 
Problema de España (25) 
4.321  Problema * España (41) 
Problema de España (32) 
4.507 
L2 Democracia * España (29) 3.912  Democracia * España (45) 3.686 
R1 España Pulso al Estado (28) 5.374    
R1 España El discurso de la 
semana (26) 
3.926    
L2 Ruptura * España (23) 
Ruptura **** España (7) 
4.303  Ruptura * España (17) 
Ruptura **** España (14) 
4.090 
R1 España Alto el fuego (23) 3.267    
L2/L3 Proyecto * España (22) 
Proyecto ** España (17) 
 
4.013  Proyecto * España (13) 
Proyecto ** España (20) 
 
3.743 
L3 Realidad ** España (22) 3.609  Realidad ** España (27) 4.026 
L2 Político * España (21) 2.697  Político * España (23) 2.181 
L2 Odio * España (21) 
Odio a España (19) 
5.095  Odio * España (5) 
Odio a España (4) 
4.271 
L5 Constitución **** España 
(20) 
3.266  Constitución **** España 
(17) 
3.071 
L2/L3 Intereses * España (20) 
Intereses ** España (3) 
4.036  Intereses * España (10) 




Símbolos de España (20) 
Símbolo de España (5) 
España *** símbolos (5) 
5.067  Símbolos de España (3) 
Símbolo de España (3) 
España ** símbolos (4) 
4.606 
L2 Histórica * España (19) 3.721  Histórica * España (16) 3.664 
L2/L3 Identidad * España (19) 
Identidad de España (17) 
Identidad ** España (10) 
4.470  Identidad ** España (6) 
Identidad *** España (5) 
3.098 
L2 Banderas de España (19) 4.908  Banderas de España (2) 3.687 
L2 Liquidación de España (19) 5.979    
L2 Caso * España (18) 2.461  Caso * España (13) 2.435 
L2 Existencia * España (18) 
Existencia **  España (3) 
4.286  Existencia * España (6) 
Existencia **  España (2) 
2.854 
L2 Gobernabilidad * España 
(18) 
5.428  Gobernabilidad * España 
(14) 
5.000 
R2 España * antiterrorista (17) 
España Lucha antiterrorista 
(8) 
España Crisis antiterrorista 
(7) 
España Política 







España *** libertad (16) 
España ** libertad (14) 
Libertad * España (13) 
Libertad ** España (8) 
3.578  España *** libertad (4) 
España ** libertad (3) 
Libertad *** España (6) 




Problemas * España (15) 
Problemas **** España (5) 
3.844  Problemas * España (11) 





Relaciones * España (14) 
Relaciones *** España (5) 
4.264  Relaciones * España (11) 
Relaciones **** España 
(10 
4.224 
R1 España referéndum (15) 
España Referéndum en 
Cataluña (14) 
4.085    
L2 Balcanización de España (14) 7.072  Balcanización de España 
(4) 
 
L4 Peligro *** España (13) 4.654  Peligro *** España (9) 4.448 
L2/L3 Cohesión * España (13) 
Cohesión ** España (3) 
4.989  Cohesión ** España (8) 
Cohesión * España (6) 
4.272 
L2/L5 Destrucción de España (13) 5.015  Destrucción **** España 
(2) 
3.679 
L5/L2 Defensa **** España (12) 
Defensa * España (8) 
3.308  Defensa **** España (9) 
Defensa * España (5) 
3.234 
R1 España La Polémica 
Nacional (12) 
3.845    
L3/L2 Modelo ** España (11) 
Modelo * España (8) 
4.973  Modelo ** España (4) 
Modelo * España (4) 
2.825 
L1 Menos España (10) 2.885  Menos España (3) 2.669 
L5/L4/L2 
L1 
Paz * España (10) 
Paz España (10) 
Paz *** España (8) 
 
2.471  Paz **** España (15) 
Paz ** España (3) 
1.871 
L2/L3 Estabilidad * España (10) 5.029  Estabilidad ** España (3) 
Estabilidad * España (2) 
3.154 
L2/L3 Integridad ** España (10) 
Integridad * España (10) 
6.065  Integridad ** España (11) 
Integridad * España (5) 
6.347 
L2 Mapa de España (10) 5.091  Mapa ** España (5) 4.711 
L2/L3 Imagen * España (10) 
Imagen ** España (9) 
3.918  Imagen * España (13) 
Imagen ** España (12) 
4.715 
L2/L3 Interés ** España (10) 
 
3.522  Interés * España (5) 
Interés ** España (5) 
 
3.347 
 L2 Terrorismo * España (9) 2.331  Terrorismo * España (7) 1.974 
L2/L3 Vida * España (9) 
Vida ** España (7) 
2.349  Vida * España (7) 




Civil *** España (9) 2.710  Civil **** España (4) 
Civil ** España (4) 
3.114 
L4/L2 Social *** España (9) 
Social * España (5) 
2.443  Social * España (28) 
Social *** España (10) 
3.395 
L2/L3 Internacional * España (9) 3.647  Internacional * España (15) 
Internacional ** España (8) 
3.556 
L2/L4/ Separación * España (9) 
Separación **** España (4) 
5.513  Separación * España (5) 





L2 Modernización * España (9) 6.198  Modernización * España 
(12) 
5.861 
L2/L4 Relación * España (9) 
Relación *** España (6) 
3.637  Relación * España (20) 
Relación *** España (12) 
4.229 
L2 Entrada * España (9) 4.046  Entrada * España (8) 3.791 
L1/L4 Social *** España (9) 
Social de España (3) 
2.443  Social de España (28) 
Social *** España (10) 
3.395 
L2/L4 Independencia * España (8) 
Independencia *** España (5) 





Estatuto **** España (8) 
Estatuto ** España (8) 
España **** Estatuto (5) 
1.630  Estatuto **** España (11) 
Estatuto ** España (4) 
España ** Estatuto (11) 
2.237 
L2/L3 Pluralidad * España (8) 
Pluralidad ** España (6) 
5.015  Pluralidad * España (11) 
Pluralidad ** España (11) 
5.259 
L2/L3 Destino * España (8) 4.251  Destino ** España (3) 4.315 
L2 Gobernación * España (8) 5.955    
L2 Asociado * España (8) 5.213  Asociado * España (7) 5.370 
L2 Asociación * España (8) 3.554  Asociación * España (6) 3.868 
L2 General * España (8) 2.266  General * España (11) 2.955 
R3 España Diario de Campaña 
(8) 
2.765  España **** campaña (4) 1.396 
L2/L3/ 
L4 
Discurso ** España (7) 
Discurso *** España (4) 
3.926  Discurso ** España (17) 
Discurso * España (6) 
3.583 
L2/L3 Situación * España (7) 
Situación ** España (7) 
3.084  Situación * España (2) 
Situación ** España (16) 
2.997 
L2/L3 Vertebración * España (7) 
Vertebración ** España (4) 
7.341  Vertebración * España (9) 




España * nacionalismo (7) 
España ** nacionalismo (5) 
2.161  España **** nacionalismo 
(8) 
España ** nacionalismo (7) 
1.764 
L2 Democrático * España (7) 3.113  Democrático * España (11) 2.731 
L2 Amor * España (7) 4.879  Amor * España (4) 4.122 
L2 Institucional * España (7) 3.377  Institucional * España (6) 2.346 
L2 Traición a España (7) 4.147    
L3/L2 Convivencia ** España (7) 
Convivencia * España (6) 
3.732  Convivencia ** España 
(10) 
Convivencia * España (5) 
3.227 
R1/R2 España * grande (7) 
España grande (5) 
4.333  España grande (11) 
España * grande (10) 
5.843 
R3/R4 España *** unión (7) 3.781  España ** unión (9) 4.079 
R3/R5 España ** soberanía (7) 3.300  España **** soberanía (5) 4.064 
R1 España vuelta a las armas (7) 3.801    
L2/L3 
R3/R5 
Histórico * España (6) 
Histórico ** España (6) 
España ** histórico (6) 
4.387  Histórico * España (9) 
Histórico ** España (5) 
España **** histórico (5) 
España ** histórico (4) 
4.177 
R3/R4 España ** libertades (6) 3.645  España *** libertades (2) 2.198 
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L2 Hora * España (6) 3.156  Hora * España (5) 2.535 
L4/L2 Políticas *** España (6) 2.122  Poíticas * España (6) 2.049 
L5-L4 Objetivo **** España (6) 3.173  Objetivo *** España (9) 2.520 
R1/R5 España Tregua (6) 2.136  España **** tregua (3) 0.421 
L2 Secesión de España (6) 5.131    
L2/L3/L4 Integración * España (6) 
Integración ** España (3) 
4.670  Integración * España (10) 
Integración *** España (5) 
4.469 
L1/L5 Encaje * España (6) 
Encaje **** España (5) 
5.713  Encaje * España (5) 
Encaje **** España (9) 
5.720 
L2 Himno de España (6) 4.007  Himno de España (3)  
L3/L4/ 
L5 
Etapa **** España (6) 3.485  Etapa ** España (3) 
Etapa *** España (3) 
Etapa **** España (3) 
 
3.637 
L2/L3 Enfrentamiento * España (6) 3.667  Enfrentamiento ** España 
(3) 
3.646 
L2 Pertenencia * España (6) 4.093  Pertenencia * España (10) 4.667 





Sistema *** España (6) 
Sistema ** España (5) 
2.528  Sistema **** España (3) 




Libro **** España (6) 
Libro ** España (4) 
4.024  Libro España (6) 
Libro * España (3) 
3.655 




Electoral **** España (5) 
Electoral ** España (4) 
España ** electoral (5) 
España * electoral (4) 
2.352  Electoral **** España (6) 
Electoral ** España (4) 
España *** electoral (2) 
1.479 
L4/L5 Grave *** España (5) 3.227  Grave **** España (3) 2.349 
R3 España ** prueba (5) 3.288  España ** prueba (3) 2.646 
L2/L3/ 
L5 
Peor * España (5) 
Peor ** España (5) 




Dictadura **** España (5) 
España * dictadura (5) 
España ** dictadura (5) 
4.143  Dictadura **** España (2) 
España **** dictadura (5) 




Soberanía * España (5) 3.300  Soberanía *** España (13) 
Soberanía ** España (7) 
4.064 
R3/R5 España ** debate (5) 2.343  España **** debate (16) 2.896 
R1/R3 España ** sociedad (5) 0.829  España sociedad (14) 1.574 
L2/L5 Presencia * España (5) 3.311  Presencia **** España (4) 2.741 
R2/R3 España ** alianza (5) 3.863  España * alianza (2) 2.541 
R2/R3 España * voz (5) 
España ** voz (3) 
3.094    
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L2 Separatista * España (5) 4.585    
L2/L4 Económico * España (5) 3.156  Económico *** España (4) 3.156 
L3/L4 Moral ** España (5) 3.227  Moral ** España (2) 
Moral *** España (2) 
2.181 
L5 Solidaridad **** España (5) 3.696  Solidaridad **** España (4) 3.150 
L3 Referéndum ** España (4) 4.085  Referéndum ** España (8) 2.587 
L2/L3 República ** España (4) 
República * España (3) 
3.518  República ** España (5) 
República * España (4) 
3.342 
L2 Papel * España (4) 3.230  Papel * España (6) 3.122 
L4/L5 Militar *** España (4) 3.546  Militar **** España (5) 2.548 
L2/L3/ 
L4 
Pueblo *** España (4) 
Pueblo * España (3) 
2.079  Pueblo ** España (7) 
Pueblo *** España (4) 
2.255 
L2/L3 Lengua ** España (4) 2.483  Lengua ** España (5) 
Lengua * España (3) 
2.272 
L2 Cultural * España (4) 3.645  Cultural * España (6) 3.389 
L2 Bueno * España (4) 3.306  Bueno * España (9) 4.045 
L2/L3/ 
L5 
Diversidad **** España (4) 
Diversidad de España (3) 
5.471  Diversidad ** España (8) 




Fuerzas *** España (4) 
Fuerzas **** España (4) 
1.785  Fuerzas ** España (10) 2.123 
L2/L3/ 
L5 
Continuidad * España (4) 
Continuidad ** España (4) 
 
4.363  Continuidad **** España (2) 2.136 
L2/L3 Representación * España (4) 3.253  Representación ** España (6) 
Representación * España (2) 
3.226 
L2/L3 Posición de España (4) 2.592  Posición de España (7) 
Posición ** España (6) 
3.281 
L2/L3 Transformación * España 
(4) 
Transformación ** España 
(2) 
5.090  Transformación ** España 
(5) 





Autonómico * España (4) 2.255  Autonómico * España (6) 





Nacionales **** España (4) 2.610  Nacionales * España (5) 
Nacionales ** España (5) 
3.607 
L2 Lingüística * España (4) 3.306  Lingüística * España (9) 3.363 
R3/R4 España ** millones (4) 2.984  España *** millones (5) 2.839 
L2/L3 Organización * España (3) 
Organización ** España 
(3) 
2.072  Organización ** España 
(6) 
1.907 
L3/L5 Muerte ** España (3) 2.213  Muerte **** España (4) 
Muerte ** España (3) 
2.567 
L2 Lenguas * España (3) 3.818  Lenguas * España (12) 4.228 
L2/L3/ 
L5 
Construcción **** España 
(3) 
Construcción ** España (2) 
3.564  Construcción ** España 
(12) 






Conflicto * España (3) 
Conflicto ** España (3) 
3.475  Conflicto * España (6) 
Conflicto *** España (5) 
2.944 
R2/R3 España ** cultura (3) 2.412  España * cultura (13) 2.932 
L2 Agua * España (3) 2.994  Agua * España (5) 4.067 
L2 Cambio * España (2) 2.738  Cambio * España (7) 2.850 
L2/L3 Articulación * España (2) 
Articulación ** España (1) 
5.600  Articulación * España (8) 
Articulación ** España (6) 
5.648 
L4/L2 Nacionalidades *** España 
(2) 
4.476  Nacionalidades *** España 
(12) 
Nacionalidades * España 
(4) 
4.554 
L3/L4 Aislamiento *** España 
(2) 
3.920  Aislamiento ** España (6) 4.412 
L3 Público ** España (2) 1.170  Público ** España (12) 3.193 
L2/L3/ 
L5 
Enseñanza ** España (2) 
Enseñanza **** España (2) 
2.483  Enseñanza **** España 
(15) 
Enseñanza * España (2) 
3.944 
L1 Marca España (2) 3.151  Marca España (7) 4.316 
L2 Amable * España (2) 
 
4.798  Amable * España (8) 
 
5.969 
L3/L4 Identidades *** España (1) 
Identidades **** España (1) 
4.600  Identidades **** España 
(3) 
Identidades *** España (2) 
3.987 
L4    Coste *** España (10) 4.441 
L4    Gasto público sanitario * 
España (8) 
5.349 
L2    Europeización * España (6) 7.177 
L2    Bienestar * España (5) 3.478 
R2/R3 España * revolución (2) 3.321  España ** revolución (5) 4.099 
 
Collocates of España, Issues/ Process: Threat 
 
L5-R5 Mundo Opinion MI L-L País Opinion MI 
L1 Contra España (45)   Contra España (15)  
L2 Odio * España (21) 
Odio a España (19) 
  Odio * España (5) 
Odio a España (4) 
 
L2 Liquidación de España 
(19) 
    
L1/L2 Destruir España (15) 
Destruir * España (2) 
    
L1 Separarse de España (15)   Separarse de España (6)  
L2 Balcanización de España 
(14) 
  Balcanización de España 
(4) 
 
L1/L2 Romper España (13) 
Romper * España (9) 
  Romper España (4)  
L4 Peligro *** España (13)   Peligro *** España (9)  




L1 Puta España (13)     
L2 Enemigos de España (12)   Enemigos ** España (4) 
Enemigos de España (2) 
 
L1 Menos España (10)   Menos España (3)  
L2/L4/ 
L5 
Separación * España (9) 
Separación **** España 
(4) 
  Separación * España (5) 
Separación *** España (5) 
 
L2/L3 Acabar con España (7) 
Acabar con la España (3) 
    
L2 Traición a España (7)     
R1 España rota (6)   España rota (12)  
R2/R3 España ** rompe (6) 
España * rompe (4) 
  España ** rompe (6) 
España * rompe (6) 
 
L2 Al margen de España (6)   Al margen de España (4)  
L2 Secesión de España (6)     
L2/L3 Enfrentamiento * España 
(6) 
  Enfrentamiento ** España (3)  
L2 Desintegración de 
España (6) 
  Desintegración de España (5)  
L4/L5 Grave *** España (5)   Grave **** España (3)  
L2/L3/ 
L5 
Peor * España (5) 
Peor ** España (5) 
  Peor **** España (3)  
L1 Perder España (4)     
L3/L5 Muerte ** España (3)   Muerte **** España (4) 
Muerte ** España (3) 
 
L1/L2 Cargarse a España (3) 
Cargarse España (2) 
    
L1/L2/ 
L4 
Salvar *** España (2)   Salvar * España (4) 
Salvar España (3) 
 
 
Collocates of España, Issues/ Process: Symbols 
 
L5-R5 Mundo Opinion MI L-L País Opinion MI 
L1 Bandera * España (74) 
Bandera de España (73) 
  Bandera * España (11) 




Símbolos de España (20) 
Símbolo de España (5) 
España *** símbolos (5) 
  Símbolos de España (3) 
Símbolo de España (3) 
España ** símbolos (4) 
 
L1 Puta España (13)     
L3 Santiago y cierra España (11) 
Santiago Matamoros y 
cierra España (1) 
  Santiago ** España (8) 
Santiago y cierra España 
(6) 
 
L2 Himno de España (6)   Himno de España (3)  





Collocates of España, Issues/Concepts: History 
 
L5-R5 Mundo Opinion MI L-L País Opinion MI 
L2 Historia * España (238) 
Historia de España (236) 
  Historia * España (250) 
Historia de España (247) 
 
L2 Histórica * España (19)   Histórica * España (16)  
R1 España contemporánea (9)   España contemporánea (34)  
R1 España imperial (9)   España imperial (7)  
L2/L3 
R3/R5 
Histórico * España (6) 
Histórico ** España (6) 
España ** histórico (6) 
  Histórico * España (9) 
Histórico ** España (5) 
España **** histórico (5) 
España ** histórico (4) 
 
L5 Dictadura **** España (5)   Dictadura **** España (2)  
L2/L3 República ** España (4) 
República * España (3 
  República ** España (5) 
República * España (4) 
 
R2/R3 España * siglo (18) 
España ** siglo (14) 
  España * siglo (27) 
España ** siglo (15) 
 
R2/R3 España * Franco (8) 
España ** Franco (3) 
  España * Franco (11)  
R1 España republicana (8)   España republicana (10)  
R1 España liberal (7)   España liberal (6)  
R1 España franquista (3)   España franquista (9)  
 
Collocates of España, Space/Time 
 
L5-R5 Mundo Opinion MI L-L País Opinion MI 
R2 España * hoy (57) 4.129  España * hoy (60) 4.368 
R1 España actual (41) 4.243  España actual (33) 3.816 
L2 Fuera de España (32) 3.851  Fuera de España (32) 3.858 
L2 Dentro de España (30) 4.093  Dentro de España (19) 3.939 
R3/R4 España *** años (26) 3.224  España ** años (18) 2.952 
R2/R3 España * siglo (18) 
España ** siglo (14) 
4.770  España * siglo (27) 
España ** siglo (15) 
4.717 
R1/R2 España siempre (14) 
España * siempre (11) 
3.147  España siempre (7) 
España * siempre (7) 
2.848 
R1 España tras (18) 2.330  España tras (11) 2.552 
R1 España después (14) 2.661  España después (14) 2.976 
R3 España ** últimos (13) 3.263  España ** últimos (11) 3.096 
R1 España antes (12) 2.626  España antes (9) 2.505 
R4/R3 España *** momento (8) 2.602  España ** momento (13) 2.481 
R1/R2 España todavía (5) 
España * todavía (3) 
3.169  España todavía (1) 2.851 






Collocates of España, Geography/Places 
 
L5-R5 Mundo Opinion MI L-L País Opinion MI 
L3/L2 Cataluña ** España (67) 
Cataluña * España (45) 
4.603  Cataluña ** España (43) 
Cataluña * España (85) 
4.875 
R2 España * Francia (50) 5.861  España * Francia (43) 6.171 
R2/R3 España ** Europa (22) 
España * Europa (13) 
5.016  España ** Europa (50) 
España * Europa (31) 
5.453 
L2 Capital de España (25) 5.169  Capital de España (9) 4.112 
L2 Lugares * España (19) 
Lugar * España (16) 
5.673  Lugares * España (9) 




Euskadi **** España (15) 
España * Euskadi (16) 
España ** Euskadi (16) 
4.179  Euskadi **** España (27) 
España * Euskadi (9) 




Vasco * España (14) 
Vasco ** España (13) 
2.986  Vasco **** España (39) 
Vasco * España (32) 
2.790 
L2 Partes de España (14) 3.899  Partes de España (16) 4.255 
R3 España ** Gran Bretaña (12) 5.675  España ** Gran Bretaña (2) 5.122 
L2 Puntos de España (11) 3.691  Puntos de España (2) 
Puntos ** España (2) 
2.875 
R2 España * Marruecos (10) 4.863  España * Marruecos (12) 5.852 
L2 Calles * España (9) 
 
4.024  Calles **** España (3) 3.516 
L2 Tierras * España (8) 4.749  Tierras * España (8) 4.733 
L2 Ciudades * España (8) 4.126  Ciudades * España (2) 3.461 
L4/L3 Madrid *** España (7) 2.169  Madrid ** España (37) 3.829 
L2/L3 Territorio * España (7) 3.551  Territorio ** España (2) 2.128 
L2/L3/ 
R3/R4 
Gibraltar * España (6) 
España ** Gibraltar (7) 
4.863  Gibraltar ** España (5) 
España *** Gibraltar (4) 
5.309 
R1 España árida (7) 8.926    
L5/L4 Comunidad **** España (6) 
Comunidad *** España (6) 
3.112  Comunidad **** España (6) 
Comunidad *** España (6) 
2.755 
L2 Comunidades * España (6) 2.994  Comunidades * España (3) 2.675 
L3/L5 Navarra ** España (6) 2.926  Navarra **** España (3) 1.586 
L2/L3 Regiones * España (6) 4.224  Regiones ** España (12) 
Regiones * España (8) 
4.393 
R2/R4 España *** Castilla (5) 4.258  España * Castilla (5) 4.662 
R2 España * Portugal (4) 5.185  España * Portugal (15) 6.595 
L2/L5 Vasca **** España (4) 
 
1.106  Vasca * España (6) 
Vasca **** España (6) 
1.640 
R2 España * América (4) 4.251  España * América (6) 5.477 
L2/L3 Territorios * España (2) 
Territorios ** España (3) 
3.528  Territorios * España (8) 




L2 Zonas * España (2) 5.199  Zonas * España (7) 4.730 
L2 Interior * España (2) 1.678  Interior * España (9) 3.009 
    Catalunya ** España (8) 
Catalunya * España (7) 
4.677 
    Herria * España (5) 3.615 
 
Collocates of España, Partitives/ Number 
 
L5-R5 Mundo Opinion MI L-L País Opinion MI 
L2 Resto * España (298) 
Resto de España (296) 
6.720  Resto de España (319) 7.033 
L1 Toda España (288) 5.660  Toda España (219) 5.506 
L1 Una España (272) 3.572  Una España (304) 3.525 
L1 Media España (92) 6.328  Media España (12) 4.853 
L2 Conjunto * España (78) 
Conjunto de España (77) 
5.590  Conjunto de España (111) 5.801 
L2 Parte * España (64) 
Parte de España (62) 
3.669  Parte de España (28) 3.183 
R1 España entera (53) 7.305  España entera (17) 6.598 
L3 Mayoría ** España (5) 1.823  Mayoría ** España (2) 1.662 
 
Collocates of España, Reference (deipsis) 
 
L5-R5 Mundo Opinion MI L-L País Opinion MI 
L1 Esta España (55) 3.062  Esta España (33) 2.741 
L1 Esa España (39) 3.257  Esa España (24) 2.888 
L1 Otra España (17) 3.488  Otra España (21) 3.255 
L1 Aquella España (15) 3.871  Aquella España (10) 4.023 
L1/L4 
R1 
Nuestra España (7) 
España nuestra (13) 
2.800  Nuestra  *** España (9) 
Nuestra España (7) 
España nuestra (1) 
2.960 
L1 Propia España (8) 2.950  Propia ** España (8) 
Propia España (7) 
3.116 
R1 España junto (6) 3.356  España junto (4) 3.381 
 
Collocates of España, Qualities 
 
L5-R5 Mundo Opinion MI L-L País Opinion MI 
L1 Nueva España (24) 3.944  Nueva España (6) 3.230 
L3 Libre ** España (20) 4.233  Libre ** España (10) 4.319 
R2/R3 España * gran (19) 
España ** gran (18) 
3.759  España ** gran (11) 
España * gran (6) 
3.570 
R1 *España moderna (15) 5.939  *España moderna (21) 5.930 
L1 Vieja España (12) 5.179  Vieja España (11) 5.431 
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R2/R3 España ** fuerte (7) 
España * fuerte (6) 
4.252  España * fuerte (2) 2.555 
R1/R2/ 
R3 
España ** diferente (6) 
España * diferente (4) 
5.218  España * diferente (5) 
España diferente (3) 
4.012 
R1/R2 España unida (5) 
España * unida (5) 
4.496  España unida (4) 
España * unida (3) 
4.242 
R1/R3 España ** diversa (5) 6.848  España diversa (6) 
España ** diversa (6) 
6.749 
R3 España ** abierta (4) 3.575  España ** abierta (5) 3.602 
R1    España plurilingüe (8) 7.667 
    España tradicional (5) 3.618 
 
 
Collocates of España, Processes of Being 
 
L5-R5 Mundo Opinion MI L-L País Opinion MI 
HERE 
R1/R2 
España es (400) 
España * es (149) 
3.363  España es (314) 
España * es (115) 
3.117 
R1 España como (275) 3.407  España como (265) 3.308 
R1/R2 España está (77) 
España * está (32) 
3.438  España está (54) 
España * está (19) 
3.350 
R1/R2 España tiene (52) 
España * tiene (27) 
3.301  España tiene (47) 
España * tiene (18) 
3.367 
R1/R2 España era (42) 
España * era (14) 
3.326  España era (43) 
España * era (12) 
3.420 
R1/R2 España hay (36) 
España * hay (20) 
3.155  España hay (29) 
España * hay (15) 
3.092 
R1/R2 España sea (38) 
España * sea (7) 
3.434  España sea (18) 
España * sea (12) 
2.544 
R1 España va (31) 3.216  España va (40) 3.920 
R1 España son (29) 2.624  España son (34) 2.622 
R2/R3 España * siendo (21) 
España ** siendo (6) 
4.228  España ** siendo (7) 
España * siendo (6) 
3.315 
R2/R3 España * sido (21) 
España ** sido (7) 
4.228  España * sido (25) 
España ** sido (14) 
2.891 
R1/R2 España fue (19) 
España * fue (10) 
2.696  España fue (26) 
España * fue (14) 
2.997 
R1/R2 España parece (15) 
España * parece (10) 
2.912  España parece (10) 
España * parece (5) 
2.609 
R1/R2 España sigue (15) 
España * sigue (5) 
3.450  España sigue (10) 
España * sigue (3) 
3.163 
R1/R2 España necesita (15) 
España * necesita (6) 
4.599  España necesita (7) 3.565 
L1 Viva España (20) 5.718  Viva España (5) 5.233 
R1-R2 España había (13) 
España * había (11) 
2.974  España había (15) 
España * había (21) 
3.413 
R1/R2 España sería (13) 
España * sería (7) 
2.942  España sería (10) 
España * sería (7) 
2.575 
R1/R2 España fuera (12) 
España * fuera (4) 
3.850  España fuera (4) 




L2 Tenemos * España (12) 3.865  Tenemos * España (6) 3.990 
R1/R2 España * existe (11) 
España existe (6) 
4.220  España * existe (13) 
España existe (6) 
6.870 
R1/R2 España haya (11) 
España * haya (5) 
2.876  España haya (7) 
España * haya (4) 
2.427 
R1/R2 España estaba (11) 
España * estaba (3) 
3.046  España estaba (7) 3.027 
L1 Tenido España (11) 3.506  Tenido España (4) 3.472 
R1/R2/ 
R3 
España están (10) 2.615  España * están (5) 
España ** están (5) 
2.199 
R1/R2 España será (10) 
España * sera (1) 
3.030  España será (5) 
España * sera (4) 
2.826 
R1/R2 España tenía (8) 
España * tenía (7) 
3.402  España tenía (5) 3.095 
L2 Queda * España (8) 3.530  Queda * España (4) 2.594 
R1 España siga (8) 4.113  España siga (2) 3.551 
L4/L3 Forma *** España (8) 3.069  Forma ** España (12) 2.595 
L2/L3 
L4 
Será ** España (7) 
Será *** España (5) 
3.030  Será ** España (5) 




Seguir ** España (6) 
Seguir * España (5) 
España * seguir (7) 
3.085  Seguir * España (4) 
Seguir ** España (3) 
España ** seguir (3) 
2.339 
R1 España tendría (7) 4.039  España tendría (3) 2.313 
R2 España * acabar (7) 3.653    
R1/R2 España tenemos (6) 
España * tenemos (2) 
3.865  España tenemos (9) 
España * tenemos (3) 
3.990 
R2 España * tenido (6) 3.506  España * tenido (8) 3.472 
L1 Vive España (6) 5.046  Vive España (1) 3.419 
R2/R3 España * constituye (6) 3.755  España ** constituye (6) 3.605 
R1 España resulta (6) 1.862  España resulta (4) 2.262 
R2/R4 España * marcha (6) 2.540  España *** marcha (2) 4.260 





Tienen * España (5) 
España ** tienen (5) 
España tienen (4) 
2.369  Tienen *** España (4) 
Tienen **** España (4) 
España tienen (5) 
España * tienen (4) 
2.144 
R1/R2 España habría (5) 
España * habría (5) 
2.862  España * habría (6) 
España habría (3) 
2.556 
R1 España tenga (5) 2.987  España tenga (7) 3.251 
R2/R5 España **** viene (5) 3.224  España * viene (3) 2.482 
L2 Vivir * España (5) 3.289  Vivir * España (2) 3.546 
R1 España pasa (5) 3.095  España pasa (2) 2.857 
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R1/R3 España ** somos (5) 3.258  España somos (2) 2.896 





Tener **** España (4) 
Tener *** España (3) 
España ** tener (7) 
España tener (3) 
 
2.470  Tener **** España (8) 
Tener * España (4) 
España * tener (5) 
España ** tener (4) 
2.735 
R1 España vive (6) 5.046  España vive (1) 3.443 
R3 España ** convertido (4) 3.279  España ** convertido (6) 2.970 
L2 Pasa * España (4) 3.095  Pasa * España (5) 2.843 
R1 España empieza (4) 3.587  España empieza (5) 3.794 
L2 Viven * España (1) 3.433  Viven * España (5) 4.170 
R1 España tuvo (1) 1.869  España tuvo (5) 3.394 
R2 España * corresponde (2) 3.499  España * corresponde (5) 3.907 
    Integran España (10) 5.067 
    Componen España (9) 5.682 
    Existente * España (7) 
Existentes * España (6) 
4.326 
4.256 
R1    España aparece (6) 4.369 
R2    España * convirtió (6) 4.071 
 
Collocates of España, Processes of Doing 
 
L5-R5 Mundo Opinion MI L-L País Opinion MI 
L2 Hacer * España (24) 3.233  Hacer * España (13) 2.504 
L2 Defender * España (23) 4.624  Defender * España (8) 3.882 
L1/L2 Gobernar España (21) 
Gobernar * España (3) 
4.213  Gobernar España (17) 
Gobernar * España (4) 
4.258 
L1/L2 Destruir España (15) 
Destruir * España (2) 
5.790    
L1 Separarse de España (15) 7.166  Separarse de España (6) 5.825 
L1 Cierra España (14) 6.054  Cierra España (6) 5.258 
L1/L2 Romper España (13) 
Romper * España (9) 




Hecho * España (11) 
Hecho ** España (10) 
España ** hecho (11) 
España * hecho (9) 
2.772  Hecho ** España (8) 
Hecho *** España (8) 
España ** hecho (7) 
España * hecho (5) 
2.578 
L2/L1 Gobierna * España (11) 
Gobierna España (6) 
5.501  Gobierna España (8) 
Gobierna * España (5) 
5.077 
L2/L3 Pretende * España (9) 
Pretende ** España (8) 
3.449  Pretende * España (2) 
Pretende ** España (2)  
2,198 
R2 España HABER dejado (10) 3.116  España HABER dejado (9) 3.681 
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L2&L3 Representa * España (8) 4.481  Representa ** España (4) 
Representa * España (2) 
3.733 
L2 Construir * España (8) 4.330  Construir * España (8) 4.269 
L2/L3 Acabar con España (7) 
Acabar con la España (3) 
3.653    
L2 Volver * España (7) 3.433  Volver * España (5) 2.523 
R2/R3 España ** rompe (6) 
España * rompe (4) 
5.487  España ** rompe (6) 
España * rompe (6) 
5.701 
R1 España rota (6) 6.221  España rota (12) 7.289 
L1 Cambiar España (6) 3.522  Cambiar España (2) 3.541 
R1 España defender (5) 4.624  España defender (8) 3.882 
R1 España vuelve (5) 3.562  España vuelve (2) 3.736 
L1 Perder España (4) 3.218    
L1/L2 Pensar * España (4) 2.524  Pensar España (4) 
Pensar * España (3) 
3.085 
L1/L2 Cargarse a España (3) 
Cargarse España (2) 
5.781    
R1 España hizo (2) 2.262  España hizo (8) 2.972 
L1/L2/ 
L4 
Salvar *** España (2) 3.585  Salvar * España (4) 
Salvar España (3) 
4.745 
    Producido * España (7) 4.153 
R1    España votó (5) 5.256 
 
Collocates of España, Processes of saying 
 
L5-R5 Mundo Opinion MI L-L País Opinion MI 
L1 Llamamos España (21) 6.977  Llamamos España (20) 6.938 
L2/L3 Hablar * España (20) 
Hablar ** España (6) 
3.539  Hablar * España (9) 
Hablar ** España (6) 
3.180 
L1 Llamada España (19) 4.425  Llamada España (7) 4.396 
L1 Llama España (12) 4.113  Llama España (9) 4.277 
L3/L2/ 
L1 
Decir ** España (17) 
Decir * España (12) 
Decir España (11) 
3.316  Decir * España (16) 
Decir ** España (6) 
Decir España (10) 
3.065 
L1/L2 Llamado España (8) 3.044  Llamado * España (6) 3.409 
L5/L4/ 
L3 
Habla **** España (7) 3.279  Habla ** España (4) 
Habla *** España (4) 
4.094 
R1 España dijo (6) 2.886  España dijo (3) 3.061 
R1/R2 España significa (6) 3.502  España * significa (3) 3.036 
L1 Llamar España (2) 3.682  Llamar España (5) 3.983 





Collocates of España, Processes of sensing 
 
L5-R5 Mundo Opinion MI L-L País Opinion MI 
L1 ODIAR a España (28) 
Odio a España (21) 
Odian a España (4) 
Odia a España (3) 
  ODIAR a España (6) 
Odio a España (5) 
 
 
L3/L5 Quiere ** España (19) 3.815  Quiere **** España (11) 3.856 
L2/L3 Quieren * España (16) 
Quieren ** España (15) 
3.917  Quieren * España (6) 
Quieren ** España (1) 
3.109 
L5/L2 Ver **** España (7) 
Ver * España (5)  
2.427  Ver * España (4) 2.172 
L2 Creer * España (7) 3.590  Creer * España (4) 3.612 
R1/R3/ 
R5 
España ** sabe (6) 
España sabe (3) 
2.488  España **** sabe (2) 
España sabe (1) 
1.057 
L3/L5 Creo ** España (6) 3.371  Creo **** España (3) 2.537 
L1 Duele España (6) 6.067  Duele España (2) 5.977 
L1/L2 Entender España (4) 
Entender * España (2) 
2.725  Entender España (3) 
Entender * España (4) 
3.138 
L2 Considera * España (1) 2.821  Considera * España (7) 3.251 
R1    España entendida (5) 5.184 
 
Collocates of España, Modals 
 
L5-R5 Mundo Opinion MI L-L País Opinion MI 
R1/R2 España * puede (29) 
España puede (26) 
2.825  España * puede (28) 
España puede (17) 
2.681 
R1/R2 España debe (16) 
España * debe (12) 
3.069  España debe (23) 
España * debe (10) 
3.282 
R1/R2 España podría (12) 
España * podría (3) 
2.971  España podría (8) 




España debería (8) 
España ** debería (4) 
2.863  España debería (6) 
España * debería (3) 
2.507 
R1/R2 España pueda (5) 
España * pueda (3) 
2.794  España pueda (4) 
España * pueda (4) 
2.233 
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